Psychological Science

This article introduces a new approach for evaluating replication results. It combines effect-size estimation with hypothesis testing, assessing the extent to which the replication results are consistent with an effect size big enough to have been detectable in the original study. The approach is demonstrated by examining replications of three well-known findings. Its benefits include the following: (a) differentiating “unsuccessful” replication attempts (i.e., studies yielding p > .05) that are too noisy from those that actively indicate the effect is undetectably different from zero, (b) “protecting” true findings from underpowered replications, and (c) arriving at intuitively compelling inferences in general and for the revisited replications in particular.

More than 100 years after Shakespeare’s death, Lewis Theobald published Double Falsehood, a play supposedly sourced from a lost play by Shakespeare and John Fletcher. Since its release, scholars have attempted to determine its true authorship. Using new approaches to language and psychological analysis, we examined Double Falsehood and the works of Theobald, Shakespeare, and Fletcher. Specifically, we created a psychological signature from each author’s language and statistically compared the features of each signature with those of Double Falsehood’s signature. Multiple analytic approaches converged in suggesting that Double Falsehood’s psychological style and content architecture predominantly resemble those of Shakespeare, showing some similarity with Fletcher’s signature and only traces of Theobald’s. Closer inspection revealed that Shakespeare’s influence is most apparent early in the play, whereas Fletcher’s is most apparent in later acts. Double Falsehood has a psychological signature consistent with that expected to be present in the long-lost play The History of Cardenio, cowritten by Shakespeare and Fletcher.

Adolescence is a period of life in which peer relationships become increasingly important. Adolescents have a greater likelihood of taking risks when they are with peers rather than alone. In this study, we investigated the development of social influence on risk perception from late childhood through adulthood. Five hundred and sixty-three participants rated the riskiness of everyday situations and were then informed about the ratings of a social-influence group (teenagers or adults) before rating each situation again. All age groups showed a significant social-influence effect, changing their risk ratings in the direction of the provided ratings; this social-influence effect decreased with age. Most age groups adjusted their ratings more to conform to the ratings of the adult social-influence group than to the ratings of the teenager social-influence group. Only young adolescents were more strongly influenced by the teenager social-influence group than they were by the adult social-influence group, which suggests that to early adolescents, the opinions of other teenagers about risk matter more than the opinions of adults.

Using the emergent friendship network of an incoming cohort of students in an M.B.A. program, we examined the role of extraversion in shaping social networks. Extraversion has two important implications for the emergence of network ties: a popularity effect, in which extraverts accumulate more friends than introverts do, and a homophily effect, in which the more similar are two people’s levels of extraversion, the more likely they are to become friends. These effects result in a systematic network extraversion bias, in which people’s social networks will tend to be overpopulated with extraverts and underpopulated with introverts. Moreover, the most extraverted people have the greatest network extraversion bias, and the most introverted people have the least network extraversion bias. Our finding that social networks were systematically misrepresentative of the broader social environment raises questions about whether there is a societal bias toward believing other people are more extraverted than they actually are and whether introverts are better socially calibrated than extraverts.

Most people have experienced distressing events that they would rather forget. Although memories of such events become less intrusive with time for the majority of people, those with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are afflicted by vivid, recurrent memories of their trauma. Often triggered by reminders in the daily environment, these memories can cause severe distress and impairment. We propose that difficulties with intrusive memories in PTSD arise in part from a deficit in engaging inhibitory control to suppress episodic retrieval. We tested this hypothesis by adapting the think/no-think paradigm to investigate voluntary memory suppression of aversive scenes cued by naturalistic reminders. Retrieval suppression was compromised significantly in PTSD patients, compared with trauma-exposed control participants. Furthermore, patients with the largest deficits in suppression-induced forgetting were also those with the most severe PTSD symptoms. These results raise the possibility that prefrontal mechanisms supporting inhibitory control over memory are impaired in PTSD.

There are large racial disparities in school discipline in the United States, which, for Black students, not only contribute to school failure but also can lay a path toward incarceration. Although the disparities have been well documented, the psychological mechanisms underlying them are unclear. In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that such disparities are, in part, driven by racial stereotypes that can lead teachers to escalate their negative responses to Black students over the course of multiple interpersonal (e.g., teacher-to-student) encounters. More generally, we argue that race not only can influence how perceivers interpret a specific behavior, but also can enhance perceivers’ detection of behavioral patterns across time. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical benefits of employing this novel approach to stereotyping across a range of real-world settings.

Observers experience biases in visual processing for objects within easy reach of their hands; these biases may assist them in evaluating items that are candidates for action. I investigated the hypothesis that hand postures that afford different types of actions differentially bias vision. Across three experiments, participants performed global-motion-detection and global-form-perception tasks while their hands were positioned (a) near the display in a posture affording a power grasp, (b) near the display in a posture affording a precision grasp, or (c) in their laps. Although the power-grasp posture facilitated performance on the motion-detection task, the precision-grasp posture instead facilitated performance on the form-perception task. These results suggest that the visual system weights processing on the basis of an observer’s current affordances for specific actions: Fast and forceful power grasps enhance temporal sensitivity, whereas detail-oriented precision grasps enhance spatial sensitivity.

Adults’ social evaluations are influenced by their perception of other people’s competence and motivation: Helping when it is difficult to help is praiseworthy, and not helping when it is easy to help is reprehensible. Here, we look at whether children’s social evaluations are affected by the costs that agents incur. We found that toddlers can use the time and effort associated with goal-directed actions to distinguish agents, and that children prefer agents who incur fewer costs in completing a goal. When two agents refuse to help, children retain a preference for the more competent agent but infer that the less competent agent is nicer. These results suggest that children value agents who incur fewer costs, but understand that failure to engage in a low-cost action implies a lack of motivation. We propose that a naive utility calculus underlies inferences from the costs and rewards of goal-directed action and thereby supports social cognition.

In the study reported here, I tracked one process through which stereotypes affect choice. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) and a measurement of predecisional information distortion were used to assess the influence of the association between male gender and career on the evaluation of information related to the job performance of stereotypical targets (male) and nonstereotypical targets (female). When the IAT revealed a strong association between male gender and career and the installed leader in the choice process was a stereotypical target, decision makers supported the leader with more proleader distortion; when the IAT revealed a strong association between male gender and career and the installed leader in the choice process was a nonstereotypical target, decision makers supported the trailer with less antitrailer distortion. A stronger association between male gender and career therefore resulted in an upward shift of the evaluation related to the stereotypical target (both as a trailer and a leader), which subsequently biased choice.

Basic visual features (e.g., color, orientation) are assumed to be processed in the same general way across different visual tasks. Here, a significant deviation from this assumption was predicted on the basis of the analysis of stimulus spatial structure, as characterized by the Boolean-map notion. If a task requires memorizing the orientations of a set of bars, then the map consisting of those bars can be readily used to hold the overall structure in memory and will thus be especially useful. If the task requires visual search for a target, then the map, which contains only an overall structure, will be of little use. Supporting these predictions, the present study demonstrated that in comparison to stimulus colors, bar orientations were processed more efficiently in change-detection tasks but less efficiently in visual search tasks (Cohen’s d = 4.24). In addition to offering support for the role of the Boolean map in conscious access, the present work also throws doubts on the generality of processing visual features.