Perspectives on Psychological Science

Race plays an important role in how people think, develop, and behave. In the current article, we queried more than 26,000 empirical articles published between 1974 and 2018 in top-tier cognitive, developmental, and social psychology journals to document how often psychological research acknowledges this reality and to examine whether people who edit, write, and participate in the research are systematically connected. We note several findings. First, across the past five decades, psychological publications that highlight race have been rare, and although they have increased in developmental and social psychology, they have remained virtually nonexistent in cognitive psychology. Second, most publications have been edited by White editors, under which there have been significantly fewer publications that highlight race. Third, many of the publications that highlight race have been written by White authors who employed significantly fewer participants of color. In many cases, we document variation as a function of area and decade. We argue that systemic inequality exists within psychological research and that systemic changes are needed to ensure that psychological research benefits from diversity in editing, writing, and participation. To this end, and in the spirit of the field’s recent emphasis on metascience, we offer recommendations for journals and authors.

Social science researchers are predominantly liberal, and critics have argued this representation may reduce the robustness of research by embedding liberal values into the research process. In an adversarial collaboration, we examined whether the political slant of research findings in psychology is associated with lower rates of scientific replicability. We analyzed 194 original psychology articles reporting studies that had been subject to a later replication attempt (N = 1,331,413 participants across replications) by having psychology doctoral students (Study 1) and an online sample of U.S. residents (Study 2) from across the political spectrum code the political slant (liberal vs. conservative) of the original research abstracts. The methods and analyses were preregistered. In both studies, the liberal or conservative slant of the original research was not associated with whether the results were successfully replicated. The results remained consistent regardless of the ideology of the coder. Political slant was unrelated to both subsequent citation patterns and the original study’s effect size and not consistently related to the original study’s sample size. However, we found modest evidence that research with greater political slant—whether liberal or conservative—was less replicable, whereas statistical robustness consistently predicted replication success. We discuss the implications for social science, politics, and replicability.

Payne, Vuletich, and Lundberg’s bias-of-crowds model proposes that a number of empirical puzzles can be resolved by conceptualizing implicit bias as a feature of situations rather than a feature of individuals. In the present article we argue against this model and propose that, given the existing evidence, implicit bias is best understood as an individual-level construct measured with substantial error. First, using real and simulated data, we show how each of Payne and colleagues’ proposed puzzles can be explained as being the result of measurement error and its reduction via aggregation. Second, we discuss why the authors’ counterarguments against this explanation have been unconvincing. Finally, we test a hypothesis derived from the bias-of-crowds model about the effect of an individually targeted “implicit-bias-based expulsion program” within universities and show the model to lack empirical support. We conclude by considering the implications of conceptualizing implicit bias as a noisily measured individual-level construct for ongoing implicit-bias research. All data and code are available at https://osf.io/tj8u6/.

The cultivation of compassion through meditation training is of increasing interest to scientists, health-care providers, educators, and policymakers as an approach to help address challenging personal and social issues. Yet people encounter critical inner psychological barriers to compassion that limit the effectiveness of compassion training—including the lack of a secure base, aversion to suffering, feeling alone in suffering, and reductive impressions of others. These barriers emerge, in part, from a lack of relational support and are exacerbated by modernist conceptions that present meditation as an autonomous, self-help practice. This article proposes a solution centered on relationality that is derived from the integration of diverse areas of psychology with contemplative traditions. Theories and findings from social, developmental, and health psychology can inform meditation programs and help recover important relational elements of compassion training from traditional cultures that address common barriers to compassion and thus promote more sustainable and inclusive care. In so doing, this article illustrates the value of psychological theories for translating important contextual elements from contemplative traditions into diverse modern settings.

Surveys indicate that at all educational levels students often use relatively ineffective study strategies. One potential remedy is to include learning-strategy training into students’ educational experiences. A major challenge, however, is that it has proven difficult to design training protocols that support students’ self-regulation and transfer of effective learning strategies across a range of content. In this article we propose a practical theoretical framework called the knowledge, belief, commitment, and planning (KBCP) framework for guiding strategy training to promote students’ successful self-regulation of effective learning strategies. The KBCP framework rests on the assumption that four essential components must be included in training to support sustained strategy self-regulation: (a) acquiring knowledge about strategies, (b) belief that the strategy works, (c) commitment to using the strategy, and (d) planning of strategy implementation. We develop these assumptions in the context of pertinent research and suggest that each component alone is not sufficient to promote sustained learning-strategy self-regulation. Our intent in developing this learning-strategy training framework is to stimulate renewed interest and effort in investigating how to effectively train learning strategies and their self-regulation and to guide systematic research and application in this area. We close by sketching an example of a concrete training protocol based on the KBCP framework.

To reach longer-term goals and live aligned with their values, people typically must regulate their behavior. Effortful self-control is one way to achieve this and is usually framed as a forceful struggle between lower-level impulses and higher-level cognitive control processes. For example, people may restrain themselves from eating cake in order to lose weight. An alternative avenue of self-regulation draws on autonomous motivation: Individuals eat healthfully because it is values-congruent or intrinsically satisfying. Recent advances in the understanding of reward valuation on a neural level (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex/orbitofrontal cortex) and emerging treatments on a clinical level (e.g., mindfulness training) suggest a possible mechanistic convergence between brain and behavior that is consistent with a shift from forced to unforced behavior change. Here we propose how an overlooked aspect of reinforcement learning can be leveraged using a simple yet critical feature of experience that is not reliant on willpower: Bringing awareness to one’s subjective experience and behavior can produce a change in valuation of learned but unhealthy behaviors, leading to self-regulatory shifts that result in sustainable behavior change without force.

Ever since Endel Tulving first distinguished between episodic and semantic memory, the remember/know paradigm has become a standard means of probing the phenomenology of participants’ memorial experiences by memory researchers, neuropsychologists, neuroscientists, and others. However, this paradigm has not been without its problems and has been used to capture many different phenomenological experiences, including retrieval from episodic versus semantic memory, recollection versus familiarity, strength of memory traces, and so on. We first conducted a systematic review of its uses across the literature and then examined how memory experts, other cognitive psychology experts, experts in other areas of psychology, and lay participants (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers) define what it means when one says “I remember” and “I know.” From coding their open-ended responses using a number of theory-bound dimensions, it seems that lay participants do not see eye to eye with memory experts in terms of associating “I remember” responses with recollection and “I know” responses with familiarity. However, there is general consensus with Tulving’s original distinction, linking remembering with memory for events and knowing with semantic memory. Recommendations and implications across fields are discussed.

In 2015, the American Psychological Association (APA) released a task-force technical report on video-game violence with a concurrent resolution statement linking violent games to aggression but not violent crime. The task-force report has proven to be controversial; many scholars have criticized language implying conclusive evidence linking violent games to aggression as well as technical concerns regarding the meta-analysis that formed the basis of the technical report and resolution statement. In the current article, we attempt a reevaluation of the 2015 technical report meta-analysis. The intent of this reevaluation was to examine whether the data foundations behind the APA’s resolution on video-game violence were sound. Reproducing the original meta-analysis proved difficult because some studies were included that did not appear to have relevant data, and many other available studies were not included. The current analysis revealed negligible relationships between violent games and aggressive or prosocial behavior, small relationships with aggressive affect and cognitions, and stronger relationships with desensitization. However, effect sizes appeared to be elevated because of non-best-practices and researcher-expectancy effects, particularly for experimental studies. It is concluded that evidence warrants a more cautious interpretation of the effects of violent games on aggression than provided by the APA technical report or resolution statement.