Environmental Values

After presenting a brief history of the idea of a human right to an adequate environment as it has evolved in the United Nations documents, I assess this approach to our moral responsibility with regard to the environment. I argue that although this rights approach has some substantial weaknesses, these are outweighed by such clear advantages as its action-guiding nature and its political potency.

After presenting a brief history of the idea of a human right to an adequate environment as it has evolved in the United Nations documents, I assess this approach to our moral responsibility with regard to the environment. I argue that although this rights approach has some substantial weaknesses, these are outweighed by such clear advantages as its action-guiding nature and its political potency.

What happens when an object you take to be beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, no longer appears beautiful or pleasing when you learn something new about it? I am assuming a situation in which there is no direct change in the perceptual features of the object, and that what you learn is not the location of some new surface property but rather a bit of non-perceptual information. I classify episodes of dampened appreciation under the heading ‘aesthetic disillusionment’, and in this paper I explore the relationship between such episodes and the broader issue of ethical constraints on aesthetic activity and appreciation. Does it make sense to say that one should not, or ought not, take pleasure in certain objects or events? I think it does – but in a very particular, almost ecological way. The subsequent discussion focuses on ethical constraints as they operate on the aesthetic appreciation of objects and events within the natural environment.

What happens when an object you take to be beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, no longer appears beautiful or pleasing when you learn something new about it? I am assuming a situation in which there is no direct change in the perceptual features of the object, and that what you learn is not the location of some new surface property but rather a bit of non-perceptual information. I classify episodes of dampened appreciation under the heading ‘aesthetic disillusionment’, and in this paper I explore the relationship between such episodes and the broader issue of ethical constraints on aesthetic activity and appreciation. Does it make sense to say that one should not, or ought not, take pleasure in certain objects or events? I think it does – but in a very particular, almost ecological way. The subsequent discussion focuses on ethical constraints as they operate on the aesthetic appreciation of objects and events within the natural environment.

This paper addresses the problem of ‘ignorance’ in philosophy and science, particularly with respect to the conceptualization, study and solution of environmental problems. We begin by distinguishing between ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ignorance’. We then offer a categorization of ignorance, and use these categories to assess the role of science as a means of reducing ignorance. We note that to proceed with science, several ‘acts of faith’ are necessary. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of an attitude of openness in science and philosophy, especially regarding environmental problems. Throughout, we illustrate our discussion of ignorance, and the problems involved in its reduction, by reference to environmental issues.

This paper addresses the problem of ‘ignorance’ in philosophy and science, particularly with respect to the conceptualization, study and solution of environmental problems. We begin by distinguishing between ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ignorance’. We then offer a categorization of ignorance, and use these categories to assess the role of science as a means of reducing ignorance. We note that to proceed with science, several ‘acts of faith’ are necessary. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of an attitude of openness in science and philosophy, especially regarding environmental problems. Throughout, we illustrate our discussion of ignorance, and the problems involved in its reduction, by reference to environmental issues.

This paper addresses the problem of ‘ignorance’ in philosophy and science, particularly with respect to the conceptualization, study and solution of environmental problems. We begin by distinguishing between ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ignorance’. We then offer a categorization of ignorance, and use these categories to assess the role of science as a means of reducing ignorance. We note that to proceed with science, several ‘acts of faith’ are necessary. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of an attitude of openness in science and philosophy, especially regarding environmental problems. Throughout, we illustrate our discussion of ignorance, and the problems involved in its reduction, by reference to environmental issues.

The ‘business judgement rule’ requires corporate directors only to act with honesty and reasonable care in the interest of shareholders. A stronger ‘fiduciary’ duty is required where one party requires protection from another. This paper argues that where corporations take risks with the environment, directors are fiduciaries. Stakeholders are in that case the general public, future generations and other species, which have not voluntarily accepted risk and cannot limit liability. Recognition of fiduciary duty in such cases is consistent with recent trends in the law of equity. It would require all economic activities to move from open to closed (sustainable) systems.

The ‘business judgement rule’ requires corporate directors only to act with honesty and reasonable care in the interest of shareholders. A stronger ‘fiduciary’ duty is required where one party requires protection from another. This paper argues that where corporations take risks with the environment, directors are fiduciaries. Stakeholders are in that case the general public, future generations and other species, which have not voluntarily accepted risk and cannot limit liability. Recognition of fiduciary duty in such cases is consistent with recent trends in the law of equity. It would require all economic activities to move from open to closed (sustainable) systems.

Global commons are natural goods which transcend national boundaries. A brief glance at management of oceans and terrestrial commons is succeeded by fuller discussion of rainforests, over which nations claim property rights, yet which perform global services. Leasing out could effect a desirable transfer of funds from North to South. Sustainable development requires these or other large incentives towards environmental protection in developing countries, but land and institutional reform are crucial to success. In conclusion, the anthropocentric ethic implicit in all such solutions is contrasted with the ecocentric one which may be necessary to preserve the biosphere in the future.

Global commons are natural goods which transcend national boundaries. A brief glance at management of oceans and terrestrial commons is succeeded by fuller discussion of rainforests, over which nations claim property rights, yet which perform global services. Leasing out could effect a desirable transfer of funds from North to South. Sustainable development requires these or other large incentives towards environmental protection in developing countries, but land and institutional reform are crucial to success. In conclusion, the anthropocentric ethic implicit in all such solutions is contrasted with the ecocentric one which may be necessary to preserve the biosphere in the future.