Political Studies

This article adapts and develops the idea of a cynical or ‘stealth’ understanding of politics to explore how citizens’ estrangement from formal politics is processed cognitively through a populist lens. Earlier work has shown the widespread presence of stealth attitudes in the United States and Finland. We show that stealth attitudes are also well established in Britain, demonstrate their populist character and reveal that age, newspaper readership and concerns about governing practices help predict their adoption by individuals. Yet our survey findings also reveal a larger body of positive attitudes towards the practice of democracy suggesting that there is scope for challenging populist cynicism. We explore these so-called ‘sunshine’ attitudes and connect them to the reform options favoured by British citizens. If we are to challenge populist negativity towards politics, we conclude that improving the operation of representative politics is more important than offering citizens new forms of more deliberative participation.

Political interest is a crucial precursor to political engagement, but little is known about how to stimulate greater interest. The article explores the role social motives have in generating interest. A laboratory experiment is used in which it is possible to manipulate beliefs about the social rewards of political engagement as well as external efficacy beliefs. Across two types of measures for political interest (self-reports and revealed preferences), connecting political engagement with social rewards led to substantial increases in political interest. Moreover, these effects were particularly strong among individuals with low levels of external efficacy. Ultimately, the data provide clear evidence that political interest can be positively stimulated with social rewards mobilisation techniques and that it is rooted in beliefs about the potential motives pursuable through politics. The paper concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of these results for studies of political participation and mobilisation efforts.

Digital media continue to reshape political activism in unexpected ways. Within a period of a few years, the internet-enabled UK citizens’ movement 38 Degrees has amassed a membership of 3 million and now sits alongside similar entities such as America’s MoveOn, Australia’s GetUp! and the transnational movement Avaaz. In this article, we contribute to current thinking about digital media and mobilisation by addressing some of the limitations of existing research on these movements and on digital activism more generally. We show how 38 Degrees’ digital network repertoires coexist interdependently with its strategy of gaining professional news media coverage. We explain how the oscillations between choreographic leadership and member influence and between digital media horizontalism and elite media-centric work constitute the space of interdependencies in which 38 Degrees acts. These delicately balanced relations can quickly dissolve and be replaced by simpler relations of dependence on professional media. Yet despite its fragility, we theorise about how 38 Degrees may boost individuals’ political efficacy, irrespective of the outcome of individual campaigns. Our conceptual framework can be used to guide research on similar movements.

While much is known about the micro-level predictors of political knowledge, there have been relatively few efforts to study the potential macro-level causes of knowledge. Seeking to improve our understanding of country-based variation in knowledge, this article demonstrates that individuals have an easier time finding and interpreting information in political environments that provide the public with greater opportunities to engage, observe, and learn about the political process. To investigate that possibility, the article analyzes how the procedural quality of the political process affects political knowledge. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the Worldwide Governance Indicators Project, survey analyses show that the transparency and responsiveness of a political system indeed influence the public’s information about political parties and, to a lesser extent, the amount of factual knowledge retained by survey respondents. In other words, the quality of democratic governance affects how much individuals know about the political process.

This article extends and tests the trust-as-evaluation approach that is dominant in political science. Citizens supposedly grant and withhold trust in politics based on an assessment of its merits. We argue that the relevance of performances and processes should be conditional on the values that citizens hold dear and the accuracy with which they perceive them. Through multilevel analyses of the European Value Survey 2008, we model the (conditional) effects of a wide range of macro-economic outcomes and procedural characteristics on two aspects of political trust: satisfaction with democracy and confidence in political institutions. We find that macro-economic outcomes do not relate to political trust once we control for corruption. The effects of corruption and macro-economic outcomes are indeed stronger among the higher educated. However, the effect of macro-economic outcomes is not conditional on citizens’ values. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings for the use of the trust-as-evaluation approach.

This article describes and explains a significant tightening in bank capital regulation in the United Kingdom since the 2008 financial crisis. The banks fiercely resisted the new capital regulations but in a novel theoretical contribution we argue that the structural power of business was reduced due to the changing ideas of state leaders, by changing institutional arrangements within the state and by wider open politicisation of banking reform.

Business interest groups are crucial actors for tax policy-making, but it is still unclear under which conditions they are more successful than politicians in shaping taxation. This article argues that centralised coordination and high levels of policy integration make business interest groups more influential in the tax policy-making process. If there is no ideological convergence between agenda setters and business, highly centralised and well-integrated business interest groups are more successful in blocking or softening revenue-raising tax reforms or simply transferring tax burdens to consumers or non-organised citizens. To evaluate this theoretical framework, I have compiled an original dataset on business groups and associations for 18 countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2010. This theory uncovers a strong link between the patterns of business coordination and the feasibility of implementing distributive tax policies. This article also contributes to the study of business politics beyond the limited sample of developed countries.

Although it is theoretically relevant, the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on vote choice remains a largely unexplored area in the field of party strategy. The article addresses this gap by focusing on the Italian regional elections, where the electoral rules allow parties to run alone and, at the same time, to present pre-electoral coalitions on the ballot paper. This setting allows us to investigate under what conditions citizens vote for their preferred party and the coalition that this party indicated to coalesce with. The results suggest that ideological congruence and the size of the parties entering a pre-electoral agreement are decisive factors. Findings also reveal that the time elapsed since the establishment of a coalition has no effect on vote choice.

This study presents a contextual explanation of regime support by arguing that although an individual’s instrumental economic calculation and intrinsic democratic value are important predictors of political support, the extent to which they matter is contingent on the nature of the regime, as defined primarily by democracy. Using data drawn from the second wave of the Asia Barometer, we find that economic perceptions are less important for regime support in democratic countries than they are in authoritarian countries, and an affection for democracy makes people more critical of the political system in authoritarian countries than in democratic countries.

What determines threat perceptions in the context of potential interstate conflict? We argue that such perceptions are to an important extent driven by domestic political cleavages and ideological differences. The ideology effects are often surprising and are more complex than the conventional wisdom would indicate. We specify the conditions under which conservatives may favor the economic rise of rising powers. Concern about budget deficits affects not only domestic political preferences but also threat perceptions. Finally, civil libertarianism in certain contexts can lead to isolationist preferences. We test these claims using the 2012 American National Election Studies data about the perceptions of American citizens of the economic and military rise of China, and of potential American responses to Iran’s nuclear program.

Is it ever justified to ‘nudge’ people towards their own health? In this article, we argue that it is. We do so by arguing (1) that nudges are not necessarily – as is commonly thought – manipulative; (2) that even those nudges that are manipulative can be justified, for instance, when they preserve rather than violate people’s autonomy; and (3) that even if nudges can be said to violate some people’s autonomy, they can still be the legitimate outcome of genuinely democratic procedures. While we do not regard nudging as the solution to all or even most public health problems, we argue for a piecemeal approach that carefully considers its benefits and downsides in light of the various values involved and the alternatives at hand.

Rhetorical scholarship has significantly contributed to our understanding of the role of confrontation in engendering social and political change, but it traditionally over-emphasises its moral aspect, which results in the simplification of public issues and the radicalisation of identities. This article introduces a distinct form of political rhetoric and analyses the rhetorical conventions that constitute it. Drawing material from the anti-mining movement formed in the region of Halkidiki, Greece, the article proposes that disputatious rhetoric, through employing the techniques of parrēsia, melodrama and antithesis, proves pertinent to the articulation of dissent, the formation of collective subjects, and the projection of a counter-hegemonic discourse which challenges dominant neoliberal practices and discourses. Disputatious rhetoric, the article concludes, encodes the possibility of social and political change, not least because it impacts on the meaning attributed to actions and prevents the solidification of a single narrative or discourse as commonsensical.

According to a prominent forward-looking justification of territorial (jurisdictional) rights, people may establish such rights over a piece of land if they develop economic and/or religious-cultural life plans the satisfaction of which requires controlling it. This argument suffers from a gap problem. The relevant life plans can be satisfied without granting their holders jurisdictional authority. Having lesser entitlements, such as occupancy rights, is sufficient. In this article, I offer a new forward-looking justification which plugs this justificatory gap. It follows the general framework of life plans-arguments, but develops a new category of plans: a person’s political plan to exercise her democratic autonomy as a citizen of the state under which she (or her group) has lived, or is living.

In his autobiography, Thomas Hobbes stated that he wrote his most influential work of political theory, Leviathan, to “absolve the divine laws” in response to “atrocious crimes being attributed to the commands of God.” This article attempts to take Hobbes seriously, and to read Leviathan as a contribution to the religious politics of the English Civil War. I demonstrate Hobbes’ appropriation of the religious terms and sources characterizing civil-war political discourse, and explore these terms and sources both in Hobbes’ response to religiously motivated politics and in the foundations of his most important political ideas. Hobbes emerges from this account as a critic of Christian politics and enthusiasm broadly conceived, as a political philosopher who employed an Israelite political model, and as an erstwhile ally of some of those usually considered his deepest opponents.