Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Empathy plays a critical role in fostering and maintaining social relations. Narcissists lack empathy, and this may account for their interpersonal failures. But why do narcissists lack empathy? Are they incapable, or is change possible? Three studies addressed this question. Study 1 showed that the link between narcissism and low empathy generalizes to a specific target person presented in a vignette. The effect was driven by maladaptive narcissistic components (i.e., entitlement, exploitativeness, exhibitionism). Study 2 examined the effect of perspective-taking (vs. control) instructions on self-reported responses to a video. Study 3 examined the effect of the same manipulation on autonomic arousal (heart rate [HR]) during an audio-recording. Perspective-taking ameliorated negative links between maladaptive narcissism and both self-reported empathy and HR. That is, narcissists can be moved by another’s suffering, if they take that person’s perspective. The findings demonstrate that narcissists’ low empathy does not reflect inability, implying potential for intervention.

Past work has linked mindfulness to improved emotion regulation, interpersonal skills, and basic cognitive abilities, but is unclear about the relation between mindfulness and creativity. Studies examining effects of mindfulness on factors pertinent to creativity suggest a uniform and positive relation, whereas work on specific mindfulness skills suggests that mindfulness skills may differentially predict creativity. To test whether the relation between mindfulness and creativity is positive and uniform (the uniform hypothesis) or differentially depends on particular components of mindfulness (the differential hypothesis), we conducted four studies in which mindfulness skills were measured, extensively trained, or manipulated with a short, incidental meditation session. Results supported a differential relation between mindfulness and creativity: Only the ability to observe and attend to various stimuli consistently and positively predicted creativity. Results regarding other mindfulness skills were less consistent. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

When people pursue important goals, they are often surrounded by close others who could provide help and support for the achievement of these goals. The present work investigated whether people are more likely to be open to such interpersonal goal support from a romantic partner when they perceive their goals as being easy versus difficult. Using a multiple methods approach, three studies revealed that, compared with the pursuit of easy goals, when people pursue difficult goals, they are less likely to seek out and be open to support from their romantic partner. Studies 2 and 3 revealed that the effect of goal difficulty on openness to support was partially mediated by loss in self-efficacy. Finally, Study 3 revealed that lack of openness to support can have detrimental long-term consequences for the relationship, as it undermines relationship well-being.

Most prior research on cultures of honor has focused on interpersonal aggression. The present studies examined the novel hypothesis that honor-culture ideology enhances the stigmatization of mental health needs and inhibits the use of mental health services. Study 1 demonstrated that people who strongly endorsed honor-related beliefs and values were especially concerned that seeking help for mental health needs would indicate personal weakness and would harm their reputations. Studies 2 and 3 showed that honor states in the U.S. South and West invested less in mental healthcare resources, compared with non-honor states in the North (Study 2), and that parents living in honor states were less likely than parents in non-honor states to use mental health services on behalf of their children (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal an overlooked consequence of honor ideology for psychological well-being at the individual, social, and institutional levels.

Mortality salience (MS) strengthens cultural values but individuals might differ in whether this process operates at a superficial, explicit level only or also at a profound, implicit level. Two studies investigated whether explicit and implicit attitudes toward Muslims after an MS induction vary as a function of threat-related action orientation (AOT), an efficient form of self-regulation of emotion and behavior that draws on the activation of the implicit, integrated self. In Study 1, there was a main effect of MS on explicit prejudice but only participants with high levels of AOT showed reduced implicit prejudice following MS. In Study 2, this interaction effect was replicated using an alternative implicit measure of prejudice. Defense in response to MS might thus not be a uniform phenomenon but might be composed of processes operating on different (i.e., profound vs. superficial) levels that vary with types of self-regulation such as high versus low AOT.

After failure, individuals frequently turn to others for support. The current research examined the process through which individuals utilize interpersonal relationships to stabilize threatened self-views. We may seek support to reassure us with warmth and acceptance after a self-threat, or to provide support for threatened self-knowledge. We proposed that although both types of support are likely to repair the affective consequences of a self-threat, only interacting with others who can provide evidence from the individuals’ past that reconfirms a threatened self-aspect would help stabilize the self-concept. Two studies demonstrated that, for individuals who have suffered a self-threat, receiving specific evidentiary support for the threatened self-aspect was more effective at restoring confidence in both the specific self-aspect and at recovering self-concept clarity than was receiving emotional support, whether the interaction was imagined (Study 1), or offered in person (Study 2) after the threat.

In three studies, we examined (a) whether conservatives possess a stronger desire to share reality than liberals and are therefore more likely to perceive consensus with politically like-minded others even for non-political judgments and, if so, (b) whether motivated perceptions of consensus would give conservatives an edge in progressing toward collective goals. In Study 1, participants estimated ingroup consensus on non-political judgments. Conservatives perceived more ingroup consensus than liberals, regardless of the amount of actual consensus. The desire to share reality mediated the relationship between ideology and perceived ingroup consensus. Study 2 replicated these results and demonstrated that perceiving ingroup consensus predicted a sense of collective efficacy in politics. In Study 3, experimental manipulations of affiliative motives eliminated ideological differences in the desire to share reality. A sense of collective efficacy predicted intentions to vote in a major election. Implications for the attainment of shared goals are discussed.

Psychologists have amassed robust evidence of antigay prejudice by assessing participants’ global attitudes toward sexual minorities and their reactions to behavioral descriptions of hypothetical targets. In daily interactions, however, perceivers make decisions about others’ sexual orientations based upon visible cues alone. Does antigay prejudice arise on the basis of such visual exposure, and if so, why? Three studies revealed that perceivers evaluated women they categorized as lesbians more negatively than women they categorized as straight. Moreover, prejudice against lesbian women was strongly tethered to gendered aspects of their facial appearance: Women categorized as lesbians tended to appear gender-atypical, and women who appeared gender-atypical were perceived to be unattractive, leading to prejudice. Similar findings did not emerge for men categorized as gay. As such, we argue that gendered appearance cues lay the perceptual foundation for prejudice against women, but not men, who are categorized as sexual minorities.

The present research investigated whether having out-group friends serves as a buffer for feeling misunderstood in interracial interactions. Across three experience sampling studies, we found that among ethnic minorities who have few White friends or are not interacting with White friends, daily interracial interactions are associated with feeling less understood. By contrast, we found that among ethnic minorities who have more White friends or are interacting with White friends, the relationship between daily interracial interactions and feeling understood is not significant. We did not find similar results for Whites; that is, having ethnic minority friends did not play a role in the relationship between daily interracial interactions and feeling understood. Together, these studies demonstrate the beneficial effects of intergroup friendships for ethnic minorities.

Liberals and conservatives disagree about obeying authorities, with conservatives holding the more positive views. We suggest that reactions to conservative authorities, rather than to obedience itself, are responsible for the division. Past findings that conservatives favor obedience uniformly confounded obedience with conservative authorities. We break down obedience to authority into its constituent parts to test the divisiveness of each part. The concepts of obedience (Study 1) and authority (Study 2) recruited inferences of conservative authorities, conflating results of simple, seemingly face valid tests of their divisiveness. These results establish necessary features of a valid test, to which Study 3 conforms. Conservatives have the more positive moral views of obedience only when the authorities are conservative (e.g., commanding officers); liberals do when the authorities are liberal (e.g., environmentalists). The two camps agree about obeying ideologically neutral authorities (e.g., office managers). Obedience itself is not ideologically divisive.

Three studies offer novel evidence addressing the consequences of explicit–implicit sexual orientation (SO) ambivalence. In Study 1, self-identified straight females completed explicit and implicit measures of SO. The results revealed that participants with greater SO ambivalence took longer responding to explicit questions about their sexual preferences, an effect moderated by the direction of ambivalence. Study 2 replicated this effect using a different paradigm. Study 3 included self-identified straight and gay female and male participants; participants completed explicit and implicit measures of SO, plus measures of self-esteem and affect regarding their SO. Among straight participants, the response time results replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2. Among gay participants, trends suggested that SO ambivalence influenced time spent deliberating on explicit questions relevant to sexuality, but in a different way. Furthermore, the amount and direction of SO ambivalence was related to self-esteem.