International Migration Review

The study of social capital has been one of the strongest areas of recent advance in migration research, but there are still many questions about how it works and why it has varying effects in studies of different places. In this article, we address the contextual variation in social capital’s effects on migration by considering migration brokers. We argue that destinations for which migration is logistically difficult to arrange give rise to brokerage industries and hypothesize that brokers, in turn, substitute for the informational capital typically provided by social networks. Our empirical tests in Nepal support this narrative, showing that social networks matter for migration to destinations where brokers are not available and have little discernible effect on migration to brokered destinations. Our results suggest that migration research should consider the growing role of brokerage agencies, that theorizations of social capital more broadly must contend with how it is delimited by brokers, and that social scientists might also consider other consequences that can arise from these migration brokers that are increasingly common in many countries and provide a marketized replacement for social capital in some cases.

There has been a surge of recent interest in the migration industries that facilitate the movement of migrants, particularly that of low-waged laborers engaged in temporary contracts abroad. This article extends this research to include migration brokers working in destination contexts, thus drawing analytical attention to the arrival infrastructures that incorporate migrants into host societies. Based on ethnographic research involving the employment agents who recruit women migrating from Indonesia to work as migrant domestic workers in Singapore, we use the concept of “translation” as a broad theoretical metaphor to understand how brokers actively fashion knowledge between various actors, scales, interfaces, and entities. First, we argue that through the interpretation of language, brokers continually modulate meaning in the encounters between potential employers and employees at the agency shopfront, reproducing particular dynamics of power between employers and workers while coperforming the hirability of the migrant worker. Second, we show how brokers operate within the discretionary space between multiple sets of regulations in order to selectively inscribe the text of policy into migrant workers’ lives. By interrogating the process of translation and clarifying the latitude migration brokers have in shaping the working and living conditions of international labor migrants, the article contributes to the growing conceptual literature on how labor-market intermediaries contour migration markets.

Scholars have increasingly examined the policies that states adopt to forge relationships with, deliver services to, and protect the rights of emigrants living abroad. Much of this research has focused on explaining the emergence and scope of emigrant policies. This article contributes to existing research by analyzing variation in the outcome of one particular emigrant policy: the Mexican state’s delivery of sociolegal consultations and support through its consular network in the United States. Specifically, I assess how the Mexican state’s provision of consular protection services diverges in frequency and form over time and within local contexts of reception. To address my research questions, I conducted a longitudinal analysis of data representing all 50 Mexican consulate districts in the United States (2010 through 2015). My dataset merges information from a variety of sources, such as the American Community Survey, with an administrative database that documents the Mexican state’s provision of sociolegal services in matters related to human rights, penal, migratory, labor, civil, or administrative issues. I find that the frequency of services across these issues varies in conjunction with the social, political, and economic characteristics of the administrative districts within which Mexican consulates operate. Furthermore, I argue that local contexts of reception can structure the frequency of sociolegal consultations between Mexican migrants living in the United States and the Mexican government through three pathways related to migrant incorporation experiences and vulnerabilities in receiving societies. Overall, my findings reveal how local receiving-society contexts can shape the support sending states provide to emigrants.

This article examines the relationship between structural integration and perceived discrimination among young people with migration backgrounds in Germany. Assimilation theories expect ethnic boundaries to lessen through minority groups’ upward mobility, while the recently proposed integration paradox asserts that structural integration increases perceptions of discrimination. Using longitudinal data from the German National Educational Panel Study, this article investigates how a successful transition from school to the training market affects young people’s perceptions of ethnic discrimination. Results of propensity score matching and linear probability models show that perceptions of discrimination increase only in response to unsuccessful entry into the training market, partially due to occupational aspirations and personal discrimination experiences. Findings also show that perceptions of discrimination do not increase for young people who are well integrated in the educational system, even if they take up a training position that is not in accordance with their desired profession. These findings highlight the importance of considering perceptions of discrimination in longitudinal and life-course perspectives to better understanding dynamics in these perceptions.

Why do high-skilled Canadian immigrants lag behind their US counterparts in labor-market outcomes, despite Canada’s merit-based immigration selection system and more integrative context? This article investigates a mismatch between immigrants’ education and occupations, operationalized by overeducation, as an explanation. Using comparable data and three measures of overeducation, we find that university-educated immigrant workers in Canada are consistently much more likely to be overeducated than their US peers and that the immigrant–native gap in the overeducation rate is remarkably higher in Canada than in the United States. This article further examines how the cross-national differences are related to labor-market structures and selection mechanisms for immigrants. Whereas labor-market demand reduces the likelihood of immigrant overeducation in both countries, the role of supply-side factors varies: a higher supply of university-educated immigrants is positively associated with the likelihood of overeducation in Canada, but not in the United States, pointing to an oversupply of high-skilled immigrants relative to Canada’s smaller economy. Also, in Canada the overeducation rate is significantly lower for immigrants who came through employer selection (i.e., those who worked in Canada before obtaining permanent residence) than for those admitted directly from abroad through the point system. Overall, the findings suggest that a merit-based immigration system likely works better when it takes into consideration domestic labor-market demand and the role of employer selection.

This article reconciles contrasting findings on the effect of access to employment on remigration by showing that this effect is actually heterogeneous and depends on migrants’ initial educational selection from the origin country. Combining longitudinal data from England and Wales (1971–2011) with data on educational attainment distributions in migrants’ origin countries, we find that the impact of being out of a job (unemployed or inactive) on the probability to remigrate is larger among migrants who were initially more positively selected in terms of educational attainment. This interaction effect appears stronger for male and recent migrants. Thus, in addition to migrants’ access to employment in the host country, the mismatch between migrants’ initial selection — that partly captures their premigration expectations — and their employment status at destination helps explain remigration behaviors.

Recent decades have seen a strong trend among democratic countries to extend voting rights at subnational levels to non-naturalized immigrants, creating substantial variation across countries in terms of voting eligibility rules for non-naturalized immigrants. Our knowledge of the consequences of these different systems for immigrant political integration is, however, limited. This article seeks to shed new light on this important issue by using Swedish data to study whether immigrants who face shorter residency requirements for voting eligibility in local elections are more likely to integrate politically. We find little compelling evidence that such is the case. The results suggest that immigrants who became eligible to vote after six to seven years were as likely to naturalize and vote in future elections in both the short and long run as those who received the right to vote after only three years of residency. Thus, although expanded franchise can be of symbolic, as well as practical, value, it is unlikely to be a panacea for immigrant political inclusion. The argument that early voting rights for non-naturalized immigrants is desirable since it helps speed up immigrant political integration should, therefore, be used with some care by those advocating for such reforms.

This article examines the 2013 migration policy liberalizations in Morocco and Turkey in order to understand whether predominantly “human rights-centric” or “diplomatic” factors influenced domestic decisions to reform migration policies. It uses original interview data collected in 2015, as well as policy documents, to examine the two reform processes and their initial consequences for migrants and refugees residing in each host state. While the academic literature on migration has focused on human rights-centric factors to understand historic migration policy reforms, Turkey and Morocco’s geopolitical and geographic positions between powerful neighbors to the north and important sending countries to the south mean that diplomatic factors are also key to understanding the incentives behind reform. This article’s findings have important implications for scholars of international migration, demonstrating that while countries like Morocco and Turkey may implement liberal and inclusive policies if there are diplomatic and economic gains to be had from doing so, such policies may have little impact on the everyday lives of individual migrants and refugees residing in these states and may be subject to reversals if such states’ geopolitical calculations change.

E-Verify is a federal electronic verification system that allows employers to check whether their newly hired workers are authorized to work in the United States. To use E-Verify, firms first must enroll with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Participation is voluntary for most private-sector employers in the United States, but eight states currently require all or most employers to use E-Verify. This article uses confidential data from DHS to examine patterns of employer enrollment in E-Verify. The results indicate that employers are much more likely to sign up in mandatory E-Verify states than in states without such mandates, but enrollment is still below 50 percent in states that require its use. Large employers are far more likely to sign up than small employers. In addition, employers are more likely to newly enroll in E-Verify when a state’s unemployment rate or the state’s population share of likely unauthorized immigrants rises. However, enrollment rates are lower in industries with higher shares of unauthorized workers. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that enrolling in the program is costly for employers in terms of both compliance and difficulty in hiring workers. A strictly enforced nationwide mandate that all employers use an employment eligibility program like E-Verify would be incompatible with the current reliance on a large unauthorized workforce. Allowing more workers to enter legally or legalizing existing workers might be necessary before implementing E-Verify nationally.

Immigration is among the most vividly discussed topics in Europe’s national parliaments in recent years, often with a particular emphasis on the inflow of Muslims. This article examines the link between articulations of national political parties (political elite discourses) and natives’ attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. It provides a nuanced view of this relationship by (i) distinguishing more (inclusionary) from less (exclusionary) immigration-friendly political elites and (ii) isolating natives’ openness toward two specific groups: Muslim immigrants and ethnically similar immigrants. Combining the European Social Survey with party manifesto data and other sources, the analysis reveals that political elite discourses perform better in explaining natives’ attitudes compared to national demographic or economic aspects. Native Europeans’ attitudes toward Muslim immigrants are more hostile in countries where political elites are more exclusionary and more welcoming where political elites are more inclusionary. In contrast, Europeans’ views on ethnically similar immigrants seem largely unaffected by exclusionary political elites. These findings suggest that political elites can play an important role in fostering or impeding immigrant integration by shaping public opinion, particularly toward more marginalized immigrant groups.

Over the last decade, issues related to immigration have become increasingly salient across Western democracies. This increasing salience has made it more important to understand people’s attitudes toward immigration, including the effects of media use on those attitudes. Differentiating between attitudes toward different types of immigration, attitudes toward immigration from different parts of the world, and perceptions of immigration’s impact, this article investigates the effects of media use on attitudes toward and perceptions of immigration in Sweden. Based on a three-year, three-wave panel study, it investigates the effects of media use on the individual level. Among other things, results show that there are limited effects of using traditional news media but more substantial effects on people’s immigration attitudes of using anti-immigration, right-wing alternative media and pro-immigration, left-wing alternative media. These findings imply that it is highly relevant to account for media use, especially alternative media use, when studying public attitudes toward immigration. Further, we find that variations in people’s immigration attitudes, to a high degree, depend on the type of immigration and on where migrants are coming from. This finding underlines the importance of measuring both of these aspects when the aim is understanding general attitudes toward immigration and/or key predictors behind immigration attitudes.