American Politics Research

We examine public attitudes about one of the most visible procedural features of Congress, the Senate’s filibuster and cloture practice. We measure the stability of those attitudes during an important legislative episode, relate them to more abstract attitudes about majority rule and minority rights, and draw inferences about the importance of those attitudes for evaluations of the parties and vote intention for the 2010 elections. We find that filibuster attitudes change in ways predicted by respondents’ partisan and policy preferences. Moreover, controlling for party identification, ideology, policy views, and attitudes about majority rule and minority rights in the abstract, filibuster attitudes have modest, asymmetric effects on party evaluations but no effect on vote intention.

Theories of political culture have traditionally been based on how the mass public views the role of government, yet scholars have rarely studied this issue. Using American National Election Studies(ANES) data from 1952 to 2008, I track cultural changes in external efficacy, a measure of the public’s beliefs about government responsiveness. The aggregate- and individual-level results indicate that external efficacy varied across political cultures until around 1980, when the differences dissipated. These findings should cause scholars to question some of the underlying theoretical basis of political culture, as well as the measurement of external efficacy.

Recent research has taken note of the steadfast growth of the Latino population in the United States by examining Latino attitudes toward those commonly identified as nonimmigrants, Whites and Blacks. Extant literature on Latino racial attitudes explores the determinants of Latinos’ perceptions of commonality with Whites and Blacks, yet it has greatly overlooked the impact that skin tone, a key differentiating factor of Latinos, has in explaining these attitudes. Using the 2006 Latino National Survey, we develop models that examine the extent that skin tone explains Latinos’ commonality with Whites and Blacks. We find that self-reported skin tone considerably explains Latinos’ attitudes toward Whites and Blacks with light-skinned Latinos sensing greater commonality with Whites and less commonality with Blacks than dark-skinned Latinos. We also find that skin tone moderates the relationship between linked fate with Latinos and closeness with Whites and the relationship between social contact and closeness with Blacks and Whites.

What determines state success when petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for review? We suggest that states can improve the likelihood of securing Supreme Court review by coordinating litigation efforts. This coordination occurs in two ways. First, some states coordinate their appellate litigation efforts internally through the creation of state solicitors general offices. Second, external coordination occurs when states join amicus briefs at the agenda setting stage urging the Supreme Court to grant review in state-filed cases. Using new data on all state-filed certiorari petitions from the 2001-2009 terms, we find that internal and external coordination is associated with an increased likelihood of the Supreme Court granting review in state-filed cases.

A great deal of research focuses on contributions by political action committees (PACs) to candidates, but PACs are also institutional mechanisms for mobilizing contributions by individuals. Restrictions on the ability of PACs sponsored by businesses, trade associations, and labor unions to solicit contributions and the private benefits of contributing imply that these PACs are likely to mobilize donors who do not otherwise contribute to political campaigns. Analysis of itemized contributions to PACs during the 2004 election cycle confirms this. Moreover, the numbers of donors and dollars contributed to sponsored PACs aggregated by congressional district during 1996-2006 are relatively unaffected by electoral competition, presidential cycles, or changes in campaign finance regulations, and the effects of urbanization are less uniform than for nonconnected PACs. PACs sponsored by economic institutions therefore expand the pool of donors beyond the usual suspects.

Research indicates that, when engaging their opponents, strategic candidates will draw (and redraw) lines of conflict, pulling attention to their advantaged topics. But do these expectations hold up in debates, where candidates are at the mercy of those asking the questions? And do strategic debate behaviors matter? This study draws on past literature to hypothesize the specific types of agenda-control behaviors we should see in debates. These hypotheses are tested in the 2008 presidential debates, using quantitative content analysis to examine candidate agenda setting, issue framing, and tone. The results show that both Obama and McCain used all three means of agenda control to continually displace the line of conflict in their favor.  These findings offer empirical support for theories of strategic agenda control and heighten our understanding of agenda setting, framing, and tone as agenda-control mechanisms.  Additionally, media and public opinion data suggest these debate agenda-control behaviors had real effects during the 2008 election.