Journal of Marketing Research

Prior research has focused on early entrant advantage rather than on theories that explain and predict how late entrants can surpass the early entrant's performance. In this research, the authors propose that learning about new brands is influenced by the way the attributes of later entrants compare with attributes of the first. In three experiments, the authors show that attributes that differentiate later entrants from the first entrant are better remembered and listed more often in judgment formation protocols if the attributes are comparable along some common aspect (i.e., they are alignable differences) than if they do not correspond to any attributes of the first entrant (i.e., they are nonalignable differences). The impact of greater memorability of alignable over nonalignable differences is that later entrants whose attributes are superior to those of the first entrant can come to be preferred over the first entrant when the attributes are alignable differences but not when they are nonalignable differences. These findings have important implications for product entry, differentiation, and positioning strategies.

In many real-world situations, consumers must evaluate future transaction opportunities in which money will be awarded for the performance of effort or for providing a service. In a marketing setting, consumers often are promised a delayed reward, contingent on the performance of future effort. In such situations, the author proposes that at the time of brand choice, the future effort is underweighted, relative to the future savings. Consequently, an incentive that appears attractive at the time of brand choice may appear unattractive at the time of redemption. The author hypothesizes and experimentally demonstrates the effect of face value, level of effort, and temporal delay on choice, redemption, and profits. Results show that temporal delay between choice and redemption causes a systematic underweighting of future effort, which mediates the increased attractiveness of alternatives with delayed incentives. The author also uses an analytical model to derive the profitability implications of delayed incentives.

Two consumer choice experiments reveal distortion of product information. When relatively equivocal information about two hypothetical brands is acquired one attribute at a time, the evaluation of a subsequent attribute is distorted to support the brand that emerges as the leader. This distortion in favor of the leading brand occurs in the absence of any prior brand preference and even when no choice is required. In the latter case, brand preference is formed spontaneously and privately. The magnitude of this predecisional information distortion is roughly double the well-known postdecisional distortion due to cognitive dissonance. A second study shows that, even when the product information is diagnostic, substantial distortion remains. Furthermore, when the diagnostic information leads to a reversal of the currently preferred brand, distortion reappears in support of the new leading brand. The implications of predecisional distortion of product information are discussed for the presentation order of brands, the presentation format of product attributes, and the potential bias in preference assessment techniques, such as conjoint measurement, that rely on pairwise choices.

Many firms divide a product's price into two mandatory parts, such as the base price of a mail-order shirt and the surcharge for shipping and handling, rather than charging a combined, all-inclusive price. The authors call this strategy partitioned pricing. Although firms presumably use partitioned pricing to increase demand and profits, there is little clear empirical support that these prices increase demand or any theoretical explanation for why this should occur. The authors test hypotheses of how consumers process partitioned prices and how partitioned pricing affects consumers’ processing and recall of total costs and their purchase intentions and certain types of demand. The results suggest that partitioned prices decrease consumers’ recalled total costs and increase their demand. The manner in which the surcharge is presented and consumers’ affect for the brand name also influence how they react to partitioned prices.

In this article, the authors examine new product extension strategies that are likely to be effective in building brand equity. The framework accounts for mixed findings in brand equity literature by identifying motivation as a factor that moderates the dilution and enhancement effects observed in prior research. The authors find that the typicality of the extension and consumers’ level of motivation determine the effect of extensions on family brand name. In high-motivation conditions, incongruent extensions are scrutinized in detail and lead to the modification of family brand evaluations, regardless of the typicality of the extensions. However, in low-motivation conditions, brand evaluations are more extreme in the context of high (versus low) typicality. The less typical extension is considered an exception, which reduces its impact on evaluations. Results also show that brand name dilution or enhancement can occur in response to congruent extensions. However, processes that underlie the effect of congruent information are somewhat different.

Why are some firms more successful at introducing radical product innovations than others? Following Schumpeter (1942), many researchers have suggested that firm size is the key organizational predictor of radical product innovation. The authors provide an alternate view and argue that one key variable that differentiates firms with strong radical product innovation records from others is the firms’ willingness to cannibalize their own investments. The authors identify three organizational factors that drive a firm's willingness to cannibalize. Results from a survey of three high-tech industries tend to support the alternate view that willingness to cannibalize is a more powerful driver of radical product innovation than firm size is. These results suggest a need to reconsider conventional wisdom on firm size, cannibalization, and organizational synergy.

Despite the relatively small number of Innovators in a potential market for a new product, they are often the main target of a firm's marketing efforts. Because the Innovators tend to influence the remaining potential adopters, that is, the Majority, firms tend to allocate more marketing efforts and resources toward the Innovators than toward the Majority. Using a two-stage game model with a diffusion effect, the authors analytically investigate whether this is always an optimal strategy. They identify several market and competitive conditions in which it might be optimal for firms to target the Majority rather than the Innovators. The managerial implications of these conditions for new product launch are discussed.

Generalized knowledge comes from cumulating results across studies, a process known as meta-analysis. Efficiently increasing generalized knowledge in a defined area—estimates of price or advertising, for example—is one important goal for research. Because (1) most meta-analyses are based on highly inefficient and unbalanced natural experiments or designs and (2) additional studies are costly, carefully selecting the next study is important. The authors demonstrate that, rather than simply selecting a study that uses currently underrepresented design variables, a procedure that reduces collinearity among design variables will produce far superior improvements in knowledge.