Abstract
Several continental and global development initiatives have been evolved to trigger development in Africa, the latest being Agenda 2063 and sustainable development goals (SDGs). This paper draws on relevant materials to examine the challenges of sustainable development, especially within the context of the serious structural adjustment challenges in Africa. Against the backdrop of the continent’s earlier dismal experiences with development initiatives, the paper assesses the promises of both Agenda 2063 and SDGs to motorize sustainable development in the continent. The paper contends that the feasibility of sustainable development in Africa is contingent upon the institutionalization of the active state. The imperative of the active state in development architecture is because of its indispensability in charting critical pathways for all-round sustainability.
Introduction
There are many unflattering shared themes among African countries with regards to development (Binns et al., 2018). From the latest available statistics and World Bank classifications, only two African countries, namely Seychelles and Mauritius are in the bracket of high-income countries (Serajuddin & Hamadeh, 2020; World Bank, n.d.). The next highest economic achievement among African countries is the classification of six of them in the upper middle income group, namely Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Namibia, and South Africa. The rest of African countries are lumped under lower middle income and low-income categories (World Bank, n.d.). In addition, among the 47 countries listed as least developed countries in the world as of December 2018, 33 of them were African countries (United Nations, 2020, p. 169).
Undoubtedly, Africa is faced with daunting development challenges, which are exacerbated by dilemmas linked to poverty, unsustainable population growth, state fragility, governance, and political instability, emigration and brain drain and insecurity (Nwozor, 2018). Since the 1970s, several development initiatives have been launched both at the continental and global levels to catalyze development, but no major breakthroughs have been recorded in the development indices of most African states (Binns et al., 2018; Fosu, 2018). In recent times, development initiatives like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) launched by the leaders of African Union (AU) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) flagged by world leaders did not translate into development for Africa (Nhamo, 2016) .
The failure of NEPAD and MDGs to catalyze development in Africa underpins the afro-pessimistic perception that characterizes current development initiatives, namely Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While Agenda 2063 is a continental initiative packaged to railroad Africa to the development destination that African people want, the SDGs are goals enunciated by world leaders to ensure sustainable development globally. On whether Africa can achieve sustainable development, Afro-pessimists contend that if the continent was off-track on five out of the eight goals of the MDGs, it might be difficult for it to register progress under the SDGs with 17 goals and 169 targets (Nhamo, 2016). However, Afro-optimists believe that Africa could build on its experiences under the MDGs to enthrone sustainable development (D’Alessandro & Zulu, 2016; Fukuda-Parr, 2016).
The major problem that this paper seeks to address is whether in the face of Africa’s subsisting dismal performance in the development arena, it can foster the necessary impetus to catalyze conditions necessary to realize the aspirations of both Agenda 2063 and SDGs. In other words, this paper examines whether development is feasible and the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the SDGs realizable despite the declining share of agriculture in the GDP of African economies, limited structural transformation and diversification as well as lack of enhanced value addition or industrialization. This paper relies on secondary data sourced from statistical reports, intergovernmental publications and journals, which it examines and analyzes in the tradition of logical inductive method to situate and project the overall development trajectories in Africa. It examines the current development initiatives embraced by Africa to enthrone sustainable development. It acknowledges that even though Africa did not make much progress in the implementation of the MDGs, the formulation of the SDGs immensely benefitted from this experience. Additionally, Africa introduced Agenda 2063 as its own initiative in order to take its development destiny into its hands. Scholars are unanimously positive about the visionary character of Agenda 2063 (DeGhetto et al., 2016; Ndizera & Muzee, 2018). Interestingly, Agenda 2063 and SDGs have various areas of overlap and commonality, which reinforce the expectations that Africa would perform better under these new regimes of development initiatives.
The Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda Nexus in Africa
The concept of sustainable development has a rich evolutionary history. From its emergence in environmental discourses, it has gained inroad in development discourses generally. Since the World Commission on Environment and Development defined sustainable development in its 1987 report, Our Common Future, as “a development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED], 1987), the concept has expanded in meaning and scope. The concept of sustainable development now has multidimensional aspects that encapsulate economic, environmental, and social perspectives (Harris, 2009).
Since sustainable development was first defined in 1987, several alternative definitions have been articulated and promoted by scholars, groups and practitioners without any consensus as to what should constitute the characterizing features of sustainability. Rather than this situation being regarded as distressing, it is enriching since the dialogues constitute the important efforts towards arriving at a common ground. Thus, these dialogues create analytical frameworks that tend to converge and unify the multiplicity of interpretations of sustainability. Sustainable development, therefore, draws its creative power from its very heterogeneous and complex ambiguity (Kates et al., 2005). This confers dynamism to the concept and opens its adaptation to fit varying situations and contexts across space and time. It is the malleable nature of the concept of sustainable development that underpinned the global consensus that birthed the SDGs in 2015.
A Prospective Overview of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
The SDGs are successor policy initiatives to the MDGs. The SDGs not only cover a broader range of issues but also serve as reference goals for the period, 2015 to 2030. Beyond the broader range of issues that the SDGs are preoccupied with, they differ from the MDGs in the areas of conception, target, purpose and political processes (Fukuda-Parr, 2016). While some goals within the SDGs built on the preceding MDGs like goals 1 to 6, others incorporated entirely new ideas and new areas of interest to the world such as goals 7 to 17 (Hak et al., 2016). The SDGs consist of 17 goals with 169 targets and 303 indicators.
One of the highpoints of the SDGs is the network of linkages among the goals and targets (Le Blanc, 2015). For instance, about 60 targets have direct links to at least another goal apart from the one to which they belong, and about 19 targets link three goals or more thus creating indirect or third party links among goals (Le Blanc, 2015). For illustrative purposes, if African countries ensure that girls benefit maximally in their educational efforts, it could have ripple effects on their economies by enhancing maternal health outcomes (part of goal 3), empowering women (part of goal 5), bridging gender gap thereby leading to gender equality (part of goals 5 and 8), and ultimately contributing to poverty eradication (goal 1), and economic growth (goal 8).
Scholars have raised concerns about the operationalization of the targets and indicators. Hak et al. (2016) are concerned that the inter-linkages among the targets and indicators could create operationalization problems that might engender ambiguity. This concern notwithstanding, one of the major factors that undermined the realization of the MDGs was the inadequacy of available finance. With regards to the SDGs, Sachs (2012) has recommended dispensing with aid volunteerism considering that, in most cases, developed countries would make aid promises and then fail to honor them. Thus, Africa must look inwards for the financing of the SDGs.
Agenda 2063 as Pan-African Renaissance
The whole idea behind the maxim of “African solutions to African problems” is the quest for home-grown approaches to various Africa-centered problems. It involves the articulation of development initiatives through consultative and participatory approaches involving African stakeholders (Kasaija, 2013; Nwozor, 2018). Although the maxim is often used within the context of peace and security in Africa due to the myriad security challenges bedeviling the continent, it has also been extended to a wide range of development issues. Thus, the spirit of the “African solutions” is embedded in the Agenda 2063 document and its emphasis is the deployment of Africa’s enormous resources to achieve both its transformation and the actualization of the development aspirations of its peoples (African Union Commission, 2015a).
The thrust of “African solutions” is to de-emphasize the continuous reliance on external entities to deal with continental challenges and to refocus attention on Africa’s capability to mobilize solutions to its own problems without depending on other external powers. The maxim of African solutions was birthed by misgivings about the motives of external assistance as a result of late responses to crises and, in some instances, the withdrawal of assistance by western powers especially during crisis (Ani, 2018). Thus, the very idea of African solutions has its own psychological dividends as it reinvigorates the spirit of independence, bestows pride on African leaders and their peoples, confers “Africanness” or indigeneity to these solutions with attendant self-reliance, and evokes a sense of responsibility for the success of such solutions (Nathan, 2013).
Beside the vagary of the assistance of western powers, Africa’s recourse to home-grown development strategies was borne out of two scenarios, namely, the success story of newly emerging economies, especially China and India, as a result of their pursuit of development through indigenous initiatives, and the failure of externally influenced development initiatives to lead to development in Africa (Agupusi, 2016).
Thus, Agenda 2063 should be seen in the light of attempt by African leaders to develop home-grown answers to the development challenges facing the continent. With seven aspirations, and 39 priority areas within the framework of 20 goals, the Agenda is anchored on the Pan-Africanist ideals of creating a dynamic and people-driven Africa that is a force to reckon with in the world arena (African Union Commission, 2015a). The Agenda, which was adopted by African leaders under the auspices of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) in Addis Ababa in 2015, is an overarching strategic framework that underpins the pursuit of sustainability for Africa within the next five decades. The central idea is the optimization of Africa’s enormous resources for the betterment of its peoples.
In order to drive the agenda, the Summit of AU-AHSG directed the African Union Commission to prepare implementation plans of 10-year durations. Thus, the first ten-year implementation plan (2013–2023) was adopted by the Summit at its 24th meeting in June 2015 and envisaged to provide the framework for AU member states, the AU organs and RECs to prepare their medium term development plans (African Union Commission, 2015b).
The plan is well-thought out and comprehensive. Its analytical starting point for projections in the seven aspirational areas of the Agenda is the current development situation of the continent. Each of the seven aspirations has goals, priority areas and target(s) for 2023 ranging from national, regional to continental. Essentially, these goals and targets are envisaged to have direct impacts on the lives, welfare, and livelihoods of the people since they will focus mainly on industrialization, human capital development, push for stronger regional integration, expansion of agricultural production, push for more efficient management of natural resources, concerted efforts towards the reduction of conflicts and the promotion of common African positions at the continental and international arenas (African Union Commission, 2015b).
Scholars are generally in agreement that the Agenda and its supporting documents constitute a great vision and an excellent planning instrument to achieve Africa’s greatness (DeGhetto et al., 2016; Ndizera & Muzee, 2018). However, Africa’s experiences with previous lofty development plans and lack of reliable statistical data provide basis for equal measure of optimism and skepticism about the capacity of the Agenda to deliver on its aspirations. In addition to a snapshot of where Africa should be in 2023 based on the first 10 years of implementing the Agenda, the background note by the African Union Commission listed the uniqueness of Agenda 2063 to include:
its nature of emergence which was bottom-up approach as a result of extensive consultations embarked upon in the process of its preparation, which also implies that it is owned by African citizens;
it is result-driven as the aspirations are anchored on goals, targets and strategies for their actualization at the national, regional and continental levels;
it has monitoring and evaluation component which ensures that track records are kept on planned activities, outputs, and outcomes. Thus, these records make it possible for reviews and program re-alignment where necessary;
it provides for policy coherence along the continuum of national, regional and continental levels;
it has developed clear-cut resource mobilization and financing/partnership strategies as well as key areas of intervention and funding options;
its people-centric framework ensures that African people are constantly informed of developments which is a departure from past frameworks which were only known to bureaucrats (African Union Commission, 2015c, p. 5).
The bottom-line is that Agenda 2063 has inbuilt mechanisms to ensure the measurability of progress in the attainment of the goals and targets associated with its aspirations.
Africa’s Development Pendulums: A Historiography of Development Initiatives
At the various points that African countries gained independence, the major preoccupation among their emergent leaders was the pursuit and achievement of development. This aspiration underpinned the numerous strategic efforts that were evolved and implemented in order to enthrone development in Africa. However, these developmental initiatives were unable to achieve their objectives. Several reasons have been advanced as underpinning the underperformance of development initiatives in Africa, ranging from leadership deficits, monocultural nature of African economies, commodity prices slump, corruption, donor-driven development models to deficits in critical infrastructure (Kararach et al., 2015; Park, 2019).
Earlier Continental Initiatives in Sustainable Development
Although the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) focused its energy on the task of decolonizing the continent through African solidarity, its other ideals included: strengthening cooperation for development on the continent, protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member-states and encouraging international cooperation within the boundaries outlined by the United Nations (Kufuor, 2005; Matthews, 2008). At the time of establishing the OAU, the emergent African leaders were aware of the imperative of African development through African unity (Nkrumah, 1963, 1966). However, the efforts of the OAU to achieve its development objectives were not completely successful due to several factors ranging from the nature of its emergence, its principal focus, ideological divide within the organization, differences over major political issues confronting the continent and its seeming preoccupation with more political than economic issues (Kufuor, 2005; Matthews, 2008; Weiss, 2008).
Notwithstanding the overall limited success of the OAU in motorizing African development, it made some serious efforts towards African development. Such efforts would include the Monrovia Declaration of 1979; the design and adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action at the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Lagos, Nigeria in 1980, as well as the Final Act of Lagos and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 (De Melo et al., 2018; Tella, 2018). The OAU was equally supportive of regional economic communities (RECs) and encouraged the formation of additional RECs to cover all the regions of the continent. The underlying idea behind these initiatives was to transform Africa into a self-reliant continental economy.
The transmutation of OAU to African Union (AU), and its formal launch in July 2002 was an intentional design by African leaders to reinvigorate the pursuit of African development. Unlike the OAU, which was primarily established as a unified platform for the decolonization of the continent from European imperialism, the AU was birthed by the demands of neoliberalism based on market-oriented development (Weiss, 2008). One of the key attributes of the AU Constitutive Act was its deviation from the erstwhile policy of non-interference. The AU Constitutive Act incorporated the policy of non-indifference in the internal affairs of member states, a provision that aligned with the global acceptance of the nexus between security and development (Stewart, 2004; Williams, 2007). Since its launch, the AU has initiated and launched several development initiatives, the major ones being the NEPAD, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Agenda 2063—the Africa We Want (African Union Commission, 2015a).
The AU has been pursuing African development through the integration of RECs. In 2009, the African Ministers of Integration, in their fourth conference, adopted the Minimum Integration Program which was an action plan to speed up regional integration as a pre-condition for the establishment of the Africa Economic Community (AEC) as conceived under the Abuja Treaty. Progress is being made in the area of intra-African trade through the auspices of regional communities. An example of such progress was the 2008 agreement by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to negotiate an agreement on a tripartite free trade area as a building block of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
An important component of the continent’s quest for economic development and integration is the strengthening of intra-African trade. Currently, intra-African trade is low at 15.4% based on 2016 data (UNCTAD, 2019, p. 3). A further elaboration of the low level of intra-African trade by the African Union showed a composition of 13% for intra-imports and 20% for intra-exports “over the period of the last seven years” (2013–2019) (African Union, 2020, p. 21). AfCFTA is certainly the most comprehensive continental trade arrangement that could remedy the low intra-African trade profile and thus spur Africa’s development (Jensen & Sandrey, 2015). Trading activities under the auspices of AfCFTA began on January 1, 2021 in line with the decision adopted during the 13th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU-AHSG on December 5, 2020 (African Union, 2021).
The need to resolve the African development dilemma underpins the various continental and global development initiatives, especially the two major development agendas, namely the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2063. On the basis of these goals, continental and global awareness is promoted, political accountability is demanded, improved metrics are developed, social feedbacks are received and evaluated, and public pressures are built to demand for action from stakeholders (Sachs, 2012).
The Millennium Development Goals: A Retrospective Assessment
The MDGs, were adopted in 2,000 by the UN General Assembly and symbolized the commitment of world leaders to pursue global development. The MDGs represented a world-wide consensus comprising a constellation of political consensus, global vision of development to be consensually pursued and a new world order of expanded prosperity (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2013). The Millennium Declaration was signed by leaders of 189 countries on 8 September 2000 in New York. It had eight goals, and 18 targets as key priorities. These included commitment to address extreme poverty in its many dimensions, promote universal primary education, gender equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat the scourge of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop global partnership (United Nations, 2015). On the basis of these goals and attendant targets, the world galvanized efforts both to meet the needs of the disadvantaged sections of the global community and also to promote development.
By the end of 2015, not much progress was made in terms of lifting Africa out of underdevelopment. This is despite glowing pictures painted by the United Nations about the overall progress recorded in the attainment of the MDGs. The United Nations reported the attainment of targets in several goals by 2015. For example, there was a decline in the number of people categorized as living under extreme poverty (the number declined to 836 million approximating more than half of the 1.9 billion people in this population bracket as at 1990); improved primary school enrolment rate, which invariably led to a drastic drop in the number of children of primary school age that were out of school (it reduced from 100 million in 2000 to 57 million in 2015). Other areas of improvement included gender equality and empowerment as reflected by the enrolment of more girls in school and the recruitment of more women into paid employment around the world; global decline in the mortality rate of under-five years, which dropped to 43 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2015 as against 90 per 1,000 in 1990; worldwide decline in maternal mortality ratio by 45% since 1990; and decline in new malaria and HIV cases, with new HIV infections dropping to 2.1 million cases or approximately 40% in 2013 as against the figure of 3.5 million cases in 2000 (United Nations, 2015, pp. 4–6).
In evaluating the progress made in the attainment of the MDGs, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon recognized the persisting inequalities in the global system, especially the overwhelming concentration of extremely poor people in developing countries. It was estimated that in 2011, about 60% of this category of people numbering about a billion lived in just five countries, namely India, Nigeria, China, Bangladesh and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations, 2015, p. 15).
However, despite the accolades of global progress under the MDGs, the overall picture of African performance was dismal (United Nations, 2015). None of the eight goals was attained. The major achievement consisted of being on track in three goals, namely goals 2, 3, and 6 (see Table 1 above). Oleribe and Taylor-Robinson (2016) locate the source of the failures in the multiplicity of systemic challenges in African countries. Undoubtedly, some degrees of progress were recorded across Africa in several of the goals. However, the overall objective of the MDGs, which was to spread development across the world, did not materialize on the continent. For instance, Nigeria’s end-point report on the attainment of the MDGs indicated that the country met the target on maternal mortality as well as that of developing global partnership for development. It additionally recorded strong and appreciable progress in other goals. The non-attainment of the goals and targets in Nigeria was attributed to such factors as persisting poverty, social inequality, youth unemployment in the absence of inclusive growth and national security challenges (Federal Government of Nigeria [FGN], 2015). Like Nigeria, most countries of Africa failed to meet any of the goals and targets. Although the MDGs implementation in Africa ended as an unfinished business, Cheru (2016) ranks it as the most successful policy initiative in the current century due to its mobilization of global commitments towards the reduction of poverty and promotion of human development.
Africa’s MDGs Performance by 2015.
Source. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Union, African Development Bank and United Nations Development Programme (2015).
Towards the Actualization of Sustainable Development in Africa: How Feasible?
The feasibility of achieving sustainable development in Africa largely depends on the transformation of its states into what may be regarded as active state. As Nwozor (2018, p. 64) has pointed out, “African statehood has been at a crossroads, mainly as a result of centrifugal forces that tug at its cohesiveness.” The result is that most African states are structurally weak to serve as bulwarks to spearhead national development. It is this weak syndrome that underpins the paradox that characterizes African states.
Natural resources are major contributors to economic growth, employment, and fiscal revenue to countries (Ayee, 2014). Africa is enormously endowed with abundant renewable and non-renewable natural resources. Despite these endowments, the African paradox consists of being enormously endowed and yet entrapped in vicious development crises. As Ayee (2014, pp. 15–16) has observed, “many resource-rich and resource-dependent African countries are characterized by disappointing growth rates, high inequality, widespread impoverishment, bad governance, and an increased risk of civil violence.”
While Africa occupies 20% of earth’s landmass and accounts for 17% of the global population as at 2017 in addition to having enormously diverse natural resources, it contributes a meagre 3% to global trade with a significantly low share of global wealth (Agupusi, 2016; United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], 2018). A major part of the challenges faced by Africa is untapped or underutilized resources. For instance, Africa has the largest surface area of uncultivated arable land in comparison to other continents (NEPAD, 2013). It has nearly 200 million hectares that could be brought into production, which represents close to half of the world’s uncultivated land (Izvorski, 2018). In the same vein, Africa uses only 2% of its renewable water resources in comparison to 5% used globally, thus resulting in only 6% of African farmland being irrigated in contrast to 40% in Asia (Izvorski, 2018; NEPAD, 2013). The combined impact of this underutilization is Africa’s food and nutrition insecurity necessitating the continent’s huge food import bill (Chamberlin et al., 2014; Nwozor & Olanrewaju, 2020). According to Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 2019, p. 47), Africa’s food import bills spiked from US$39.29 billion in 2007 to US$70.09 billion in 2017. It is estimated that Africa’s food import bill will rise to US$110 billion by 2025 (Blueprint, 2019). Africa’s balance of payments deficits in the food sector (excluding fish) in 2017 was US$30.84 billion (FAO, 2019, pp. 47–51).
Within the context of poverty, Africa accounts for 25% of world’s poorest countries. The World Bank (n.d.) classification of countries by income as at 2020 lumped most African countries in the low-income and lower middle income categories. The only exceptions were Seychelles and Mauritius which were categorized as being in the high income group and Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Namibia and South Africa that were captured in upper middle income group (Serajuddin & Hamadeh, 2020; World Bank, n.d.). Additionally, African countries dominated the list of least developed countries of the world (United Nations, 2020). Table 2 below shows that out of the global wealth of US$399.2 trillion in 2019, Africa accounted for only US$4.8 trillion, making it a region with the least wealth in the world. Even India with comparable population with Africa recorded US$15.3 trillion wealth, which far surpassed the wealth of the entire Africa.
Global Household Wealth Profile by Region (2019).
Source. Shorrocks et al. (2020, p. 8).
The imperative of development in Africa is underscored by its seemingly insignificant share of global wealth as well as increasing poverty in contradistinction to the overall poverty decline globally. According to the 2020 Global Wealth Report, the total global wealth recorded massive expansion as it rose from US$117 trillion in 2000 to US$399.2 trillion at the end of 2019, averaging 6.6% growth per annum (Shorrocks et al., 2020, p. 7). Specifically in 2019, global wealth recorded a relatively fast-paced growth resulting in aggregate global wealth increase of US$36.3 trillion, which translated to a rise of 10.0% (Shorrocks et al., 2020, p. 7). In comparison to other regions, it would appear that Africa did not benefit much from this global prosperity. However, a closer holistic evaluation indicated that Africa recorded some progress in the expansion of its wealth. As Shorrocks et al. (2020, p. 7) have rightly observed, “every region recorded notable gains in both total wealth and wealth per adult, with Africa, China and North America leading the way.” Out of the US$36.3 trillion gained globally in 2019, Africa’s share of US$588 billion represented about 14% (Shorrocks et al., 2020, p. 8). These indices constitute part of the imperatives that drive the urgent need to evolve development models capable of facilitating the continent’s exit from under development.
The picture of poverty in Africa indicates that it is a serious challenge on the continent. Despite substantial reduction in the incidence of poverty in Africa as it fell from 54% in 1990 to 41% in 2015, many Africans are trapped in poverty (World Bank, 2018a). The reason for this seeming paradox is Africa’s population bulge, which led to the number of poor people on the continent increasing from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015 (Beegle et al., 2016). Current estimations indicate that one in three Africans live below the global poverty line, thus representing 70% of the world’s poorest people (Hamel et al., 2019). Projections indicate that while global poverty rate is expected to decline by 2030, no such positive prospects exist for Africa. In fact, the projections are that poverty will be primarily an African phenomenon by 2030 if current trends exist as “the top 10 poorest countries in the world will be African—both in terms of absolute numbers and share of extreme poor as a percentage of the total population” (Baier & Hamel, 2018, n.p.). Table 3 below provides Africa’s poverty profile, which shows that 34% of African population lives in extreme poverty.
Africa’s Poverty Profile (2019).
Note. World poverty clock, Retrieved December 18, 2019, from https://worldpoverty.io/headline/
A related challenge to Africa’s weak wealth profile is the contradiction of distributional inequality. The wealth distribution among the population is characterized by gross inequality (Nel, 2018). In other words, there is a wide gap between the elite and the masses in the wealth spectrum, which spans from poor to rich with categories of poorness and richness in-between. While some high net worth Africans are found in the ranks of global top wealth percentile, more than half of the African adult population is located within the base of the wealth spectrum (Nel, 2018; Shorrocks et al., 2020). A comparative picture of regional wealth distribution indicates that in contrast to developed countries where about 30% of adults fall within the base of the wealth pyramid, more than 90% of the adult population in India and Africa are in this range. The major difference between developed countries and Africa is that while majority of those at the base of the pyramid are transient and may likely exit in the former, many residents of the latter are unlikely to exit due to limited prospects for wealth creation (Shorrocks et al., 2020).
Africa’s debt profile has been upswing, which poses serious challenges of sustainability (Adeniran et al., 2018). Africa’s experience in the 1990s with debt peonage was responsible for its stagnation during that period. Debt burden undermined the capacity of the continent to develop as debt servicing obligations gulped the funds that could have been deployed for infrastructural development. As United Nations (2004, p. 9) points out, “the continent received some $540 billion in loans and paid back some $550 billion in principal and interest between 1970 and 2002. Yet Africa remained with a debt stock of $295 billion.” Additionally, the uncertainty associated with policies in indebted countries hindered private investment, as investors would not want to risk their funds in an environment with questionable prospects of policy continuity. The overall impact was the incapacity of African countries to create the essential conditions for sustainable economic growth and national development (Adeniran et al., 2018; Nwozor, 2009; United Nations, 2004).
In recent times, the debt profile of African countries has risen dangerously. Almost every African country is heavily indebted. The African debt circle is further expanding. For instance, Africa’s Eurobond debt passed the US$100-billion mark in 2019 after Ghana and Egypt issued US$2.7 billion and US$8 billion Eurobonds respectively (Adegoke, 2019). In recent times, several countries have been forced into the dire straits of being unable to service their debts. These countries include, Angola, The Gambia, Eritrea, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan (Shelton, 2019). The danger that lies ahead is that the continued rise in external debt stocks of African countries in the face of poor economic growth would railroad them into debt crisis (World Bank, 2018b). According to World Bank (2020, p. 7), African countries recorded the fastest accumulation of external debt stock in 2019 with an average rise in the neighborhood of 9.4%. Africa’s total external debt stocks as of 2019 was US$625billion
A new dimension in the current debt profile of Africa is that a substantial portion of the debt is owed to China. China is the single largest bilateral creditor to Africa, even surpassing the World Bank. It is estimated that about 20% of all African governments’ debt is owed to China as at 2018 (Brautigam et al., 2020; Sun, 2020). Africa’s indebtedness to China has been on the rise since 2000, and was estimated at US$143 billion as of 2017 (Sun, 2020).
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have already designated several African countries as either being at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress. The countries designated as being in debt distress are Eritrea, Gambia, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Sao Tomé and Principe, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Also, countries like Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia have been categorized as being at high risk of debt distress (Brautigam et al., 2020). The looming dangers of debt crisis in Africa has raised a lot of issues, including governance gaps and debt relief. The governance gaps, which include corruption, appetite for easy money, irresponsible borrowing by African governments, and questionable management of the loans, are at the root of the ineffectiveness of the loans and eventual transformation into a burden (Broadman, 2020; Sun, 2020). Considering Africa’s development aspirations, African leaders must rethink the economics of loans.
There are bases for Afro-pessimistic and Afro-optimistic outlooks for what the SDGs and Agenda 2063 hold for Africa. The pessimism about whether these agendas could lead to Africa’s development renaissance is anchored on the historical experience of failed development initiatives. Some scholars have remained pessimistic about the likelihood of meeting the goals and targets of the development agendas given the limited success in the attainment of the MDGs. Nhamo (2016) wonders about the practicality of achieving the 17 goals and 169 targets of the SDGs and the seven aspirations and 39 priority areas of Agenda 2063 when all that was accomplished under the MDGs with only eight goals and 18 targets was just “a good progress.”
Thus, despite the widespread optimism that the world would leverage on the experiences of the MDGs to achieve greater success in the pursuit of the SDGs, there are doubts about the replicability of that optimism in Africa. This Afro-pessimism is as a result of Africa’s poor report card under the MDGs. As at the conclusion of the MDGs in 2015, Africa was on track on only three goals, namely, goal 2 which focused on universal primary education; goal 3 that was preoccupied with the empowerment of women and promotion of gender equality; and goal 6 that paid attention to HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
The point that Africa was on track in three goals under the MDGs suggests that there are prospects for more strides in successive development initiatives. Cheru (2016) has observed that Africa’s greatest success with regard to MDGs was not necessarily meeting the various targets but the positive improvement recorded in ameliorating and improving human conditions in various countries. Although progress was uneven across the continent and there were gaps in attaining intended targets, generally speaking, Africa made impressive gains. Indeed, most African countries were actually active in the attempt to meet the MDGs and recorded varying degrees of success in all the goals. In some instances, African countries outperformed the global averages (D’Alessandro & Zulu, 2016). The United Nations, development agencies and scholars have emphasized that there are basis for optimism and that Africa is poised to build on its gains to entrench sustainable development. This is achievable through leveraging on some overarching lessons already learned in implementing previous initiatives and transposing same to the successor development initiatives (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Union, African Development Bank & United Nations Development Programme, 2015).
In the past two decades, Africa has experienced resurgence in its economic growth and consistently maintained its growth trajectory with the effect that several African economies are counted among the fastest growing economies in the world (Asongu, 2018; Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2018). The expectation is that Africa’s economic growth could lead to industrial development which in effect would help to expand its share of global wealth and, thus, combat poverty. This optimism is anchored on two factors. The first is the abundant resources in Africa, which confer on it a comparative advantage as well as position it as a prospective manufacturing hub; and the second is the historical experience of China and other late industrialisers in terms of combining rapid growth with a program of accelerated poverty alleviation (DeGhetto et al., 2016; Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2018). Part of the reasons behind the positive inclination that African development could materialize is based on the observation of historical trend in global industrial development. The global industrial development had followed a “flying geese pattern.” This pattern materializes as a result of saturation in more advanced industrial countries and available opportunities in lesser developed economies. The latter attracts increasing capital investments with a regional pattern of technology diffusion, which boost industrialization (Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2018).
In providing bases for optimism, Fukuda-Parr (2016) notes that different circumstances underpinned the introduction of both the MDGs and SDGs. Unlike the SDGs which were produced through widespread negotiations and consultations with relevant stakeholder states, people and experts, the MDGs were produced through limited consultations. In terms of purpose, while the MDGs were a North–South aid agenda designed specifically for the underdeveloped countries, the SDGs have universalistic character, targeting all countries, both rich and poor (Fukuda-Parr, 2016). Additionally, MDGs focused on poverty and its alleviation with poverty narrowly defined as meeting basic needs. The SDGs set a broader agenda transcending poverty and extending to sustainability in environmental, social, and economic spheres.
The commonality in the goals of the SDGs and Agenda 2063 is a strong indication of the likelihood of implementation (See Appendix A). What this implies is that whether African leaders focus on SDGs or Agenda 2063, the commonality in their various goals will ultimately lead to sustainable development. Also, the implementation of Agenda 2063 has been broken down into five stages based on 10-year implementation plans. This breakdown strategy in implementation will make it easy to monitor progress and make adjustments accordingly. In the same vein, the funding projections are anchored on internal sources, which means the implementation of the agenda will not depend on the benevolence of western countries and associated uncertainties. The identified sources envisaged to fund the first ten-year plan include, commercial finance from both public and private sources, concessional loans, commercial loans based on market price, equity and other market-like instruments, foreign direct investments (FDIs), crowd sourcing, government budgetary increases and portfolio investments (African Union Commission, 2015b). What this implies is that the necessary machinery to actualize sustainable development is already in place.
The Active State as a Critical Pathway to Sustainable Development
A major problem that confronts Africa and which is at the root of its continued inability to find the rhythm of development is its weak and fragile state system (Nwozor, 2018). As Park (2019) has pointed out, “African governments suffer from weak capacity to undertake given tasks in terms of implementing policies, solving problems and providing public services.” The state is the arrowhead of development as it mobilizes and allocates resources in the course of governance. An active state is one in which the appurtenances of governance demonstrate uncompromising willingness to pursue the ideals of the state. In other words, an active state transforms itself into a strong institutional instrument that transcends narrow group interests by building an encompassing system. Such a state has to be “strong enough to provide a solid minimum framework of law and order, enforcement of contracts and other basic institutions underpinning the market” (Bardhan, 2016, p. 862) to produce forward-looking investment climate that enhances productivity, grow incomes, and lead to increased wellbeing.
The Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) scores overall governance in Africa out of 100. Since 2010, the average overall governance scores have not measured up to 50.0, an indication that there is still a long way to go in terms of leveraging the government to provide good governance. While the average overall governance was 48.6% in 2015, it only appreciated marginally in 2019 at 48.8% (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). Governance is conceptualized in the context of the Mo Ibrahim Index as “the provision of political, social, economic, and environmental public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens” (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020, p. 8). The poor score on governance in Africa has far-reaching implication on development.
All the development initiatives at both the continental and global levels depend on the state for their actualization. Since their independence, African states have undergone several distortions that tended to undermine their capacity to engineer development. These distortions range from the inability to transform to developmental states with embedded autonomy capable of promoting and delivering economic growth and development, economic stagnation orchestrated by rapacious elite, entrenchment of authoritarian and unaccountable regimes, discriminatory policies formulated and driven by the logic of generating benefits for limited groups, to the ascendancy of the neo-patrimonialism. The combined effect of these distortionary forces has been the inability of African states to pursue national development without interference from private particularistic demands (Oosterveer, 2009).
So, one of the key requirements and critical pathways to facilitating the achievement of sustainability in Africa is to strengthen the state system. Thus, sustainable development is achievable through the enthronement of what Evans (2010) refers to as capability enhancing state in Africa. What this entails is the enhancement of the capabilities of African states in terms of developing their efficiency in the delivery of collective goods like health and educational services as well as infrastructural facilities, expanding administrative capacity and developing active democratic structure for effective socioeconomic action (Evans 2010; Guseh & Oritsejafor, 2019). The result will be the expansion of the capabilities of the citizenry as the sure foundations of sustained growth and development.
Recommendations and Conclusion
A major lacuna in the development initiatives over the years across Africa is the absence of science and technology in development permutations. A robust science and technology research framework is indispensable in national development. Although Agenda 2063 recognizes the relevance of science, technology and innovation in entrenching development, it does so from the perspective of developing the human and social capital of the continent through an education and skills revolution that emphasizes science and technology (African Union Commission, 2015b). Thus, the thrust of the Agenda in this regard is not essentially in the context of integrating them in the implementation plan as a strategy to actualize the aspirations of sustainable development. Science and technology research holds the key to present and future development of countries and continents as already demonstrated by development trajectories in both advanced and newly industrializing countries.
There is no aspect of Agenda 2063 and SDGs that cannot benefit optimally from science and technology for their sustainable actualization. Thus, science and technology research plays a fundamental role in creating wealth and improving the overall quality of life of the people, generating relevant scientific database and inducing real economic growth and transformation. Thus, setting up development initiatives and evolving implementation strategies can do little in the absence of an active state working in collaboration with active scientific community.
Although, previous continental and global development initiatives did not trigger development in Africa, however, some level of success was achieved in the MDGs. The modest strides recorded in the MDGs have served as an impetus for optimism that the latest development initiatives, namely Agenda 2063 and SDGs would place Africa on the path to sustainable development. Afro-pessimists might have a point in doubting the possibility of the current development initiatives to railroad Africa to sustainability given previous failures and the absence of deliberate policy thrusts to correct the myriad of structural deficiencies in various countries of the continent. Undoubtedly, there are several structural deficiencies that Africa must resolve to be able to realize the aspirations of both Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. The checklist of focus will include reversing the monocultural economic base through diversification, revitalizing the agricultural sector, evolving a welfare system that will target the eradication of poverty, reversing the piling external debts, strengthening Africa’s trade profile and improving public infrastructures. The actualization of all of these goals would require the emergence of active states across Africa.
The link between optimism and pessimism with regards to the capacity of Agenda 2063 and SDGs to translate into veritable frameworks for inclusive growth and sustainable development on the continent is the enthronement of active state or capability enhancing state (Evans, 2010). The active state would create the right structural framework to institutionalize sustainability. In addition to relying less on external financing and developing multiple sources of internal financing to drive development, more intentional efforts must be made towards mainstreaming science and technology in the whole spectra of the development agenda. Additionally, the African scientific community must be mobilized to chart interdisciplinary paths for sustainable development research.
Footnotes
Appendix A. Agenda 2063 and SDGs 2030: Interlocking commonality profile
| S/N | Agenda 2063 aspirations | Agenda 2063 goals | Corresponding SDGs |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development. | 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens. 2. Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation. 3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens. 4. Transformed economies. 5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production. 6. Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth. 7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities. |
1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere in the world; 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss. |
| 2 | An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance. | 8. A United Africa (Federal or Confederate). 9. Continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional. 10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa. |
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. |
| 3 | An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law. | 11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched. 12. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place. |
16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. |
| 4 | A peaceful and secure Africa. | 13. Peace, security and stability is preserved. 14. A stable and peaceful Africa 15. A fully functional and operational APSA |
16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. |
| 5 | An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics. | 16. African cultural renaissance is preeminent. | |
| 6 | An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children. | 17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life. |
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. |
|
|
Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner. | 19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence. |
10. Reduce inequality within and among countries. |
Source. Adapted from African Union Commission (2015b, p. 116).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
