Studies in Christian Ethics

The article examines sin through the lens of forgetfulness, as both are phenomena situated between passivity and activity, and intricately linked in the biblical tradition. It shows how the propensity to forget God is rooted in a particular form of presence that is characteristic of YHWH. The narrative of the making of the golden calf is analysed for its potential to highlight the ‘predicament’ peculiar to the Jewish and Christian faiths: to seek a more palpable divine presence than that in the word alone. The article explores this theme further by way of theologically juxtaposing the calf with the Agnus Dei and offering considerations on conscience, confession and the opacity of the Christian life.

A presupposition of this essay is that a Christian understanding of sin should give attention to the emotions (or passions). Taking anger as a case in point, an account is offered of the paraenēsis in Eph. 4:26 where anger and sin are juxtaposed. The main argument is that the teaching about anger has to be situated in relation to the moral-theological vision of Ephesians as a whole, central to which is the coming together as one of Jews and Gentiles in the Church. Anger is a sin, if it undermines the eschatological oneness of the Body of Christ.

Knowledge of sins of speech derives from knowledge of God and from knowledge of created nature as teleological, rational, social and communicative. Speech is directed to God and neighbours; it is causal and irrevocable; good speech demonstrates integrity, good intent, justice and moderation. Sinful speech arises from wicked intention and damages both speaker and hearer. Blasphemy opposes vocal confession of God with disparagement of his excellence. Defamation opposes justice by speaking against the neighbour’s good reputation. In the Christian community, the speech of regenerate creatures is under repair, as thanksgiving to God and edification of neighbours are established by the moving power of the Holy Spirit.

The Psalms are a heterogeneous collection of texts that may come from many different periods, yet a reasonably consistent picture emerges of the sins they mention. These are mostly to do with social interactions, though there is some attention to sins of thought and intent. Because so many Psalms are concerned with supplications by those oppressed by others, the emphasis tends to fall on malice rather than on more ‘obvious’ sins such as murder or adultery, which are little mentioned. There is not much reflection on the nature of sin as such, though Psalm 51 suggests that it goes back even as far as one’s conception.

Sin has infinite variety, but is also a unified phenomenon. As a way of displaying both these aspects, the vice-lists of the New Testament explore patterns by which sin unfolds in a sequence of diverse but connected forms. The eschatological vice-list of 2 Timothy 3 treats this as an unfolding of the sin of pride from an immanent form (love of self) to a socially concrete one (love of pleasure). Exploring this train of thought in further detail, we find room within the progress of pride for the love of money and the love of war.

In the Questions on charity in the ST (2a2ae, qq. 23-46), Aquinas considers at length the vices opposed to charity, omitting altogether any Question on a vice opposed to mercy. What does the omission reveal about mercy and its difficulties? First, I reject ready-to-hand explanations of the omission. Second, I consider the relation between mercy and compassion, showing that for Thomas the primary impediments to compassion are less vices than psychological forces irreducible to any single vice. Third, I turn to a different set of obstacles to mercy – acts that can arise from compassion, but do not help (and often harm) the person in need. Given these difficulties, how can Thomas take the practice of virtuous mercy to be generally possible? I conclude with a discussion of suffering and the gift of wisdom.

This essay challenges the portrayal of philosophical idealism as sinful ‘confinement in the self’, arguing that this obscures a relationship between Hegel and Bonhoeffer characterised by variation rather than contradiction. I first trace a limited congeniality between their respective critiques of the ‘beautiful soul’ and the ‘privately virtuous’, showing how both thinkers resist moral isolation through the call to confession. Second, I follow their attempts to overcome an oppositional logic between such social exchange and divine agency, rooted in the syntax of Hegel’s phrase ‘God existing as community’. This provides sharper focus to Bonhoeffer’s variations, changing the subject from God to Christ and the attendant act from reciprocal confession to intercessory prayer. Rather than merely defensive revision, I argue that this reveals an agile Christology which can sustain an ethical posture of ‘being for others’ through the withheld confession and broken trust typical of a communion of sinners.