Personality and Social Psychology Review

Social constructionism and experimental social psychology represent two complementary paradigms for understanding human social behavior, but over the last quarter century they have remained oddly and unnecessarily estranged from one another In this article, we trace the history of social constructionist thought and find that the intellectual lineage and guiding assumptions of these two subcultures of social psychology are essentially the same. Next, we clarify the philosophical and ideological bases of their divide to determine how wide the rift really is. Although the differences may appear to be unbridgeable, we argue that a rapprochement is both possible and desirable. At the level of metatheory, Donald Campbell and William J. McGuire have demonstrated that constructionist and empirical insights can be usefully integrated in social psychology. At the level of empirical research, studies of the situated self-concept, social identity, collective representation, attitudes as temporary constructions, communication and shared reality, and cultural psychology have progressed through the incorporation of constructionist themes. Similar opportunities await researchers who explore the contextual bases of history, ideology, and other shared systems of meaning and their implications for social psychology. Finally, we identify some substantive and stylistic complementarities of social constructionism and experimental social psychology and analyze their joint potential for contributing to a well-balanced discipline of social psychology that is worthy of both parts of its name.

Jost and Kruglanski (this issue) offer a compelling vision of the professional gains to be derived from a thoroughgoing rapprochement between constructionist and experimental inquiry in social psychology. They effectively establish grounds for dialogue of great importance to the future of the field. While I concur with much that they propose, I would like to make an important distinction between the foundational premises that guide these differing endeavors and the ongoing practices of inquiry. By addressing the ungrounded character of both empiricist and constructionist metatheory, we are better able to explore the pragmatic consequences of the various forms of theory, methods, and politics invited by experimental and constructionist approaches.

Constructionism, and specifically discursive psychology, has an enriched view of science rather than being against science. Whatever the political merits of experimentation, discursive psychologists have made specific criticisms with respect to the difficulty of capturing central features of social action and interaction using experiments. They have developed rigorous analytic techniques for the study of records of natural action. These avoid a number of the problems with experimental research and have the advantage of directly studying action located in its home settings. Social psychology would benefit if such work were both represented in, and engaged with, in APA journals.

I concur with Jost and Kruglanski (this issue) that the rift between social constructivist and experimental social psychology is bigger than it need be. I do so by showing that many social-psychological theories predict why we have the rift that we do. I use this method to point out that self-reflexivity is possible and desirable. This is especially the case when we try to consider how our own political and historical context influences our work. I give examples from my teaching of social psychology, and of contemporary research that has been informed by both social constructivist criticisms and by knowledge of experimental methods.

The science of social psychology would benefit from a renewed commitment to big brash theory. Jost and Kruglanski (this issue) suggest that social constructionist themes and attitudes may be useful in this regard. I elaborate further on the ways in which social constructionist theory can indeed inspire conceptual boldness but warn that constructionist approaches can also be conceptually constraining. Social psychology will benefit most if social psychologists emulate social constructionists' willingness to engage in “unnecessary” speculation but rebel against constructionists' unwillingness to seek universally applicable theories. Social constructionism challenges us to confront big questions, and the science of social psychology will best be spurred forward if we respond to that challenge by seeking big bold answers.

This article proposes an adaptive connectionist model that implements an attributional account of cognitive dissonance. The model represents an attitude as the connection between the attitude object and behavioral-affective outcomes. Dissonance arises when circumstantial constraints induce a mismatch between the model's (mental) prediction and discrepant behavior or affect. Reduction of dissonance by attitude change is accomplished through long-lasting changes in the connection weights using the error-correcting delta learning algorithm. The model can explain both the typical effects predicted by dissonance theory as well as some atypical effects (i.e., reinforcement effect), using this principle of weight changes and by giving a prominent role to affective experiences. The model was implemented in a standard feedforward connectionist network. Computer simulations showed an adequate fit with several classical dissonance paradigms (inhibition, initiation, forced compliance, free choice, & misattribution), as well as novel studies that underscore the role of affect. A comparison with an earlier constraint satisfaction approach (Shultz & Lepper, 1996) indicates that the feedforward implementation provides a similar fit with these shortcomings of this previous model.

We examine reference values used in self-regulation research and identify two functions they fulfill: a standard function and a goal function. The standard function occurs when a reference value represents a desired state for the self in the present whereas the goal function occurs when a reference value represents a desired state for the self in the future. We argue that different factors influence the emotional, motivational, and behavioral outcomes of these functions. The magnitude of any discrepancy with a “standard” is important, whereas for a “goal,” the rate of discrepancy reduction, relative to an “expected” rate, is important. A review of the empirical literature supports these propositions. Consequently, we propose that future research should in-corporate our distinction between these two functions.

The present article reviews evidence for the malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. In contrast to assumptions that such responses are fixed and inescapable, it is shown that automatic stereotypes and prejudice are influenced by, (a) self- and social motives, (b) specific strategies, (c) the perceiver's focus of attention, and (d) the configuration of stimulus cues. In addition, group members' individual characteristics are shown to influence the extent to which (global) stereotypes and prejudice are automatically activated. This evidence has significant implications for conceptions of automaticity, models of stereotyping and prejudice, and attitude representation. The review concludes with the description of an initial model of early social information processing.