Abstract
Over the past decade, in the wake of the global housing crisis, many countries have again turned to public housing to increase the supply of affordable housing for disadvantaged residents. Because the literature and past experience have generally shown public-housing policies to be contrary to the urban-diversity approach, many countries are reshaping their policies and focusing on a mix of people and of land uses. In this context, the Israeli case is particularly interesting. In Israel, as in many other countries (such as Germany and England), there was greater urban diversity in public-housing construction during the 1950s and 1960s (following the state’s establishment in 1948). However, at the beginning of the new millennium, when many countries began to realise the need for change and started reshaping their public-housing policies in light of the urban-diversity approach, Israel responded differently. In this study I use urban diversity’s main principles – the mix of population and land uses – to examine the trajectory of public-housing policy in Israel from a central housing policy to a marginal one. The findings and the lessons derived from the Israeli case are relevant to a variety of current affordable-housing developments in many places.
Introduction
Throughout the 20th century, public-housing policies proliferated in European countries, the United States and Israel. However, in each place they were designed and implemented differently to accommodate differences in the primary goal, target population, project size, location, form of subsidies and level and method of maintenance (Houard, 2011; Scanlon et al., 2014; Schwartz, 2014: 125–157; Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007). Despite the differences, public housing consisted mainly of large housing estates in unattractive locations and created homogeneous communities that quickly became concentrations of poverty (Bloom, 2012; Ruming et al., 2004).
The onset of the new millennium, and especially the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, was intertwined with a housing crisis and rising demand for affordable housing. In response, many countries have developed policies to increase the supply of affordable housing (Calavita and Mallach, 2010; Gurran, 2008). As part of these policies, many countries have returned to one of the oldest and best-known solutions: public housing. Drawing on the lessons of the past, the new initiatives took an urban-diversity approach and highlighted the need for a mix of people (in terms of income levels, ethnicity and age) and land uses (Fainstein, 2005; Talen, 2012). This approach was perhaps most developed in England, but it is of increasing interest across Europe and in the United States (Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007: 5–33). 1
In this context, it is particularly interesting to examine the trajectory of public housing in Israel. In Israel, as in many other countries (such as Germany and England), there was a greater level of urban diversity in public-housing construction during the 1950s and 1960s. However, at the beginning of the new millennium, when many countries began to realise the need for change and started reshaping their public-housing policies in light of the urban-diversity approach, Israel responded differently. As this paper shows, since the late 1990s, Israeli governments have turned away from an urban-diversity approach in public housing. Even the country’s largest-ever social protest in the summer of 2011 barely dealt with public-housing policy. Only recently, towards the end of 2015, have the government and the public-housing companies begun emphasising the importance of public housing and the need to formulate an updated public-housing policy.
In this study I examine the trajectory of the public-housing policy in Israel from a central housing policy to a marginal one. The next section briefly reviews the literature on urban diversity and public-housing policies in various countries. The third section reviews Israel’s public-housing policy over time. The fourth and main section analyses the implementation of Israel’s public-housing policy and its current outcomes with regards to the mix of population and land uses. Finally, I discuss and compare the findings regarding Israel’s public-housing policy with trends in other countries. The findings and the lessons derived from the Israeli case are relevant to a variety of current affordable-housing developments in many places.
Public housing and urban diversity
Public housing: Overview and current trends
Public housing is one of the oldest policy tools for increasing the supply of affordable housing. The First World War and the economic crisis of the 1930s stimulated the production of public housing in some European countries and in the United States. However, public housing spread globally only after the Second World War (Scanlon et al., 2014).
‘Public housing’ generally refers to government-owned housing, usually low-cost rental apartments, for lower-income people who cannot afford market rents and are even less able to buy an apartment or a house. However, there is no single formal definition of public housing, Whitehead and Scanlon (2007: 5) argue. The definition may include ownership type; who constructs the dwellings; whether the rents are below market level; the relevant funding and/or subsidy stream; and, most important, the primary goal of the housing, whether it is formally available to all households (for example in Austria and Sweden) or reserved for those who cannot meet their own housing needs (for example, in England and the Netherlands).
Since the 1980s, in most countries the percentage of the housing stock allocated for public housing units has declined substantially. In England, for example, it declined from 31% in 1979 to only 18% in 2011 (Whitehead, 2014: 106); in the Netherlands, it declined from 43% in 1975 to 32% in 2011 (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014: 26). And although in Germany in the 1970s public-housing units constituted almost a quarter of the housing stock, today they constitute only 5% (Droste and Knorr-Siedow, 2014: 184–200). In many countries this trend was due to a combination of privatisation, which allowed the sale of the apartments to their tenants, and a slowdown in construction starts of public-housing units. However, most societies maintained a certain level of new construction of public-housing units. In England, for example, around 2001, the public-housing stock was at its lowest, accounting for only 11% of the 130,000 new homes. Since then it has risen again, constituting 13% of 175,000 new homes in 2007, just before the financial crisis, and a much higher proportion, 25% (of less than 115,000 new homes), in 2011 (Whitehead, 2014: 108). In the Netherlands, between 2006 and 2011 some 160,000 social units were added (137,000 new units built and 22,000 second-hand units purchased) (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014: 26).
Despite the various manifestations of public housing in different places, Whitehead and Scanlon (2007: 6) argue that the social sector generally houses a disproportionate number of people who are young or old, single parents, retired or economically inactive, poor or who have special needs. Moreover, in most European countries immigrants and ethnic minorities are over-represented (Scanlon et al., 2014: 12–20; Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007: 6).
In the United States and in many European countries, the majority of public-housing units built in the 20th century were in large urban projects (Schwartz, 2014: 125–157). In many cities this led to the creation of slums consisting mainly of public housing (Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007: 5–33). 2 Consequently, in many countries, and especially in Western Europe, new public-housing initiatives have focused on mixed-tenure sites, a greater mix in the existing stock, and more efficient use of public assets (Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007: 6). Many societies have adapted their public-housing policy to neoliberal trends, which are dominant in advanced-economy countries. Instead of national subsidies providing most of the funding and local authorities or housing companies building the units, public/private partnerships are being explored, and more and more private developers are becoming involved in building and operating public-housing and urban-renewal projects (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014: 37–39; Whitehead, 2014: 118–119; Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007: 5–33). In the concluding section I discuss these developments and compare them to those in Israel.
The urban-diversity approach
In planning theory, the urban-diversity approach is a reaction to the fundamental-zoning approach, which was based on the segregation of homogeneous districts (zones) and created homogeneous concentrations of poverty (Fainstein, 2005; Talen, 2012). The urban-diversity approach, in contrast, is based on a mix of people, land uses and activities. Proponents of urban diversity argue that the dominant zoning approach, which emphasises economic efficiency and the protection of property values, neglects other values and produces dullness and discrimination.
The urban-diversity approach has become a central tenet of most conceptions of the ‘good city’. Theorists who are proponents of urban diversity argue that it benefits the city’s entire population. Jacobs (1961: 200–205), for example, argues that diversity makes cities more appealing and is the source of economic productivity. Young (1990: 239) explains that ‘what makes urban spaces interesting, draws people out in public to them, gives people pleasure and excitement, is the diversity of activity they support’. And Sandercock (1997) states that the function of city planning is to create urbanity, which allows people from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds equal rights to city space.
Socially diverse neighbourhoods are seen as essential for broader community well-being and for achieving social-equity goals (Fainstein, 2010: 69; Jacobs, 1961: 144; Talen, 2012). Consequently, many scholars since the 1960s have supported urban-redevelopment strategies that stimulate physical and social heterogeneity. Land-use diversity involves mixed uses and land-use dispersal within the city or the state (Fainstein, 2005). It includes an emphasis on the public sphere: kindergartens, parks, community centres. These public spaces are important meeting places for residents, where they can talk, interact with one another, decide on common issues and feel that the city is relating to their community needs. This, in turn, helps create a strong civil society that cares and fights for its city (Harvey and Potter, 2009). Diversity also means having different types of buildings and apartments (including different lot sizes, floor-space sizes and finishing standards), with a focus on the effect of these differences on housing prices in the area. Such diversity may help prevent the formation of exclusionary zoning in a city or neighbourhood (Hananel, 2014).
Despite the seeming unanimity of urban theorists on the merits of urban diversity, many studies indicate negative effects of urban diversity (Fainstein, 2005). With regard to public housing, social diversity usually means the integration and assimilation of public-housing tenants in areas dominated by private-home ownership and private rental. But disadvantaged tenants are not readily accepted into communities dominated by private owners. A substantial proportion are actively constructed as different, and they experience oppression, stigmatisation, exclusion and even hostility (Ruming et al., 2004).
Public housing in Israel
Immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, a massive wave of immigration began that more than doubled the Jewish population within three years – from 650,000 to more than 1.5 million (Sleifer, 1979). Public housing was created to house the immigrants and populate the country’s periphery.
The national-settlement and security role of Israel’s public-housing policy was stated explicitly in the country’s first strategic plan in 1952. 3 As a result of this plan, dozens of new municipalities, called development towns, were created in the 1950s to disperse the Jewish population so as to prevent the country’s Arab population from taking over land. Most of the immigrants who arrived, mainly from North Africa and Asia, during that period were sent directly to development towns, where the majority of public-housing units were built (Hananel, 2009; Tzfadia, 2006; Yiftachel, 1992).
In the 1950s, public housing comprised more than half of all the housing construction in Israel. Some was built by the housing branch of the Ministry of Labour and some was built by public-housing companies that operated under the government’s supervision and with government funding (Feivish, 2006).
In the 1970s, when immigration dropped substantially, the construction of public housing decreased to an estimated 30% of all building starts, and the government’s housing policy changed from supporting the construction of housing units (supply side) to mainly providing financial assistance for housing ownership through subsidised mortgages (demand side) (Feivish, 2006).
In the 1980s, the Ministry of Construction and Housing launched a major new initiative –selling public-housing apartments to tenants, with financial aid of 48% to 60% of the price, depending on family size and location, and with preference given to outlying development areas (Feivish, 2006; Feldman, 2011). This initiative began the privatisation of public-housing stock and is a manifestation of the neoliberal and privatisation trends in Israel that have increased since the 1980s (Werczberger, 1995). 4
An exception to these trends occurred in the beginning of the 1990s. The immigration of nearly one million people from the former Soviet Union led the government to resume construction of public housing. In 1991, 61,730 public-housing units were built, compared to 3490 in 1989 (Benchetrit, 2003). However, after 1991 hardly any units were built, and a policy that encouraged the sale of public-housing units dramatically decreased the number of existing units.
As early as the 1950s and 1960s, when public housing was the main building method in the country, all public-housing tenants had the option of purchasing their apartments and receiving various benefits. In the 1970s, following the transition to the policy of subsidising mortgages for young couples, purchases of public-housing apartments declined. Consequently, in the mid-1980s the government began encouraging public-housing tenants to purchase their homes by providing significant discounts. 5 In 1993, with the Labour Party’s rise to power, the government froze the sale of apartments in the centre of the country, except to families living in high-density conditions in poor neighbourhoods (Feivish, 2006).
In 1997, when the conservative Likud Party came to power, the government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu took another step toward the privatisation of public housing by transferring the management of public housing, by tenders, to private companies. 6 During that time, maintenance of the public-housing stock was already a serious problem. In 1998, the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) passed the Public-Housing Tenants Rights Law, which for the first time placed responsibility for the maintenance of the public-housing units on the state and the housing companies. Despite the law, the State Comptroller’s reports year after year have documented the rundown condition and poor repair of most of the housing (Feldman, 2012). 7
The willingness to transfer the management of public housing to private companies sparked protest by some tenants and social-change movements and led to the establishment of the Public-Housing Forum (PHF) – a coalition of social organisations, led by the Mizrachi Democratic Rainbow (MDR) 8 – that acted together with the tenants. In 1998, the PHF joined forces with a group of members of Knesset headed by MK Ran Cohen, who proposed a new law on the matter.
The Public-Housing Act of 1998 was passed after prolonged debate between coalitions and political camps and was a great victory for the supporting MKs and for the PHF, whose primary aim was to enable tenants to buy their apartments with discounts of up to 85%. Ostensibly, this aim is consistent with the government’s privatisation of public housing. However, the bill had a much broader goal. It was also intended to foster intergenerational justice by allowing public-housing tenants to accumulate assets and bequeath them to their children. 9 To maintain the supply of public-housing units, the law stipulated that all sales proceeds would go for the construction of new public housing (Clause 10).
Immediately after the law was enacted, it was suspended for two years. This ritual was repeated every two years, thus enabling the government to repeatedly put off implementing the law. Nevertheless, some 37,500 apartments were sold between 1999 and August 2011, 10 substantially reducing the public-housing supply. In contravention of the spirit of the law, the sales proceeds were not used to build additional public housing. Between 1999 and August 2011, the revenue from the sold apartments totaled NIS 2.75 billion, but no new housing units were built (Feldman, 2011).
There are currently 60,500 public-housing units in Israel, which constitute less than 2.5% of the total housing stock. 11 Approximately 2.5% (200,000 people) of the Israeli population live in public housing. 12
In the 1960s, the public-housing stock consisted of 206,000 units. In 1999, just before the government began its discounted sale of public housing, there was a reserve of 108,000 public-housing units, inhabited by some 300,000 people (Feivish, 2006; Feldman, 2011). 13 Since 1999 the number of public-housing units and tenants has declined by 45%, even though the demand for public housing has risen substantially (Feldman, 2011). This change is to a great extent congruent with the government’s attitude toward public housing and the declared policy of reducing the reserve of public housing.
Two government companies that operate throughout the country own 92% of the public-housing units: Amidar (72%) and Amigur (20%). Other units are owned by four municipal companies that manage public housing in four cities: Heled, in the Petakh Tikva region; Halamish, in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa region; Prazot, in the Jerusalem region; and Shikmona, in the Haifa region (Feldman, 2011). According to data published by the Ministry of Construction and Housing in July 2015, 576 public-housing units are vacant, all of them in the periphery. 14
Analysis of public housing and urban diversity in Israel
Israel’s public-housing policy has changed greatly since the 1950s. In this section I examine the relationship between the implementation and outcome of this policy today and the principles of social mix and land-use diversity.
Search data and methodological constraints
It was almost impossible to obtain data about public housing in Israel. First I asked the Ministry of Construction and Housing, 15 which is in charge of implementing public-housing policy, for basic data about public-housing units and tenants: the total number of housing units and the distribution of the units by municipalities; and the total number of tenants and the distribution of tenants (and households) by income, age, ethnicity and nationality. The ministry ignored repeated requests over more than two years.
Therefore, I contacted each of the six housing companies (Amidar, Amigur, Heled, Halamish, Prazot and Shikmona). The data they provided were partial and uneven, making it difficult to create a uniform overall picture. For example, each company presented the age distribution differently, and none provided data regarding income distribution or distribution by ethnicity or nationality. This limited the analysis I could conduct, so that when looking social mix I focused primarily on the age distribution.
Nevertheless, the eligibility criteria, together with the socioeconomic level of the municipalities where most public-housing units are located, made it possible also to examine the socioeconomic status of the tenants. Below, I connect the socioeconomic level of the tenants with the socioeconomic status of the municipalities that contain most of the public-housing stock. I obtained further important information from Amidar and Amigur, which hold 92% of the public-housing units. These data include the average apartment area, the average number of persons per room, the average area per person and the percentage of National Insurance Institute benefits among recipients of public-housing tenants. Some of the information was obtained through interviews with senior Amidar officials.
Despite substantial methodological limitations, by cross-referencing all the data from the Ministry of Construction and Housing website, Central Bureau of Statistics reports, the Knesset, the State Comptroller’s reports, data I had received from each of the housing companies and data I obtained through personal interviews, I was able to conduct research that reflects the current situation. Attempts to obtain data for previous periods for comparison were unsuccessful. Even attempts to obtain information about changes in the eligibility criteria for public housing were unsuccessful. Such data were not available even to Knesset researchers in 2012, who note that their requests for statistics regarding changes in eligibility criteria were ignored by the Ministry of Construction and Housing (Feldman, 2011). This lack of access to basic information in itself indicates the attitude of the establishment and its organs in Israel to public-housing issues.
Social mix by age and income
The population mix of tenants has undergone significant changes over the years. As in some European countries (such as England), in the 1950s about 50% of housing starts in Israel were of public-housing units, which suggests that the public-housing tenants varied in age and income. Over the years, following a reduction in the housing stock and stricter eligibility criteria, the heterogeneity of the population declined. The distribution of tenants by age appears in Table 1.
Distribution of public-housing tenants in Israel by age in 2014 (p. 12).
The distribution by age of public-housing tenants differs significantly from that of the total population of Israel. As Table 1 shows, tenants aged 65 and over account for 30% of public-housing residents, while they constitute only 10% of the total population. This percentage of elderly tenants in public housing is similar to that in England and the Netherlands (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014: 35; Whitehead, 2014: 117). In contrast, the percentage of families with young children in public housing in Israel is half that of the general population (24% compared with 57.7%). In an international comparison, these findings are surprising, because in most countries the proportion of children and families with children, and especially of single-parent families with children, in public housing is higher than that in the general population (Scanlon et al., 2014: 12–20; Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007: 6). However, when one looks at the specific trajectory of public-housing policies in Israel, these findings are not so surprising. Since the 1990s, because Israel’s government stopped the construction of public housing almost completely, it has become extremely difficult for young families with children to obtain a public-housing apartment. At the same time, the existing public-housing tenants have become older and, as a consequence, their share among all public-housing households has increased.
A closer examination based on data received from Amigur reveals that 67% of Amigur housing units have only one tenant, or at most two. In Amidar units, the average apartment area is 64.60 square meters, the average number of persons per room is 0.91 and the average area per person is 25.25 square meters. 18 This means that a large portion of the apartments are inhabited by elderly people with low residential density. According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, about 50% of all Israelis live in conditions of greater housing density. These data are particularly surprising in view of the low socioeconomic status of the vast majority of public-housing tenants, as I show below. 19
With regard to social mix by income, because I could not obtain data on the distribution of public-housing residents by income level, I conducted crosschecks of all data received from the Ministry of Construction and Housing and the housing companies. First I looked at the eligibility criteria for public housing. Obtaining a public-housing unit in Israel is a complicated process. Prospective tenants must register and have their eligibility examined by various officials, including the Ministry of Construction and Housing, other ministries and a detective agency. Eligibility, which is checked continually, is limited to people who do not already own a housing unit and whose income does not exceed a certain level. Applicants must also meet a large number of additional criteria, including such factors as marital status, family size, age of children and health status, and must not have previously owned a dwelling. Eligibility, once granted, is for two years. If no housing is found by the end of that period, the applicant must repeat the eligibility procedure. After entering the apartment, the tenant’s financial situation is not tested again, unless the tenant seeks to purchase the apartment or asks for a discount in rent. 20
According to Ministry of Construction and Housing data, the maximum monthly household income for eligibility in 2011 was NIS 5914 shekels (about USD 1516), which was less than half the average income of Israeli households at that time. In fact, the eligible households had incomes that were in the lowest three deciles of all households. 21 In 2015, 2620 families were on the waiting list for public housing: 2110 of these had no housing and had received certification; the rest were public-housing tenants who had applied to move to better units. 22 The average wait was two years, but in attractive locations, such as Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, the wait was seven years (Feldman, 2011).
As noted above, in the face of rising demand, decision-makers substantially increased the eligibility requirements. Therefore, an understanding of Israel’s public-housing policy requires an analysis of the changes in the eligibility criteria. However, these data were not available to me. Data received from Amidar and Amigur indicate that more than 90% of public-housing tenants are entitled to a substantial discount on rent for public housing and that most of them receive a supplementary benefit from the National Insurance Institute. The remaining 10% consist mainly of public bodies (such as synagogues and kindergartens), eligible adult children of deceased tenants or individuals who for various reasons received apartments but were not entitled to a discount. 23
Another indication of the low socioeconomic status of the public-housing tenants is the socioeconomic level of the municipalities in which most public-housing units are located, compared with the distribution of the total Israeli population, as presented in Table 2. 24
Distribution of public-housing units by municipalities’ socioeconomic level. 25
As we can see from Table 2, the majority (64%) of public-housing units are located in municipalities at socioeconomic levels 5 and 6, whereas only 38% of the total population lives in these municipalities. Although 36.2% of the population lives in municipalities at socioeconomic levels 1–4, only 15% of the public-housing stock is located there. Members of national minorities constitute a marginal percentage of public-housing tenants and are concentrated mainly in mixed Jewish-Arab cities. 26 No non-Jewish migrants live in public housing. The absence of national minorities and migrants from public-housing units is different from the situation in most Western countries, where these populations are over-represented in public housing (Scanlon et al., 2014: 12–20; Whitehead and Scanlon, 2007: 6). This situation can be explained by the primary goal of Israel’s public-housing policy – dispersal of the Jewish population in peripheral areas – and by the fact that most municipalities at socioeconomic levels below 4 are populated by members of national minorities (Bedouin, Arabs, Druze and Circassians), which were not part of the target population of this policy.
An exception among the low socioeconomic-level municipalities is Jerusalem (level 4), which has a relatively high concentration of public housing. However, many public-housing units in Jerusalem are located in the city’s disadvantaged Jewish neighbourhoods (such as the Katamonim, Shmuel Hanavi and Kiryat Menachem). The high percentage of public-housing units in municipalities at socioeconomic level 8 (10%) is noteworthy. Half of these units are located in Tel Aviv, but the vast majority of them are in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the south of the city (such as Tel Kabir and Neveh Ofer [Jaffa Bet], Jaffa Gimmel, Jaffa Dalet, Livne South and North, Kfir and Kfar Shalem). 27
Geographic dispersal and land-use mix
Most of Israel’s public-housing units were built in small, new development towns during the 1950s, in the geographic periphery. In this respect, as early as the 1950s Israel was different from most European countries and the United States, where the majority of public housing was built in big cities. Over the years the unbalanced geographic distribution in Israel has been exacerbated, because most of the public-housing units that were sold were in the central area, as shown below. An examination of the geographic distribution of the public-housing units in 2015 appears in Table 3.
Geographic distribution of public-housing units by district.
As Table 3 shows, the geographic distribution of public-housing units is very different from the distribution of the population. The central districts (Tel Aviv and Centre) contain 40.7% of the population but only 23.9% of the public-housing units. Some 70.1% of all public-housing units are in peripheral districts – North (25%), South (34.5%) and Haifa (10.6%). 30 Nationwide, more than half (54%) of the public-housing stock is in development towns established under the Sharon Plan. The largest concentrations are in cities such as Kiryat Shmona (1322 units), Dimona (2723), Ofakim (1314) and Kiryat Gat (1806).
The unbalanced distribution of housing units nationwide is reflected prominently in the percentage of total housing units of a municipality that are public-housing units, as shown in Table 4.
Public-housing units as a percentage of the total housing stock of selected municipalities.
Whereas public housing comprises less than 2.5% of all housing units in Israel, in the development towns the percentage of public-housing units is much higher. In Dimona, for instance, it is nearly a quarter (23.4%) of all dwellings, 18% in Ofakim and 16.9% in Kiryat Shmona. In central municipalities, however, the percentage of public-housing units is lower than the national average: Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1.1%; Holon, 1.3%; and Rishon Lezion, less than 1%. 31
The situation was more balanced before the sale programs, in which most of the apartments sold were in the centre of the country (67%) and only a third in peripheral areas (33%), despite the priority given to sales in peripheral areas. Even the apartments sold in the peripheral areas were largely in cities closer to the centre, such as Ashkelon (7%), Ashdod (9%), Kiryat Ata and Kiryat Yam (7%) (Feivish, 2006; Feldman, 2011).
In view of the high percentage of public-housing units in development towns, it is important to examine also the unbalanced distribution of revenue-generating land uses in these municipalities. In Israel, as in many other countries, residential property rates, collected directly from the residents, by and large do not increase the municipal budget substantially. The municipality’s budget is determined by the amount of revenue-generating land uses, such as industrial, commercial, tourism and office zones, within the municipal borders (Hananel, 2009). Since the 1980s, as government funding has decreased substantially, local authorities have had to rely increasingly on self-generated revenue. Consequently, since the 1990s many development towns, which have a severe shortage of revenue-generating land uses, have suffered a financial crisis. Many have been unable to pay salaries and to provide suitable public services – such as proper education, health, culture and welfare systems – to their residents, many of whom are public-housing tenants (Hananel, 2009).
Some very recent trends
During the last decade, the sharp increase in housing costs in Israel and the ensuing housing-affordability crisis have resulted in a 23% increase in the waiting lists for public housing (from 2150 in 2007 to 2788 in 2015) (Bosso, 2015a). A 2015 report by the State Comptroller devoted to the general housing crisis notes that from January 2008 to December 2013 the real price of housing (both new and second-hand) in the centre increased by 55%. In peripheral districts (North, Haifa and South) – where 70% of public-housing units are located – the increase was even greater (66%–68%, compared with 43% in Jerusalem and 61% in Tel Aviv). The report indicated that the increase in housing prices and a decline in the average real wage substantially increased the burden of housing costs, particularly for households in the six lowest income deciles – that is, a potential decline in the ability to pay for basic living needs, increased financial risk and real harm to quality of life. 32
The social protest of 2011 33 focused on the housing problems of the middle class, ignoring those of the disadvantaged population, such as public housing (Schipper, 2015). However, during the protest the nationwide Periphery Bloc Forum (PBF) was established to protest the housing crisis affecting the periphery and the disadvantaged. Even after the protest subsided, the PBF continued to demand a return to the construction of public housing. 34 The PBF’s intensive activity and the extreme housing crisis led the government and the housing companies to understand that change was necessary.
As a first step, in January 2014, the government decided to start implementing the Public-Housing Act, 15 years after it was enacted. But an amendment allowed the use of sales proceeds for rental assistance and repair of existing housing. Consequently, the public-housing stock reached a historic low of 58,879 units (Bosso, 2015b).
In September 2014, the then construction and housing minister Uri Ariel (from the right wing party ‘the Jewish Home’) decided to buy 1000 second-hand apartments. But only four second-hand apartments were actually bought (Bosso, 2015b).
In March 2015, a national election was held and a new government was formed. Although the new government, again headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, is similar to its predecessor, its attitude towards public housing has changed in a positive and meaningful way. This change can be attributed largely to the entry of the new centrist party, Kulanu, and to the combination of Moshe Kahlon, its chairman, as finance minister, and Yoav Galant as construction and housing minister. 35
Upon taking office, Galant declared a five-point plan for resolving the public-housing crisis: (1) earmarking for public housing 5% of all units built on public land (which is 93% of all land in Israel); (2) flexible criteria for immediate occupancy of (500) vacant units; (3) urban renewal projects by Amidar in buildings where the majority of units are public housing and transfer of apartments to those entitled; (4) urban renewal projects by Amigur, construction of small apartments (up to 55 square meters) for those entitled; (5) a substantial increase in renovation of existing public-housing units. 36 The PBF welcomed the comprehensive program and the changed attitude towards public housing.
In the six months since the declaration of the plan, Galant has allocated funds for purchasing second-hand apartments for public housing, substantially increased the annual allocation for renovation of older buildings and begun promoting urban renewal projects and discussing the terms of payment for those eligible (Bosso, 2015c). In November 2015, Galant froze evictions and ordered the establishment of a committee to re-evaluate the eviction policy (which had not been examined in an orderly manner for many years) (Bosso, 2015d). 37
Discussion, conclusions, and some lessons
This study shows that Israel’s public-housing policy has changed substantially since the 1950s and that the level of urban diversity in respect to the mix of population and land uses has declined dramatically. This situation is not unique to Israel and reflects the general attitude towards public housing in many European countries and in the United States. However, the study shows clearly that at the start of the 21st century, when most countries began to address the problem, Israel’s declared policy only exacerbated it.
Regarding population mix by age, more than 30% of Israel’s public-housing tenants today are elderly, a percentage similar to that in England and the Netherlands. However, in contrast to these countries where the percentage of children and families with children in public housing is higher than that in the general population, in Israel the percentage of families with young children in public housing is less than half that in the general population (24% compared with 57.7%). Because of this imbalance, a large portion of the apartments are inhabited by elderly people with only 1–2 persons per unit, which is a lower residential density than that of the general population in Israel. This is inefficient for the housing market, because many disadvantaged families with children are living in inappropriate density in public-housing units or in the open market.
Another interesting demographic finding, related to Israel’s nation-building and security considerations, is that public housing was (and to some extent still is) considered the main tool for Jewish immigrant absorption. Consequently, although in Israel, as in other countries, public-housing residents are the most disadvantaged population, they include mainly Jews. Whereas in other countries national minorities or migrants are the majority of public-housing tenants, in Israel they are a tiny minority.
With regard to geographic and land-use diversification, because of Israel’s nation-building and security considerations, most public-housing units were intentionally built in development towns in peripheral areas, and only a marginal percentage were built in the central urban areas, unlike the situation in most European countries and the United States. Since the end of the 1990s, most of the apartments sold were in big cities in the centre of the country, exacerbating the unbalanced geographic distribution.
However, the main way in which Israel differs from other countries, and which has had a major effect on all other aspects, is that since the end of the 1990s, the government has stopped production of public housing. In most other countries there was a significant slowdown in the production of public housing after the 1980s, but in most places construction continued in parallel to the policy of selling the apartments to their tenants. No countries stopped construction completely. Moreover, in Israel, over the last two decades, approximately 40,000 apartment units have been sold. To control the rising demand for public-housing units, decision-makers raised the eligibility criteria. This combination of shrinking the supply and raising the eligibility bar enabled the government to keep the public-housing waiting lists stable for many years, despite rising demand. Consequently, the government saw no need to change its attitude towards public housing or update its public-housing policy – until the last decade, as described above. The structure and forms of ownership and funding were never changed, and until the most recent developments there were no new initiatives or involvement of the private sector or public-private partnerships, as in other countries.
In conclusion, one might say that the trajectory of public housing in Israel has undergone major changes, and is perhaps the most significant in Western countries with developed economies. From a key housing policy in the 1950s and 1960s it has become a marginal policy (pertaining to only 2.5% of the total population, from the lowest three income deciles). However, very recently significant changes have been made in this policy. This is a delayed response to the increasing protests organised by public housing tenants since 2011. It will be interesting to follow these developments and to examine the future of Israel’s public-housing policy: Will it once again become a central housing policy? Will it remain marginal? Or will it adjust itself to the social, economic and political changes in Israel and provide adequate housing solutions for the country’s disadvantaged? Unfortunately, it is still too early to answer these interesting and important questions.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I thank the editor, Mark Stephens, and the anonymous reviewers for their useful and challenging comments, which have strengthened the paper. I deeply thank Naomi Carmon, Oren Yiftachel, Gila Menahem, Itai Sened, Rachelle Alterman, Tali Hatuka, and Ruthie Schwartz for their helpful and insightful comments. I also thank Guy Tanenbaum, Joseph Karavani, Eli Ginsburg, Sagit Azary-Viesel, and Revital Karin Sela for their assistance in obtaining data. Special thanks to Zeev Pnini and Yael Ben-Yefet for sharing with me valuable data and their relevant experience.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.