Overturning Italy’s Article 18: Exogenous and endogenous pressures,and role of the state

Introduction

In the autumn of 2014 Italian political debate was dominated by the image of Marta, a low paid, precarious worker with few, if any, employment rights. Marta’s insecurity was viewed as typical of a growing segment of the Italian workforce, usually younger, often female, and immigrant. This was contrasted to more unionized and older employees in core manufacturing and in the public sector who had significant employment security under Article 18 (of Law 300/1970). Just over a month after dismissing its importance, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi announced Article 18’s abolition as a cornerstone of his newly introduced Jobs Act. In so doing, he presented (and conceived) Marta’s precarious state as a direct consequence of those employees with strong employment protection. Despite strong union protests, including a million person rally in Rome on 25 October 2014, the Jobs Act won approval to become law from both the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Hence the Jobs Act overturned the core aspect of Article 18, the pillar of Italian employment protection for more than 40 years, which stated that in the case of proved unfairness of individual dismissal, the employer can be forced by a judge to reinstate the employee. This core element has been a restraint on management discretion in dismissals (Simonazzi et al., 2008: 3). Italy is one of the few OECD nations to have had such reinstatement provisions (OECD, 2013: 81). ¹ How can we explain this substantial change in Italian employment protection legislation?

Employment protection legislation (EPL) consists of three different items: regulation of temporary contracts, of collective dismissals, and of individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts (OECD, 2013). The last in turn is composed of three sub-dimensions: procedures that employers face when starting the dismissal process; notice periods and severance pay; and the difficulty of dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss workers, as well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair (such as compensation and reinstatement). The last is the focus of our research. More specifically, within the wider changes in Italian EPL, our focus is on the specific case of the abolition of this core aspect of Article 18 by the Jobs Act.

Two forces prevail in explaining recent EPL changes in Italy: stronger exogenous pressures on the state by international institutions, including the increasingly interventionist role of the EU (Meardi, 2012a, 2012b), and weaker endogenous pressures on the state, mainly through the decline of business organizations and especially unions (Culpepper and Regan, 2014). Our goal is not to develop a legalistic discussion about the changes in EPL and about all the aspects of the Jobs Act. We instead aim to shed some light on the explanatory power of these two forces in the case of the abolition of Article 18 by the Jobs Act. Finally, while we examine the Italian government policy decision making process, we situate our study within wider state policy making. This is because, first, the government is among the most relevant institutions of a state and, second, we contextualize our case study within the overall pressures operating on and within Italian state institutions.

In the next section of this study we trace the distinctive characteristics of the Italian context and recent EPL changes, highlighting the turning point represented by the Jobs Act. Explanations emphasizing stronger exogenous and weaker endogenous pressures are then considered in the third section. In the fourth section we present the methodology for data collection and analysis. Collected evidence sustains that ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ arguments offer important insights about the abolition of the core aspect of Article 18, but both tend to ‘read off’ state policy decision making. Our central contribution is therefore to highlight that state policy decision making is still a critical institution in mediating these pressures and developing strategies that led to the abolition of the core aspect of Article 18 (henceforth just Article 18).

The Italian context and changes in employment protection legislation

Italian development has been characterized by a ‘bricolage’ of differences, incoherencies, and dysfunctionalities (Colli and Rinaldi, 2015). For instance, Italy is characterized by some of the highest levels of economic and geographical uneven development in the EU (Colombo and Regini, 2016; Trigilia and Burroni, 2009). It has a few big international firms such as Fiat coexisting with a large number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are especially prevalent in the north and central regions of Italy. SMEs, however, have been characterized by a low level of investment in research and development (Simonazzi et al., 2008). The south has remained largely underdeveloped and with a substantial presence of informal work (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009).

A critical element of this bricolage character is the Italian state policy decision making. Since the Second World War the Italian state’s pervasive concern has been maintaining the support of the most influential different social interests (Farnham, 2004). Thus, rather than coordinating different actors as the state does in core coordinated market economies such as Germany, the Italian state has been historically highly permeable to different domestic pressures, protecting or compensating them through favorable policy decision making (Hassel, 2014). Thus, Italy has been considered as a unique case of ‘state-influenced’ or ‘dysfunctional state capitalism’ (Colli and Rinaldi, 2015; Hassel, 2014; Schmidt and Gualmini, 2013). Due to these policy decision making processes, the Italian state has been viewed as lacking autonomy and a largely ineffective, if not corrupt institution (Amyot, 2004: 185; Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004).

State permeability has also resulted in EPL policy decision making adding to the unevenness of the Italian bricolage. During the late 1960s and early 1970s trade unions achieved their peak of strength based in large firms. Their ability to pressure the state policy decision making process lead the Italian state to pass the Statute of Workers’ Rights in 1970 (Statuto dei lavoratori, Law 300/1970), providing fundamental trade union rights and strong employment protection for many (but not all) employees. ² More specifically, workers in firms with fewer than 16 employees have been more exposed to employers’ freedom in firing and in case of court recognition of unfair dismissal, have been just entitled to at most six months’ salary monetary compensation. By contrast, employees in larger firms have been strongly protected from unfair dismissal by Article 18. Indeed, in the case of proved unfair dismissal, the employer had to reinstate the dismissed employee (Simonazzi et al., 2008: 3). This article both significantly constrained employer discretion over firing, but by not covering employees in smaller firms, introduced an important dualism in the Italian labor market.

However, once the postwar economic boom ended, by the late 1970s business pressure for a state policy response to liberalize the Italian labor market steadily grew (Amyot, 2004: 185). During the 1990s this pressure to reduce EPL intensified due to the influence of neoliberal policy advisors on the state, as a way to counter the decline in Italian competitiveness in the wake of increasing global competition. The opportunity to abolish Article 18 thus became central to Italian political debate (Sacchi, 2013). However unions, the CGIL (the left-wing national union) in primis, consistently strongly opposed the abolition of Article 18. Therefore the persistence of Article 18 became a symbol of Italian union strength, especially for the CGIL (Schmidt and Gualmini, 2013: 366).

Stronger exogenous and weaker endogenous pressures

In order to shed some light on the overturning of Article 18 by the Jobs Act, we turn now to two fundamental forces used to explain the changes in EPL prior to the Jobs Act.

Methodology

In order to assess the explanatory power of exogenous and endogenous pressures contributing to the abolition of Article 18, we collected evidence through multiple sources and multi-key actors’ narratives (Myers, 2009; Silverman, 2006). ⁷ We focused on three actors: the state (government), business, and unions. In the last two cases our attention was on the two pivotal organizations involved in the reform of Article 18, i.e. Confindustria, on the business side, and the CGIL, on the labor side. We collected some preliminary data through documentary analysis on the different positions of social actors concerning the Jobs Act, and the abolition of Article 18, especially official reports and direct media declarations by the CGIL, Confindustria, and the government. We also analyzed the text of the Jobs Act.

Moreover, our analysis is based on original data from semi-structured interviews with key informants. First, we interviewed four Italian academics expert in Italian employment relations and who had also closely observed the development and final text of the Jobs Act. Second, we interviewed representatives of the institutions on the labor and business side, namely five CGIL and two Confindustria officials. Third, we also interviewed three government officials involved in the conception, development, and writing of the Jobs Act (the overturning of Article 18 included). Interviews were conducted individually, lasting between one-and-a-half and two hours. With the exclusion of an interview in November 2015, all the others took place between March and May 2015. Respondents’ opinions remain subjective perceptions and not objective evidence, however they allow us to gather some important insights into exogenous versus endogenous forces, and the role of state policy decision making in the abolition of Article 18.

All of the interviews were recorded and we noted the most relevant elements. We began the interviews with generic questions about the path taken towards changing Italian EPL, afterwards focusing on the Jobs Act and Article 18. Respondents were asked to explain the position of their institution (i.e. government, unions, or business organizations) and their perceptions about possible motivations that lead to the overturning of Article 18. Narrations were first analyzed for evidence of endogenous and exogenous pressures. More importantly, our attention was also directed to other possible sources of explanation. Findings emerged through a cross-comparison of the responses of these three sets of actors.

Results

The interviewees all confirmed the importance of the strong external pressures on Italy and the necessity for the state to respond with labor market reforms. As one government official emphasized, ‘You needed reforms in order to signal your commitment [to international economic institutions]’ (government official 1). An academic underlined that the 1994 OECD study about the necessity to introduce more flexibility was very influential in the changes to Italian EPL. Similarly, another government official highlighted the strong influence of the first European directive in 1997 (97/479) on the subsequent changes introduced in Italian EPL. Another government official underlined that ‘the EU thus has had some steering powers and member states needed to take that into account … . And it was one way that the EU entered into the domestic stage’ (government official 2). The pressures have been so strong that ‘well after almost 20 years of delay [from the European directive of 1997], the Jobs Act more or less implemented this idea of flexibility which has been applied by different countries in different ways’ (government official 2).

With reference to more recent EPL changes, a CGIL executive underlined the strong influence of the ECB requirements in the letters of August 2011 addressed to the Italian government. ‘They told us the reforms we have to do, such as welfare reform, local administration reform, introduce more flexibility in the labor market. Three years and a half later we accomplished all the priorities defined by the ECB. The imbalance between economic and political power is therefore apparent’ (CGIL 4).

Strong pressures from international bodies were considered to ‘have been in the same direction, that is more flexibility, some kind of deregulation, simplification of the rules’ (government official 2). This respondent argued that over time the EU pressures shifted from a ‘soft’ maintenance of the European social model to a more direct austerity program lead by the Troika. While Italy has never been formally been put under any program by the Troika, the Renzi government had to show responsiveness to its pressures, but, as a CGIL executive underlined, in this space of policy maneuvering ‘the government chose the easiest way: attack an historically and consolidated labor right [Article 18] in a moment of economic crisis and union decline’ (CGIL 4).

The perception that weaker pressure was being placed on the state by the unions and business corpi intermedi was also largely shared. One government official underlined that the modernization of society and its greater fragmentation and individualization had undermined collective representative institutions (government official 2). Moreover, another government official emphasized that neoliberal economists also played an important role in promoting a neoliberal discourse in many Italian national newspapers. These economists not only attacked unions but also employer associations: ‘Confindustria is actually not good for them [neoliberal economists] because it is a collective agency and a distributive institution. They don’t like corpi intermedi’ (government official 1). Moreover, all the interviewed key informants highlighted that since the 1990s political parties, and especially business organizations and trade unions (i.e. corpi intermedi), have faced a deep internal crisis of representation. This makes them less able to influence the government. As one Confindustria respondent admitted: ‘Renzi would like to use the corpi intermedi, … to change the country, but … in this moment they defend the old strategy and Renzi does not hear them’ (Confindustria 1).

Union strength and entrenched governmental labor market policy prevented governments in the 1980s and 1990s from ‘completely subscribing to a deregulation approach’ (academic 1). On the contrary, since the 2000s ‘unions have been in a defensive position [and have had] an extremely weak capacity to promote effective positive actions towards the government’ (CGIL 4). Confindustria and CGIL trade union executives both underlined that they confront deep representational challenges with their respective constituencies. For employers, the difficulty of representing such a disparate range of firms limited their ability to achieve consensus (Confindustria 2). In the trade union case, the first issue is to reach out and represent the large array of young, flexible, and precarious workers. Moreover, unions also underlined the difficulty of having a voice at the European level and, within Italy, a lack of unity between different unions during a moment of economic crisis and a reduction of labor rights. One CGIL executive stated: ‘If we were really strong we would change the abolition of Article 18 through a massive general strike’ (as was the case in 2002) (CGIL 2). ‘Workers are divided, unions are divided, and so for the government it was simpler to attack Article 18’, said another CGIL executive (CGIL 5). The loss of political influence of corpi intermedi was compared by a CGIL executive to a loss of ‘antibodies to defend democracy’ (CGIL 4) that had formerly allowed them to put more pressure on the state policy decision making. Indeed, as one government official concluded: ‘The Jobs Act reduces the voice of the trade unions who are now at the lowest in their power and popularity’ (government official 3).

Interestingly, almost all interviewees reported that the effectiveness of the core aspect of Article 18 (i.e. reinstatement) was marginal before the Jobs Act. A government official underlined that:

It is quite weird that Italy is considered a rigid labor market … . It [Italy] is actually closer to the liberal market economies than continental countries, basically for two reasons: one the share of small firms. In small firms it is very easy to hire and fire (Article 18 has never been applied to them). And then secondly, the small firms pop up and die very easily and so that increases the gross labor turnover. (government official 1)

The impact of Article 18 on larger firms was also considered insignificant. A government official reported that the number of cases of dismissed individuals in big firms is small, citing evidence from the Veneto region where more than 90% of disputes have been reconciled before going to court. In the same line, a CGIL executive underlined that ‘the tradition of firing your employees for stupid reasons and then negotiating monetary compensation with the union was already largely in place’ (CGIL 1). An academic expert underlined that, ‘most of the business community members … admit, explicitly or implicitly, that Article 18 has not been a limitation to invest … it is not really an economic problem … Article 18 became more and more a symbolic [issue] … but we know the importance of symbols’ (academic 2). Similarly, a state official acknowledged ‘it is very difficult to show empirical evidence that Article 18 had any impact’ (government official 3). While in favor of the abolition of Article 18, one Confindustria representative conceded that its net effect was likely to be only marginal since it is ‘one of hundreds [of changes] to follow the new economy, but only one’ (Confindustria 1).

Even if marginal in its effects, the overturning of Article 18 was not considered without consequences. First, both one government official and one Confindustria respondent emphasized that judicial review introduced increased uncertainty over dismissal costs. Even more importantly, union executives also underlined that under Article 18, managers needed a ‘strong case to fire someone’ (CGIL 3). Another CGIL executive stressed the high symbolic value of Article 18: ‘When presented in the parliament in 1970 the Statute of Workers’ Rights [Statuto dei lavoratori] sustained that the constitution was entering into the firms … [and] the law was protecting the weaker part of a labor force … now the inequality of the relation is no longer perceived … and the principle of the constitution is leaving the firms’ (CGIL 4). Finally, it was underlined that the right of reinstatement in the case of unfair dismissal represented a collective understanding that a worker’s right to a job could override managerial prerogatives. Now this understanding has been substantially eroded, since judges cannot force the reinstatement as prior to the Jobs Act. As one CGIL executive emphasized, ‘If you can force an employer to reintegrate a worker, the judge can rule on the organization of the firm. If he cannot, [he] can’t put his fingers on how managers organize the firm’ (CGIL 2). No matter how unjust the dismissal, judges now can only award monetary compensation over a range already defined by the law.

The government decision to overturn Article 18 was therefore considered an ‘ideologically driven action’ (CGIL 2), ‘a political statement’ (Confindustria 1), ‘a real symbolic action to show that the governance of employment relations and economic policy in Italy is now changing … that there are more unilateral decisions of the government without consulting unions or other social partners … it is just the government’ (academic 2), and even ‘a way to conquer the CGIL, which is viewed as a political enemy [by Renzi]’ (CGIL 4). As one government official argued, by weakening employment protection while only marginally increasing employability measures such as active labor market policies, the Jobs Act ‘is a neoliberal reform in its consequences’ (government official 2).

Thus both increasing international pressures, most notably by the EU, and the weakening of domestic corpi intermedi actors played an important role in the abolition of Article 18. However, as a number of respondents made clear, while under pressure, the Italian state itself played a crucial role in making choices around EPL, especially Article 18. Italy was viewed as having a qualitatively different relationship with the EU than Spain, Portugal or Greece, since it was both ‘too large to fail and too big to bail’ (government official 1). This position has given the Italian state some greater latitude when bargaining with the EU. Thus one respondent argued that labor market policy change was driven ‘more by internal debate … there was no strong technical advice from the OECD or the European Commission’ (government official 3). Thus during the crisis in the fall of 2011, the Italian finance minister refused a loan from the IMF, stating, in the words of one respondent, ‘I know of better ways to commit suicide’ (government official 1), but chose a combination of the latter’s oversight and European Commission and ECB assistance. Respondents emphasized that as a founding member of the EU, Italy viewed taking IMF loans like Spain and Greece as relegating it to the periphery (academic respondent 3). These and other respondents emphasized that the Italian government, from Monti through Renzi, has used this marginally greater bargaining power to trade off EPL and other reforms to win greater financial flexibility under EU Stability Pact rules, but also to support key EU actors such as the ECB’s Mario Draghi to win approval from Germany to adopt quantitative easing polices (academic respondent 1). A government official summarized: ‘the Italian government has always resisted the idea of accepting the Troika and in fact we have not accepted the special kind of financial support which might imply we are like Spain … . Our government has refused this approach claiming that we are aware of these ideas, but we will adapt any transfer of those ideas to Italy’ (government official 2).

Furthermore, the interviewees viewed the declining influence of corpi intermedi on government policy, and as not just reflecting the former’s reduced capacities. Since Italy had joined the Euro in 1999 the Italian government had less need to rely on the corpi intermedi – especially labor – for controlling wages (academic 1). This declining role of the corpi was underlined by how decisions around the Jobs Act and Article 18 were made. As one government official made clear, in spring 2014, when the Renzi government started to conceive the Jobs Act, ‘Article 18 was initially not on the table’ (government official 1). Instead of discussing with unions and business organizations, he highlighted, ‘it was totally insulated policy making’, which also included Renzi exerting an almost unprecedented centralized control over the various government ministries involved. A CGIL executive similarly emphasized that ‘even before the drafts [of the Jobs Act] were out, the dialogue with the government was already interrupted because Renzi had already declared that he would govern the country with or without the consent of the corpi intermedi’ (CGIL 2). Indeed, the development of the Jobs Act ‘was totally behind closed doors work, made by ministers and advisors and in particular the prime minister’ (government official 1). Thus while in the first drafts of the Jobs Act changes to Article 18 were not under discussion, in the last weeks before the law was announced, ‘it was Renzi himself … after listening to the discussions about whether to change Article 18 at a certain point, he said, “I am fed up with this, why don’t we just abolish the article?! You know what? … I’m going to kill it!” ’ (government official 2). It was also made clear by another government official that while Renzi openly discussed other aspects of the Jobs Act with experts, ‘it was not in the case of Article 18 [for] the bargaining was not with the trade unions but it was all internal within the government, with the various ministers’ (government official 1).

Discussion

Both stronger exogenous and weaker endogenous pressures offer important insights into the abolition of Article 18. However, they are not sufficient to explain this phenomenon. Indeed, both perspectives tend to ‘read off’ the central role of the Italian state in the policy decision making process. Thus explanations underlining stronger exogenous pressures, such as from the EU and the Troika, overemphasize the asymmetrical power of international institutions. First, it is clear that even in the depths of the current crisis, Italy’s relationship with the EU differs from other Southern European nations such as Spain, Portugal and especially Greece. Thus Italy possesses an economy almost twice the size of Spain, with a manufacturing sector that is second within the EU only to Germany (Anderson, 2014). Italy’s long-term economic stagnation and high public debt has weakened its power vis-a-vis the EU (Ciccarone and Saltari, 2015), but the latter is not in a position to simply dictate terms to the Italian state. Second, this perspective does not allow for a more finely grained analysis to highlight the space for maneuver left to the Italian state. Stronger external pressures on the Italian state shed light on the general tendency towards a more flexible labor market, but cannot fully explain the more specific aspects of the overturning of Article 18.

A similar argument can be made regarding the role of endogenous pressures on the state. Certainly, both unions and business organizations are aware of their institutional weakness and less power to pressure the Italian state in comparison to the period before the 1990s. However, trade unions and business associations still have a non-residual institutional strength that could make them relevant actors to be involved in the state policy decision making process. Italian union density is higher than the average in OECD countries, and collective bargaining coverage is estimated around 85% (Visser, 2013). Moreover, unions demonstrated that their mobilization power is not dead. For instance, the CGIL organized a protest of a million people in Rome on 25 October 2014 against the Jobs Act. Business associations are also weaker, but as Regini (2014) makes clear, with their control over investment and increasing international exit options, the ability of firms to influence state policy decision making is less affected than labor’s, by declining domestic cohesion. Nonetheless, the interviews and other data collected reveal that reduced endogenous pressure cannot fully explain either alone, or in combination with increasing exogenous pressures, the overturning of Article 18.

What emerged as the strongest explicative element is that the Italian state still remains a critical institution in mediating such pressures and in making policy choices. The subjective nature of our interviews makes these conclusions tentative, but while state powers may be increasingly constrained by economic and political internationalization, it maintains critical resources, powers, and room for maneuver in mediating exogenous and endogenous pressures (Harvey, 2005; Howell, 2006). This includes also the state’s ability to ground its policy making in authoritative narratives (such as Marta), in the avoidance of dialogue with unions and business associations, and in the unilateral promotion and enforcement of EPL, until the abolition of Article 18. Thus while many of our respondents viewed the debate around Article 18 as largely symbolic, as one CGIL executive emphasized, state actors such as Renzi ‘know the value of myths and symbols’ (CGIL 2).

The Italian state thus appears to have strategically used exogenous pressures to sustain its political choices. ⁸ On the one hand, the Renzi government views the roll back of Article 18 as a symbolic, yet important, signal to the EU – and especially the ECB – that his government is committed to reforms to gain greater budget flexibility. On the other hand, exogenous pressures have been used by the state to gain leverage over unions. This reflects an increasingly neoliberal hegemony within the state stemming in part from the increased prominence of economists and labor lawyers who have entered Italian public life since the collapse of the First Republic in 1992 (Thompson, 2009: 248). These actors consider both the influence of the corpi intermedi and Article 18 as fundamental causes of the country’s ‘labor market problems’, because they increase regulatory complexity and reduce economic growth (Sacchi, 2013). Moreover, the more centralized state policy making process exhibited by the Renzi government’s Jobs Act is consistent with that of the Italian state during the 2012 Fornero reform and more neoliberally driven labor market reforms across much of the EU (Blokker, 2015; Clauwaert and Schömann, 2013).

Therefore, while by 2014 Article 18 had been significantly weakened by earlier changes in EPL, such as Fornero in 2012, it would be wrong not to view the overturning of Article 18 by the Jobs Act as a fundamental path-altering change in the state policy decision making process. While the symbolic nature of the abolition of Article 18 was emphasized by many respondents, Article 18 represented the culmination of postwar trade union power, especially of the CGIL. Therefore, by making the decision to roll back Article 18 the Italian state has made a strong statement, reflecting not only short-term crisis management goals, but a longer term remaking of the fundamental values of Italian employment relations.

Conclusions

In order to explain the overturning of Article 18 for newly hired employees by the Jobs Act in Italy, we evaluated the explanatory power of two forces: stronger exogenous pressures on the state from international institutions (especially the EU), and weaker endogenous pressures on the state from employer associations and especially unions. Collected documents and interviews allow us to underline that the specific case of the abolition of Article 18 is only partially explained by the interaction of these two forces.

In a context of growing neoliberal pressures by international institutions that push forward changes in EPL, and a weakened business and especially labor movement, our case has highlighted that the overturning of Article 18 is also centrally explained by Italian state policy decisions to both push and codify a profound alteration to EPL. This turning point in employment protection contrasted with the Italian path from the 1990s to introduce flexibility at the periphery without making more flexible the exit for core employees in larger firms. Moreover, changes in EPL in the 1990s were bargained with unions, and then in the 2000s were introduced by just consulting or informing unions. However, the overturning of Article 18 represented instead an action by the state which was not only ‘impermeable’ to union pressures, but deliberately attacked one of the most important symbols of the postwar Italian union movement.

Our study thus reinforces Regini’s (2014) important point about the critical role that power, and especially state power, plays in institutional transformation. Thus while institutions such as Article 18 were critical in giving powers to both the Italian judiciary and unions and workers to control dismissal, in an increasingly neoliberal international and domestic environment they are ultimately vulnerable to shifts in state power.

Finally, the abolition of Article 18 has important social implications for employees. A critical one is the further erosion of unions through the undercutting of solidarity between employees, which is a basic element to structure, enhance, and institutionalize union power (Hyman, 2011). Such solidarity among employees has been progressively challenged by the deep divisions in the Italian labor market between a growing precarious workforce (outsiders) and more protected insiders. Yet increased flexibility in firing through the abolition of Article 18 – in the Italian context characterized by relatively weak active labor market and inclusion programs – can like other neoliberal EPL reforms in the EU further deepen this duality. This in turn makes solidarity among employees still more difficult (Hermann, 2014). Moreover, the overturning of Article 18 introduces a new element of division among insiders, i.e. employees hired after the Jobs Act was passed and no longer protected by the core aspect of Article 18 and employees hired before it and still protected. The Marta narrative about unprotected versus overprotected employees could thus find fertile ground and erode solidarity also among insiders in big firms, one of the few remaining bastions of unionism.