War in History

Gerhard von Scharnhorst was the intellectual father of the Prussian and later German armies. Professor Dennis E. Showalter was a noted scholar of German, American, and military history. Both mentored countless students and authored a number of seminal works in military history. Both demonstrated the enduring importance of military history in the minds of policy makers, military personnel, and the public. Both were truly enlightened scholars.

This article examines the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff during the period of the Wars of German Unification and the entirety of the Kaiserreich. The practice of pairing up a commander and a chief of staff was one that was specific to Germany. Traditional scholarship holds that in many cases, it was really the chief of staff who did all the thinking, while the commander was nothing more than a front man. The primary example of this was the relationship between Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. The problem is that unthinking historians have projected relationship of this particular duo on the rest of the imperial German army. One of the reasons for this was the presence of members of German royal families in high command positions. This article suggests that first, commanders, including royal family members, were far more influential than their chiefs of staff. In addition, the power wielded by chiefs of staff also reflected the nagging problem of battlefield communications, especially given the limitations of telephone and early wireless radio. Once these difficulties were eliminated by the collapse of the imperial regime, and the development of radio, the power of chiefs of staff was severely curbed by 1939. Thus, the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff was at best a transitory phenomenon.

Dennis Showalter’s influence on the scholarship of the First World War is unmatched among American historians. His work is especially important for two reasons. First, it studies the German Army using primary sources and original research, a particularly valuable contribution given the mythic and just plain false associations that many amateur scholars place on the German military. Second, Dennis’s career involved long stretches of teaching cadets and military officers. His work thus combined an appreciation of the problems of the past with the challenges of the present day. The second half of this essay renders homage to that tradition by examining patterns in Dennis’s writings of the First World War that remain relevant to an understanding of war in our own time.

Whenever one thinks of the World War II, the image of dark menacing panzers cutting deep swathes into enemy forces comes up to the mind. No amount of interpretation and overinterpretation can belittle the extraordinary role-played by the panzers in World War II. Similarly, despite the presence of numerous good works by various historians and introduction of exotic methodologies, Professor Dennis Showalter’s place in the world of academic writings on World War II can never be marginalized. The present article humbly attempts to highlight one aspect of Professor Showalter’s research: history of tanks during the World War II. This essay has two sections. The first section evaluates Showalter’s three works dealing with armour during the World War II. In the next section, the present author, inspired by Showalter’s works on armoured war, attempts to recount the evolution of armoured branch in the Indian Army until the end of World War II. Indian tank units, as this article argues, played a crucial role in the capture of Meiktila and the subsequent ‘Race to Rangoon’.

This article presents a critique of Whiggish approaches to military history. It begins with this quotation from Dennis Showalter – ‘military history is arguably the last stronghold of what historiographers call the “Whig interpretation”’ – and notes that Showalter’s assessment was a reflection on both the general absence of theory and the linked poverty of the fallback theoretical basket of the subject, with such staples as War and Society, Face of Battle, and Military Revolutions. Recognizing the shortcomings of numerous approaches to military history, the author identifies the challenge – writing military history that incorporates multiple regions and takes a global approach. As the author concludes, the problem for the historian remains how best to address the complex interactions of, in particular, change and continuity, structure and conjuncture, the West and the wider world, and to do so to produce an account that is able to identify and probe crucial issues and key questions.

Fiscal-military hubs were cities characterized by the clustering of specific expertise and resources, which became centres where states, and semi-state and non-state actors arranged the transfer of war-making resources in early modern Europe. Using this concept enables the study of the business of war to shift the locus beyond the state towards a transnational history, while integrating political, military, economic, and cultural aspects that have generally been studied separately. By examining the hub, we can untangle the full complexity of this business, and reveal its actors, networks, assets, prices, routes, culture, and rules of conduct.

This article discusses how American satirical magazines responded to the First World War while the United States remained a neutral power. By focusing on these previously overlooked sources, it demonstrates that satirical humour performed two significant functions. First, it acted as a tool of persuasion through which magazines agitated for or against American intervention in the conflict. Second, it became a major means with which periodicals sought to ostracize German-Americans, fuelling nativist sentiment. Ultimately, satirical magazines suggest that while responses to the war were initially diverse, most Americans had come to support military intervention by April 1917.

Russia was much more entwined in the narrative of Gallipoli than the Australian (and the international) historiography of that epic encounter suggests. The principal knot that tied Gallipoli and Russia together was the Constantinople Agreement of April 1915. Russia utilized British fears that she would abandon the Eastern front to impose on its Allies the secret Constantinople Agreement, which promised possession of the Straits and Constantinople to Russia after a successful war. Gallipoli was, in effect, both the main catalyst and guarantor of the Agreement, which then played a role in keeping Russia in the war, crucially denying Germany a one-front war.

Historians have overlooked the important role played by airpower in combined arms during the Palestine Campaign, 1917–1918. This article argues the Egyptian Expeditionary Force adopted Western Front command structures, successfully integrating airpower within their command and control systems. Tactical and strategic airpower provided intelligence which allowed Corps and Army Headquarters to control the tempo of operations, while ground attack operations disrupted Ottoman command and control arrangements. This integration made a clear contribution to the success of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at the crucial battles of Third Gaza and Megiddo.

When Wuhan became the centre of Chinese resistance, the Kuomintang formulated a defensive strategy for the geography of the Central Yangtze. Without a coherent riverine defence doctrine, they were over-confident about the benefits of the terrain, causing a series of catastrophic blunders including the neglect of the intricate connections between ground and waterborne forces, the deployment of subpar troops for the defence of key fortifications, and the mistaken utilization of ‘drowned earth’ tactics. This article challenges existing narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War and fills a gap in the current understanding of the defensive aspect of riverine warfare.

Between 1940 and 1955, Britain explored controversial radiological weapons. Keen to discover further military uses for atomic energy, defence officials and scientists initially approached the field with much hope and optimism. However, technical difficulties, economic costs, public and political aversion, competition from other controversial weapons, and even the resistance of scientists themselves, soon came to dominate the direction of policy. This article explores the unique British experience with radiological weapons, determines how far Britain ventured down this questionable path, and accounts for why, after over a decade of research, they were judged a step too far.

Despite the vast academic and popular interest in the Dieppe raid of 19 August 1942, there remains a curious oversight of the German side of the story. This contribution interrogates German sources in order to explore the Dieppe air battle and its consequences from the perspective of the German armed forces. The paper ultimately demonstrates that the Germans learnt much about the role of air power in coastal defence from their experiences at Dieppe, but that the implementation of those lessons was lacking.

The little-known World War II battle for Termoli, code named Operation Devon, took place in early October 1943 and began with the only Allied amphibious landing on Italy’s Adriatic coast. It was a joint operation between newly formed elite groups and regular units of the Allied armed forces. A brigade made up of two units of commandos and the 1st Special Air Service, known during this operation as the Special Raiding Squadron, was given the task of making the first landing. Despite the initial success of the operation, a drawn out and fierce battle ensued. With the help of archival material from the Imperial War Museum, London, and The National Archives, Kew, this article reconstructs the key elements of a battle that has received little scholarly attention, particularly in relation to the role of conventional forces in the fighting. In doing so, it provides an overview of the battle, analysing the main factors that led to a chaotic handover between special and regular infantry forces and what made the action ultimately successful. Finally, it reveals how the operation was part of an evolutionary process for special forces and helped to cement their role in UK military doctrine.