India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

The view that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is not new nor an aberration has anchored New Delhi’s embrace of this geopolitical reality and the articulation of its central role and vision for this dynamic theatre. This revisiting of history has happened, in New Delhi’s understanding, because of drivers such as globalisation, multipolarity and a recognition by the United States that it needs to work with others to manage the disruptive rise of China, among other global challenges. India has always considered itself an Indo-Pacific actor, given its geographical location, its interests and stakes primarily in the Indian Ocean and increasingly in the pacific, its bilateral partnerships which then see a shared interest in the region, its presence in existent Indo-Pacific bodies spanning the two oceans and its growing role as a provider of net security and preferred maritime security partner for many countries in the Indo-Pacific. This article traces the evolution of the Indo-Pacific in New Delhi’s strategic calculus and its pre-eminence as a theatre of geo-strategic and geo-economic opportunity. It argues that three trends have emerged as distinguishable features, which serve as building blocks of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific today, especially for India: (a) issue-based coalitions driven by function, where flexibility of these configurations remains a strategic asset, (b) like-minded countries working together in overlapping bilateral, minilateral and plurilateral formats to expand global initiatives in a way that they are institutionalised within the national agendas of regional like-minded powers and (c) a focused effort on building capacity of countries in the Indo-Pacific to give them viable alternatives which go beyond binaries formed around ideological and political contestation. Post COVID-19, consolidating the India way in the Indo-Pacific will depend on how India strengthens its domestic capacity and shapes geopolitics at the regional and global levels.

The temptation to explain India’s foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East through the lens of power alone has obscured a rich history of Indian diplomacy in the region that escapes power-centric explanations. India’s relentless advocacy for Palestinian statehood, its diplomatic support for the weaker Arab states against Israel and Western powers and its role in UN mediation and peacekeeping missions in the region are difficult to explain using a structural realist framework that privileges power alone. Challenging the dominant historiographies, this article introduces the concept of status into the study of India’s behaviour in the Middle East. Based on a re-reading of secondary sources, it argues that status and power have been articulated in various ways in India’s behaviour in the Middle East. Under prime ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, India pursued status without power, following a primarily normative strategy of status-seeking in the region that afforded India considerable deference at the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. Following India’s nuclear tests of 1998 and a decade of economic growth, however, power and status converged in India’s behaviour in the Middle East through further alignment with US interests in the region and greater use of naval power projection. By shedding light on the various possible ways in which status and power articulate, this article attempts to step away from the artificial opposition between morals and self-interest as guiding principles of foreign policy. The inquiry into status challenges the prevalent historiographies and analytical frameworks that have dominated the discussion on India’s foreign policy in the Middle East, generating productive openings for reconceptualising and reimagining the field.

India has been a long-time supporter of nuclear disarmament. Much before other countries supported these measures, India had proposed universal nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban treaty as well as a freeze on the production of fissile material. Opinion is however divided on India’s approach and rationale behind pursuing disarmament. Some call it utopian while others describe it as a pragmatic approach that suited India’s national security needs at that time. India has always had a peculiar relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regimes. India stressed disarmament as a solution for nuclear proliferation and has viewed nuclear disarmament as enhancing its security interests. This article divides India’s advocacy of global nuclear disarmament into six phases beginning from India’s independence in 1947 to the current period when two parallel tracks have emerged in India’s nuclear diplomacy—one track has continued with its traditional advocacy of universal nuclear disarmament, while the second track where it has engaged with the prevailing non-proliferation regime. India’s nuclear disarmament diplomacy has moved away from moral and ethical considerations to highlighting national security considerations. It is no longer anchored on the ‘disarmament or no disarmament’ question as the traditional disarmament advocacy of India often posed. Instead, the current Indian diplomacy is focused on the emerging rules and frameworks of governance in international security matters and how India can be part of it—multilaterally or through coalition of like-minded partners.

Climate change emerged as a serious diplomatic concern for India in the early 1990s. India has since been a staunch champion of the developing world, in multilateral climate negotiations; from playing a key role in establishing the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities, to forging alliances with countries with shared developmental concerns. Faced with the growing impact of climate change and changing geopolitics, India’s foreign policy on climate change has undergone significant shifts during two decades of multilateral climate talks. First, India’s willingness to undertake domestic climate action as a result of its changing economic status and, second, the role of the political leadership—since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014—in shaping the climate discourse both in the country and abroad. India has, in recent years, shed its defensive, naysayer strategy at climate negotiations and led several multilateral initiatives for climate action. As India celebrates 75 years of its Independence, it is forging a new, confident leadership on issues of climate change. While there is continuity in India’s traditional stance on finance and technology transfer during negotiations, Indian foreign policy has begun to display a marked change in the strategic use of climate change to assert greater power on the global stage.

India has been a point of attraction for world throughout the history as ‘Golden Bird’ as land of spiritualism, architectural marvels and cultural heritage. Buddhist ‘Middle Path’ to Kautaliya’s pragmatic political thought and Gandhi’s strategy of Satyagraha and non-violence attract appreciation around the world. The two decades of 21st century has immensely boosted India’s soft power. Yoga and Ayurveda have assumed prominent place in the life and practice of people worldwide with celebration of ‘International Yoga Day’.

The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 has placed special emphasis on the rich heritage of culture, knowledge and thought as its guiding light are very attractive option and way of life. With pandemic underway, our yoga practice assumed added importance and popularity to deal with multiple socio-psychological and physical issues.

The vision of the NEP once translated in practice can prove to be an unbeatable soft power to facilitate India to achieve its global leadership position in the emerging world order.

This article explores India’s economic diplomacy since its early years of Independence, from the margins to a relative significance in the global economic hierarchy. It begins by identifying the constant, governing first principles and core objectives of India’s economic diplomacy that have remained constant over the years. The first three sections broadly embody the distinctive phases of India’s economic diplomacy, each laced with turning points, challenges and shifts entailed therein. The article ends with a concluding section that provides an analysis of India’s economic diplomacy in terms of broader trends, current challenges and the road ahead in the policy-relevant future.

This article aims to understand India’s remarkable nuclear journey in the last 75 years. It categorises India’s atomic trajectory into four distinct periods: Ambivalent (1948–1988), Reserved (1989–1998), Responsible (1998–2008) and Resurgent (2009 onwards). In doing so, the article provides an account of how the changing nature of India’s nuclear programme has impacted the scope and depth of its nuclear deterrence. However, the programme’s status is also consequential for India’s foreign policy practice and its approach to using force in international politics. The article shows how India’s nuclear capability, its foreign policy practice, and its approach to the use of force have seen dramatic shifts in the last thirty years. A resurgent India aims to become a world-class nuclear power, undisturbed by foreign perceptions of its atomic programme and increasingly resolute to use force even under the threat of escalation by its nuclear adversaries.

Earth’s climate is changing drastically and its effect is being felt over the entire world. Some nations suffer more because of several geographical and demographical factors. People have started migrating from their homeland because of the disasters occurring due to climate change. These migrants commonly known as climate refugees are homeless and without rights. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has recognised the need to protect climate refugees and has taken initiatives to relocate the climate refugees. Recently, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) ruled that no country can send back a refugee whose life is at imminent threat due to climate change. Even though this decision is non-binding on the countries, it puts an international pressure on countries to act soon concerning climate refugees. India is one of the countries which might face a great migrant influx from neighbouring countries. The Sundarbans ¹ Delta of Bangladesh is one of the high-risk areas and it is estimated that around 50–120 million climate refugees might migrate to India. India needs to be prepared for this crisis and develop a sound refugee policy framework.  Against this backdrop, this research article aims to highlight legal issues relating to the protection of climate refugees in India and suggests policy measures to overcome the crisis.

Mark McClish, The History of the Arthashastra: Sovereignty and Sacred Law in Ancient India (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Pp. 306, ₹7486 (Hardcover). ISBN-10: 1108701744.

Medha Bisht, Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Philosophy of Strategy (Routledge, 2020). Pp. 188, ₹13450 (Hardcover). ISBN: 9781138553071.

S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World (Harper Collins India, 2020). Pp. 226, ₹699 (Hardcover). ISBN: 9789353579791.

Shivshankar Menon, India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present (Penguin, 2021). pp. 406, ₹699. ISBN: 9780670091294.

B. M. Jain, The Geopsychology Theory of International Relations in the 21st Century: Escaping the Ignorance Trap (Lexington Books, 2021). pp. 249, ₹8000. ISBN: 9781498573597.

Itty Abraham, How India Become Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Stanford University Press, 2014). pp. 207, ₹7628. ISBN: 0978804792684.

Séverine Autesserre, Frontlines of Peace: An Insider’s Guide to Changing the World (Oxford University Press). 2021, Pp. 241, ₹1558. ISBN-13: 9780197530351.

Achal Malhotra, The South Caucasus: Transition from Subjugation to Independence (ICWA/Macmillan Education, 2020). Pp. 248, ₹1985.

Bhaswati Mukherjee, Bengal and Its Partition. An Untold Story (Rupa, 2021). Pp. 200 + Bibliography + Acknowledgement + Index, ₹575. ISBN: 978-93-5333-958-6.