The Journal of Criminal Law

The status of genocide in international law is well developed and forms part of customary international law and also treaty law. International tribunals such as the International Criminal Court and specialised chambers such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have addressed and made a number of convictions regarding genocide. This relative success in the international criminal justice system regarding genocide has given the appearance that perpetrators responsible for genocide will be brought to justice. Yet, there is a fundamental crack in international criminal law with regard to genocide as a crime and how to bring perpetrators to justice. That crack, is essentially, the narrow scope and definition of genocide, and also how to demonstrate that perpetrators had the intention of committing genocide. I contend in this article that the scope of genocide should be extended to include economic genocide and argue that spillover intent of aiders and abettors of genocide requires more clear and coherent rules to include economic genocide as part of how the crime of genocide is assessed in international law. The article first presents and discusses the notion of genocide, taking into consideration the Genocide Convention (1948) and then discusses the status of Article 2(c) of the Convention to define economic genocide. The article then posits the calculated economic measures that affect the conditions of life of peoples involve intent and that intention has a spillover effect.

This article analyses the current context and the use of the public order offence of ‘riot’ held in s. 1 of the Public Order Act 1986. It examines the historical roots of the statutory offence and the difficulty of securing a conviction following times of public disorder due to the nature and interpretation of the wording in s. 1. The article identifies, and uses as an example, the perception that football disorder includes riotous football fans, although official Home Office statistics on football disorder highlight that the offence of riot is not utilised. The statutory offence of ‘riot’ is an underused tool, although the term ‘riot’ is freely used by the media to describe disorderly behaviour. The article projects to make a recommendation that the factors underpinning the definition of riot needs to be re-examined to enable the judiciary to interpret s. 1 in a manner that is more practicable.

This year will mark the 10th anniversary of the commencement of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. The Act was significant in that it introduced a specific offence for corporate killing in the UK for the first time. Such reform was generally welcomed, yet many academics and practitioners were critical of what they perceived to be the Act’s unnecessary complexity and questioned how effective it would be. The Grenfell Tower fire has recently stimulated renewed debate about corporate manslaughter and the ability of the law to hold organisations and individuals to account. To engage meaningfully in this discourse, it is imperative to review the Act’s performance in practice over the last 10 years. The author offers an original contribution to knowledge in this area through (i) fresh analysis of whether the criticism 10 years ago has proved to be well founded; (ii) scrutiny of the extent to which the Act has been successful in meeting its stated aims; (iii) critique of the judicial precepts in this area; and (iv) new insights into the future of corporate manslaughter including how the Act could be more efficacious. The statutory corporate manslaughter offence affords a superior basis of liability to the unwieldy common law offence that preceded it; there have been more prosecutions, higher average fines and its reach encompasses more than just micro/small companies. Conversely, the Act is simultaneously a disappointing compromise; fewer prosecutions than predicted, unjustifiable inconsistency in sentencing, a continued lack of individual accountability and a prosecutory preoccupation with a limited range of defendant. The introduction of new sentencing guidelines and recent case law developments, including the first fine measured in the millions of pounds, signal progress and have gone some way to address these inadequacies. Despite this, it is questionable whether the Act can rise to the challenge of securing convictions in relation to Grenfell Tower and similar factually complex tragedies. In order to fully capture and prevent the wide range of deaths within the Act’s remit, it is clear that prosecutors need enhanced training and a willingness to embrace a holistic reconceptualisation of ‘offender’.

This article considers the necessary ingredients for an individual to consent to running the risk of the HIV virus being transmitted through high-risk unprotected sexual intercourse. In order to achieve this aim, an assessment of what should equate to a fully informed consent is evaluated. The article will provide a comparative jurisdictional analysis of the consent requirement in three particularised jurisdictions: England, Canada and the USA. A comparison of relational judicial precepts will follow the discussion of extant law in each country. It will be established that few jurisdictions fully consider the requirements of a fully informed consent. The final part of the article will suggest a bespoke new legislative framework that will account for the circumstances that are necessary for an individual to provide a fully informed consent to the risk of acquiring the virus.