Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space

Mining companies, in recent decades, have been changing how they source and refine ores by seeking metal-bearing wastes to be smelted alongside “traditional” mining concentrates. I propose the term “flexible mine” to describe this expansion of ore supply chains, and I demonstrate how it operates through multiple registers of flexibility: spatial, temporal, and interpretational. The flexible mine is both a “widening” and a “deepening” commodity frontier for the mining industry promising a disarticulation from geophysical processes and, by extension, mining country geopolitics. The organizational and technical changes associated with mining above-ground ores seem to suggest a new phenomenon, wholly different than traditional mining and refining. Instead, however, the mining of waste streams blurs the boundaries between extraction, production, manufacturing, consumption, and disposal. Further, the flexible mine challenges the distinction between urban and non, arguing against relying on too-familiar binaries in geographic scholarship. I highlight how these registers of flexibility address three problems in below-ground mining (geospatial fixity, resource scarcity, and environmental effects) and also create new governance challenges in regulating extractive industries.

Building on the concept of polarity in global value chains, we explore how the nature of the governance of a global value chain can evolve and how contingencies can reshape governance arrangements. A case-study of the New Zealand fishing industry highlights how parties inside and outside the global value chain came to contest labour standards, laying the base for credible regulation. In 2011 through a series of convergent events, migrant crew on board South Korean fishing vessels, hitherto exploited, abused and isolated, emerged as a significant actor to bring about a clear transition in the governance of a multipolar global value chain. In this paper, we analyse the series of events which led to regulatory change and consider whether the dynamics from the case offer lessons for improving labour standards and regulation in global value chains more generally.

That cities compete against each other is a cliché of the contemporary neoliberal condition, in which so much focus and energy is expended on a zero-sum-game of trying to outshine imagined rivals. In this article, we examine how this type of competition plays itself out in China, and more specifically in and around Shanghai, in the Yangtze River Delta. We argue that the competition here, principally for foreign and domestic inward investment, is intense and multi-scalar. It is fuelled in particular by China’s nested territorial administrative structure, leading to a situation that eventually involves all scales, from district to central government. We choose therefore the term competitive urbanism to encapsulate these multi-scalar and multi-directional competitive forces. Lying at the centre of this competitive urbanism in the Yangtze River Delta is the giant new Hongqiao project in west Shanghai, second only in expanse and ambition to Pudong. The Shanghai municipal government has promoted this project partly in response to competitive pressures from other cities in the Yangtze River Delta, and partly to swing the dynamic of growth westward within the city and link it better to its hinterland. In this way, Hongqiao is reinforcing and accelerating the competitive urbanism that characterizes China’s most prosperous region.

As cities around the world are tunnelled and hollowed to new depths, geographers are giving increasing attention to infrastructure in the context of verticality, often framed through urban planning or geopolitics. This paper responds to calls from geography and the wider geohumanities for ethnographic and aesthetic consideration of vertical infrastructures by reflecting on London’s sewer system as a site of embodied engagement and creative imagination. Once venerated by the press and public as engineering, medical and aesthetic triumphs, London’s sewers are thought to have morphed into sites of ubiquitous obscurity. This paper counters this understanding by considering bodies, technologies and activities through time that have shaped imaginations of London’s main drainage, including the work of contemporary urban explorers. I argue that although the current aestheticization of infrastructural spaces in London is connected to particular technologies, politics and geographical concerns of the present, it also echoes body-space interventions and affects across a 150-year span. This aesthetic legacy is a crucial pillar in our understandings of urban verticality.

High-standard entrepreneurial ventures are usually justified as a means of stimulating capital investment for social, spatial, and financial side benefits for the public. We show the unequal consequences of these ideas in Tel Aviv—Jaffa, where the location of the projects subject to such obligations is not really mitigated by the location of municipal public flagship projects and by the spatial distribution of the municipal development budget. As in many other urban centers, planning bureaucrats in this city advanced numerous expensive residential ventures to finance a variety of municipal initiatives and increase public budgets. Despite their success in attracting private investments, collecting developers’ taxes, exactions, and revenues, the more complicated issues and the less affluent communities see less private and public spending. We link this tendency to the growing fragmentation of urban planning, to the supremacy of the local plan—practically operating as a planning deal—and to the emergence of various municipal tools supporting the feasibility of the deal. We thus claim that while the entrepreneurial planning practice fosters the connections between flexible planning and urban economy, a short-range financial conclusion is unavoidable—most of its products are directed to attract additional similar projects. By tracing this institutional conduct, we claim that while current urban planning is subordinated to market logic and investments, it is actually trapped in a vicious cycle of deepening its own economic appeal. Simultaneously, planners are losing the ability to direct public goods to where they are needed.

Energy prosumption has become a common phrase as more householders and communities are producing and consuming their own electricity and heat. Prosumption is a combination of two words: production and consumption, and emerged as a concept at a time when consumers were beginning to be more proactive and take over steps traditionally thought of as ‘production’. In many ways, energy prosumption is nothing new (e.g. wood combustion), yet development of our modern energy system has changed the relationships between energy producers and consumers (e.g. smart meters, renewable energy production). Thus, there is a growing body of research interested in the motivation and conditions for the uptake of microgeneration technologies and the implications to energy infrastructures and big energy producers. However, this ‘energy prosumption’ scholarship generally lacks a strong conceptual foundation and misses the opportunity to build on existing prosumption literature and related debates. This paper brings the wealth of literature on prosumption into the energy context and reflects on the insights offered by a prosumption lens. Our study explores a particular manifestation of prosumption – when a household is simultaneously a producer and consumer of their heat and/or electricity via microgeneration – and we present data from semi-structured interviews with 28 households living with microgeneration technologies in Scotland, UK. Thus, we provide a robust framework from which future research on household and community energy prosumption can build.

Policy efforts to reduce the carbon intensity of domestic energy consumption have, over the last three decades, been dominated by an almost dichotomous reading of the relationship between technology and social change. On the one hand, there is a conception of personal responsibility that constructs domestic energy users as key actors in the adoption and (appropriate) use of low carbon energy technologies; from this perspective, environmental change becomes a matter of mobilising personal capacities such that individuals make better choices. On the other hand, decarbonising homes is conceived to be an outcome of top-down infrastructural interventions, with householders (or end users) positioned as relatively passive agents who will respond to engineered efficiency in linear and predictable ways. In practice, both positions have been found wanting in terms of accounting for how (and why) change happens and in turn delivering on ambitious policy goals. The argument we develop in this article goes beyond critiquing these problematic framings of technology and the locus of agency. Drawing on three contrasting low carbon energy technology projects in the UK, we present an alternative perspective which foregrounds a more experimental, ad hoc and ultimately provisional mode of governing with domestic energy technologies. We reflect on the meaning and political implications of this experimental turn in transforming (and decarbonising) domestic energy practices.

Wildfire is a global environmental ‘problem’ with significant socioeconomic and socionatural impacts that does not lend itself to simple technical fixes (Gill et al., 2013: 439). In Australia, a country with a pronounced history of disastrous landscape fires, these impacts are expected to increase as the peri-urban population continues to grow and the climate continues to change. This paper draws upon the burgeoning literature on anticipatory regimes to analyse an in-depth case study of a government pilot in the highly fire-prone State of Victoria, where practitioners have utilised a simulation model to measure and intervene in the distribution of wildfire risk. The pilot presents the ‘calculative collective device’ (Callon and Muniesa, 2005) of wildfire management at a moment of what I label ‘calculative rearticulation’, wherein figurations of the future are rebooted, reconstructed or recalibrated; such moments, I suggest, can reorient the institutionally conservative spaces – such as environmental or risk management – providing opportunities for practitioners and others to interrogate the existing distribution of hazards and anticipatory interventions. Through such opportunities ‘hazardous’ more-than-human landscapes can be imagined otherwise.

Cultural diversity is a complex and multi-faceted concept. Commonly used quantitative measures of the spatial distribution of culturally defined groups—such as segregation, isolation or concentration indexes—have been designed to capture just one feature of this distribution. The strengths and weaknesses of such measures under varying demographic, geographic and behavioral conditions can only be comprehensively assessed empirically. This has been rarely done in the case of multigroup cultural diversity. This paper aims to fill this gap and to provide evidence on the empirical properties of various segregation indexes by means of Monte Carlo replications of agent-based modelling simulations under widely varying assumptions. Schelling’s classical segregation model is used as the theoretical engine to generate patterns of spatial clustering. The data inputs include the initial population, the assumed geography, the number and shares of various cultural groups, and their preferences with respect to co-location. Our Monte Carlo replications of agent-based modelling data generating process produces output maps that enable us to assess the sensitivity of the various measures of segregation to parameter assumptions by means of response surface analysis. We find that, as our simulated city becomes more diverse, stable residential location equilibria require the preference for co-location with one’s own group to be not much more than the group share of the smallest demographic minority. When equilibria exist, the values of the various segregation measures are strongly dependent on the composition of the population across cultural groups, the assumed preferences and the assumed geography. Index values are generally non-decreasing in increasing preference for within-group co-location. More diverse populations yield—for given preferences and geography—a greater degree of spatial clustering. The sensitivity of segregation measures to underlying conditions suggests that meaningful analysis of the impact of segregation requires spatial panel data modelling.