Environment and Planning D: Society and Space

The nucleus of postmodern philosophy and theory is derived primarily from French neostructuralist writings. The ontological foundation of such literature is the idealist rejection of the possibility of knowing reality and, as a consequence, the enclosure of the subject within the signifying universe, which in turn results in the exaltation of the signifying processes as the only social processes. The same emphasis, but through nonverbal means, is demonstrated by postmodern architectural and urban design. In geography, however, postmodernism is interpreted differently. In two recent books (by Soja and by Harvey) the postmodern era in human geography is related to the heightened importance of space for social reality and theory. But the split of geography itself between Marxist geography on the one hand, and behavioural and humanistic geography on the other, shows the pertinence of the signifying dimension for the field of geography. In this paper, it is argued that the roles of space and meaning are equally important for geography, and it is proposed that an analysis of the signifying aspect of space may be achieved through semiotics, currently the most complete and sophisticated theory of meaning and culture. The main problem for geography, which is addressed in the final section of this paper, is the integration of a renewed version of the semiotics of space with an equally renewed Marxist geography, the most powerful explanatory approach to geography we have at our disposal.

How do I know the difference between you and me and how do we share our beliefs in the same? How are we made so obedient and so predictable? As a minimalist approach to these questions I imagine human thought-and-action as a double helix, It is assumed firstly, that man is a semiotic animal, a species whose individuals are kept together and apart by their use of signs; secondly, that every sign within itself combines elements of drastically different ontologies. This invisible world is then captured in a three-dimensional coordinate system whose axes are those of identity, difference, and intentionality. While the resulting map is anchored in fix-points of silence, the real world of socialization and understanding is always in flux. The paper closes with a pastiche on Carl von Linné's Flora Suecica; in the current world of thought-and-action, signifier and signified are assigned the same ordering functions as stamina and pistil once were in the world of plants. How do I draw the invisible lines of the taken-for-granted? How do I project a dematerialized point onto a transparent plane?

A handful of plain maps are presented, each one representing certain features of the landscape of language. Through the use of conventional mapping techniques, what is invisible becomes visible. A morphological map shows a plain of speech hemmed in by two mountain ranges of silence and cut through by a silent stream of perfect representation. A topological map depicts this landscape in terms of the three fields originally defined by Charles Sander Peirce as iconic, indexical, and symbolic. An anthropological map explains how the landscape is being settled by Homo significator, who first lives in Ferdinand Tonnics's realm of Gcmeinschaft and then moves across the river into the realm of Gescllschaft. Finally a map of the genesis of landscape is drawn based on principles borrowed from Rene Girard's theory of mimetic desire.

This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion of the historical geography of modernity. It is argued that the exclusive focus on social theory has detrimental effects on the appreciation of normative political concerns and that it ignores the resurgence of normative political theory. Habermas's concept of the public sphere, and its place within his theoretical and empirical studies, is, by contrast, commendably concerned with linking the social and historical work with normative political theorising, and its usefulness for geographical investigation is applauded. However, the criticisms directed from, in particular, communitarian political theorists and contextualist social researchers would seem to make his attempt to bring a ‘strong’ theory of public political life back within the remit of a reconstructed social theory less plausible. One set of responses to this criticism comes in the form of the attempt to build geography into this normative political theory, turning public spheres into public spaces; Arcndt's political theory, in conclusion, is thus held to be a significant contribution to the historical geography of modernity.

We all practice it, use its presumed power of explanation, and never seem to get tired of it: theory, only recently introduced to geography at large, appears to be indispensable for any truly rigorous analysis of the social world. But is it really? In this paper it is argued that even the most sophisticated of attempts at ‘theorizing the social’ can claim success only by abandoning reason where reason is needed most: in the abstract formulation of particularity. In the pursuit of this ultimately fatal flaw of any theoretical endeavour, the author ultimately asks what it is about society and space that seems to require a theoretical approach, and what precisely we stand to lose if we opt for a theoretically informed abandonment of theory. With reference to Walter Benjamin, whose work is read as an embodiment of the most crucial conflict between reason and justification, an attempt will be made towards a genuinely material social science that does not rely on external guarantees to achieve a modest goal in the possibility of cognizance.

Philo has brought Foucault's early, ‘archaeological’ work to the attention of human geographers as a possible source of help in theorizing specificity. By contrast, in this paper the archaeological project is portrayed as an illuminating failure which holds valuable lessons for geographers. The archaeological period is placed in the context of Foucault's career, and then the Archaeology of Knowledge is situated as the arena for Foucault's most instructive encounters with the problems of necessity, contingency, and human subjectivity. Although Foucault's profound theoretical modesty does not solve the problem of how to theorize specificity, it does suggest that we make significant adjustments in our own attempts to do so. The implications of the argument are given a test drive through a brief reading of recent work by Thrift, after which a recasting of the notion of responsibility is put forward as a means of beginning to deal more bravely with poststrueturalism.