27:T510,

Reorganization or revival of the financially distressed corporate person is the prime objective of insolvency law. To rationalize the said objective, the insolvency law in India—Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 has adopted the manager-displacement model of the insolvency regime. It has become progressively evident from existing literature that the development of corporate governance mechanisms may have imperative implications on the aptness of a nation's legal system and its accomplishments. The existing evolutionary theory asserts that corporate bankruptcy and corporate governance structure complement each other. The historical account of corporate ownership structure in India represents a predominance of concentrated ownership patterns. Through the perspective of the existing evolutionary theory of corporate insolvency, the paper analyzes the corporate ownership structure and development of corporate insolvency law in India. The article also explores whether corporate ownership structure as a corporate governance mechanism can explain the progression of the insolvency regime in India. The findings of this paper would be of significance for jurisdictions that are considering reforms within their existing corporate insolvency law.

28:T479,

In R v Lawrance, the appellant had induced the complainant to participate in sexual intercourse with him by falsely assuring her that he had had a vasectomy. The England and Wales Court of Appeal (‘EWCA’) set aside his conviction for rape. Their Lordships held that, because the appellant's deception ‘related not to the physical performance of the sexual act but to risks or consequences associated with it’, the complainant had ‘agree[d] … by choice’ within the meaning of s 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 c 42 (‘SOA’). I contend here that, contrary to what certain commentators have argued, the EWCA's decision was correct as a matter of statutory construction. That said, it demonstrates an urgent need for law reform. I then assess some of the many recent suggestions about how the English law relating to deceptive sex might be reformed. I conclude that English law should provide that, generally, the person who uses deception to induce sexual ‘consent’ is guilty of a non-consensual sexual offence. That said, in certain circumstances, sex by deception should not be criminal at all.