Journal of Theoretical Politics

Rational choice theories could be improved, their scope broadened, and their explanations made more powerful by asking not only `How do people go about getting what they know they want?' but also `Why do people want what they want in the first place?'. The advantages of combining a theory of goal direction, which is the operational base of rational choice, and a theory of preference formation are manifold: a monistic conception of cause as self-interest is replaced by a pluralistic conception of culture allowing for a variety of motives for action; master objectives, which play out over a sequence of moves, supersede immediate objectives that cover only the next act; concentration on how institutional rules influence incentives, though valuable in and of itself, gives way to a parallel consideration of how individuals shape institutions; and the overwhelming concentration on material self-interest, which discomforts so many social scientists who might otherwise be well disposed to rational choice explanations, opens up into a diversity of selves who construct a variety of interests in the service of different ways of life (or cultures).

The intersecting global societal and natural-environmental systems are described in terms of evolution, instability and structural change. Systems theory, particularly a number of constructs from dissipative-structure theory and synergetics, are applied in this description. The policy meaning of dynamic, reconfigurational systems change and the need for new kinds of policies to fit such change are emphasized. The history of systems support for policymaking is reviewed. The 1990s are interpreted as representing a coalescence of several `exhausted' evolutionary cycles/structures including the Fourth Kondratiev, the Great Power hegemony, and the Newtonian paradigm of science and society. In addition, the natural environment is interpreted as being in a state approaching catastrophic collapse. Accordingly, the 1990s are considered to present an emergent window of opportunity for the development of new kinds of policies. Several recommendations for further work are made.

This article shows linkages between a broadened transaction-cost theory of politics and prior studies analyzing governmental behavior such as agenda control, strategic use of information, cost concealment and cost dispersion. It develops a model of government manipulation of politically relevant transaction costs in order to facilitate both more comprehensive specification of the determinants of such political behavior and more accurate assessment of the likelihood and consequences of institutional change. The article presents a taxonomy that classifies conceptually various observed and potential forms of governmental transaction-cost manipulation.

The emerging East Central European multiparty systems share many specific features of democratic transition yet cannot be characterized or even described by the usual typologies. The rise of party systems in Southern Europe, however, suggests some parallels for an historical and theoretical approach. This paper first analyses the stages of emergence of the Hungarian party system in a Central European context and then draws some theoretical conclusions for party theory in general.

Retrospective considerations do influence vote choice. But the manner in which voters incorporate retrospective evaluations is still an empirical question. This essay compares two voting rules: a traditional retrospective rule and a retrospective-prospective rule. The rules are differentiated based on the information costs associated with each. It is assumed that the traditional retrospective rule is less costly since voters need only make evaluations about the incumbent, whereas using a retrospective-prospective rule, voters must acquire additional information about the challenger. This essay argues that a choice of voting rule is a function of whether voters perceive the electoral environment as being stable or unstable (in terms of the issue positions candidates adopt over time). Laboratory experiments are conducted to test this proposition. In general, the results show that voters show a greater tendency to rely on a traditional retrospective rule when they perceive a stable electoral environment.