Establishing cross-border co-operation between professional organizations: Police,fire brigades and emergency health services in Dutch border regions

Abstract

This article explores the conditions under which local and regional governments will establish and sustain cross-border co-operation in the fields of police, fire fighting and emergency health services. It argues that understanding this type of cross-border co-operation requires a focus on the way in which professionals define and apply their professional standards in cross-border contexts. Moreover, it requires a focus on individual organizations and professionals working in them, rather than ‘government’ or ‘the state’ as a whole, since cross-border co-operation in these areas typically develops as a result of disparate and unconnected initiatives taken by governmental actors in a given border region. Based on four studies of cross-border co-operation in Dutch border regions, we argue that differences in legal, organizational and cultural backgrounds between the participating countries can be and are overcome by street-level professionals and their organizations, who act as ‘regionauts’ in exploring opportunities for cross-border co-operation. In this type of ‘bottom-up’ cross-border co-operation, motivation among participants is the key to establishing co-operation, and solutions to differences between work routines will be developed along the way. As a result, the establishment of cross-border co-operation often is an experimental, pragmatic enterprise, which is greatly affected by local intra- and inter-organizational dynamics. This opens the potential for pragmatic, flexible and creative solutions. Yet, at the same time it also runs the risk of producing unaccountable cross-border arrangements that are insufficiently embedded in legal and professional safeguards against error and abuse.

Keywords

Cross-border co-operation cross-border governance European Union professionals regionauts soft spaces

Introduction

Increasingly, local and regional governments are co-operating across borders in fields such as policing, crisis management, fire fighting and health services. For governments, these co-operation initiatives are a response to cross-border issues at the local and regional level, such as car theft or burglaries perpetrated in one country by criminals from a neighbouring country, fires and other types of disasters that threaten communities on both sides of the border, or large events (such as European football matches or pop festivals) that draw visitors from across the border (cf. Spapens, 2010).

In addition, cross-border co-operation allows local and regional governments to pool scarce resources, which is particularly relevant in sparsely populated regions with limited governmental services. For instance, fire brigades may work across borders, thus improving coverage and reducing response time. Cross-border co-operation also allows local governments to draw upon each other’s equipment and manpower in the case of large-scale emergencies that they cannot handle on their own.

However, this trend has not been even. Significant differences in the intensity and form of cross-border co-operation can be observed, not just across Europe but even between nearby regions within the same country (Medeiros, 2010; Perkmann, 2003). Even though cross-border co-operation offers opportunities for local governments to develop and exploit joint benefits, it also requires sustained investments in time and effort, in order to establish contacts, develop joint understandings and overcome legal and cultural differences. This is not only true for the establishment of initial co-operation, but also for sustaining that co-operation over time. Although such investments are inherent in any type of inter-organizational co-operation, they are arguably compounded in cross-border situations, given the wide differences in legal systems, organizational formats and work routines between similar types of organizations on two sides of a border (cf. Klatt and Herrmann, 2011: 77–78; Knippschild, 2011: 631–632). Apparently, then, some regional and local governments are more willing to make this investment than others and/or more able to overcome the hurdles associated with cross-border co-operation.

In this paper, we explore the question under what conditions local and regional governments will establish and sustain cross-border co-operation in the fields of police, fire fighting and emergency health services, and how they deal with inconsistencies in work routines on the two sides of the border. We do so on the basis of four studies on cross-border co-operation in Dutch border regions. These regions show a great variety in terms of types and intensities of co-operation. We argue that differences in legal, organizational and cultural backgrounds between the participating countries can be and are overcome by street-level professionals and their organizations working across borders. In this type of ‘bottom-up’ cross-border co-operation, motivation among participants is the key to establishing co-operation, as they see, develop and sometimes ‘construct’ benefits of cross-border links. In this process, solutions to differences between work routines will be developed along the way. As a result, the establishment of cross-border co-operation often is an experimental, pragmatic enterprise, which is greatly affected by local intra- and inter-organizational dynamics.

By focusing on cross-border regional co-operation in the domain of police, fire fighting and emergency health services, this article aims to make three specific contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, most attention in the existing literature has gone to the growth of cross-border regions (CBRs), formalized and institutionalized structures of co-operation between local and/or regional governments (e.g. Klatt and Herrmann, 2011; Medeiros, 2010, 2013; Nelles and Durand, 2014; Perkmann, 1999, 2003, 2005; Pikner, 2008). A variety of studies have looked at the genesis of CBRs and the extent to which they pose a challenge to ‘traditional’ government structures, which are confined to individual nation states (Blatter, 2001; Hansen and Serin, 2010; Johnson, 2009; Nadalutti, 2012). Yet, cross-border co-operation in the fields of policing, fire fighting and emergency health is not necessarily linked to CBRs. Although in some cases, co-operation in these fields may be part of a CBR, in other cases it is established and operates on the basis of separate agreements or informal understandings between relevant organizations on the two sides of the border. Hence, to understand the rise and functioning of cross-border co-operation in these fields, we need to look beyond (formal) CBRs.

Secondly, even where co-operation in these fields is part of a CBR, its creation and maintenance require separate explanation. For instance, the CBR in the Dutch–German border region around Enschede and Münster is the oldest in Europe (created in 1958), but co-operation in the fields of policing and emergency services has only been taken up since 2000. Hence, there is no automatic link between the creation of a CBR and the establishment of co-operation in these fields. Therefore, accounts of the rise of CBRs in general do not explain the rise and maintenance of cross-border co-operation in these specific fields.

Thirdly, most existing studies have looked at co-operation in the fields of economic development and spatial planning (Church and Reid, 1999; Knippschild, 2011; Medeiros, 2010; Nelles and Durand, 2014; Scott, 1998). Partly, this is probably a result of the fact that the earliest forms of cross-border co-operation in Europe were meant to support regional economic development (see, e.g. Perkmann, 2007: 263). The link between cross-border co-operation and economic development has been further strengthened by the close relationship between the rise of cross-border co-operation and the European Union’s (EU’s) INTERREG programme (cf. Medeiros, 2010, 2013; Perkmann, 2003).

Studies on co-operation in policing, fire fighting and emergency health services are much more scarce. A group of researchers has extensively studied co-operation between local police forces in the Meuse–Rhine Euregion around Aachen, Liège and Maastricht (see the four-volume study of Spapens et al., 2005–2010), while Gallagher (2002) and Johnson (2002) have studied co-operation between local police and emergency services on the French and UK sides of the English Channel.

This article adds to these studies by looking at cross-border co-operation in policing, fire fighting and emergency health services together, and analyses it in terms of co-operation between professionals and professional organizations. The differences between them notwithstanding, these three fields of activity have a number of characteristics in common, which raise specific issues in cross-border co-operation. To begin with, the three fields are all involved in the handling of emergency situations, in which individuals have to decide and act quickly, without much room for on-the-spot coordination. Moreover, all three fields present distinctively professional organizations. Employees in these organizations, at least in line positions, dispose of specific, exclusive and legally circumscribed and enforced competences. Entry into these positions is conditional upon the completion of specific professional training. Finally, in each of the three fields, careers often take place within the same type of organization, so that they constitute closed career systems. This raises particular issues in cross-border co-operation because of the resulting deeply engrained legal, organizational and cultural differences between co-operating individuals and organizations.

In the remainder of the paper we will proceed as follows. Firstly, we will sketch a theoretical framework for understanding local and regional cross-border co-operation in the context of professional organizations. Next, we will introduce the studies on which our analysis is based. This will be followed by a presentation of the main results of these studies. Finally, we will draw a number of conclusions and discuss their implications for our understanding of cross-border co-operation.

Theorizing cross-border co-operation

Professionals and professional organizations in cross-border co-operation

Cross-border co-operation takes place within the context of what students of spatial planning have labelled ‘soft spaces’. In their study of spatial planning in the Thames Gateway area, Allmendinger and Haughton (2009: 619) describe these soft spaces as ‘associational relationships which stretch across a range of geographies’, leading to multiple, overlapping spaces with fuzzy geographical and functional boundaries. In these soft spaces, ‘objectives (…) are being delivered in the spaces between formal agencies and plans and strategies’ and they ‘privilege different, informal scales and spaces’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009: 631).

Cross-border co-operation typically takes place within such hybrid, overlapping governance arrangements. These arrangements operate alongside (and on the basis of) pre-existing and formal governmental scales and institutions, which are defined within national states. They thereby form an eminent example of Brenner’s (1999) point that globalization has led not so much to deterritorialization, in which territorial scales become increasingly irrelevant for understanding interactions between actors, but to reterritorialization, in which territorial scales are reconfigured rather than transcended.

Soft spaces pose specific challenges to co-operation among professionals, since the regulation and control of professionals and professionalism have largely been tied to these national governmental scales, which differ greatly in terms of legal systems, organizational formats, policy styles and professional cultures. What is required, therefore, is a theoretical understanding of cross-border co-operation in the context of professionalized organizations and individuals.

The notion of professionalism implies two crucial claims: a claim to exclusive expertise and competence, and a claim to work for the benefit of clients and society (Freidson, 1994: 61ff; Wilensky, 1964: 138). This professional logic applies to medical personnel, fire fighters and policemen alike. As a result, all three professions can claim an exclusive (legally sanctioned) competence, based on expert training and their position within a professional organization. Because they have been inculcated by years of training and experience, professional norms tend to exert a strong influence over the work routines of individual professionals. Professional norms define what is the right thing to do in a given situation. Being a ‘good professional’ implies handling things according to professional norms and routines. These norms and routines relate to legal competences (who is allowed to do what?), organizational formats (who has authority over who or what?) and work practices (what is the best way to handle a situation?). Deviation from them is deemed ‘unprofessional’ behaviour. Differences in professional norms between countries may hamper co-operation, as professionals on each side of the border are likely to stick to their ‘own’ way of working.

At the same time, professional norms and routines are not all-determining. Often they leave room for interpretation that professionals can exploit to facilitate co-operation. Moreover, professionals may creatively seek to find ways of reconciling seemingly inconsistent norms and routines. These processes of reinterpreting and coping with professional norms typically take place at the ‘street level’, at which actual practices are developed and take shape. From existing, domestic studies of street-level bureaucrats, we know that professionals within organizations will develop their own set of work routines when confronted with unclear, demanding and contradictory organizational demands (Lipsky, 1980). This is likely to be the same for street-level professionals working across borders. Moreover, this dynamic may operate not just at the level of individual employees (which were the focus of Lipsky’s study) but also at the level of (local) organizations. The informal routines that are developed in these situations may differ substantially from the legal frameworks that are supposed to guide professional behaviour.

In that sense, street-level professionals and their organizations resemble what, in their studies of the Øresund border region between Denmark and Sweden, O’Dell (2003) and Löfgren (2008) have called ‘regionauts’:

Regionauts move in both the physical and mental landscapes of a region, exploring differences in anything from the legal system to market conditions. This kind of on-the-ground region building often goes against the intentions of planners and policymakers, and may include creative subversions of existing conditions: bending rules and identifying loopholes. (Löfgren, 2008: 196–197)

O’Dell and Löfgren both identified citizens in border regions as regionauts, juxtaposing their ‘experimentalist’ cross-border explorations with the planned and intentional co-operation regimes constructed by bureaucrats and policy-makers. Yet, this type of on-the-ground construction of cross-border co-operation may also take place within government structures and bureaucratic organizations. The government or state is not a unitary actor or system but a collection of organizations and individuals with their own ideas, interests and resources. Hence, street-level professionals and their organizations may operate as regionauts, constructing and inventing cross-border co-operation as they explore opportunities for collaboration and work with their counterparts across the border.

This tension between professional routines and creative solutions is relevant in relation to both key questions in this article: under what conditions will co-operation be established and how will professionals and their organizations deal with inconsistencies across borders? We will turn to these two questions in turn.

Establishing cross-border co-operation

The development of on-the-ground practices and routines to deal with the dilemmas of cross-border co-operation is dependent on the willingness of actors to engage in this type of co-operation in the first place. Since cross-border co-operation almost inevitably involves a departure from established routines and creates a degree of uncertainty and potential risk both for organizations and individual street-level professionals, some sort of driver is required for it to develop.

Arguably, organizations and street-level professionals need to see sufficient benefit in cross-border co-operation if they are to take up the challenges involved in it. The recognition of joint interdependencies is a forceful driver in this regard. As studies of inter-organizational co-operation have found, if organizations perceive their own performance to be dependent on the activities of others, they may seek coordination (Chisholm, 1989) and the level of coordination is associated with the perceived level of interdependence (Van Boetzelaer and Princen, 2012).

Taking a slightly different angle, Klatt and Herrmann (2011) identify differences between two sides of the border as the main incentive to start co-operation. If actors (be they firms or governmental organizations) can obtain benefits across the border that they cannot obtain ‘at home’, they will be motivated to start cross-border co-operation. Co-operation will materialize if information is available and the costs of overcoming cultural and administrative barriers are not prohibitively high (Klatt and Herrmann, 2011: 79–80). Here too, then, joint benefits are seen as the main incentives for co-operation.

This is not to say that cross-border co-operation is simply the result of a rational calculus among participants. The crucial element here is perceived interdependence or benefits. Hence, an analysis of the incentives for co-operation should not limit itself to ‘objective’ measures but focus on the factors that drive the perception of interdependence, benefits or needs. Important facilitators of such a perception are the existence of ‘policy entrepreneurs’, who take it upon them to promote the cause of cross-border co-operation in their local governments, and the occurrence of forceful ‘focusing events’, which put the issue of cross-border co-operation high on the local agenda (cf. Kingdon, 2003; see Casson and Dardanelli, 2012 for an example of the role of leadership in international co-operation between regions).

If these factors lead to a strong sense of interdependence, initiatives for cross-border co-operation are likely to be taken. As previous studies have shown, strong motivation to co-operate across borders is also able to overcome many of the formal and cultural differences that make co-operation more difficult. For instance, in his study of spatial planning co-operation in the German–Polish–Czech border region, Knippschild (2011) found that differences in the structure of public administration, perceived cultural differences and language difficulties were less of a barrier to co-operation than differences in resources and the perceived need of co-operation (cf. also the earlier study by Scott (1998)). In his study of co-operation between local police forces in Kent and Northern France, Gallagher (2002: 111) came to the same conclusion, claiming that ‘“sheer necessity” at an operational level can overcome barriers on the ground’.

Negotiating cross-border differences

In terms of the ways in which professionals will cope with inconsistencies across borders, the argument developed above leads one to expect flexible, pragmatic and relatively informal approaches to co-operation. This expectation ties in with the observation in several studies of cross-border co-operation that rather than creating comprehensive formal arrangements, actors have tended to develop flexible, ad hoc arrangements that suit their concrete purposes (Church and Reid, 1999: 644; Hansen and Serin, 2010: 223; Johnson, 2009; Pikner, 2008).

This type of co-operation offers room for actors to devise pragmatic, bottom-up approaches outside of comprehensive formal frameworks. As Hansen and Serin observed in their study of co-operation in the Øresund region, ‘cross-border problems and issues were often resolved along the way without the need for major institutional change’. Reflecting on cross-border co-operation more generally, Perkmann (1999: 665) concluded:

Taking together the loosely coupled interaction patterns, the considerable number of participating actors and the broadly defined policy objectives, the outcome of cross-border cooperation governance has to be seen as a compounded effect rather than as the realization of deliberative strategies.

This ad hoc and ‘bottom-up’ nature ties in with the idea that cross-border co-operation is driven primarily by street-level professionals and their organizations, which, acting as ‘regionauts’, look for and formulate approaches to cross-border issues as they arise. For government as a whole, then, cross-border co-operation is an ‘emergent’ as opposed to a ‘deliberate’ strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). It arises out of the collection of, largely ad hoc and unrelated, activities by professionals and organizations within local government, which together produce a specific pattern of cross-border co-operation.

In terms of organizational format, cross-border co-operation will take the form of a decentral network (Provan and Kenis, 2008), rather than an integrated and centrally steered institutional body. Decision-making within this decentralized network is crucially mediated by the relations among the network participants, which are characterized by (shared and individual) interests, (the existence or lack of) mutual trust, and power relations. As a result, the outcome of cross-border co-operation is not likely to show one uniform pattern, but will be highly dependent on the specific local and regional configuration of interests, trust and power that underlie specific forms of cross-border co-operation. Understanding these differences requires an analysis of these configurations.

Methodology

The empirics in this paper come from a research project on cross-border co-operation in Dutch border regions, which we have carried out over recent years. This project included four different studies, which taken together aim at understanding better the dynamics and drivers of cross-border co-operation:

in the first study (Geuijen et al., 2008), forms of co-operation in the field of policing were researched, including the exchange of information among local police forces in the Belgian/Dutch/German region around Aachen, Liège and Maastricht (the Meuse–Rhine Euregion);

in the second study (Hooijer, 2010), efforts to establish local cross-border co-operation along the Northern half of the Dutch–German border were examined, comparing two regions with a high level of co-operation with two regions in which co-operation remained rudimentary;

in the third study (Candel, 2011), the attitudes of police officers towards cross-border co-operation were studied in two regional Dutch police forces, one along the Dutch–Belgian and one along the Dutch–German border;

in the fourth and final study (Folgerts, 2011), the effectiveness of co-operation in the field of crisis management was analysed in the Dutch–German border region around Enschede and Münster.

The aim of these studies was to understand cross-border co-operation from the bottom up, that is, in terms of the actual practices and routines that have developed around and in cross-border activities. The main characteristics of the four studies are listed in Table 1.

Table 1.

The four studies.

	Geuijen et al. 2008	Hooijer 2010	Candel 2011	Folgerts 2011
Central focus	Work routines at the street level	Determinants of local cross-border co-operation	Determinants of European attitudes among Dutch police officers	Effectiveness of cross-border co-operation in the field of crisis management
Type(s) of organization	Policing	Emergency services	Policing	Emergency services
Dutch border region(s) studied	Southern Limburg (Meuse–Rhine Euregion)	IJsselland Drenthe Twente North-East Gelderland	North-East Gelderland Mid-West Brabant	Twente
Methods	Non-participant observation Interviews Expert meetings	Interviews Documents	Interviews Documents Non-participant observation	Interviews Documents Non-participant observation
Number of interviews	26^a	16	27	16

The study of work routines in the exchange of information among local police forces in the Meuse–Rhine Euregion was part of a broader study on the role and behaviour of Dutch civil servants in European co-operation. The 26 interviews listed here were all held in the field of police co-operation, but were not restricted to local police co-operation in the Aachen–Liège-Maastricht area. Because the interviews for the different parts of our study of police co-operation partly overlap, all 26 interviews have been mentioned here.

Methodologically, the studies relied on a combination of methods. Firstly, interviews were conducted with participants in cross-border co-operation. These interviews were held with respondents at all levels of the organization: from chiefs and policy advisors to unit managers and street-level professionals. In addition, several interviews were held with people working on cross-border co-operation policies at the national level.

Secondly, three out of the four studies also used non-participant observation as a way to find out how cross-border co-operation was practised on the ground. The types of situations observed differed between studies. In the first study, the actual exchange of information taking place in EPIC, the Euregional Police Information and Coordination Centre in Heerlen, the Netherlands, was observed. In the third study, an operation by a Joint Hit Team in Roosendaal, on the Dutch–Belgian Border, and an international course on forest fire control were observed. In the fourth study, a meeting of Dutch border regions taking place in the city of Arnhem was observed.

Together, these studies provide an inventory and analysis of a wide range of practices and issues inherent in local cross-border co-operation, which can be used to understand the dynamics in and the drivers behind co-operation efforts.

Cross-border co-operation in Dutch border regions: setting the context

Two characteristics are important for understanding cross-border co-operation in Dutch border regions: firstly, the large degree of variation in co-operation practices and actual levels of co-operation and, secondly, the multi-layered character of co-operation frameworks.

To start with the former, in formal terms cross-border co-operation in Dutch border regions is old and well-established. The Euregion around the Dutch city of Enschede and the German city of Münster is the oldest of its sort in Europe, and nowadays a chain of Euregions covers the Dutch border from North to South (with Germany) and East to West (with Belgium), including one Euregion that covers areas in all three countries.

However, this formal framework of Euregions obscures a wide range of variation in terms of practices and the types of joint activities undertaken. In some areas, such as the Enschede–Münster border region, police, fire brigade and health emergency services co-operate to a fairly large extent. For instance, in this region German trauma helicopters are operational on the Dutch side of the border approximately 50 times a year, while ambulances cross the border with about the same frequency. Just south of this region, in the border region between the Dutch town of Winterswijk and the German town of Oeding, German fire brigades have even been assigned parts of Winterswijk, since they are closer to those areas than the closest Dutch fire brigade. In the case of a fire alarm, these German units will be notified directly and cross the border to fight the fire. The border region around Aachen, Liège and Maastricht is another example of a region with high levels of co-operation.

By contrast, other border regions show a much more limited level of co-operation. For instance, in the border region between the Dutch province of Drenthe and the German Landkreis Grafschaft Bentheim, instances of co-operation in the fields of policing, fire fighting and emergency health services are few and far between. These differences cannot be linked directly to the existing legal frameworks. As was mentioned above, all border regions are covered by a Euregion. Moreover, in the Drenthe–Bentheim region, a formal agreement on mutual assistance in case of disasters was concluded in 2009. Yet, the follow-up to this agreement was limited, making it more symbolic than operational.

In addition to the variety of co-operation practices and activities, cross-border co-operation in Dutch border regions has a strongly multi-layered character. To illustrate this, Table 2 gives an overview of relevant agreements and legal frameworks in relation to cross-border co-operation in the field of crisis management in the Enschede–Münster region.

Table 2.

Relevant agreements in the field of disaster management in the Twente–Münster Euregion.

Level	Relevant agreements
European (EU and Council of Europe)	EU legislation in the field of justice and home affairs
	INTERREG
	EU and CoE frameworks for local cross-border co-operation
Bilateral (Germany–Netherlands)	1997 Treaty on mutual co-operation in the case of disasters
Bilateral (Germany–Netherlands)	2005 Treaty of Enschede (police co-operation)
Regional	2001 Covenant on mutual assistance in crisis management 2006 Agreement on cross-border use of trauma helicopters
Local	Various bilateral agreements between fire brigades, emergency health units and police forces on the two sides of the borders
Local	Joint disaster contingency plans by municipalities on both sides of the border

EU: European Union; CoE: Council of Europe.

The table shows the most important legal instruments at four levels. At the European level, EU legislation in the field of justice and home affairs affects local and regional cross-border co-operation. In addition, INTERREG can be used for funding co-operation initiatives, while both the EU and the Council of Europe have created formal frameworks within which local and regional governments can co-operate across borders (such as the EU’s ‘European Group for Territorial Co-operation’). At the bilateral level, several agreements have been concluded between Germany and the Netherlands that are directly relevant, such as the 1997 Treaty on mutual co-operation in case of disasters and the 2005 Treaty of Enschede on police co-operation. At the regional level, a formal agreement on mutual assistance was concluded in 2001. In 2006, a separate agreement was concluded to facilitate the use of German trauma helicopters on the Dutch side of the border. At the local level, finally, a plethora of bilateral agreements exist between individual police forces, fire brigades and emergency health services, ranging from formal agreements to informal understandings. As a final example, municipalities on both sides of the border have developed joint disaster contingency plans, which are meant to coordinate efforts in case of disaster.

The mere number of levels and agreements involved shows the complexity of these co-operation arrangements. This complexity is directly related to the variety in practices and activities noted above, in two directions. To begin with, the variety of local practices gives rise to the creation of agreements at various levels. Whereas EU and bilateral frameworks create general norms for cross-border co-operation, regional and local agreements are created to fill in gaps left in those more general and abstract frameworks and to reflect local concerns and priorities. At the same time, local and regional actors sometimes also actively push for frameworks at a higher level of government, in order to address concerns they are not able or willing to deal with at their ‘own’ level. This is more relevant in some organizations than others. Local Dutch police forces, in particular, tend to put greater emphasis on formal legal frameworks and mandates than fire brigades and emergency health services, which leads to a call for bilateral (or EU) agreements.

Conversely, the multi-layered and complex character of cross-border co-operation also reinforces local diversity. It opens opportunities for local policy entrepreneurs to forge local practices, as agreements on different levels overlap and sometimes contradict each other. In that sense, the multilevelness leads to local diversity. The ambiguity of higher-level frameworks creates room for different understandings and framings at the local level. For instance, in the active border regions of Enschede–Münster and North-East Gelderland, several actors stressed their understanding that cross-border co-operation was mandatory under the Treaty of Enschede or Dutch law, whereas this argument was never mentioned in regions with little cross-border co-operation. Partly this depended on the lens through which those legal frameworks were interpreted.

A good example of this dynamic came from an interviewee from the emergency health unit in Twente and North-East Gelderland, who argued that cross-border co-operation was mandated since Dutch law required his organization to monitor risks in adjacent regions. From a purely national perspective, such a provision will be interpreted as meaning ‘adjacent regions within the Netherlands’, whereas from a transnational perspective it also includes adjacent regions across the national border. One can probably determine which of the two is the ‘correct’ interpretation, legally speaking, but for the purposes of our analysis this is not the point. Rather, what is important is how local actors use and frame legal frameworks at a higher level to justify and bolster local practices. The pre-existing disposition towards cross-border co-operation conditions the understanding of legal frameworks by local actors rather than the other way around, although these actors can subsequently use this understanding as an argument vis-à-vis more reluctant partners in their regions. In that way, the case for cross-border co-operation is constructed by local actors as part of their understanding of their jobs.

Establishing and maintaining cross-border co-operation

In terms of the establishment and maintenance of cross-border co-operation, three main (clusters of) findings can be identified. The first cluster concerns the establishment of cross-border co-operation: what are reasons for professionals to start co-operating across borders? The second cluster focuses on the conditions under which co-operation will continue or cease to exist. The third cluster of findings is of a different nature. It shows the trade-offs between competing values often encountered within cross-border co-operation, as professional values clash with organizational objectives and with political logics.

Firstly, cross-border co-operation is established successfully in cases of either a tangible necessity, for example a crisis, or of an acutely felt interdependency. A major example of a crisis that induced professionals to co-operate was the Enschede fireworks disaster in 2000. When an enormous fireworks warehouse explosion occurred near the Dutch–German border there was little coordination between the fire brigades, health providers and police departments of both countries, despite the 1997 formal agreement on mutual assistance in case of disasters between Germany and the Netherlands. The fireworks disaster tore down a complete neighbourhood and took the lives of dozens of inhabitants of the city of Enschede. This gave rise to major activities to breathe some life into the existing formal agreement, among other things by establishing an effective communication structure and most of all regularly practising together.

Another case in which cross-border co-operation is established is when interdependency is acutely felt by professionals in their daily practices. An important example is NeBeDeAgPol, which is the Dutch, Belgian, German police co-operation that was established in the Meuse–Rhine border region. For some 40 years, police(wo)men in this region have felt the need to co-operate across borders, because the criminals they have to deal with work across borders as well (cf. Spapens et al., 2005–2010). The geographic situation is specific: the Dutch piece of land that criminals have to cross to go from Belgium to Germany is only some 50 kilometres wide, in some parts even less. This has led to active co-operation between (local) police authorities in the three countries.

The perceived interdependence crucially depends on the extent to which professionals see cross-border co-operation as necessary to attain the goals that are central to their own profession. Not only do borders create opportunities for professionals to interact and co-operate, but they also create the necessity for it. Professionals need this co-operation to be able to attain their professional goals. Crudely stated, police professionals want to catch criminals, health providers want to save lives. They prioritize cross-border co-operation if they see that it helps them to achieve these goals. This also works at the level of individual attitudes. The single most important factor determining (positive) attitudes towards cross-border co-operation among police officers was the extent to which they had experienced forms of cross-border co-operation in their jobs. This attitude could be strengthened by organizational efforts to create those experiences, such as the creation of joint police patrols in the Dutch municipality of Montferland and the German town of Emmerlich, and the establishment of a joint police station on the Dutch/German border between Dutch Dinxperlo and German Süderwick.

In addition to the perceived interdependence, trust is a crucial prerequisite for co-operation. Only if participants on both sides of the border are convinced that the other side is (1) sincere in its efforts to co-operate and (2) able to deliver on its commitments, will time and effort be invested in the establishment of co-operation. Trust need not exist from the very beginning; it may also develop as the two sides explore possibilities for co-operation on the basis of perceived interdependence. Such initiatives will only lead to tangible co-operation if the two sides trust each other, which in turn may strengthen the initial level of trust.

The second finding that resulted from our empirical studies relates to why cross-border co-operation is continued. This is the case if the sense of urgency continues and benefits are perceived high while financial and organizational costs are low. If the hurdles for co-operation become too high, professionals may conclude that it no longer works for them to continue investing. Especially when no new crises occur, the ‘sense of urgency’ with which professionals started co-operating may fade. For example, 10 years after the Enschede fireworks crisis we saw this happening. The ‘leader’ of the co-operation was transferred to another job. Policy-makers and practitioners still met, but less frequently and with less enthusiasm. Slowly and unintentionally priorities changed and cross-border co-operation ceased to be perceived as urgent by the participating professionals. Their focus shifted towards their own national organizational goals and targets, ‘forgetting’ the way in which cross-border co-operation had been perceived as part of attaining those goals. No new ‘leader’ stood up to take the role of framing the co-operation as being of the utmost importance for attaining professional and organizational goals.

The third finding concerns the way in which decisions to co-operate across borders are part of broader organizational trade-offs between (often) competing values. As a result, cross-border co-operation depends not only on the perceived gains from that co-operation but also on the perceived effects on other valued organizational objectives and professional standards. This trade-off may work out differently in different regions. For instance, in the parts of the Dutch town of Winterswijk that are ‘assigned’ to German fire brigades, fire alarms are directly sent to the German emergency room. A different situation existed in the border region between the Dutch province of Drenthe and the German Landkreis Grafschaft Bentheim. In this region, Dutch fire brigades sometimes fight fires on the other side of the border, if they can reach them more quickly than their German counterparts. Yet, attempts to send those fire alarms from the German side of the border directly to a Dutch emergency room were consistently blocked by the responsible German emergency room in Nordhorn, which insisted that all German fire alarms should be relayed via them, even if that cost extra time. Here, the trade-off between the benefits of co-operation and the loss of control were clearly made differently by two different organizations.

The political context is an important facilitator and constrainer of cross-border collaboration in this regard. An example of the constraining effects occurred in 2010, when Dutch Safety Regions (a form of regional government tasked exclusively with crisis management, which were set up from the mid-2000s onwards) received the assignment from the national government to prioritize their internal crisis management organization. Because of this, the focus of Safety Regions at the Dutch–German borders shifted towards the internal level, and less money and fewer professionals were available for cross-border co-operation.

Negotiating cross-border differences: pragmatic professionalism

In the course of co-operation, professionals showed a remarkable ability to overcome practical, cultural, legal and other barriers if they thought cross-border co-operation was necessary. Cultural and linguistic differences in mutual communication were never seen as a serious impediment by our interviewees. Although initially these barriers were perceived and posed hurdles, this changed rather quickly as people became used to co-operating across borders. In that sense, they did not impose insuperable barriers to cross-border co-operation.

In addition to these differences in communication, two other types of cross-border differences required attention: differences in operational practices and differences in legal frameworks. These two categories partly overlap, as operational practices are embedded in and guided by legal frameworks. Nevertheless, they are not identical, since many operational practices are not specifically required by legal frameworks, and can therefore be adjusted without having to change any legal norm.

The typical way of dealing with these differences can be illustrated by looking at examples of each category. A good example of different operational practices concerned the approach to fighting fires in Germany and the Netherlands. Our interviewees indicated that in the case of a burning house, Dutch fire brigades tended to enter the house in order to fight the fire relatively more often than German fire brigades. The latter tended to opt for fighting the fire from the outside. Likewise, forest fires were approached in different ways, either by using mobile fire engines or by rolling fire hoses into the forest.

Although each of these approaches is legitimate, they cannot be combined in a single fire, since fire fighters from different brigades would hamper each other’s efforts. Since these approaches are deeply engrained in the professional way of working of fire fighters and have been inculcated in years of training and practice, they cannot be changed easily for a single occasion. The solution found consisted in splitting larger fires (which typically are the types of fires in which fire brigades from both sides of the border are involved) into smaller parts, with each fire brigade responsible for a specific part of the fire. This proved a practical solution to fighting the fire together without having to adjust practical routines.

In the case of legal barriers, two approaches could be identified. For instance, in the Meuse–Rhine region, police professionals were frustrated because of the opportunities for criminals to drive a stolen car across the border, while the police were not allowed to chase them any further than ten kilometres into the next country. In this case, the problem was ‘solved’ by informally allowing police officers to do this, long before the law allowed it. A similar approach was taken in the Enschede–Münster region to the prohibition under German law to transport certain medicines across the border, which effectively made it impossible for German ambulances to cross the border. Here, too, the practice that developed consisted of simply doing it, without adjustment of the formal legal framework.

This strategy may work for professionals in the sense that they can ‘get on with the job’, but it has obvious drawbacks. From a democratic and legal point of view, doing things that contravene established legal frameworks creates clear problems, since legal norms are also meant to install safeguards against abuse and protect citizens. Professionals working across borders were mostly aware of and sensitive to these concerns, but sometimes still chose to act differently if their professional judgement indicated this could be done safely.

In addition to these democratic and legal concerns, the lack of legal backing also creates problems for professionals and their organizations themselves. Legal frameworks are not just constraints but also offer protection, in the sense that if something goes wrong professionals and their organizations can justify their actions with reference to established legal norms and professional standards.

A second approach to legal barriers therefore consists of creating legal frameworks in order to fill gaps. To that end, local actors may actively lobby with higher governments for changes in legal frameworks or bilateral agreements between the countries. This is what happened with the chasing of criminals across borders in the Meuse–Rhine region. The police lobbied heavily with national civil servants for a treaty with Belgium and Germany that would allow the police not only to chase criminals (in emergency situations), but also to patrol across the border wearing their police uniforms and weapons in non-emergency situations, such as music festivals (such as Pinkpop in the Netherlands) or international car rallies (Francorchamps in Belgium). Likewise, the use of alarm lights and sirens by foreign emergency vehicles across borders was regulated by Dutch law in 2000.

What emerges from this analysis is a picture of cross-border professionals as highly pragmatic and active. They are pragmatic in the sense that they are looking for practical, on-the-ground solutions that allow them to achieve the results they (and their professional standards) deem important. They are active in the sense that they do not simply operate within a given legal framework, but actively try to mould and change that framework, by defining new practices under existing law, adding local agreements to higher-order law or lobbying for changes in that higher-order law. The key drivers of these attempts to overcome cross-border barriers and differences are the same as were identified for the establishment of cross-border co-operation: professionals and their organizations find ways to surmount problems if they see that it helps them to achieve their own goals.

Conclusions

Reflecting on our empirical findings, we can draw three conclusions. Firstly, our case studies show how organizations and professionals in government actively deal with, construct and mould cross-border co-operation. This has two important implications for the understanding of cross-border co-operation in the literature. To begin with, it shows the importance of a disaggregated perspective on ‘the state’ in cross-border co-operation. Whereas part of the literature on cross-border co-operation has juxtaposed the role of ‘the state’ with that of ‘citizens’ or ‘firms’, this overall label obscures important differences, conflicts and struggles within the institutions and officials of the state. Whereas some organizations and officials favour cross-border co-operation, others do not, and similar differences exist as to the form of cross-border co-operation. A more systematic analysis of these intra-governmental dynamics is crucial for understanding the existence, form and timing of cross-border co-operation.

In addition, extending the previous point, governmental attempts at building cross-border co-operation are often not planned and comprehensive but rather tentative, experimental and piecemeal. Within governments, certain individuals and organizations act as entrepreneurs, who try to create room for (specific types of) cross-border co-operation. Hence, the role and activities of ‘regionauts’, as they have been identified by O’Dell (2003) and Löfgren (2008), can also be, and in fact often are, played by governmental actors.

Secondly, all of our case studies of CBRs indicate that the motivation to co-operate, or the ‘sense of urgency’ among participants, is the most important factor driving co-operation efforts. If such motivation is present, professionals prove capable of coming up with practical solutions to a wide range of hurdles they encounter in setting up co-operation, whether these hurdles are legal, technological or organizational in nature. This is not to deny that differences across borders affect or complicate cross-border co-operation. Yet, in the end, for professionals motivated to co-operate, these differences do not present insurmountable barriers to co-operation and they can often be dealt with at the local level without higher-order legal harmonization.

At the same time, motivation and sense of urgency are far from given in cross-border co-operation. In many cases, cross-border co-operation may change in nature or intensity if it becomes subordinate to domestic or internal-organizational priorities. Moreover, cross-border co-operation often depends on the drive and efforts of a few highly motivated individuals and/or the occurrence of high-profile focusing events that highlight the benefits of cross-border co-operation. Once the individuals move to other positions or the memory of the focusing event abates, cross-border co-operation may easily come to a halt and revert to its prior state of low priority. This reflects Nelles and Durand’s observation that cross-border co-operation initiatives often are ‘instruments for coordinating cross-border policies in the interests of the represented partners’ rather than independent political actors that have both an institutional interest in sustaining co-operation and the independent resources to assure it. This leads to a cyclical pattern in which co-operation is re-established and reinvented as new sets of actors replace the initiators of earlier co-operation efforts.

For local government organizations involved in cross-border co-operation, this has two implications. To begin with, in setting up cross-border co-operation, they should focus first and foremost on building commitment and a sense of urgency among those that have to carry out the co-operation in practice. In this way professionals need to be facilitated to develop their ‘sense of urgency’ into concrete and workable cross-border co-operating practices. Solutions to practical problems need not be completely solved before co-operation starts but will most likely follow efforts at co-operation. Furthermore, when co-operation is up and running, it is important to broaden the basis under that co-operation within the organization. Because of the low degree of institutionalization of co-operation, it remains vulnerable to set-backs if it hinges on only a few motivated individuals.

A third conclusion is that professionals tend to prioritize their professional norms, which are focused on attaining goals central to their professional code, over organizational goals if these do not match, or if the organization hinders them with too many rules or too limited budgets. They grab opportunities that transnational networks provide to be able to attain these goals in a better way, in which ‘better’ is defined in terms of their professional standards. They also seem able to surmount legal, national, cultural and organizational barriers that may hamper them to get there as long as these goals are crucial to their professional identity.

As a final remark, our analysis is not meant to be unconditionally positive about the prospects for cross-border co-operation. One ‘lesson’ from our case studies is that local professionals and their organizations have a strong capacity to establish cross-border co-operation and develop workable solutions to the problems they encounter. Yet, another lesson is that in doing so their professional standards may occasionally clash with democratic and/or legal standards. The complex, multilevel and networked context of cross-border co-operation provides ample opportunities for skilful entrepreneurs to ‘get things done’. At the same time, it also provides ample opportunity to circumvent democratic and legal controls, since accountability arrangements are often not geared to cross-border practices.

This problem is not exclusive to cross-border co-operation but presents itself in a wide range of ‘networked’, ‘joined-up’ and ‘multilevel’ arrangements. For local governments, however, the cross-border element adds a new and largely unknown dimension, which requires concomitant forms of control and accountability. The challenge in devising these arrangements is to ensure an acceptable degree of oversight without stymieing the creativity and local knowledge of the street-level professionals involved in the co-operation. In addition to ensuring a degree of accountability, these structures may also facilitate the exchange of best practices, so that individual regionauts need not reinvent the wheel every time they engage in co-operation initiatives.

Likewise, issues arise in regard to individual citizens affected by cross-border co-operation. Cross-border co-operation, as well as the routines developed to make it work, are often the result of well-intentioned efforts to increase the effectiveness of local service delivery. As long as these routines work well, they can deliver these benefits in practice. Yet, citizens need to be able to appeal and have recourse to justice if, for instance, people are arrested or harassed by the police for the wrong reasons, if damage is caused to individual property as a result of fire fighting or a patient dies after intervention by medical professionals from across the border. Regimes of liability, compensation of damages and, in extreme cases, sanctioning of individual professionals, have been developed in domestic contexts and may not work well for cases in which professionals from one country are active in another country.

Two approaches to strengthening these regimes in a cross-border context can be imagined. To begin with, legal safeguards can be developed at the national or even EU level, which provide a formal framework for professionals and organizations involved in cross-border co-operation. In addition, since professionals and professional practices are at the heart of these forms of cross-border co-operation, cross-border practices could be made a more explicit part of professional standards and practices. For this purpose, classic ‘professional’ methods can be used, such as peer reviews and systematic feedback from stakeholders involved in or affected by cross-border co-operation activities. Although formal arrangements will always be necessary, these professional approaches form a valuable complement, as they tie in with the professional logic underlying much of cross-border co-operation.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conference ‘Towards a European Society? Transgressing Disciplinary Boundaries in European Studies Research’, University of Portsmouth, 28-30 June 2012, and an internal research seminar at Utrecht University’s School of Governance. The authors would like to thank Tanja Börzel, Mirko Noordegraaf and the other participants in these events for their valuable comments. In addition, the authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for EURS for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions.

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