Contingencies of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance

Abstract

Studies on dynamics of power relationship play a significant role in the collaborative governance literature because many issues and challenges in collaborative governance can be linked to power asymmetry in collaboration. This article proposes a contingency framework on power asymmetry in collaborative governance that includes six contingency factors of power sharing from contextual, network, and node perspectives. We focus on how each contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and the effectiveness of collaborative governance and suggest that, instead of focusing on the attempt to balance power and share power in collaboration, it will be more fruitful to design and implement collaborative arrangements based on the dynamic contingencies.

Keywords

contingencies power sharing power asymmetry collaborative governance

Introduction

Collaborative governance has received increasing attention by scholars and practitioners in recent decades. There is a host of similar phrases used interchangeably in literature, including collaborative governance, collaborative public management, collaborative decision making, network governance, and so forth (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Huxham & Vangen, 1996; Mandell & Keast, 2007; O’Leary & Vij, 2012; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Especially, collaborative governance is often used interchangeably with collaborative management. Both of them emphasize engaging participants across the boundaries of organizations or sectors in a formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative process of decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2008), but the term “governance” is “broader and encompasses various aspects of the governing process, including planning, policy making, and management” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 548). Another important synonym is network governance. Network governance involves a set of autonomous individual organizations working together to address complex problems and adapt to contextual contingencies based on implicit and open-ended (social-building) contracts, rather than hierarchical and market means (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Apparently, all these similar terms capture a common emerging phenomenon: the collaboration of different organizations from public, private, and civic sectors working together as stakeholders based on deliberative consensus and collective decision making to achieve shared goals that could not be otherwise fulfilled individually (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Booher, 2004; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012).

Collaborative governance contributes to solving public problems by extending and integrating resources (Rogers & Weber, 2010); promoting information and knowledge sharing (O’Leary & Vij, 2012); motivating innovation (Rogers & Weber, 2010); producing more effective, efficient, and flexible policies and sophisticated forms of solutions to problems (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Purdy, 2012; Sousa & Klyza, 2007); and generating solutions that can capture the interests and requirements of different stakeholders (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005). However, dynamics in collaborative governance bring in many challenges, such as the problems of transparency, commitment, accountability, and efficiency (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bingham, 2009; Huxham & Vangen, 2000; Huxham, Vangen, Huxham, & Eden, 2000; O’Toole, 1997; Purdy, 2012). Most of these challenges can be linked to power asymmetry in collaboration (Huxham et al., 2000; Provan & Milward, 2001; Purdy, 2012). Although collaboration assumes a power-sharing arrangement by default, that is, collaborative governance always involves some degree of sharing responsibility for decision making and actions among stakeholders, there is always an imbalance in the stakeholders’ power relationship and different levels of dependencies of the stakeholders among each other (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Lawler & Yoon, 1996; Mahapatra, Narasimhan, & Barbieri, 2010), captured by the term power asymmetry or power imbalance. Because of the power asymmetry, the more powerful stakeholders may manipulate the collaborative process, leading to many challenges in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008) that might threaten the effectiveness of the collaboration (Choi & Robertson, 2013).

Literature has made significant efforts in tackling the problems associated with power asymmetry, by explaining the causes and influences of power imbalance in collaborative governance, and proposed power sharing as the solution (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Berkes, 2010; Echeverria, 2001; Gray, 1989; Warner, 2006). For example, research in effective practices within collaboration highlighted several techniques for balancing power among unequal partners, so that partners with fewer resources will have adequate voice (Purdy, 2012; Winer & Ray, 1994). However, the pursuit of power sharing as the solution to power imbalance leads to difficulties in theorizing and implementation (Crona & Bodin, 2010; Dandy, Fiorini, & Davies, 2014; Grindle, 2004; Jentoft, van Son, & Bjørkan, 2007; Linder, 1999; Maner & Mead, 2010; Zérah, 2009). Sharing power in collaboration requires, conceptually, an insightful reflection on the dynamics of power sharing, and, practically, a clear guideline to handle the challenges such as time-consuming negotiation, less flexibility, and ineffectiveness (Huxham et al., 2000; Moynihan, 2009). Few studies have tackled these problems in handling power asymmetry through power sharing in a systematic way in collaborative practices. To address this issue, this article tries to answer the following research question:

Research Question: What is the relationship between power sharing and effective collaborative governance?

As explained above, we consider power sharing as a process of sharing responsibility for decision making and actions among stakeholders in collaboration, which is a significant approach to promoting different participants’ influences in collaboration. Power sharing is a “process,” rather than a perfect outcome of sharing power equally in collaboration. We argue that power sharing and power asymmetry are best conceptualized as a continuum, rather than as binary categories. In collaborative governance, the degree of power sharing varies from collaboration to collaboration and is likely to vary over time within the same collaboration. Instead of struggling to investigate whether a collaboration is sharing power equally among stakeholders, it is more fruitful to study under what conditions certain power arrangements contribute most to effective collaborations. In this article, we reflected whether power sharing is an effective approach to dealing with the challenges of power asymmetry in collaborative governance, and explored possible contingency factors that would moderate the influence of power sharing in collaborative governance. We conclude that the answer to this research question is ideally situated within a contingency framework that incorporates key factors affecting the degree and symmetry of power sharing among stakeholders in collaboration.

This article is organized as follows: We will first examine the theorization of power and power sharing in effective collaborative governance, and then discuss six contingencies of power sharing from contextual, network, and node perspectives. Along with each contingency, we provide a corresponding proposition to explain how this contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. We conclude the article with a discussion of the significance and implications of our contingency framework.

Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance

Power is a complex and dynamic concept that has been studied from diverse perspectives. For example, in governance literature, power is characterized by blurred boundaries and mutual dependence between multiple levels of different sectors, such as public sector, private sector, and civil society (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Meehan, 2003; Stoker, 1998). In the context of collaborative governance, power is also characterized as dispersed, shared, and opaque rather than having formal power hierarchies (Huxham, 1991; Huxham et al., 2000). A clear conceptualization of power is needed as a starting point for analyzing the contingencies of power sharing in collaborative governance.

There is a massive body of literature discussing the concept of power. From the behavioral perspective, Dahl (1957) conceptualized power as that “A has power over B to the extent to which he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (pp. 202-203). He distinguished four elements of power: the base of power (the source of power), the means of power (the instruments used by A to influence B’s behavior), the scope of power (the range of power or the areas over which A can affect B’s behavior), and the amount of power (the extent or the probability of B’s actual performance or action that are caused by A’s power; Dahl, 1957; Lister, 2000). This categorization of the four elements of power were echoed by Kaplan (1964) who described three dimensions of power: the weight of power (the degree to which A affects B), the domain of power (the number of Bs that can be influenced by A’s power), and the scope of power (the range of B’s behaviors that is determined by A; Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Kaplan, 1964). Dahl and Kaplan’s behavioral definition of power was extended by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), with the assumption that power does not only refer to getting somebody to do something that he or she does not want to do but also refers to preventing somebody from doing what he or she wants to do. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) pointed out that power can be exercised not only in decision-making processes but also in non–decision-making processes. In the non–decision-making process, the exercise of power may influence the context of decision making (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970) or control which issues can be allowed to become agenda items (Walsh, Hinings, Greenwood, & Ranson, 1981).

Complimentary to the behavioral perspective, Lukes (1974) presented another conceptualization of power from the social construction perspective that focused on “socially structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups” (p. 22). According to Lukes (1974), power can be beyond relationships among individuals, moreover, it can also be resulted from “socially structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups” (p. 22). Thus, even though B voluntarily desires to do what A wants, there still exists the exercise of power from A, because the desires of B might be the result of the manipulation by A through some kinds of ingrained social structure and cultural patterns (Dawson, 1996; Lister, 2000; Lukes, 1974). Lukes’s perspective extends the understanding of power as decision making and agenda setting by adding preference shaping in the picture (Hay, 1997). Based on his conceptualization of power, there can be no observable conflict in the process of exercising power, and power goes far beyond the relationship between individuals’ behaviors into the arena of the socially constructed contexts effected by A, and upon which, subsequent actions of B must take place (Hay, 1997).

In recent years, scholars have made good attempts in expanding the conceptualization of power beyond individual exercising power. For example, Crosby and Bryson (2005) used structuration theory specifically to understand power in settings where no one is in charge. Thus, the power is viewed as organizational controls of ideas, resources, rules, modes, media, and methods in interorganizational dynamics. Applying this understanding of power in collaborative governance, what literature recognized as ambiguous, complex, and rapid changing nature of power in collaborative governance (Huxham et al., 2000; Purdy, 2012) could be elucidated by a framework that delineates the influencing factors in power relationship between members in a collaborative network. Earlier studies have made some efforts in this direction. For example, Hardy and Phillips (1998) presented a simplified framework, emphasizing that formal authority, control of critical resources, and discursive legitimacy are three important aspects of power, which are useful in making sense of power dynamics in interorganizational domains. In line with Hardy and Phillips, Purdy (2012) offered a more comprehensive framework on how participants of collaborative governance assess power, manage power imbalances, and use power strategically based on the different sources of power (authority, resource, and discursive legitimacy) and in different arenas of power (participant selection, process design, and content framing). Purdy (2012) also pointed out that individual and single organizational perspectives on power are inadequate to form the framework for assessing power in collaboration. The social setting, or institutional context, is significant when addressing power relationship in collaboration (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; O’Toole & Meier, 2004). O’Toole and Meier (2004) also treated collaborative network as an outcome enmeshing in a broader environment. Inequality and more powerful elements that are already present in social settings may affect the decision or response of network managers (O’Toole & Meier, 2004). Clearly, power should be analyzed from different factors and across different perspectives to help participants strategically manage and share power in a collaboration. However, the existing literature has not engaged reflections critical enough on promoting the practices of power sharing and on the influencing factors in power relationship for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Effectiveness of Collaborative Governance

Effectiveness of collaborative governance is a multidimensional and complex concept. Most literature tends to conceptualize it in terms of outcome-based measures and process-based measures (Gray, 2000; Head, 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Provan & Milward, 1995). According to Head (2008), the criteria for effectiveness of collaborative networks “might include a mix of process issues (e.g. agency survival, network growth, membership interaction, service co-ordination) and outcome issues at several levels (e.g. range of services, cost effectiveness of services, impact on clients)” (p. 741).

Outcome-based measures assume that collaborative network is goal directed (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Provan & Milward, 1995), so they focus on the achievement of multiorganizational or network-level outcomes (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Both outcome goals and intermediate goals (“outputs” that are seen as steps in the direction of outcome goals) are taken into account when measuring network effectiveness, using measures including value for money in service delivery, degree of democracy for seeking public-interest outcomes, and social capital such as mutual respect and trust (Chen, 2008; Gray, 2000; Head, 2008). In addition to outcome, collaborative processes, which are largely measurable through the perceptions of participants, should also be included into the assessment of collaborative network effectiveness (Head, 2008). Measurements for effective collaborative processes can include the process of aligning different perspectives (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), building trust among partners (Leach & Sabatier, 2005), and enabling adjustment to proposed actions (Muro & Jeffrey, 2008).

Effectiveness also depends on the input leading to the accomplishment of goals (Morse & Wagner, 1978). One traditional perspective of evaluating effectiveness is based on system resource model, focusing on inputs of resources and emphasizing a congruence or “fit” between input and output (Cameron, 1986; Langford, 1979; Willcocks, 1992). In line with this model, the input side of effectiveness in collaborative governance is relevant to resources provided by individual organizations or endowed by the interorganizational network as a whole to accomplish network-level goals (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007), and is often measured by resource acquisition and maximization, especially some scarce and valued resources (Friedlander & Pickle, 1968; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967).

Stakeholder approach is another key perspective of assessing collaborative network effectiveness. In addition to the systematic logic of performance improvement, performance assessment needs to strengthen the entire performance improvement system by focusing on stakeholders’ expectations, stakeholder satisfaction, and empowering stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Holzer & Yang, 2004). The stakeholder approach of assessing effectiveness of collaboration is complex because diverse stakeholders may hold differing, incompatible, and changing criteria (Cameron & Whetten, 1983; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Lewin & Minton, 1986; Provan & Milward, 2001). Consistent with a multiple-stakeholder perspective, satisfaction of three stakeholder groups is important in collaborative networks, including principals as monitors and funders of the collaboration, agents as administrators and service-level professionals, and clients as receivers of the services delivered by the collaboration (Provan & Milward, 2001). Satisfaction of these stakeholder groups provides a recognition of the multidimensional nature of effectiveness in collaborative governance.

To sum up, the effectiveness of collaborative governance can be assessed from multiple perspectives: the extent to which the collaboration can acquire and maximize needed resources as network input, the degree of the intended network-level outcomes achieved by collaborative efforts, the process building of collaborations toward achieving network-level outcomes, and satisfaction of stakeholders about their collaborations. It should be noted that different measuring perspectives can be used to assess the effectiveness of certain aspects of collaborative governance, rather than evaluating whether the collaboration as a whole is effective or ineffective.

Appeal of Power Sharing in Effective Collaborative Governance

Necessary for an effective collaboration, power sharing is believed to be a highly advocated power relationship because the role of formal hierarchies is declined in collaboration (Berkes, 2010; Huxham, 1991; Huxham et al., 2000). Many empirical studies support that power sharing is positive for collaboration. For example, power sharing can produce an ethos of cooperation and trust in a public–private partnership as well as promote the sharing of responsibility, knowledge, and risk between partners (Linder, 1999). Adopting a governance model of sharing power and responsibility, agencies can establish firm partnership in local government (Carmichael & Knox, 1999), contribute to the effectiveness of partners in their collaboration (Carley, 2000), secure legitimacy and support for a governance system (Jentoft et al., 2007), reduce inherent fragmentation among stakeholders (Ehler, 2003), and ensure stability in heterogeneous societies (Grindle, 2004). These benefits brought by power sharing among partners contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency in collaboration, and then promote the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Accompanied with these benefits of power sharing in collaborative governance, a set of challenges are also unavoidable when implementing power sharing. These challenges include time-consuming processes for trust building and power sharing, stalemate and inaction caused by poor implementation of power sharing, unwillingness to collaborate or even withdrawal from collaboration due to reluctance of sharing power with others, and so forth (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Coff, 1999; Gray, 1985). These challenges can undermine the performance of collaboration; thus, they are negatively correlated with the effectiveness of collaboration. Unfortunately, these challenges and the factors causing these challenges are largely ignored by current literature, leading to the following limitations in our current understanding on power sharing.

First, most empirical studies supporting power sharing in collaboration were based on specific areas, such as comanagement in marine areas (Jentoft et al., 2007), governance in poverty reduction (Grindle, 2004), integrated coastal management (Ehler, 2003), or specific local government partnership (Carmichael & Knox, 1999). The principles of power sharing distilled from these empirical studies have some limitations when applied to other areas as power relationship varies based on many factors, many of which are contingent upon specific situations. Second, although a large number of studies have shown that power sharing can bring in benefits, how to deal with the challenges in the process of sharing power, such as time-consuming negotiation, less flexibility, and ineffectiveness (Huxham et al., 2000; Moynihan, 2009), was largely neglected. The realization of these benefits relies on the appropriate implementation of power sharing, which is contingent upon a large number of dynamic factors. Current literature has not yet provided a systematic contingent framework within which the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaboration is situated. Third, the lack of a systematic framework also leads to difficulties for scholars and practitioners to have a clear guideline to design an effective power relationship between participants. Finally, emphasizing power sharing in collaborative governance simplifies the complexity of the power relationship across different stages or across different collaborations. Power relationship depends on many factors in individual participants, the network formed by participants, and the institutional environment within which the network forms. It is important for researchers to further investigate what conditional factors contributing to certain power arrangement will affect the effectiveness of collaboration.

In line with the above analysis, this article is aimed to explore possible contingency factors affecting the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. We believe that to analyze and deal with the challenges of power sharing, it is necessary to consider the power dynamics under a contingency framework, rather than making any absolute assumption about power sharing and its benefits to collaboration. We attempt to achieve this goal by synthesizing six possible contingencies that moderate the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaboration. We explore these six contingencies from the contextual perspective that forms the institutional environment for collaborations; from the network perspective, where coordinated actions of participants occurred; and from the node perspective, where the characteristics of each individual participating organization affect the collaboration.

In addition to providing a better understanding of factors influencing power sharing, our contingent framework will also help practitioners engaged in collaboration to evaluate their own roles and status in power relationship and better understand the dynamics of power sharing in collaboration. In practice, participants in collaboration tend to pursue power sharing and enlarge their share of power, which might not necessarily benefit themselves or the whole collaboration. We believe that the appeal of power sharing in collaboration requires careful empirical investigation before it is used as the panacea to address issues brought forth by power imbalance. With our contingency framework, participants can better reflect their strategies to develop the power relationship in their specific collaborative networks and harness the benefits of the collaboration.

Contingency Framework of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance

In this article, we identify six contingency factors from three different perspectives: the contextual perspective (institutional environment as the contingency factor), the network perspective (different missions accomplished by collaborative network and the types of network as the contingency factors), and the node perspective (power-sharing experience of participating organizations, diffusion of power sources among participating organizations, and cost–benefit calculation of participating organizations as the contingency factors). In line with the general usage in collaborative governance literature, here “participant” refers to the participating organizations in a collaboration. In the following sections, we will analyze each contingency factor and propose specific propositions on how each contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Contingency 1: Institutional Environment and Power Sharing

System theorists assume that organizations must interact and adjust to the environment in which they operate (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2011). Institutional theory also emphasizes the influence of a social framework of norms, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions on organizations’ behavior (Oliver, 1997). Organizations are willing to conform or demonstrate conformity to these social expectations in the environment that they operate because this conformity will improve their chances of survival and success (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1997). When organizations collaborate, the environment of the interorganizational collaboration is a vital source of resources, rules, and legitimacy (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000) that have great influence on the collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Guo & Acar, 2005; Phillips et al., 2000; Wood & Gray, 1991). Institutional environment sets basic protocols and norms under which participants in collaboration will form common understanding and behavior patterns (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002), such as some widely accepted modes of organizing interorganizational activities (Alter & Hage, 1993).

Among many elements in collaboration affected by institutional environment, trust, especially system trust, is an important factor that can affect the power relationship between participants. System trust refers to the trust that an individual organization places in the environment around it, reflecting a feeling of safety in the current location or present situation (Adams & Davis, 2005; Pennington, Wilcox, & Grover, 2003). System trust can reduce complexity, uncertainty, and opportunistic behavior in social relationship (Bachmann, 2001). There are two ways to build system trust: structural assurances including system’s regulations, laws, contracts, and guarantees; and situational normality referring to a previously experienced situation that appears normal and, thus, reduces uncertainty in the interaction (Adams & Davis, 2005; Pennington et al., 2003). Both the structural assurances and situational normality are related to institutional arrangement, which is essential to produce system trust that can coordinate transorganizational relationships (Bachmann, 2001). If the institutional order of a socioeconomic arrangement is weak, the risk of trust among members will be very high and a potential trustor will favor power instead of trust in interacting with others (Bachmann, 2001). On the contrary, strong institutional environment can produce more system trust because organizations incline to believe that the system’s rules can protect them from unforeseen challenges in social relationship (Adams & Davis, 2005).

By comparing the different degrees of rigidness in regulations in business collaborative networks of Britain and Germany, Bachmann (2001) found that institutional regulations are stronger in Germany, which cultivated a higher level of system trust between companies with less tendency of relying on power to coordinate their interorganizational relationships. Under this environment, sharing power will be easier to realize, without too much risk in time-consuming negotiation or serious contradictions. Similarly, in a study on multilevel governance and collaborative federal institutions in Australia, Painter (2001) found that a change in institutional rules characterized by power sharing and interdependence limited certain participants’ unilateral actions, such as the use of veto and holdout power (Painter, 2001). Under this environment, a system trust in the institutional rules was formed by the partnering agencies who were then able to reach intergovernmental agreement on sharing power to make decisions jointly (Painter, 2001). In addition to those formal rules, some informal rules in institutional environment encouraging collaborative governance are also important to reduce the challenges of power sharing, and then benefit the effectiveness of collaborative process. In a successful collaborative governance case in the Blackfoot River watershed in Montana State of the United States, one informal rule contributing to its specific institutional environment is a shared idea of promoting effective governance by broadly pooling stakeholders’ knowledge assets (Weber, 2009). This institutional factor helped to flatten power and promote knowledge-based power sharing in the collaboration because it can remove the knowledge monopoly enjoyed by some stakeholders, thereby giving a larger array of stakeholders enough influence within the collective decision process (Weber, 2009).

These examples reveal that an institutional environment strongly cultivating and promoting collaborative relationships provides a solid foundation for power sharing in terms of system trust and shared ideas, values, and norms. Trust building, joint decision making, and collaborative spirit can be enhanced within this kind of institutional environment, all of which can make power sharing confront fewer challenges and become more beneficial for an effective collaborative process. Therefore, we propose the following:

Proposition 1: The stronger the institutional environment is in cultivating collaboration, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Contingency 2: Different Missions of Network and Power Sharing

The missions accomplished by different collaborations are not identical but have different characteristics. Some missions, such as emergency management of a crisis or exigency, require urgent response and high efficiency. Other missions, such as urban management and natural resource management, need longtime planning and implementation. Although power sharing could benefit collaborative governance in general, the effects of power sharing on collaboration are contingent upon different missions intended by the collaborations. For the exigent missions that require urgent demands and are efficiency oriented, a time-consuming process of negotiating power sharing will inhibit efficient responses to the emergency, whereas, the long-term missions that are engagement oriented or effectiveness oriented can afford power-sharing negotiations to achieve the mission of the collaboration.

Current literature assumed that a collaborative network plays an essential role in emergency management (Kapucu, 2005; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Wybo & Lonka, 2002). However, the requirement of quick response and high efficiency to manage crisis or disaster cannot afford participants to spend too much time and efforts to negotiate power structure in the collaboration. Literature has confirmed that, in the emergency management collaborations, central authority is necessary to maintain sufficient power to impose orders, take accountabilities, and coordinate resources while taking advantage of the collaborative network to promote information sharing and communication (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011; Moynihan, 2005; Waugh & Streib, 2006). The effectiveness of collaborative governance in this situation focuses on reducing the input of time, promoting resource sharing, enhancing coordination and communication, as well as delivering necessary goods and services to the public. For example, Moynihan’s (2009) analysis on network governance of the crisis response via Incident Command System (ICS) revealed that “a network governance perspective allows us to integrate two seemingly conflicting imperatives of emergency management—the need for interorganizational collaboration and the need for rapid coordinated response” (Moynihan, 2009, p. 912), which is achieved through a temporary hierarchical structure to coordinate multiple response organizations, forming “a highly centralized mode of network governance” (Moynihan, 2009, p. 895).

Different from exigent missions, some other missions of a collaborative network are not urgent but need longtime planning and implementation. For example, urban governance, as a set of institutionalized working arrangements under which the broad social, political, and economic forces deal with urban-steering issues and mold the process of urban development, requires participants from multiple governmental and nongovernmental (private or voluntary) sectors for long-term planning and implementation (Brenner, 2004; Hendriks, 2014). Therefore, even though negotiating power structure in the collaboration will consume much time, it will not significantly affect the accomplishment of these missions. Moreover, besides efficiency as one of the important factors in such governance networks, other factors may be more crucial in urban governance. Literature indicated that advancement of participation, power sharing of citizens (especially vulnerable groups), and promotion of multistakeholder arrangements are significant in urban governance to balance certain dominant social groups and reduce potential intensified conflicts among stakeholders (Andersen, 2001; Baud & Dhanalakshmi, 2007; Dekker & van Kempen, 2004; Parés, Bonet-Martí, & Martí-Costa, 2012; Zérah, 2009).

Urban governance in Mumbai, as studied by Zérah (2009), exemplified a power asymmetry that is in favor of certain classes in society. The middle and upper-middle classes are powerful in decision-making processes; yet, nongovernmental organizations play a disappointing role in promoting poorer communities to participate, which brings in difficulties to optimize public services for all stakeholders. The effectiveness of urban governance focuses more on having an inclusive process of decision making and improving different stakeholders’ satisfaction by respecting and considering their interests and perspectives. To improve the effectiveness of governance and motivate actual engagement of diverse stakeholders in the long term, power sharing is an appropriate approach in urban governance even though it is time consuming. Therefore, we propose the following:

Proposition 2: The less exigent the mission accomplished by collaborative governance is, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Contingency 3: Types of Network and Power Sharing

Collaborative networks could be categorized in many different ways, among which mandated and voluntary networks are the two most common types. Mandated network refers to the legal or policy-mandated collaborative relationship between participants (Brummel, Nelson, Souter, Jakes, & Williams, 2010; Rodríguez, Langley, Béland, & Denis, 2007), whereas voluntary network refers to the collaboration and partnerships formed on the basis of voluntary participation rather than hierarchical control (Alexander, Comfort, Weiner, & Bogue, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Although both types of collaborative governance networks involve various degree of power-sharing arrangements (after all, even in mandated collaboration, participants are by definition compelled to share power), in practice, the influence of power sharing on the effectiveness of collaborative governance may vary in these two types of network.

For example, “voluntary networks are created bottom-up by the professionals and organizations that will participate in the network, whereas mandated networks are created by policy dictate, typically by a government agency” (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 449). Voluntary collaboration is characterized by consent, reciprocity, and trust (Das & Teng, 2001; Greenwood & Van Buren, 2010; Snavely & Tracy, 2002), which implies that when collaboration is formed voluntarily, participants will have more consent, reciprocity, and trust among each other, and the collaboration will be more effective when measured by the process and stakeholder satisfaction. This consent will be positive for their willingness in negotiating power structure in collaboration because they have more common values and trust, thus willing to compromise reciprocally when collaborating, leading to a better chance to collaborate effectively. Voluntary network may also be driven by reciprocity to obtain more benefits whereas motives of reciprocity, in turn, enhance cooperation, collaboration, and coordination among partners (Oliver, 1990). Similarly, trust between voluntary partners is also an important driver for them to form a collaborative network. Because of trust, partners can predict the risk of sharing power with each other more confidently. Therefore, they are more willing to share power with each other, and fewer challenges will be encountered by participants when sharing power. Comparatively, mandated collaboration usually involves some degree of use of bureaucratic or hierarchical mechanisms to achieve more effective outcomes of the collaboration (Rodríguez et al., 2007). In a mandated network, participants engage in interactions largely based on the mandate (Raelin, 1980) that might hinder the level of mutual consent, reciprocity, and trust. In this situation, internal legitimacy, which refers to the participants’ positive assessment and mutual consent of network, is unlikely to be very high (Kenis & Provan, 2009). Because legitimacy depends on the “consent of the governed” (Green, 1989) and internal legitimacy is not likely to be high in a mandated network, participants tend to either involuntarily comply with a differentiated power structure dictated in the mandate or struggle to gain more power for themselves due to lower levels of trust and reciprocity, leading to difficulties in an effective collaboration.

In addition, the different planning approaches in these two types of network also suggest a difference in power sharing. Bryson et al. (2006) synthesized two different planning approaches in collaborative settings. One approach is more applicable for mandated collaboration, which emphasizes deliberate planning and careful articulation of missions, goals, roles, responsibilities, and action procedures, as key factors to the effectiveness of collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006). The other approach is more applicable for voluntary collaboration, which emphasizes the emergence of the missions, goals, roles, and action steps over time through conversations involving a broader network of affected partners (Bryson et al., 2006; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Even though both “deliberative planning” and “careful articulation of missions, goals” can be used in mandated and voluntary collaborations, the degree of using these two approaches in the two types of collaboration is not the same, which leads to different impacts on the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaboration. The first approach assumes deliberate planning from goals and careful articulation of missions and responsibilities dominated by a few powerful parties with less power sharing, whereas the second approach assumes a more democratically effective conversation between a broader network of affected partners in forming missions and specifying responsibilities where power sharing between participants is a key factor to the effectiveness of collaboration.

It should be noted that categorizing governance network types into mandated and voluntary is a simplified picture of reality and cannot capture all the nuances in collaborative governance; however, this categorization is a typical example that helps to explain the influence of network types in the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. Therefore, we propose the following:

Proposition 3: The more voluntary the type of collaborative governance is, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Contingency 4: Previous Collaboration Experience and Power Sharing

As explained by path-dependency theory, existing institutions, structures, and policies extended from historical traditions, norms, and practices will result in difficulties and constraints in reform (Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Wilsford, 1994). In collaborative governance, previous collaboration experience of different participants will affect their power sharing in current collaboration by inheriting their past patterns of thinking and actions. The research of Walsh et al. (1981) confirmed this by indicating that the exercise of power is influenced by “the rule of the past over the present” (p. 146), and partners with less experience of working together are not accustomed to sharing power (Lasker, Weiss, & Miller, 2001). These previous collaboration experiences can influence the current power sharing in three manners.

First, for participants with insufficient power-sharing experiences in collaboration, it is difficult to establish the legitimacy of power sharing. Legitimacy is “a social judgment of acceptance, appropriateness, and/or desirability” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 416) that helps to reduce challenges and contradictions in social interactions. For participants with limited power-sharing experiences, the embrace of power sharing as a legitimate mechanism in collaborative governance challenges traditional institutions of authority characterized by hierarchical styles of arrangements that they are familiar with (Booher, 2004). In this situation, to establish enough legitimacy for power sharing as a new arrangement in collaborative governance, more efforts and time are needed to overcome potential challenges and contradictions.

Second, the lack of power-sharing experiences will increase reluctance of traditional powerful participants to share power in collaboration. With limited experiences of collaboration or power sharing, powerful stakeholders are inclined to adhere to the accepted culture, previous policies, and pre-identified problems within their groups to protect their power positions and prevent potential risks caused by other participants’ increasing possessiveness and use of power. As the stakeholders who have already possessed sufficient power to obtain benefits in the interaction with others, powerful participants also have strong willingness and enough capability and skills to keep the existing power relationship to prevent potential loss of benefits resulted from power sharing.

Third, participants in a weaker power position may have limited capacities to share power due to their insufficient previous power-sharing experiences. Sharing power always comes along with sharing accountability, and if the participants do not have enough capacity to take on more accountability, they may choose voluntarily to rely on more powerful partners and, thus, give up some of their power in exchange for less accountability in the collaboration. In addition to accountability, power sharing also requires certain capacities in negotiation, strategy building, visioning, and professional knowledge for the effectiveness of a collaboration, most of which can be acquired through previous experiences.

For example, based on a study on the Deer Initiative, a collaborative partnership on natural resource management in England, Dandy et al. (2014) found that the previous policy and accepted culture in natural resource management emphasizing traditional institutions of authority and hierarchical styles of arrangements were still considered as more legitimate, although collaboration and power sharing become an emerging arrangement in this natural resource management. Sharing power is severely limited due to the fact that substantial power has been previously wielded to certain powerful participants (e.g., government agencies in the traditional deer and forestry sector) in advance rather than being shared. These traditional powerful stakeholders who had limited power-sharing experiences have effectively resisted further inclusion of more diverse stakeholders and impeded power sharing in collaboration by emphasizing their priorities and dominating agenda-setting process (Dandy et al., 2014). At the same time, less powerful stakeholders who had insufficient capacity to negotiate power with powerful partners were not encouraged to participate in agenda setting or decision making. In this case, sharing power among stakeholders is limited even though collaborative governance as a form of natural resource management has emerged and gained legitimacy (Dandy et al., 2014).

The effectiveness of collaborative processes, such as joint decision making and mutual trusting relationship, will be inhibited due to the challenges encountered by power sharing between partners with insufficient power-sharing experience, which will further negatively affect the collaborative outcomes as well as participants’ satisfaction with their collaboration. Therefore, we propose the following:

Proposition 4: The less power-sharing experience participants have, the less beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Contingency 5: Diffusion of Power Sources and Power Sharing

The relationship between power sharing and the effectiveness of collaboration is also contingent upon diffusion of power sources in collaboration. Power sources, which mainly come from formal authority, resource control, and discursive legitimacy (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Purdy, 2012), are the foundation of exercising power. It is unrealistic to share power without the diffusion of power sources among participants.

The roles or functions of participants in collaboration are not identical but vary among members based on their power sources. Participants dominating power sources are usually the central actors in collaboration, who can control different arenas of collaboration, including the participants (“who is involved in a collaborative process and who leads it”), the process design for collaboration (where, when, and how of collaborative governance, influencing the nature of interaction and the modes that are used for communication and decision making”), and the content of the collaboration (“what issues are addressed and what outcomes are pursued”; Purdy, 2012, p. 411). Participants in a weaker power position are usually marginalized in these arenas, which deprives many of their opportunities to negotiate power sharing. When power sources are highly concentrated in certain participants in a collaboration, many challenges need to be coped with in the process of power sharing.

Taking resource control as an example, in a collaborative network, partnering organizations that can provide resources or services vital to all or to a large number of their partners can gain more power due to the centrality of their functions (Benson, 1975).

For example, where network organizations are engaged in the delivery of multiple, differentiated services to clients, an organization at the center of referral flow, namely, one to which all or many clients must be referred, may gain power over those at the periphery. This occurs because centrality makes an organization crucial to the resource acquisition of other agencies. (Benson, 1975, p. 233)

The powerful position of the organization with the central function is based on its resource control that is crucial to other partners in the network. This imbalanced power relationship is difficult to challenge if the powerful organizations’ central position in the referral flow does not change.

Crona and Bodin (2010) also discussed concentrated power sources in the hands of certain actors in the fisheries management, which leads to a power asymmetry between participants in the collaborative governance in fisheries. Actors in fishing community, who possess fish equipment, natural environmental knowledge, and links to relevant officials and nongovernmental organizations, are defined as “opinion leaders” based on their capacity to amplify their influence on shaping others’ understanding about the fishery and the natural environment (Crona & Bodin, 2010). The legitimacy of the “opinion leaders” is not easy to be challenged because their power sources are difficult to transfer to other actors in a short term. Moreover, the “opinion leaders” who have invested “sunken costs” would potentially resist major changes in their possession of resource (Crona & Bodin, 2010), which also makes them reluctant to share power with other participants. Because the sources of power cannot be easily shared with others, power sharing will lose its foundation and be extremely challenging, leading to difficulties in aligning different perspectives and making decisions jointly, which are important measures in assessing the effectiveness of collaboration from the process perspective. The disappointing collaborative process will further undermine stakeholders’ satisfaction about their collaboration. Therefore, we propose the following:

Proposition 5: The more widely diffused power sources are, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Contingency 6: Cost–Benefit Calculation and Power Sharing

Collaboration is always associated with potential costs, including a loss of decision making or operating autonomy (Provan, 1984; Schermerhorn, 1975), unfavorable ramifications for organizational image or identity (Levine, White, & Paul, 1963; Schermerhorn, 1975), and expenditures of time and communication activities (Booher, 2004; Johnston, Hicks, Nan, & Auer, 2010; Schermerhorn, 1975). For participants in collaboration, cost–benefit calculation is important to ensure that the benefits are recognized as outweighing the costs (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992). In practice, there is an intrinsic trade-off for participants in a collaboration, when they have to choose either having autonomy with more power or getting more benefits at the cost of relinquishing some power (Maner & Mead, 2010). The choices may depend on their expectation and calculation of the cost and benefit in giving up some power in a collaborative arrangement. If participants expect that benefits in collaboration will outweigh the cost of giving up some power or leaving the collaboration, they are more likely to tolerate a certain degree of differences or even disparities in power sharing.

As we defined in the previous section, collaborative governance is a multiorganizational arrangement, where diverse stakeholders from public, private, and civic sectors work together based on deliberative consensus and collective decision making to achieve shared goals that could not be otherwise fulfilled individually. The major purpose of collaboration is to achieve some shared goals, rather than pursuing power in collaboration. Power sharing is a means to obtain benefits brought in by collaboration, rather than an end by itself. Therefore, participants’ willingness and behaviors of pursing power sharing will be contingent upon their cost–benefit calculation in achieving their ultimate goals or putting more efforts to achieve power sharing.

On the one hand, because the power relationship among stakeholders is significantly related to the degree of perceived interdependency among them (Gray, 1985), participants in a weaker power position often depend more on their partners and have more desire and needs to stay in the collaboration. Even though their power is weaker, they may be more willing to keep important partners from leaving the collaboration, thus more willing to yield to important partners in power-sharing arrangement, because the replacement cost caused by the leave of these important stakeholders has to be considered (Coff, 1999). Based on the calculation of cost and benefit, they are likely to keep the collaboration working rather than only focusing on sharing more power with key actors. In this situation, power sharing is not a necessary condition for an effective collaboration. On the other hand, because powerful participants are also dependent upon less powerful partners in collaboration, if powerful participants expect that sharing some power with others will not undermine their major interests, but instead can improve the legitimacy of collaboration and ultimately benefit the whole collaboration in a long run, it is possible for them to be more willing to share power with their partners.

Studies of some social psychologists, such as Murray, Holmes, and Griffin (1996), have also found that parties who have a heavy dependence relationship with each other are more likely to interpret ambiguities in their partners’ behaviors in a positive, rather than a negative, light. This implies that partners in collaboration who depend heavily on the benefits produced by each other are more likely to positively interpret the ambiguities in each other’s behaviors, including behaviors of using power in the collaboration. Without too many concerns about the negative outcomes of exerting power, power sharing is less attractive compared with their heavy dependence relationship and the benefits associated with it.

Huxham (2003) suggested that a willingness to accept the manipulative behavior in dealing with power relationship in a collaboration is sometimes appropriate. Based on the cost–benefit analysis, manipulative behaviors in power relationship, such as shifting certain powerful positions among partners in some periods of time or maintain the existing power asymmetry, will likely be accepted by partners if these behaviors can maximize the benefits of collaboration. However, if participants assume that sharing power with their partners will promote their benefits obtained through collaboration, they tend to promote power sharing. From the cost–benefit perspective, the effectiveness of collaboration can be promoted in terms of both outcomes achieved by collaboration and the stakeholders’ satisfaction with their collaboration. Therefore, we propose the following:

Proposition 6: The more acceptable the cost–benefit calculation is for participants, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Discussion

Power relationship is a key issue in researching and practicing collaborative governance. Literature has noted power asymmetry between participants as one of the major problems in collaborative governance and proposed power sharing as a solution to this problem. However, the challenges in the process of sharing power, such as a time-consuming process for trust building and power sharing, stalemate and inaction caused by poor implementation of power sharing, and unwillingness to collaborate or even withdrawal from collaboration due to reluctance of sharing power, need to be reflected in depth. To provide a guideline for addressing these challenges, we proposed a contingency framework for power sharing, considering the complexity of different perspectives in participants, collaborative network, and institutional environment influencing power in collaborative governance.

The development of the contingency framework starts with our interpretation of power, which includes three aspects: the behavioral perspective, the social construction perspective, and different influencing factors in power dynamics. The behavioral perspective (the power from A on B that gets B to do something that B does not want to do otherwise) suggests that the ability to exercise power on others plays a critical role in power relationship because the power is exercised by A against B’s will. In our contingency framework, we identified factors influencing some participants’ ability in exercising power. From the node perspective, we believe that participants’ previous experiences of power sharing and structures of power sources contribute to their ability to exercise power. Participants with rich previous power-sharing experiences have more capability, knowledge, and skills to promote power sharing in their ongoing collaboration. In addition, diffused power sources will decentralize functions of participants and, thus, prevent certain participants from dominating the process of collaboration, contributing to the effectiveness of collaborative governance network.

The social construction perspective (the power from A on B that makes B voluntarily want to do what A wants) implies that power is socially structured and culturally patterned that will lead to B’s internalization of A’s will and willingness to yield to A’s power. In the context of collaborative governance, once established as being legitimate or necessary, either power sharing or power asymmetry could be accepted socially as reasonable and function well in collaboration. Contingencies, such as increased system trust produced by a strong institutional environment that can cultivate collaboration, less exigent missions that could afford democracy-oriented power sharing, more voluntary collaborative network, more previous power-sharing experience, as well as more acceptable cost–benefit calculation on power sharing, will promote power sharing through the process of social construction. The shared power that is socially constructed and culturally patterned is more beneficial for the effectiveness of collaboration.

The last aspect of power interpretation suggests that power could be further decomposed into different factors, such as power source, power means, power scope, and power arena, that all contribute to the effectiveness of power relationship. This conceptualization helps to reflect the extent of power asymmetry in collaboration. Significant difference in power can negatively affect the interorganizational relationship between participants because it undermines the involvement and trust of participants. Yet, pursuing power distribution as equal as possible is not necessary and may prove undesirable and unrealistic due to the stalemate and inaction provoked by it (Gray, 1985). How to find a balance between power sharing and power asymmetry is related to the flexible strategies in dealing with different power factors. Our contingency framework provides a general guidance to manage these dynamic factors in power by proposing that the appropriateness of power sharing for the effectiveness of collaboration will be affected by the diffusion or concentration of power sources, the more or less previous experiences in power means, the different power scopes denoted by more or less mandatory types of the collaboration network and more or less exigent missions of the network, and the corresponding power amount exercised or shared based on acceptable cost–benefit calculations.

Our contingency framework is situated in the institutional theory and resource dependence theory. Institutional theory claims that organizations conform to social framework of norms, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions composed and existed in their institutional context (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1997). We proposed three contingencies in our framework, which are in line with the institutional theory: institutional environment from the contextual perspective, missions of network from the network perspective, and previous power-sharing experience from the node perspective. First, stronger institutional environment cultivating collaboration brings in more willingness for participants to share power based on their system trust in environment and confidence on predictable outcomes of sharing power. Second, to accomplish different missions of network, existing institutional context, either inclines to be more bureaucratic or democratic, will affect the necessity and feasibility of power sharing. For example, exigent missions cannot afford the time-consuming negotiation in power sharing and, thus, will work better when existing institutional arrangement emphasizes central control. Third, participants with less power-sharing experience within an institution characterized by hierarchical styles of arrangements may be less voluntary to share power in a new collaboration, because power sharing is discouraged by the existing institution and lost its legitimacy to certain extend, thus harming the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Resource dependence theory argues that organizational survival relies on their ability to secure critical resources from the external environment, and the interorganizational dependencies are created by the needs of all organizations to acquire or share scarce resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Provan, Beyer, & Kruytbosch, 1980). In a collaboration, an organization can be more powerful relative to its partners if it controls more resources needed by others or if it can reduce its dependency on others for resources (Provan et al., 1980). We proposed three contingencies in our framework, which are in line with the resource dependency theory: types of network from the network perspective as well as power sources and cost–benefit analysis from the node perspective. From the network perspective, when a network is mandated to form, and the interdependencies between participants are largely externally imposed and, thus, might not be strong enough to motivate them to collaborate voluntarily, mandated participants might have reduced willingness to share power, leading to reduced benefits of the collaboration. From the node perspective, if power sources are concentrated on a single organization, this organization can be more powerful due to its possession of more resources needed by other partners and weaker dependencies on others, leading to challenges and reluctance for powerful participants to share power, which will further undermine the collaboration. However, if the ultimate goal of a less powerful organization to participate collaboration is to acquire scarce resources, that organization is more willing to give up some power to stay in the collaboration after a cost–benefit calculation.

Essentially, the contingency framework emphasizes the importance of balance between power sharing and power asymmetry, which is the key issue of power dynamics in collaborative governance. As we discussed on the appeal of power sharing in collaborative governance, most literature treated power sharing and power asymmetry as two opposite types of power relationship in collaboration. The binary demarcation of these two concepts has been assumed in research on power dynamics in collaborative governance, leading to claims on the assumed benefits of power sharing and claims on the apocalypse of power asymmetry. In reality, power asymmetry and power sharing are always interwoven and coexisted, leading to a mixture of both in any state of the collaborative network. Sharing power perfectly among participants is clearly an impossibility, whereas power asymmetry is more likely to be the norm of collaboration due to the specific socio–economic–political contexts where the interorganizational collaboration situated. Therefore, the attempts of sharing power as much as possible in collaboration should be called into question. When pursuing power sharing in collaboration, the efforts in analyzing and practicing power sharing on collaboration should focus on the factors affecting the dynamics of power relationship upon which collaborative governance could be effective.

Our contingency framework also provides some empirical guidance to practitioners when collaborating with other partners: (a) When participating in a collaboration, it is necessary for participants to evaluate the institutional environment outside the collaboration, such as the rigidity of regulations and rules that can control the participants’ behaviors; (b) understanding both individual organizational goals and common missions of the collaboration is necessary when sharing power between partners; (c) improving the internal consent or legitimacy of the mandated collaborative network is significant for power sharing; (d) choosing the partners who have positive previous experiences in power sharing with others is beneficial for an effective collaboration; (e) being cautious to participate in a collaboration in which the partners’ power sources are extremely asymmetric if you are willing to share more power with your partners; (f) promoting the “outcome justice” and improving the participants’ satisfaction with their benefits gained in collaboration are significant for promoting power sharing. As Huxham (2003) indicated, practitioners need to apply any theoretical analysis contingently to guide their efforts in collaboration because “particular approaches to resolving issues are not necessarily transferable to other situations” (p. 420).

Our theoretical framework was built upon the literature on power sharing as related to the effectiveness of collaborative governance. However, this literature is thin in providing rich examples and cases upon which we could situate our framework. It is also possible that some cases we used in this article might be subject to alternative interpretations and explanations. However, this article is a starting point to study power sharing in collaborative practices within a contingency framework, which could shed some light on future empirical studies that this field is in dire need.

Certainly, due to the complexity of collaborative governance, it is also difficult for this article to exhaust all contingency factors that can influence the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. Moreover, the contingency factors identified in this article are not mutually exclusive. These factors will most likely coexist and function together in a collaborative arrangement. We expect future studies, both conceptual and empirical, can further investigate more contingencies or the interplay between contingency factors. We also call for studies to include more dynamics in collaborative governance to develop a comprehensive framework, and more in-depth studies on the compounding effects of these contingency factors in influencing the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Conclusion

In this article, we attempted to explore certain contingencies affecting the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. We approached the key question—whether power sharing is beneficial for the effectiveness of collaborative governance—from a contingency perspective (“It all depends”), and developed a contingency framework that identifies six contingencies, including institutional environment (from the environmental perspective), different missions accomplished by collaborative network and types of network (from the network perspective), and power-sharing experience of participants, diffusion of power sources among participants, and cost–benefit calculation of participants (from the node perspective). We argue that these contingency factors will affect the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. This contingency framework will help both scholars and practitioners to develop a conceptual understanding of power relationship in collaboration and provide insight on how the power dynamics in collaboration can be managed.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Bing Ran is an associate professor of public administration in the School of Public Affairs, Penn State Harrisburg. His research interests focus on the dynamic interactions between society’s complex infrastructure and human behavior, tackling topics such as collaborative governance networks, organizational identity, knowledge integration, social entrepreneurship, and hybrid organizations.

Huiting Qi is a doctoral candidate in the PhD program in public administration in the School of Public Affairs, Penn State Harrisburg. Her research interests include collaborative governance networks, behavioral public administration, and organizational theory. Her latest publication is “Issues and Challenges of Public Service Procurement in China: A Collaborative Governance Perspective” (International Journal of Public Policy, 2016).

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