International Area Studies Review

Does the rise of China inexorably anticipate the onset of global instability or even a great power war? Today, routine comparisons are made between a rising China with that of Germany over 100 years ago. Organski, in his original explication of power transition theory, however, was far more cautious. Despite predicting the remarkable rise of China nearly 60 years ago in his book (1958), World Politics, Organski was circumspect in predicting a great power war involving China and the United States. This article examines the development of power transition theory by a variety of scholars since Organski. We draw on these developments of power transition theory to analyze the implications of the rise of China. We also introduce the other articles that compose this Special Issue of International Area Studies Review on power transition theory and the rise of China.

Heavily reliant on the work of Charles P Kindleberger, theories of hegemony and power transition have been built on the largely unchallenged assumption that the United States acts as a global economic stabilizer in time of crisis. However, there has been no attempt systematically to delineate, operationalize and test whether the United States performs this role utilizing Kindleberger’s five functions. Proponents of these theories have, in contrast, characterized China as either a free-rider or a predator waiting to challenge American leadership in times of crisis. In evaluating these characterizations, we test two hypotheses that examine the extent to which the United States and China have performed these stabilizing functions with regard to three major economic crises (the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the 2001 “DotCom” crisis and the Great Recession of 2007–2009). Our findings suggest that Kindleberger’s functions are more evenly shared than conventional scholarship would predict and that China has played a supportive, stabilizing role. Without evidence of explicit collaboration between the two countries, these functions were shared. Furthermore, China played an increasingly important role in supporting the global economic system over time and the trend line suggests they will continue to do so in the future. If Kindleberger’s criteria are correct, the assumption of a single country, the United States, acting as a stabilizer is therefore empirically mistaken. If his criteria are flawed, major IR theories that have assumed the criteria to be true and/or have assumed that the United States plays this unique role in the global economy are in need of critical reassessment.

The alliance transition theory is developed by incorporating the pivotal middle power’s role into Organski’s power transition theoretical framework. The theory posits that the situation of parity of alliance power between the dominant power’s alliance camp and the rising dissatisfied challenger’s camp is likely to lead to major war; and, further, that the pivotal middle power is able not only to help reinforce the dominant state’s power preponderance over its potential challenger but also to play a mediating role of persuading the rising potential challenger to be more satisfied with the status quo. Applying the alliance transition arguments to the East Asian region, the theory suggests that a pivotal middle power such as South Korea can be a crucial addition to the United States’ capabilities to maintain its preponderance of power over the potential challenger, the People’s Republic of China. Together with other like-minded middle powers, the Republic of Korea, as a key regional ally of the United States, can also play the constructive role of persuading China to be a responsible member of the status quo system, by engaging substantially with China.

In this article I analyze double-layered power struggles from a power transition perspective. This study compares the case of global power transition between the US and China linked to a case of regional power transition between China and Japan. US–China relations in the global order have been more cooperative than China–Japan relations in the regional order since the beginning of this century. The question is about how the two cases interact with respect to each other.

The first scenario shows that stability in the global order deters instability in the regional order. The US–China partnership stabilizes China–Japan conflictual relations. In this situation the US, China and Japan maintain status quo policies and regional order is stabilized. The second scenario is one in which instability in the regional order overwhelms stability in the global order. In this situation China and Japan accelerate their hegemonic struggles in Northeast Asia, and the US serves to mediate between China and Japan. The US should be making a decision as to what kind of diplomatic stance it will take to minimize the tension between China and Japan. The US must also make its own world strategy. China is more likely to be a status quo power in the global order, but a challenger in breaking down the status quo in Northeast Asia. However, the US role is critical in making this power transition stable or unstable.

This paper explores the stability of deterrence in East Asia and the effects of missile defense on regional security. In particular, we evaluate the policy implications derived from the power transition perspective for the development of the US missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the short term, we anticipate that the stability of deterrence in East Asia will be increased by the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that creates a power preponderance of satisfied challengers against potential regional challengers. The long-term horizon is, however, tenuous because the rapid expansion of US-led missile defense systems may significantly alter the trajectory of China’s missile strategy by increasing its dissatisfaction with the status quo. One fundamental implication is that, without further restrictions, long-term deployment stability in East Asia will become increasingly fragile.

Nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence are key factors in cost calculations underpinning decisions on war or peace between states. This paper combines deterrence and interdependence in a proposed theory of major power peace, with reference to a number of insightful works on the ongoing transition of power from the US to a rising China. The paper explores the hypothesis that as long as the US and China can deter each other with a combination of conventional and nuclear forces, and refrain from actions to drastically reduce their economic dependence on each other, there is little risk of war between them. Peace will be further secured if important third party countries, notably Japan, remain covered by US extended deterrence and integrated economically with both China and the USA through trade and transnational production chains. Only if the US, Chinese or Japanese governments take politically motivated actions to radically reduce their economic dependence on one another are they likely to engage in a security competition of sufficient intensity to generate an arms race and a substantial risk of war. This does not just hold for all-out war but for limited war as well, given the risk of escalation.

While entering into a deep confrontation with the West in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia has sought to uphold its international profile by upgrading its strategic partnership with China and adding new economic content to it, first of all in energy deals. At the same time, Moscow is aware of the risks related to becoming a minor partner to powerful China and to diminishing its ability to make its own contributions to forming the global agenda. One way of avoiding too much dependence on Chinese patronage would be to retain and cultivate the traditional ties with Vietnam and perhaps even play a pacifying role in the oscillating Chinese-Vietnamese tensions. Russian energy companies are exploring opportunities for further advancing offshore oil and gas projects in the South China Sea, although the profitability of these projects remains rather low. Russia has delivered two out of six contracted Kilo class submarines to Vietnam, but its role as the main provider of weapons may now be challenged by the USA and Japan. The prospects for maintaining or expanding Russia’s security and energy connections with Vietnam is thus a demanding topic for analysis, which may throw light also on the all-important trilateral relationship between China, the USA and Japan.

Erratum to ‘Intra-regional trade of ASEAN+3: Trends and issues for the economic integration of East Asia’ by Hee-Ryang Ra

International Area Studies Review June 2015 Vol. 18(2) 109-137 doi:10.1177/2233865915581431