Security Dialogue

This article seeks to explain the limits of critical discourses of `global war' and biopolitical framings of `global conflict' that have arisen in response to the globalization of security discourses in the post-Cold War era. The central theoretical insight offered is that `global war' should not be understood in the framework of contested struggles to reproduce and extend the power of regulatory control. `Global war' appears `unlimited' and unconstrained precisely because it lacks the instrumental, strategic framework of `war' understood as a political-military technique. For this reason, critical analytical framings of global conflict, which tend to rely on the `scaling up' of Michel Foucault's critique of biopolitics and upon Carl Schmitt's critique of universal claims to protect the `human', elide the specificity of the international today. Today's `wars of choice', fought under the banner of the `values' of humanitarian intervention or the `global war on terror', are distinguished precisely by the fact that they cannot be grasped as strategically framed political conflicts.

The securitization framework has greatly improved empirical analysis of security threats. Yet, it could benefit from heightened analysis of two often neglected aspects. First, this article argues that securitizers may invoke multiple referent objects to strengthen their argument that the referent object possesses the `right to survive'. Second, by drawing attention to the presentation of securitizing moves, as well as their content, it highlights how securitizers attempt to persuade multiple audiences that their securitizing moves should be accepted and countermeasures enacted. These claims are illustrated through the analysis of an atypical case of securitization performed by an unlikely set of securitizers, humanitarian aid organizations, as they argue that indistinctiveness poses an existential threat both to their material security and to their identity.

This article discusses the international response to the conflict in Darfur from 2003 onwards in order to explore some of the key challenges related to implementing the responsibility to protect (R2P). First, we show that the debates on R2P in connection to Darfur translated into little more substantive action than the pragmatic decision to deploy peace operations with mandates that included civilian protection, as suggested by the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and later by the hybrid UN—AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Second, we argue that the international response to Darfur illustrates three major challenges to R2P implementation. These are: political limitations inherent in the R2P framework; moral dilemmas emerging from military action; and tactical challenges, as exemplified by the struggles faced by the AU and the UN in Darfur. We conclude that the international failure to offer meaningful protection in Darfur highlights the need for continued caution and critical analysis of the ways in which R2P is conceptualized and implemented.

This article forms a critique of security sector reforms implemented in Albania and Montenegro between 2000 and 2007 by and on behalf of the European Union. It argues that within these reforms it is possible to discern a tension between a more holistic development approach and a security-based approach that is top-down and largely founded on the self-referential security concerns of the European Union. Drawing on research conducted by the author in Albania and Montenegro, the article utilizes public surveys to point out the distance between internal security reforms funded by the EU and the everyday security concerns of residents living in ineffectively policed states. The article concludes that a security-first agenda has slipped into the EU's aim to create an area of `freedom, security and justice'. Thus, while the rims of the Western Balkans are being secured, lack of reform in the interior hampers the socio-economic development and democratization of states engaged in the EU enlargement process.

In October 2005, the Russian trawler Elektron refused to be subjected to arrest when caught by the Norwegian coast guard fishing illegally in the Fisheries Protection Zone off the Svalbard archipelago. With two Norwegian coast guard inspectors still on board, the trawler took off from its pursuers, heading for Russian territorial waters. Observers in Russia were outraged by the attempted arrest and called for Russia's Northern Fleet to flex its muscles as the hot pursuit in the Barents Sea unfolded. The purpose of this article is to explore underlying factors that may explain Russia's non-escalatory behavior during the incident and why the issue was not `securitized' by Russia's political establishment. The article is to be read as a case study exploring the phenomenon of `failed securitization'. On a more policy-oriented level, it also aims to shed light on Russian policies and perceptions with regard to the role, relevance, and usefulness of military power in the European Arctic, as well as the interplay between intra- and interstate security dynamics.