Rationality and Society

This article discusses the central role of subjective rationality in the social sciences, particularly sociology. Actions need not produce good outcomes to be subjectively rational, but need only be carried out for reasons seen as good by the actor. The article examines a class of reasons that are both good (that is, subjectively rational) and invalid, that is, not objectively rational. An imaginary dialogue between David Hume and Anthony Downs is used to illustrate the way in which the apparent irrationality of ideology can be incorporated into subjective rationality. The social use of magic and the case of false beliefs are examined as further examples in the same class. Finally, the way in which good mental procedures can lead to false beliefs is examined.

Theoretical and experimental studies of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma have yielded a central insight into the logic of cooperation: the principle of reciprocity. However, previous models, based on either rational-actor or evolutionary processes of optimization, entail unduly restrictive assumptions. This essay proposes a behavioral alternative in which reciprocity is interpreted as operant conditioning - rewarding cooperation and punishing defection. The proposed stochastic learning model shows how players with no grasp of the structure of their relationship can escape social traps via random walk. Insights drawn from the two-person problem are then extended to multilateral encounters.

The study of compositional effects is a central interest of sociologists in the field of educational research. In particular, the positive effect of the average achievement level of classes and ability groups on individual achievements of students has attracted much attention. This article presents a rational-choice theoretical model that (1) explains this compositional effect, (2) explains the differential effect of ability grouping on the achievements of low-and high-achieving students, and (3) predicts that the compositional effect is larger for low-achieving than for high-achieving students. By introducing new assumptions the model can be used to produce new hypotheses. This is illustrated by a derivation of hypotheses about the effects of different disciplinary climates on schools. It is concluded that a rational choice model can provide explanatory mechanisms currently lacking in research on compositional effects.

Historians commonly assume that the Old Regime monarchy in France attempted to eliminate corporate society in order to create liberal institutions. They also assume that the centralization of state power occurred at the expense of such corporate bodies as provincial estates, the municipal corporations, and the village communities. By contrast, I argue that those institutions were not vestiges of an earlier society waiting to be swept away by the stronger, more unified modern state. Instead, I believe that corporate bodies not only flourished under the Old Regime, but contributed to the functioning of the absolute state.

This article explores the implications of the use of time (the scarce input) in voluntary associations where members are rational maximizers but use time both “egoistically” and by “helping” others. The model leads to a picture of individuals subject to an internal prisoners' dilemma. In addition, the association is assumed to operate a division of labor where the use of “egoistic” time by one member impacts upon the utility of others. The interplay of three interrelated games is studied and implications for the use of time in associations are derived.