Scharnhorst and Showalter: A tale of two enlightened scholars

I met Professor Dennis E. Showalter in a chance encounter during the summer of 1980 at the Militärgeschlichtliche Forschungsamt, then located in Freiburg im Breisgau. I was in Freiburg furthering my study of the German language at the Goethe Institut and hoping to examine the papers of Gerhard von Scharnhorst (Nachlaβ Scharnhorst). Dennis was there complying recently published German sources for inclusion in his review article, ‘Military History in Germany: An Overview of Periodic Literature’, which appeared regularly in Military Affairs (later in Journal of Military History). As I was perusing the stacks, Dennis walked over, introduced himself, and asked if he could help me find what I was looking for. I recognized his name, introduced myself, reached into my book bag, and pulled out my copy of Railroads and Rifles, which I was reading at the time. As a smile came across his face, I informed Dennis I would be attending graduate school at Duke University that fall and was a bit disappointed to learn that Scharnhorst’s Papers had been relocated to the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preuβischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin. So we spent several fruitful days talking about my graduate studies and gathering sources on Scharnhorst, military education, and the Prussian army for my future research.

Over the nearly 40 years that followed, I have benefitted tremendously from his professional advice and friendship. Dennis read my dissertation, ‘Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin,’ and provided his thoughtful commentary and recommendations for its improvement. Attached to his appraisal was a letter to Praeger Publishers urging them to publish it. Dennis later wrote a nice review of my book in the American Historical Review. Whenever we later met at the annual meetings of the Society for Military History, he would always inquire about my current historical activities. I remember informing him at one of those conferences that I was going to write a biography of Scharnhorst, since there was no modern study of him in any language. Dennis was thrilled and offered to read chapters as I completed them. Over the next decade, he kept encouraging me to keep writing, especially when the task seemed overwhelming. He read the entire manuscript, pruning away ambiguities and offering advice and encouragement without stint. Along the way, I was able to publish two articles from my study in War in History. Thanks largely to his continual inspiration and assistance, my book is currently under contract for publication in 2020.

When Professor Kathryn Barbier asked me to contribute a piece in honour of Dennis for his contributions to War in History and to the field of military history, I readily accepted this opportunity to express my profound gratitude for all of the interest Dennis has displayed towards me and my historical endeavours, as well as the mentoring he has provided over the past four decades. Since Dennis typified Scharnhorst in so many ways, I chose to write this comparative study of these two remarkable scholars. I hope this article provides a worthy tribute to Dennis Showalter and his tremendous contributions to the study of German and military history.

Born two hundred years apart, Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) and Dennis E. Showalter are two enlightened scholars of military history. Interestingly, both were born within a year of the outbreak of a decisive major war that ushered in a new era of military history. For Scharnhorst, it was the Seven Year’s War; for Showalter it was the Second World War. Both wars shaped their futures. Both became thoughtful students of war. Both became prolific writers who published numerous scholarly books, articles, and reviews. Both presented reflective papers before scholarly associations and to the public. Both were editors of professional journals. Both held leadership positions in learned communities. Both loved to study and write about battles, campaigns, and great military leaders – the essence of military history. In short, Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Dennis E. Showalter represent two of the finest examples of scholarship in the field of military studies.

Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Dennis E. Showalter were blessed with mentors who shaped their formation and their study of military history. Count Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst zu Schaumburg-Lippe-Bückeburg (1724-77) was one of the most enlightened soldiers then living in Germany. It was Count Wilhelm who introduced Scharnhorst to the profession of arms and to the concept of Bildung. A fruit of Germany’s classical age, Bildung was the perfectibility of the individual’s character and intellect through the process of continual study. Under the skillful tutelage of Count Wilhelm, Scharnhorst received a classical formation in the arts and sciences, with an extensive professional emphasis on military knowledge and skills, as well as a foundational education in mathematics, the sciences, and foreign languages. In keeping with the spirit of the German Enlightenment, Count Wilhelm emphasized the integration of professional and technical knowledge with humanistic values. He supplemented Scharnhorst’s education in the military sciences with a lively study of contemporary literature. It was this Bildungsprinzip that guided Scharnhorst’s entire military career. Even more significant was the importance Count Wilhelm had placed on the objective study of history to understand human relationships and to bridge the gap between theory and practice.

In a similar fashion, Professor Otto Paul Pflanze (1918-2007) provided an unforgettable model of scholarship for Dennis Showalter. Pflanze was an internationally known historian and hailed as the foremost biographer of Otto von Bismarck. He directed Showalter’s dissertation and, as his Doktorvater, taught Dennis to recognize the interaction between the social, political, cultural, and economic forces in society, along with their military, intellectual, and institutional pressures. The breadth and depth of Showalter’s later studies reveal he learned his lessons well. In all of his books, articles, and presentations, Dennis clearly demonstrates his encyclopaedic knowledge, his brilliant thinking, and the integrity of his impartial judgement, always accompanied by his charming wit.

Scharnhorst left the academy at Wilhelmstein imbued with the German Enlightenment notions of Bildung. Shortly afterwards, he entered Hanoverian service. His superiors quickly recognized his talents and appointed him an instructor, initially at his regimental school in Northeim, then at the newly founded artillery school in Hanover. While teaching, he edited three professional journals: Militair-Bibliothek (1782-84), Bibliothek für Officiere (1785), and Neues Militärisches Journal (1788-93 and 1797-1805). He also published two seminal and practicable books: Handbuch für Officiere (1789-90) and Militärisches Taschenbuch, zum Gebrauch im Felde (1794). Throughout his 15 years as an educator, Scharnhorst continued his intensive self-study programme under the superb mentorship of General-Major Emmerich Otto August von Estorff (1722-96), Oberst Victor Lebrecht von Trew (1736-1804), and Professors Albrecht Friedrich Ludwig Meister (1724-88) and August Ludwig Schlözer (1735-1809). He attended lectures at the University of Göttingen, joined several learned societies, and became a freemason. He was also involved in a number of scientific endeavours, the most noteworthy was his development of a micrometre telescope that, with the help of a measuring scale, permitted its user to obtain a more accurate estimation of distances for artillery gunners. ¹

Following in the footsteps of his mentor, Dennis left the University of Minnesota in 1969 and settled at The Colorado College, where he pursued a brilliant teaching and writing career in military history. In addition to his ‘refreshing’ study, Railroads and Rifles (1975), Dennis has written extensively on the wars of Frederick the Great, the German Wars of Unification, and World Wars I and II, publishing more than a dozen major books and edited and co-edited several others. ² His captivating study of Tannenberg: Clash of Empires (1990; revised edition, 2004) won the prestigious American Historical Association Paul Birdsall Prize in European Military and Strategic History in 1992. It was also a selection of the History and Military History Book Clubs. Another book, Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the 20th Century (2005), was a selection of the History Book Club, the Book of the Month Club, and the Military History Book Club. It also appeared in Spanish, Polish, and Japanese editions.

While teaching and mentoring countless students and scholars, Dennis found the time to write numerous articles and review articles (including several in German and French), as well as reviews of other scholars’ works. He edited, co-edited, and served as a consultant for several scholarly journals, such as War in History; edited and co-edited several books, especially Eisenhower’s Legacy: Dwight Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century (2005) and, with Robin Higham, Researching World War I: A Handbook (2003); and sat on a number of editorial boards. Over the past half a century, Professor Dennis E. Showalter has become one of the foremost students of German and military history.

In all his endeavours, Scharnhorst aimed to promote the formation of leaders, which earned him the reputation of a military scholar. As a true child of his age, he continually endeavoured to apply his Enlightenment ideals to the profession of arms and embarked on a long journey that would lead him from the professional standing army to the national citizen army. For Scharnhorst, this was initially a purely intellectual exercise and his emancipation came only gradually, simply because he found it highly problematic to conceive of an educated citizen passing through the brutal gauntlet of the professional standing army. Then came the French Revolution with its levée en masse, and almost immediately, Scharnhorst comprehended the awesome power of a free society and its citizen army.

When Hanover joined the First Coalition against France in 1793, Scharnhorst left the classroom for duty with the English-Hanoverian army. During several engagements in Flanders and later in Holland, he demonstrated exceptional leadership under fire and came to realize the value of a sound, formal military education for soldiers. In sharp contrast to previous ideas that all an army required in order to fight successfully and achieve victory on the battlefield was the proper amount of order and discipline, training and drill, Scharnhorst recognized that now, in an age of mass armies, a well-organized intellect was the essential ingredient to the profession of arms. As a true empiricist, he never succumbed to any lofty idea that demanded the abolition of the professional standing army in favour of a so-called people’s army. He had to see the worth of these new forces clearly demonstrated in combat before he would accept them. The War of the First Coalition offered him that undeniable proof of the inherent weaknesses of traditional military institutions and the promising future of national armies.

For the rest of his life, Gerhard Scharnhorst never ceased studying the transformation of warfare unleashed by the French Revolution. One of the first lessons he appreciated was the enormous energy of a free society. Time and again, ordinary French citizens showed their willingness to sacrifice, fight, and die for their country. Scharnhorst reasoned that German citizens would be just as eager if all gifted men could aspire to the highest positions of leadership in both society and in the military. This was the obvious conclusion for an enlightened soldier of humble origins. Scharnhorst’s reaction to the French Revolution and its impact on the art of war was clearly stated in a series of memoranda he sent to his superiors and in articles he wrote when his superiors ignored him. The most notable was his book-length analysis, ‘Basic Reasons for the French Success’. ³ The nation-in-arms had completely altered warfare, and Scharnhorst was among the first anywhere who understood that the leader must also change. The problem was to define his role in terms of a new social and political structure of society. It was during these years that there crystallized in his mind a set of specific reforms designed to meet the challenge of the nation-in-arms.

Bildung became the cornerstone of Scharnhorst’s modernization efforts. He advocated better education for officers and non-commissioned officers, and more realistic military training and combat readiness for all soldiers. He also insisted that leaders maintain a continual intellectual pursuit of the art of war. This was paramount; for only through the cultivation of leaders could the army maintain a progressive response to a changing art of war. In teaching the lessons he had learned from the new tactics, strategy, and logistics the French had used to conquer their natural frontiers, as well as Flanders, Holland, and parts of Germany and Italy, Scharnhorst hoped to develop a cult of objectivity within the army, instructing its leaders not to react to structured or ritual things lest they become mechanical themselves. He wanted them to question all received ‘truths’ in a systematic and disciplined fashion, responding correctly to a critical, independent analysis of the facts. He clearly recognized that good leaders are not developed if given scenarios to follow. It was here that the objective study of history was most important, since Scharnhorst believed that the study of the past enabled leaders to understand their present situation and to appreciate their profession and the role chance and the unknown play in combat.

Scharnhorst’s programme of education for victory was designed to develop leaders capable of commanding the nation-in-arms. Leadership in this national army had to be attainable for all. Unfortunately, in Hanover, this proved to be too arduous a task. From the time of the ancient Greeks, Persians, and Romans, as well as the Japanese and Chinese, the aristocracy had always looked upon itself as the divinely ordained leaders of society. As the self-appointed guardians of the people, the nobility relieved itself of any obligation to perform manual labour, so noblemen could stand watch and protect the lower classes, and by doing so, become honourable men. Over the centuries, there emerged among the aristocracy a deeply rooted prejudice against physical labour and Bildung. This mentality reached its zenith in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, when this form of chivalry was firmly entrenched and sanctioned not only by royal decree, but more importantly by religious authority as divinely ordained by God. ⁴ These feudal values still prevailed in an age when discovery and advances in science and technology, along with the questioning of religious and political authority, had altered the art of war, the face of battle, and the feudal concept of chivalry. Because of their scientific and technical natures, the notions of Bildung threatened virtually all that the nobility held sacred. ⁵

Since he could not stop the admission of ignorant noblemen into the army, or their subsequent advancement, Scharnhorst recommended promotion to lieutenant only after the successful passage of an examination that covered both theory and practice. He also advocated periodic evaluations of all officers to establish their fitness for continued military service. Abolishing all types of nepotism, connection, and the deadwood associated with the professional standing army was so important to Scharnhorst. At the same time, he wanted to retain the vital elements that the standing army provided: its discipline, sense of honour, and esprit de corps. This could only be achieved through a more equitable application of military justice for the common soldier and a system of advancement based on education and demonstrated performance, not birth and family connection. Scharnhorst essentially sought to replace the aristocracy of birth with an aristocracy of education.

The challenge Scharnhorst faced was how to integrate these new leaders into the Hanoverian army and get them accepted. Somehow, he had to introduce brains into the whole structure, a different kind of professional standing army. His solution was the ‘General Staff with Troops’ [later known as the Truppengeneralstab]. He understood that the nobility had rarely shown any zeal for formal schooling or even private study, simply because aristocrats had virtually everything handed to them because of their birth. They rarely had to earn anything. Because noblemen had the reserved right of command without having any real military competence, Scharnhorst would achieve his goal by educating promising officers in a general school of war. He would then select a small group of graduates and further cultivate them in the advanced components of the art of war. By assigning them to the General Staff with Troops, he would permeate the army with enlightened men of character and intellect. They would not ‘command’ but would ‘assist’ their dilettante commanding generals. For Scharnhorst, the General Staff with Troops would become the brain and nervous system of the army, animating its operations and providing the impulse that set the army in motion.

Throughout his endeavours to modernize the Hanoverian army, Gerhard Scharnhorst remained cautious and deliberate. He never permitted the arcane thinking of royal absolutism to diminish or to obscure the revolutionary reasoning of the nation-in-arms. This national army would have to be organized into smaller more manageable units, called divisions and corps that combined infantry, cavalry, artillery, and supporting units. It would then be led by the General Staff with Troops. Significant changes in the infantry would transform its tactical doctrine and operational concepts from a linear system of line formations into a combination of line formations, attack columns, and skirmishers. To support the infantry attack, Scharnhorst sought to expand, reorganize, and modernize the artillery with better equipment, guns, and organization. All of these measures were designed to ensure tactical flexibility on the battlefield and operational independence in the theatre of operations. Realistic and frequent combat training, both in times of peace and during active military operations, would keep the soldier in tune with an ever-changing art of war.

In keeping with this concept of the national army, Scharnhorst insisted that Hanover abolish the mercenary character of its army by introducing universal military conscription. As his mentor Count Wilhelm had done, Scharnhorst advocated no exemptions among the citizenry. To obtain victory, the citizen-soldier must once again become a warrior defending his country. He must infuse his military actions with his personal, social, and political convictions. This was possible only if he felt himself to be a citizen of worth and not a mere subject of royal absolutism. The people themselves would thus become the reservoir of national military strength. Through this Bildungprinzip, Scharnhorst hoped to create a new generation of leaders and soldiers who would transform the Hanoverian army with a new spirit.

The armies of revolutionary France offered conclusive proof that soldiering was no longer a craft or leisurely occupation, but a profession that demanded continuous study and preparation. It was Scharnhorst’s great achievement that he not only recognized this new dimension of warfare, but also attempted to develop institutions to harness it. Convincing the ruling elites of Hanover that the role of the professional soldier would have to conform to a new social and political structure proved to be an impossible task. Hanover rejected Scharnhorst’s ideas outright, without ever considering their merit. Such ‘Jacobin’ sentiments were totally alien and unacceptable to the Hanoverian elites. Sensing he had no future in the Electorate of Hanover, Gerhard Scharnhorst accepted an appointment in the Prussian army. He arrived in Berlin in the spring in 1801. There he hoped to implement the modernization ideas he had developed and refined in Hanover.

Shortly after he transferred to Prussian service, Scharnhorst was asked to direct the activities of the soon-to-be Militärische Gesellschaft (Military Society). His reputation as an enlightened soldier had preceded him to Berlin, and judging from the constitution of this society, intellectual interest in the art of war had prompted its establishment. ⁶ Significantly, the idea of a volunteer society to discuss military affairs was not new in Germany. Nine years earlier in 1792, one of the most rational soldiers of his day, General lieutenant Martin Ernst von Schlieffen (1732-1825), had founded in Wesel the Patriotic Society for Students of the Art of War. Schlieffen’s goal was to promote the study of war by ending ‘the squandering of leisure time by officers already educated; and additionally, to awaken the desire of younger officers to be educated’. ⁷ Schlieffen modelled his society on the Berlin Academy of Science, to which he belonged. One of the founding members of the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, who was also part of the Patriotic Society in Wesel, wrote that Schlieffen’s ‘particular concern for the Bildung of the military’ was felt throughout the command. ⁸

Scharnhorst had praised the Patriotic Society in the Neues Militärisches Journal, advocating the establishment of similar military societies throughout Germany. He suggested the military society could be a means of promoting professional growth by encouraging officers to study the art of war and their profession. ⁹ His argument was familiar. At best, military schools provide only a rudimentary foundation upon which to build. Without further education, the officer would be of little use in time of war. The challenge was to motivate the officer to study his profession. Scharnhorst’s solution was interesting. He noted nothing develops the officer’s ‘situational judgment in war’ (known today as situational awareness) better than practical field exercises. The problem was getting officers to the field. ‘Perhaps this could be accomplished through a kind of military society’ under the direction of general officers and general staff personnel, men who, Scharnhorst believed, possessed a diverse knowledge of military affairs. Every three months, these officers would pose tactical field problems to the membership. Any officer who wished to participate would send his solution to the secretary of the club, who would mark it with only a number to ensure anonymity and impartiality. Winners would be selected quarterly and receive personal recognition from their prince. Their names would be published in the local newspaper and they would also receive a substantial monetary prize. Scharnhorst hoped that this would encourage participation among the officer corps. ¹⁰

This article reveals several noteworthy aspects of Scharnhorst’s own professional development. In 1792, he was concerned primarily with tactical problems and their solutions. This was consistent with the officer’s perceived role in battle. After his return from the war in 1795, he suggested essay competitions that included the so-called ‘higher components of the art of war’ (operations and strategy), subjects more likely discussed among princes. ¹¹ Again, this was consistent with Scharnhorst’s experience in combat. He realized that officers, regardless of rank, now had to be prepared to assume the role of the prince or senior leader. A second important feature was his concern for impartiality. From his involvement editing the Militair-Bibliothek and the Bibliothek für Officiere, Scharnhorst developed a ‘deeply rooted fear of prejudice and suppression of the truth’, as well as the vindictiveness he suffered from rival parties. ¹² He wanted the Militärische Gesellschaft to enjoy the same freedom from censorship found in ‘the academies and other learned societies’. ¹³ Another key point was the link between the military society and the general staff. Scharnhorst mentioned this association in both papers and suggested that the general staff was ideally suited to play a leading role in the professional development of leaders.

The central theme of Bildung was the most significant aspect of Scharnhorst’s agenda in this article and while directing the Militärische Gesellschaft. He understood Bildung was a lifelong process of spiritual and intellectual growth, not just the social polish needed to enter court life. The challenge was convincing leaders used to the cabal of court life to meet openly and discuss military affairs in a society ready to admit all officers. Part of the lure was the opportunity for young officers to meet and learn from older and more experiences soldiers. An open society would also make it clear to the aristocracy that it was not a revolutionary conspiracy trying to form a new elite. Scharnhorst brought with him to Berlin the concept of a volunteer royal society as a means of bringing reason to bear on matters of policy and strategy, and when asked to direct the activities of the Militärische Gesellschaft, he seized this opportunity.

The purpose of the Militärische Gesellschaft was to instruct its members ‘through the exchange of ideas on such subjects on the art of war which have a particular relevance in our time’. ‘At the very first meeting’ the Society decided to focus ‘on the actual state of the art of war’, which the French and Napoleon were teaching, and ‘on the apparent contradictions in its principles’, which were baffling most observers. ¹⁴ Had the art of war changed since the Seven Years’ War? Was the legacy of the past, of Frederick the Great, still valid? These were the central historical questions the founders of the Militärische Gesellschaft sought to answer. They formed the basis of all work in the Society throughout its four-year existence.

Functioning like a club, the Militärische Gesellschaft sponsored papers, lectures, discussions, and essay competitions on military affairs. The founders agreed ‘that no meeting should take place without the reading of a composition on a purely military subject, or the reading of a short abstract dealing with the review of a new military work’. ‘In this way’, Scharnhorst continued, ‘the Society hoped to eliminate all extraneous endeavors, to find material suitable for discussion, and to guide the collective views on such subjects which may deserve a preeminent attention’. ¹⁵ Here lies the essence of Scharnhorst’s pedagogical ideal: the importance of and necessity for objectivity, and the need for group effort in obtaining and maintaining that objectivity. Of all the topical areas the Militärische Gesellschaft treated, military innovations being introduced abroad, particularly in France, attracted the most interest.

Battles and leaders were among Scharnhorst’s preferred presentations before the Militärische Gesellschaft. Frederick the Great was his favourite leader. All but one of Scharnhorst’s battle analyses highlighted the Prussian king’s leadership abilities. Scharnhorst believed the test of combat validated or invalidated an army’s doctrine, its training, and its leadership. Among the battles he analysed were Lowositz (1756), Prag (1756), Rossbach (1757), Breslau (1757), and Leuthen (1757). He also spent considerable time evaluating Napoleon’s impressive Italian campaign of 1800 and his splendid victory at Marengo. In the process, he refuted the conclusions of Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow’s recent book, The Campaign of 1800. In all of his lectures, Scharnhorst went beyond the realm of just military factors and addressed the larger historical forces that influenced the development of an army as an institution. But his main focus always remained on battle analysis.

Likewise, Dennis Showalter understands the critical importance studying battles and leaders. In his 1975 article, ‘A Modest Plea for Drums and Trumpets’, he warned fellow military historians ‘of the dangers of straying too far’ from their roots, arguing for a return to the mainstay of their profession. ¹⁶ Leading by example, Dennis then produced some of the finest campaign studies. In addition to his Tannenberg book, he has written The Wars of Frederick the Great (1996; updated edition Frederick the Great: A Military History, 2012), The Wars of German Unification (2004), Hitler’s Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare (2009), and Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk, the Turning Point of World War II (2013). These splendid works analyse the causes, effects, and implications of these wars on German military policy. Dennis carefully guides his reader through what actually happened during the campaign and on the battlefield, from its grand strategy down to the tactical level, all-the-while examining battles and leaders in the context of contemporary diplomatic, political, and economic affairs. At other times, he focuses on the lives of individual soldiers, such as in his study, Soldiers’ Lives through History. The Early Modern World (2007), co-authored with William Astore. In his campaign and battle analyses, Dennis reviews the social settings and military doctrine of the belligerents and shows how battle may be understood as a case study of challenges that military organizations face throughout a war. The similarity between the methodology of Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Dennis Showalter in their studies of battles and leaders is striking.

Under Scharnhorst’s direction, the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin became a focal point of Bildung in the Prussian army. Here, in perhaps the truest sense of the word, Bildung meant not just education or culture, but also being part of a community of learning. In this community, Scharnhorst created an intellectual climate that attracted many prominent officers and civilians. The membership included officers of all ranks (representing nearly every garrison in Prussia), eight princes (two from the royal house), and four civilians, the most notable was Minister of Finance Heinrich Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr von und zum Stein (1757-1831). Nearly half the officers were captains and lieutenants, including most of Scharnhorst’s students at the Berlin Institute for Young Officers. Nearly 60 per cent of the membership later became general officers. ¹⁷

Members of the Militärische Gesellschaft played a central role in the modernization of the Prussian army after 1806. During the Wars of German Liberation (1813-15), they led the Prussian army to victory against Napoleon and laid the foundations for Prussia’s remarkable achievements in the Wars of German Unification (1864, 1866, and 1870-71). Five of the eight chiefs of the Prussian General Staff from 1813 to 1870 came from the Militärische Gesellschaft. Seven of the 10 field marshals appointed from 1813 to 1870 were also members. During this period, other members filled key leadership positions as Minister of War, Inspector-General of Education, Inspector-General of the Artillery, Inspector-General of the Engineers, President of the Military Education Commission, and Minister of Finance. Most of these men acknowledged their debt to Gerhard von Scharnhorst. It was ‘as if God suddenly placed our Scharnhorst in his true element’ and put him ‘in direct contact with the learned parties of the Prussian army’. ¹⁸ Scharnhorst’s impact was clearly profound.

In another effort to cultivate leaders in the Prussian army, Scharnhorst expressed the desire to take charge of the small and moribund Berlin Institute in the Military Sciences for Young Infantry and Cavalry Officers. The Berlin Institute was one of six military district schools Frederick the Great had established in 1779 to offer courses in the military sciences to the larger garrisons. Because Frederick really never championed the professional development of his officers, these institutes possessed no systematic programme of education. ¹⁹ This was due to the fact that most Prussian officers (like their Hanoverian contemporaries) ‘were still far from agreement on the value of academic knowledge for the average infantry and cavalry officer’. ²⁰ Fortunately, there were those who believed that education would enhance the officer’s leadership abilities.

On 5 September 1801, Friedrich Wilhelm III (1797-1840) directed Scharnhorst to assume the superintendency of the Berlin Institute under the direction of Generallieutenant Levin von Geusau (1734-1808). The king wanted Scharnhorst to audit the institute and its programme of instruction, to examine the proficiency of the student body, and to report his findings to him. ²¹ Less than a month later, Scharnhorst submitted his plan to transform the school into the army’s central institution of higher military education. ²² The student body was set at 40. A new course of instruction would extend over three consecutive winters from 1 September (following the annual autumn manoeuvres) to 21 March and would emphasize both theoretical and practical knowledge that would benefit the officer in his profession. Students would attend classes each morning, approximately 20 hours a week. The king even provided a room in the royal palace for this instruction. Afternoons would be reserved for remedial instruction, practical exercises, or field exercises. Officers would also be required to attend classes on gunnery and a course on basic military knowledge (known as the Military Encyclopedia) at the nearby artillery school in Potsdam. To teach these new courses, Scharnhorst wanted to triple the faculty. He would teach tactics, strategy, the duties of the general staff, and military history. Occasionally, guest speakers would be invited to present their views on contemporary or historical issues. ²³

Military and academic considerations forced Scharnhorst to modify the curriculum and certain procedures. To broaden their educational horizons, he arranged for officers to attend evening lectures (for a small fee) on foreign languages, philosophy, literature, and the natural sciences. He also granted select students some flexibility in their programmes. Those artillery and engineer officers who considered themselves proficient in gunnery, surveying, or mathematics were not required to attend certain classes, but were still responsible for all course content. Scharnhorst believed that as mature individuals, officers should be capable of accepting full responsibility for the execution of their lessons. No one supervised the activities of pupils, nor was an officer punished for skipping classes, or for enjoying the court and cultural life in Berlin. ²⁴ Scharnhorst hoped that such an environment would promote learning through a sense of self-reliance and self-discipline, giving the Berlin Institute the character of a small university. He understood that true leadership generates respect, not fear. It elevates people, rather than diminishing them.

Friedrich Wilhelm was truly impressed with the endeavours of Gerhard Scharnhorst to inculcate a sense of Bildung into the Prussian army. He showed his appreciation on 14 December 1802, when he raised Scharnhorst to the hereditary nobility. Less than a year later, on 26 November 1803, the king ignored the advice of his closest advisors and approved the recommendations of Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft for a new organization for the Prussian General Staff. Not surprisingly, the modernization of the General Staff coincided with Scharnhorst’s plans to reorganize and expand the Berlin Institute for Young Officers. In March 1804, the first class graduated from the Berlin Institute, with nine graduates obtaining positions on the new General Staff. Shortly afterwards, on 26 March, the king appointed Scharnhorst head of the General Staff’s western section (France) and promoted him to Oberst. Then on 21 June 1804, Friedrich Wilhelm adopted Scharnhorst’s concept for reorganizing and expanding the Berlin Institute, renaming it Academy for Young Officers.

With the reorganization and expansion of the Prussian General Staff and Berlin Institute for Young Officers, Scharnhorst had achieved a major goal. The French Revolution had transformed the art of war, destroying the Frederician concept of command and control. Mass armies and vast theatres of war required the creation of an organization capable of planning, coordinating, and centralizing the activities of war. If officers of the General Staff were to function well under the stress of combat, they would need an intensive programme of education, training, and evaluation. Scharnhorst believed the Berlin Academy for Young Officers would ideally complement the General Staff by providing the necessary formal military Bildung for its personnel. In theory, Scharnhorst felt Prussia now had the organization and intellect that would enable it to meet the challenge of the French. Unfortunately, as he and other enlightened soldiers and civilians in Prussia so clearly understood, this would not be enough to defeat Napoleon.

Disaster in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt in October 1806 shook the foundations of Prussian military theory and practice, furnishing an impetus for analysis and reform. Never before had any first-class army been so swiftly and so decisively reduced to impotence. Many contemporaries blamed Prussia’s collapse on the short-sightedness of Friedrich Wilhelm III and his political and military advisors. ²⁵ Significantly, this viewpoint continues to appeal to those sympathetic to Scharnhorst, Stein, and the reform movement. In sharp contrast to this standard script, which depicts a Prussian army in steady decline from 1763 to 1806, Dennis Showalter offered a brilliant alternative perspective. In his insightful analysis, ‘Hubertusberg to Auerstädt: The Prussian Army in Decline?’ Dennis integrated military developments in Prussia from the end of the Seven Year’s War to Jena and Auerstädt with its foreign policy making. ²⁶ He convincingly showed that when the Prussian army marched off to war in 1806, there was no obvious or logical reason to expect disaster. For all of its shortcomings during the campaign, which contemporaries and later historians take delight in pointing out with their 20/20 hindsight, the Prussian army nevertheless fought very well, inflicting serious casualties on the French. As Dennis concluded, the Prussians in 1806 ‘faced a French army at the peak of its efficiency, commanded by one of history’s greatest captains at the height of his powers’. Undeniably, the regeneration of the Prussian army so quickly during the years of modernization and its subsequent performance during the Wars of German Liberation (1813-15) clearly establish, as Dennis stated, that there was ‘by no means prima facie evidence of irreversible dry rot before Jena and Auerstädt’.

Instrumental in leading the modernization of the Prussian army after Jena and Auerstädt was Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Following the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, Friedrich Wilhelm summoned Scharnhorst and Stein to rebuild what remained of his ruin kingdom. As Chairman of the Military Reorganization Commission, Scharnhorst assembled trusted officers sympathetic to reform. Although the modernization of the army was the work of many, Scharnhorst relied on only a few to help develop and direct his programme of education for victory. Most had been his students at the Berlin Institute or members of the Militärische Gesellschaft. Several others had attracted his attention during the recent campaign. All had proven themselves under fire. When Stein joined the Commission, the bond between civil and military authorities, between politics and the art of war, was forged. Not surprisingly, Scharnhorst and Stein held remarkably similar social, political, and military views. With the reluctant approval of the king, Scharnhorst and Stein were able to implement many of their pre-war ideas, most notably a limited nation-in-arms.

When the Prussian army took the field against Napoleon in 1813, it bore little resemblance to the force that had marched so gallantly into the open jaws of destruction in 1806. Once again Dennis Showalter provided a welcome examination of this remarkable transformation, briefly at the end of his article, ‘Hubertusberg to Auerstädt’ and 14 years earlier in his study, ‘The Retaming of Bellona: Prussia and the Institutionalization of the Napoleonic Legacy, 1815-1876’. Dennis argued convincingly that Prussia showed a remarkable and progressive approach to the study of war and military leadership that went far beyond that of the French. Recognizing that disciplined intellect and sound organization were fundamental to the conduct of military affairs, Gerhard von Scharnhorst mobilized Prussia’s military brain power and shaped it into an effective instrument of war. Dennis concluded by writing that the story of the Prussian army from Waterloo to Sedan ‘is the history of an effort to focus and control, to integrate the heritage of a system in flux into a system in being’. ²⁷ The French Revolution and Napoleon offered conclusive proof that soldiering was no longer a craft or some leisure activity for the aristocracy, but a profession that required continuous study. It was Gerhard von Scharnhorst’s great achievement that he not only clearly saw this new dimension of warfare but also attempted to develop institutions capable of meeting the challenge of a changing art of war.

As an educator, Dennis Showalter exemplifies Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Like Scharnhorst, Dennis has taught his pupils how to acquire information independently, how to deal with challenges scientifically, and how to seek solutions, organize findings, and check their practical suitability to obtain new insights. His writings personify this methodology. For his distinguished accomplishments as an educator, The Colorado College awarded Dennis its Gresham Riley Achievement Award in 2005 and its Lloyd E. Worner Teacher of the Year Award in 2011. Although he never formally directed any graduate students, Dennis has nevertheless been, like Scharnhorst, a mentor to an entire generation of young military officers and students in pursuit of their graduate-level education. In this capacity, he has taught at the United States Air Force Academy, the United States Military Academy, and Marine Corps University. At West Point, he served as its Distinguished Visiting Professor (1997-1998) and as its Robert F. McDermott Chair (2001-2002). The Department of History at the Air Force Academy awarded its prestigious Clio Award to Dennis in 2000. In 2011, a number of former students and colleagues honoured Dennis with a Festschrift titled Arms and the Man. Indeed, Dennis Showalter has become a ‘force multiplier’ within the defence community. ²⁸ For his lifetime achievement in military writing, Dennis was awarded the prestigious Pritzker Military and Museum and Library Award in 2018.

While teaching and mentoring students and scholars, Dennis Showalter was active in numerous historical endeavours. Among the key leadership positions Dennis has held over the past 40 years have been President of the Society for Military History from 1997 to 2000, and before that the Society’s Vice President from 1993 to 1997. He has also served on its Editorial Advisory Board for over 20 years. In addition, he has been a Joint Editor of War in History since 1993, and has served as Series Editor, Modern War Studies, University of Kansas Press; Series Editor of Brassey’s Military Profiles; and Editor, Praeger Press, History of the Western Soldier. Dennis has also been an Editorial Advisor for Military History Quarterly, an Editorial Consultant for the Encyclopedia Britannica, and an advising fellow at the Barsanti Military History Center at the University of North Texas. For his historical achievements, Dennis has been the recipient of numerous awards over the years. The American Military Institute recognized Dennis with its Moncado Prize in 1981. Later, the Society for Military History recognized his service with its Victor Gondos Memorial Service Award in 2002, and its Samuel Eliot Morison Achievement Award in 2005.

Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Dennis E. Showalter stand out as two highly talented educators and brilliant scholars. When he entered Prussian service in 1801, Scharnhorst ‘was the best known military writer in Germany’ and an acknowledged authority on military education. ²⁹ Today, Dennis Showalter is one of the most renowned international historians of German and military history. Dennis has always been supportive of my role as an Army command historian, reminding me of the important work public historians perform in collecting the primary source material and conducting the oral history interviews that academic historians later use to form the basis of their studies. It has been a real pleasure to express my gratitude to Dennis E. Showalter.