“Enemy at the Gates”: An Analysis on India’s Experiences with the Taliban

Abstract

India’s long history of relations with Afghanistan dates back to the time of the Mauryans. It became even stronger after India’s independence in 1947. Since 1947, India has always maintained the policy to support whosoever comes to power in Kabul, but in 1996, there was a shift from that policy as the Taliban, a radical Islamist group, captured power. Pakistan has always been paranoid about India–Afghanistan relations as it never wanted hostile neighbours on both sides of its borders. Its urge for a friendly government in Kabul got satiated when the Taliban came to power, with its support. New Delhi did not recognize the Taliban government and, instead, shunned all diplomatic relations with Kabul. It was only after the Taliban regime was ousted through the US intervention that India rejuvenated its relations with Kabul. However, even after 19 years of intervention, the Taliban remained a potent force, and now as the USA plans to withdraw from Afghanistan, it is trying to negotiate a peace settlement with the Taliban. Currently, India too is trying to engage in dialogues with the Taliban, which again marks a shift from its earlier strategy. This study analyzes India’s experiences with the Taliban and shift in its policy from the pre-9/11 period (1996–2001) to the post-9/11 period (2001–early 2019).

Keywords

Taliban pre-9/11 period post-9/11 period continuity shifts and experiences

India has a long history of relations with Afghanistan, which dates back to the time of the Mauryans, and it became stronger after India’s independence in 1947. India’s engagement with Afghanistan has been based on three fundamental propositions: first, to counteract and pressurize Pakistan; second, to maintain strong economic relations with Afghanistan as it has huge mineral reserves, and third, to use Afghanistan, following the emergence of the Central Asian states out of the erstwhile Soviet Union, as a springboard for gaining a foothold in the energy-rich Central Asian region. Afghanistan, on the other hand, had looked upon India as a potential counterweight in its relationship with Pakistan (Bajoria 2009). There are other minor factors like ideology (non-alignment), culture, history, and religion that had helped in bringing the two countries together. Jawaharlal Nehru’s profound understanding of the Afghan society and his cordial personal relations with many Afghan leaders, including Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, helped him in strengthening the relationship with Afghanistan, and it was under his tutelage that India and Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Friendship in 1950, which agreed to recognize and respect the independence and rights of each other (Treaty of Friendship 1950). It was followed by a few other treaties, including the Treaty of Trade and Commerce (1950), which was to strengthen the economic cooperation between the two states (Lok Sabha Debates 1955). Nehru was aware of the strategic importance of Afghanistan, and these two treaties were in coordination with the first two fundamental postulates of India’s Afghanistan policy. When Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister, she continued to follow the footsteps of her father and maintained cordial ties with the Kabul government. Though New Delhi’s approach had been more focused on keeping Pakistan at bay, it continued unhindered amidst the Cold War politics, and even after the political upheaval of the Saur Revolution of 1978. The Saur Revolution changed the dynamics of Afghan politics and established a pro-Soviet communist regime, compromising the ideals of non-alignment. But the political ruckus that continued after the Saur, eventually led to Soviet intervention in 1979. The Charan Singh government of India unhesitatingly condemned the intervention (Dixit 2000: 21), but when Mrs. Gandhi came back to power in 1980, she made it a point not to criticize the Soviets publicly as it would antagonize them and even retracted India’s previous statement criticizing the Soviet Union at the United Nations (Horn 1983: 246). This is considered as a shift in India’s Afghanistan policy, as it compromised India’s commitment to the policy of non-alignment. But this stance was short lived, and it moved back to the previous position of condemnation due to immense domestic pressure (Gujral 2011: 171). In the 1980s, Mrs. Gandhi even visited both the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to facilitate a dialogue between the two, to seek a moderate political dispensation in Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal (Schmemann 1982), but before any further development could take place, she lost her life. Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother, wanted to play a role of a negotiator between the USA and the Soviet government and continued to maintain cordial relations with the Kabul government, but this diplomacy did not yield any result (Cherniav 2000: 77). Gandhi even tried to have a tryst with President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan and reach out to the Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah at the same time to ensure peace and stability in the region. Though these endeavors brought India to the center stage of negotiation, it was short lived due to four main reasons—first, the USA was not ready to accept a non-aligned government in Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal; second, the Soviets thought that Gandhi’s progress in offering them an acceptable withdrawal policy was too tardy (as they were banking on Gandhi to negotiate the withdrawal issue; third, Zia was in no mood to negotiate on Pakistan’s proxy wars in Afghanistan as he could sense victory; and, fourth, Najib was completely isolated from the Afghan masses, while policy paralysis on New Delhi’s part came in the way of Gandhi’s continued support for him. The assassination of Mrs. Gandhi brought Narasimha Rao to the helm of the affairs in New Delhi who championed the pragmatic policy of conciliation with Afghanistan. Although Rao continued to negotiate on Najib’s freedom (who was vulnerable and stranded in the UN compound in Afghanistan), he also struck the chord of conciliating with the Afghan Mujahideen leadership. Though there were tensions between India and Pakistan due to skirmishes in Kashmir, Rao supported the Peshawar Accord brokered by Pakistan to accommodate the Mujahideen leadership in Kabul (Bhadrakumar 2016). But the government of Kabul under the Mujahideen was short lived as fighting broke out within the various groups of the Mujahideen, which eventually helped the Taliban to capture power in Kabul. Though there were more shifts than continuity in India’s policy toward Afghanistan due to external and internal factors, the relations between New Delhi and Kabul continued unhindered till the Taliban established its rule in Kabul in 1996.

The Rise of the Taliban and Pakistan’s Inimical Role

On September 25, 1996, the Taliban stormed Kabul, and on that night, they castrated and killed Najibullah and his brother who were stranded in the UN office compound (BBC News 2001). The horrific killings came as a shock to the world, and it marked the arrival of the Taliban as a formidable force on the world scene. The quintessential question that “who are the Taliban” started reverberating in all the power corridors of the world. The infighting among the Mujahideen leaders disillusioned both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia though they had funded them during the Soviet intervention. Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was then serving as President, was not toeing the line of Islamabad, and the Pakistani military and Inter-Service Intelligence—ISI (Pakistani intelligence agency) were also becoming wary of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Mujahideen leader who had the full support of Pakistan, but clearly failed to capture Kabul and was losing ground militarily (Rashid 2001). The Afghan masses were getting wary of the endless fighting between the Mujahideen, and the situation was fast deteriorating. As Mullah Mohammad Ghaus, a Mujahideen who later became the Foreign Minister during the Taliban regime, had told in an interview, ‘We would sit for long time to discuss how to change the terrible situation. Before we started we had only vague idea what to do and we thought we would fail, but we believed we were working with Allah as his pupils.’ (Ibid.: 22) There were other Mujahideen leaders who were also searching for a long-term solution to the problem. As Mullah Mohammad Abbas, a warlord who later became the Minister of Public Health in Kabul, had mentioned in an interview:

The old Mujahideen leadership had utterly failed to bring peace. So I went with a group of friends to Herat to attend the Shura [council] called by Ismail Khan [powerful warlord and former Governor of Herat province], but it failed to come up with a solution and things were getting worse. So we came to Kandahar to talk with Mullah Omar [a military commander who was famous for his fighting with the Soviets and later he became the founder member of the Taliban] and joined him. (Ibid.)

Many such leaders joined Mullah Omar, and they chalked out an agenda and declared him to be the supreme commander of their forces. They announced their aim to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Shariah law, and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan, and these issues continued to be integral for the organization even after they captured Kabul. As majority of the cadres were students at madrassas, the name they chose for themselves was ‘Taliban’. A “talib” in Arabic is an Islamic student, one who seeks knowledge compared to the mullah who gives knowledge. The name Taliban (plural of talib) was also strategically used to sideline the Mujahideen because it was a signal to the common Afghans that they would remain dissociated from party politics and only concentrate on cleansing the Afghan society from warmongers (the Mujahideen). This boosted the image of the Taliban as the war-wary Afghan people believed that they could purify the social system, which had gone wrong and usher in an Islamic way of life that had been compromised by corruption and excesses. Many of the Taliban foot soldiers were born in Pakistani refugee camps and were educated in Pakistani madrassas and had learned the fighting skills from the Mujahideen leaders who were based in Pakistan (Ibid.: 23). They were unaware of the history of Afghanistan and only had an inclination toward an ideal Islamic society and toward Pakistan. Mullah Omar himself in an interview to a journalist Rahimullah Yousufzai had said, “We took up arms to achieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffering at the hands of the so-called Mujahideen” (Yousufzai 1995: 8).

The intrinsic link between the Taliban and Pakistan was from the madrassas, especially those run by Maulana Fazlur Rehman (who later became the Chief Minister of North West Frontier Province—NWEP) and his Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) party, which had its roots in Baluchistan and NWFP. It was not unknown that Rehman shared deep relations with the Taliban leadership and was often termed as the godfather of Mullah Omar (Schmidle 2007). Pakistan always wanted a friendly government (anti-India) in Kabul because they have the paranoia of having two hostile neighbours on different sides of the borders. Islamabad had a ray of hope that the Mujahideen would act according to its terms, but when the Mujahideen leadership started hobnobbing with New Delhi and Narasimha Rao hosted Rabbani and other “Wahhabis” in New Delhi on their route to Jakarta to attend the Non-aligned movement summit (Bhadrakumar 2016), Pakistan became skeptical of them. Islamabad was already searching for an alternative and when Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister, Fazlur Rehman became her political ally. Rehman got the access to the interiors of the Pakistani government, army, and the ISI to whom he had mentioned about the newly emerging force—the Taliban (Rashid 2001: 26). Reportedly, in the beginning, the ISI was not convinced about the prospects of the Taliban and continued its support for the Hekmatyar faction, but, once it became evident (by 1994) that Hekmatyar would not be able to overpower the Rabbani government’s control of Kabul, the search for alternative Pashtun proxies began (Ibid.).

Prime Minister Bhutto wanted to open a route to Central Asia, but the shortest route which was through Mazār-i-Sharīf was blocked due to infighting among the Mujahideen, and so a new route was suggested by Rehman, backed by the Pakistani transport and smuggling mafia. It was known as a northern route passing from Quetta to Kandahar, Herat, and onto Ashkhabad in Turkmenistan (Ibid.). Pakistani Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar and the ISI officials began negotiating with the warlords of that region, but it did not succeed due to the attack on the small Afghan border post of Spin Boldak by the Taliban. Spin Boldak was a crucial point for the Pakistani transport mafias as it was through that area the smuggled fuel and other commodities enter Afghanistan (Aikins 2009: 5–10), but it was under control of Hekmatyar and his men who were disrupting its business. The transport mafia paid several hundred thousand Pakistani rupees to Mullah Omar and even promised a monthly stipend to the Taliban if they could clear the road and ensure the safety of the trucks (Hussain 2014). After the Taliban attack, the Mujahideen leaders accused Pakistan of funding the Taliban, and the negotiation got disrupted. In the meantime, Babar wanted to take advantage of the turmoil and ordered 30 trucks test convoy to travel to Ashkhabad with loads of medicines, but the trucks were hijacked by the Mujahideen at Takht-e-Pul near Kandahar. To free the trucks, Pakistan hired the services of the Taliban and on November 3, 1994, the Taliban attacked the hijackers and freed the trucks, and on the same day, they moved to Kandahar and after 2 days of intermittent fighting captured Kandahar from Mullah Naquib, the prominent Mujahideen commander inside the city who surrendered and retreated. However, there was speculation that the ISI had bribed Naquib to surrender with the promise that he would retain his command (Rashid 2001: 28–29). This event led to the beginning of Pakistan’s association with the Taliban, and the fall of Kandahar was celebrated by JUI, and Babar took credit for the Taliban’s success by privately telling the journalists that the Taliban were ‘our boys’ (Takkar 2016). After this incident, support from the Pakistani government increased multifold, and even Pakistani journalists were asked not to write anything detrimental to the Taliban. Pakistan not only started providing money, but the Pakistani military allowed the Taliban to capture the arms dump of Hekmatyar which was outside Kandahar, leading to the seizure of around 18,000 Kalashnikovs, dozens of artillery pieces, large quantities of ammunition, and vehicles (Ibid.). A Pakistani military attaché in an interview had accepted that “Rehman acted as a bridge between the Taliban and the Pakistani government.”¹

Interview with ‘A’, Pakistani Military Attaché, Details withheld on interviewees request.

However, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf denied the Bhutto government’s role in helping the Taliban, as he said ‘the Taliban did not ask for or receive any help from Pakistan in their earliest stages’ though ‘Bhutto tried to take credit for having created, raised and launched it, in the hope that the Taliban’s rapid success would be to Pakistan’s political advantage.’ (Musharraf 2006: 211)

Nevertheless, the Taliban’s success was swift, and they were able to capture important towns from the different warlords by either defeating them or bribing them. By December 1994, some 12,000 Afghan and Pakistani students had joined the Taliban in Kandahar (Rashid 2001: 29), which unofficially became the Taliban headquarters. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) started discreetly funding the Taliban and even the USA welcomed the emergence of the “third force” probably in the hope of witnessing some stability in Afghanistan (Musharraf 2006: 211). As the Taliban marched toward Kabul, local warlords either fled or surrendered to them. But the Taliban faced severe resistance in Kabul from Rabbani’s forces led by his skillful commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. Pakistan was worried by Rabbani’s success, and so it attempted to woo Hekmatyar, Dostum (Uzbek Warlord), and Hazara chiefs to persuade them to join the Taliban. However, this initiative failed as the Taliban refused to join hands with the warlords whom they condemned as “communist infidels” (Rashid 2001: 44). Pakistan then convinced Saudi Arabia to back another major bid to capture Kabul in 1996, and the chief of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki-al-Faisal visited Islamabad to facilitate the move. Within 2 months after Prince Turki’s visit, the Taliban attacked Jalalabad; Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped in the surrender and flight of the head of the Jalalabad Shura Haji Abdul Qadeer. Allegedly, Qadeer received a bribe of around USD 10 million in cash as well as a guarantee that all his assets and bank accounts in Pakistan would not be frozen (Ibid.: 48). Once the Taliban captured Jalalabad, Massoud retreated from Kabul and evacuated the city as he knew that it could not be defended from the attacks coming from all four sides. Though in 1994, Massoud had refused to provide Najib a safe exit from Kabul (Bhadrakumar 2016) when India had negotiated for it, in 1996, when he was withdrawing, he had offered Najib a safe exit from the city. It is believed that on September 26, 1996, Massoud had sent one of his senior generals to Najib, asking him to leave with the retreating government troops and promising him a safe passage to the north of Afghanistan, but Najib had refused the offer (Rashid 2001: 49). The same evening, the Taliban reached Kabul, and then Najib was killed. The Taliban victory was complete, which signaled further disaster for the Afghan people and Afghanistan, while Pakistan achieved its goal of having secured a friendly government at Kabul.

India’s Dealing with the Taliban in the Pre-9/11 Period

The rapid success of the Taliban took New Delhi by surprise as both Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) had initially ignored the Taliban as another Pakistan-supported fringe militia. In fact, whatever intelligence India received about the Taliban in 1994–95 was from Massoud, who had allegedly opened a channel of communication with them to defeat Hekmatyar (Bhadrakumar 2016). The brutal killing of Najib and his brother came as a shock for New Delhi, which it had not anticipated (The New York Times 1996). It took no time in condemning the ghastly murders and made it clear that it would unambiguously oppose the Taliban regime. New Delhi closed down its embassy in Kabul and evacuated its personnel like most other countries, and thus India discontinued its diplomatic presence in Kabul throughout the period of the Taliban regime from 1996–2001. India also endorsed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1076, which criticized the Taliban for violating human and women’s rights and decided not to recognize the regime as Afghanistan’s legitimate government as per the UNSC Resolution. Though India abandoned its ties with Kabul, it continued its tryst with the Rabbani government and hosted Masood Khalili, Rabbani’s political aide in New Delhi, which clearly revealed its stand (Paliwal 2017: 98). In March 1996, the Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov visited New Delhi and held talks with the Indian leaders on the political developments in the region. Both these states expressed concern about the growing power of the Taliban and agreed to cooperate together to check the Taliban influence (Pact with Russia on Afghanistan 1996). Then, India in association with Russia, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics (CAR) decided to provide covert military, financial, and medical support to the anti-Taliban United Front, which came to be known as the Northern Alliance.

India firmly believed that the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would be problematic for its national security and could also be an obstruction to its relations with the CARs. Hence, it decided to provide materials to the Northern Alliance to deal with the Taliban. The airfields in and around Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, were made operational in order to ferry equipment to the Northern Alliance as it was closer to Massoud’s stronghold in the Panjshir Valley (Sreedhar 2003).

India has always been averse to the Taliban as it considered them to be the proxy of Pakistan. The paranoia that the Taliban would support the Kashmiri separatist movement and would further damage the situation had gripped New Delhi. However, these arguments were not credible enough for India to not even try to engage with the Taliban. Many in Indian political circles believed that India could never engage with the misogynistic Islamists with a highly questionable approach to human rights like the Taliban, but it could also be argued that the Mujahideen were often no better than the Taliban in respect of human and women’s rights and their understanding of Islam (Ghosh 2006: 115). Even if the anti-Pakistan “proxy-thesis” framed by the idea of realpolitik were true, then engaging with the Taliban would have been within reason. Initially, the Mujahideen also had the support of Pakistan and still India successfully engaged with them, and the Taliban leadership also had some spikes with Islamabad, which did not allow them to officially recognize the Durand Line (Eric Walberg [Journalist and Former UN Advisor], personal communication [Skype call], February 17, 2019). Above all, the Taliban was controlling the major part of the Afghan territory by 1997 and emerged as the coherent military force dominated by ethnic Pashtuns with whom India shares a long history. Moreover, keen on international recognition, the Taliban was cautious before taking an openly anti-India stance. In October 1996, Mullah Muttawakil, an important member of the ruling central Shura of the Taliban, in an interview to journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai said that “We [Taliban] certainly can have better ties with New Delhi if India stops interfering in Afghanistan and assures us that Afghanistan’s embassy in New Delhi will not be allowed to be used against the Taliban by Rabbani’s appointees there” (Yusufzai 1997). Muttawakil had wondered “what has the Taliban done to attract Indian ire?” He was frustrated with India’s approach toward them and argued that New Delhi must be required to know “a lot more about Afghanistan” so as to formulate a successful policy. Nevertheless, the Taliban’s proposal for friendly ties came with a string attached. It wanted New Delhi to dissociate all links with Rabbani and throw its weight behind the Taliban. John Cherian had agreed that “once [1996] Gujral [then External Affairs Minister] had told me [him] that the Taliban wanted to maintain diplomatic relations with New Delhi,” but India did not reciprocate (Frontline 2014).

The US intelligence report of 1996 suggested that Harkat-ul-Ansar, a Pakistan-based militant outfit, had been training jihadis in Paktia and Khost since the mid-1990s (National Archives 1996). J.N. Dixit, former Indian Foreign Secretary, had also agreed that Pashtun mercenaries had been operating in Kashmir even in 1993–1994 when the Taliban was in its nascent stage (Dixit 1995: 503). So, the rise of the Taliban should not have added much further impetus to the Kashmir problem. It was true that the Taliban had allowed the training camps of Al-Qaeda and other militant organizations to sustain on the Afghan soil. But that was more so because it received support from Pakistan (Musharraf 2006: 211). Even the Taliban had always denied their active presence in Kashmir, though they had compassion for Kashmiri separatists (National Security Archives 1997). So, there was always a possibility that if India had provided some feelers to them, the scenario may have been different. The conciliators within the power corridors of New Delhi wanted to engage with the Taliban even if diplomatic recognition was out of question (Prakash 1997: 8). The objective of such engagement was to understand the internal dynamics of the regime better and assess if a covert workable relationship could be established. However, to make the process of conciliation effective, it was imperative for India to maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul, but the closing down of the embassy at the end of 1996 diminished India’s scope to explore and understand the Taliban movement. Although India was the last country to leave Kabul, this move completely shut down New Delhi’s options to negotiate with the Taliban.

The conciliators had urged New Delhi to maintain contacts with all groups in Afghanistan and join hands with other neighboring countries in pacifying and normalizing the situation (Dixit 1996: 113). However, New Delhi, which was going through domestic political upheavals due to government instability, could not maintain contact with all Afghan factions and, instead, demonized the Taliban. Unfortunately, the assessment of the conciliators proved accurate when India’s policy to support the Northern Alliance suffered a jolt as the Mujahideen leaders fell one after the other like a pack of cards before the Taliban onslaught, and Kabul was captured. India’s quandary with the Taliban reached its height when the USA received the Taliban delegation in Washington in 1997 (BBC News 1997), while Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE recognized it as Afghanistan’s legitimate government.

Even though there was no reciprocation from India, the Taliban continued to send feelers to New Delhi. On June 1997, Mullah Abdul Jalil, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Taliban, wanted India to stop treating the Taliban as its enemy. Jalil said:

We can consider forging mutual beneficial ties with India if it brings positive changes in its Afghanistan policy...The Taliban wants friendly ties with all countries, both Islamic and non-Islamic. With our neighbours, including India, we would like to have normal relations based on policy of non-interference. Until now, India has been interfering in Afghanistan affairs. We want this interference to end. In fact, we will be waiting for signs that indicate a change of heart in New Delhi. (Yusufzai 1997)

New Delhi was constantly driven by the detractors who discouraged any engagement with the Taliban. There were popular beliefs that the Taliban would have treated India’s recognition as a certificate for their jihadi ideology, which was antagonistic to India’s secular understanding. Salman Haider had supported the view and said:

For us to be associated with the Taliban which was directed against us was obviously not the wise thing...the Taliban [had] their links with Pakistan which was not just ideological links but they had active support on the battlefields in trying to make them a dominant force in Afghanistan. (Salman Haider [Former Foreign Secretary, New Delhi], personal communication, June 1, 2015)

On being questioned about India’s decision to not reciprocate to the feelers from the Taliban, Rana Banerji reiterated the dominant view and said ‘There was no possibility, given their ideology, statements and actions; there was no scope to respond in a positive way’ (Rana Banerji [Former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi], personal communication, October 13, 2014). The majority of the policymakers were against India’s engagement with the Taliban and so the conciliators failed to make any changes in India’s policy toward the Taliban, and their role got extinguished in the power corridors of New Delhi. India gradually lost all contacts with Kabul and sacrificed the powerful Kabuliwalla connection with the Pashtuns for the next 6 years of the Taliban regime.

However, New Delhi’s dissociation from the Taliban and its association with the Northern Alliance did not yield dividends for them. In fact, when the Indian Airlines flight IC-814 was hijacked by Pakistani-based militant organization, Harkat-ul-Ansar (later named Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) and taken to Kandahar, India’s options for hard bargain narrowed. India’s lack of diplomatic ties with the Taliban left little scope for India to maneuver the situation and to effectively engage with the Taliban leadership. In fact, no Indian official was immediately available who had some contacts to engage with the Taliban, in order to negotiate with the hijackers. Yet, the circumstances finally forced the Indian delegation to connect with the Taliban to negotiate the release of those passengers. Although the Taliban played both the jury and judge balancing both India and Pakistan, its efforts in handling the situation was lauded even by Jaswant Singh, then the Foreign Minister (Cherian 2000). It was evident from the efforts of the Taliban that it wanted to forge a relationship with India, and a senior Taliban leader interviewed by Rudra Chaudhuri had said that it was for the first time the Taliban thought carefully about diplomacy and “started thinking about India beyond Pakistan.” (Chaudhuri 2014) This is probably the last feeler from the Taliban to New Delhi before its regime was dismantled by the US intervention after the 9/11 incident. However, direct rapprochement between New Delhi and the Taliban did not materialize as Jaswant Singh had pointed out to the media that “fundamentals of our Afghan policy remained unchanged.”(Cherian 2000) The hijacking saga made it evident that India’s policy of isolating the Taliban was a myopic vision (as it proved to be an embarrassment) and corroborated the arguments of the conciliators.

India and the Taliban in the Post-9/11 Period

The US intervention after the 9/11 ousted the Taliban regime from Kabul and inserted a pro-West weak democratic regime under Hamid Karzai after the Bonn Agreement in 2001. India which had diplomatically alienated itself from Kabul went back and began to consolidate its influence in Afghanistan. New Delhi was the first country to reopen its embassy in Kabul, followed by the opening of other consulates in Jalalabad, Herat, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif. After the Bonn Conference, New Delhi immediately announced USD 100 million as aid to reconstruct the war-ravaged Afghanistan (D’souza 2007: 834). Since then, India has followed a policy of high-level engagement with Afghanistan marked by political, humanitarian, capacity-building, economic rebuilding, and infrastructure development projects. The number of high-level visits, which followed between the two countries, was an indicator of the bonhomie that was gaining momentum. This made Pakistan wary of its future in Afghanistan, and it began escorting the Taliban fighters who were on the run to a safe haven so that they can regroup and continue the insurgency.

Pakistan also had reservations based on assumptions that the USA would dump them once its objective gets fulfilled in Afghanistan as it had after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. So, President Pervez Musharraf wanted to ensure that Afghan Taliban remained a proxy force for Pakistan and began to convince them to unite and relaunch its attacks against the foreign forces in Afghanistan. Though many Taliban leaders preferred making peace with Karzai, the ISI persuaded them not to do so (Rashid 2012: 50). Apart from providing the Taliban with guns and ammunitions, the ISI helped them to set up training camps manned by its own officers in Baluchistan province. The ISI even built a secret organization to run the Taliban and engaged many retired army and ISI officers who were operating outside traditional military structures to control the organization (Ibid.: 51). In 2003, Mullah Omar was allowed to set up a Leadership Council (Rahbari Shura) in the Pakistani city of Quetta, initially composed of 10 people, which later got multiplied into 33 members (Bird and Marshall 2012: 142). There were four shuras functioning under the Leadership Council, namely the Quetta Shura, which took responsibility for “Greater Kandahar” and areas further west up to Herat; the Peshawar Shura took responsibility for eastern Afghanistan; the Miramshah Shura got the responsibility of Loya Paktia and provinces north toward Kabul; and Gergi Jangal Shura was entrusted the responsibility of Helmand province (Roggio 2010). Apart from this organizational structure, Hekmatyar and his Hezb-i-Islami party operated in tandem with the Taliban from northern Pakistan (Rashid 2012: 51). Taliban also started recruiting Pakistani Pashtuns to provide them with base security and additional manpower and radicalized them for its cause. This move boomeranged and led to the birth of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which, over the years, had engineered several terror attacks against the Pakistani military. Over the years, Pakistan has accused India of funding the TTP, but no concrete evidence has been provided. However, the Indian analyst, Bharat Karnad had acknowledged this claim that R&AW has ties with the TTP. He said, “Severing relations with TTP will mean India surrendering an active card in Pakistan and a role in Afghanistan as TTP additionally provides access to certain Afghan Taliban factions.” (The Express Tribune 2017) Though New Delhi’s stand of “no good Taliban” contradicts its proximity with the TTP, it probably wanted to use it as a counterbalance against Pakistan, which has deep links with the Afghan Taliban.

India’s understanding toward the Afghan Taliban evolved considerably after the intervention in 2002. Though it remained wary of legitimizing the Afghan Taliban, it became conscious of the perils of viewing it as a monolithic entity completely subservient to Pakistan’s interests and political directions. Unlike the 1990s when New Delhi was blindly opposing the Taliban, it understood the problem of doing that and began viewing those political outfits and figures that were dependent on Pakistan for political and financial sustenance as the problem entities. However, this learning curve was not an easy one because New Delhi was derisive of the Western categorization of “good” and “bad” Taliban as they argued that all Taliban were unsavory. Taliban, on the other hand, attacked Indian installations and killed Indian workers and nationals, especially during the construction of the Zaranj-Delaram Highway. The Taliban had also demanded the withdrawal of all Indian personnel working on various projects with the Afghan people and government for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country (Lakshman 2008). The warning note in crisp English “this is not India or America. Indians should go out [of Afghanistan]” (Sharma 2005: 10) was found beside the body of an Indian worker Maniappan Raman Kutty who was kidnapped and killed by the Taliban, bears the testimony of the bloody road which New Delhi had to travel (Sreenivasan and Shukla 2005). The Indian embassy and consulate was attacked, leading to loss of lives. According to the intelligence reports, it was the ISI-backed Haqqani network, which had engineered the attacks (Indiatimes 2018).

In the London Conference in 2010, India was sidelined by the international community, especially the USA that wanted to start negotiations with the “good” Taliban. Though India had always denounced the rhetoric of “good” Taliban, there was little India could do about this, given the US’ urge to withdraw from Afghanistan and Karzai’s own penchant for engaging to the Taliban (Rediff News 2010). S.M. Krishna, then India’s Foreign Minister, indicated that though India was toeing the line, it had set three conditions for the Taliban to comply with. He said, “If the Taliban accepts the Afghan constitution, sever ties with the Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and renounce violence and are accepted in the mainstream of Afghan politics and society, we could do business” (Gul 2010). Shashi Tharoor, former Minister of State, External Affairs, had said:

New Delhi has come around to accepting dialogue with those Taliban elements who are prepared to renounce violence...But New Delhi is wary of those who, under Pakistani tutelage, might pretend to be reborn constitutionalists, but seize the first opportunity after the American withdrawal to devour the regime that compromises with them. (Tharoor 2012)

So, after years of apathy, ignorance, and policy learning, India officially accepted an Afghan-led conciliation with the Taliban in 2011.

India began to make forays within the Taliban organization through Mullah Abdal Salam Rocketi, a senior Taliban commander, who began to participate in Afghan electoral politics after the Taliban rout. He was employed by R&AW to provide real-time intelligence about the Taliban (Paliwal 2017: 219). However, engaging with those Taliban leaders who were closer to the ISI was proving to be difficult for New Delhi. Ambassador Manpreet Vohra reiterated the frustration as he said:

...so I mean how do you do this anyway, engagement. Having one meeting or something once in a while, is that going to lead to anything, particularly when the strings of the movement are controlled by Pakistan and the Pakistani army. What is it that we can do? (Manpreet Vohra [Former Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, New Delhi], personal communication, August 21, 2018)

Despite this, the conciliators present in the Manmohan Singh administration pushed for dealing with the Afghan Taliban only leaving aside the Haqqani network, which was completely under the aegis of the ISI (Paliwal 2017: 230). As Pramit Pal Chaudhuri put it “How can we deal with the Haqqanis, they are mercenaries under the control of the ISI” (Hindustan Times 2018). So, the conciliators, resonating Prime Minister Singh’s regional strategy, began engaging with the Taliban, and R&AW officers started providing inputs on the hierarchy of the Afghan Taliban (Paliwal 2017: 231). With the appointment of Shiv Shankar Menon as the National Security Adviser (a notable conciliator) in March 2010, engaging with the Afghan Taliban found new momentum and Indian Express reported about India having opened channels with Hekmatyar to initiate its dealings (Gupta 2010: 9). The endeavor brought results as in 2010, Zabiullah Mujahid, then spokesperson of the Taliban, mentioned in an interview:

We favour neither India nor Pakistan. We cannot ignore Pakistan as it is a neighboring Islamic country and gave refuge to hundreds of thousands of displaced Afghans...We are not saying that India should get out of Afghanistan. Nor can India be completely expelled from Afghanistan. The Taliban are not in any direct conflict with India. Indian troops are not part of NATO forces, they have not occupied Afghanistan...It is possible for the Taliban and India to reconcile with each other. Our complaint is that India backed the NA [Northern Alliance] and is now supporting the Karzai government. (Yusufzai 2010)

Though no immediate rapprochement happened, the nuanced approach to negotiations with the hope of influencing the Taliban began. The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership (2011) and subsequent interaction between Kabul and New Delhi were further steps toward the reconciliation with the Taliban.

The rise of the conciliators within Singh’s administration blended coercion with negotiation in their dealings with the Afghan Taliban. Though Singh has often been criticized as being soft toward Pakistan and Afghanistan, the value of coercion can only be realized if it is coupled with negotiation. The negotiation with the Taliban did not mean non-coercion against those who were spoilsports like the Haqqanis. India silently but surely managed to achieve three things: first, to ensure that influence of Pakistan gets marginalized through the negotiations with the Taliban and covert operations from R&AW; second, to continue the negotiations with Pakistan to maintain a formidable diplomatic pressure; and, lastly, to rework India’s image to maintain an image as an obstructionist regional power (Paliwal 2017: 247). Though the detractors gained significant ground when Modi came to power, the negotiations continued in a low-key manner. The hard-line tactics with Pakistan and delivering lethal weapons to the Afghan National Force had acted as deterrence for some time,²

Interview with ‘B’, Former R&AW Officer, Details held on interviewees request.

but dialogues with the Afghan Taliban have resumed, with India sending two seasoned diplomats (TCA Raghavan and Amar Sinha) to Moscow to meet the Taliban leaders (Chaudhury 2018). As the USA has started vociferously engaging with the Taliban so that they can leave respectfully from Afghanistan, it is pertinent for India to understand the dotted lines and bank on realpolitik to negotiate with the Taliban and not fall back to the headstrong rhetoric of the detractors. The Taliban is an integral part of the Afghan political framework and controls significant territory even after decades of international intervention. The violence that the US forces have unleashed on the common Afghans had turned the tides toward the Taliban (Herold 2004: 316). The Taliban has always been perceived by majority of Pashtuns as an indigenous force capable of removing foreign domination and maintaining law and order. As the outcome of both the US peace dialogues and the current Afghan elections are in doldrums, there are chances that it can provide impetus to the Taliban. If India wants to continue its engagement in Afghanistan, it is imperative to maintain a sustained dialogue with the Taliban. Simultaneously, a dialogue with Pakistan must also be initiated to maintain an all-round approach because as Alexis de Tocqueville had observed, “When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness” (Tocqueville 2010). Thus, if India fails to learn from the past and shows incompetency in dealing with the Taliban, its future in Afghanistan will certainly be shrouded in darkness.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

References

Aikins

Matthieu

. 2009. “The Master of Spin Boldak,” Harpers Magazine , December, pp. 5–10.

Bajoria

Jayshree

. 2009. “Indo-Afghanistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Policy Relations , July 22. Available at http://www.cfr.org/Publication/17474/Indiaafghanistan_Relations.html (accessed January 2, 2019).

BBC News . 1997. “Taleban in Texas for Talks on Gas Pipeline,” 4 December. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/west_asia/37021.stm (accessed February 2, 2019).

BBC News . 2001. “When the Taliban Took Kabul,” October 15. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1600136.stm, accessed January 2, 2019.

Bhadrakumar

M. K.

2016. “How India Reached Out to the Afghan Mujahideen,” Rediff.com , September 14. Available at https://inwww.rediff.com/news/special/exclusive-how-india-reached-out-to-the-exclusive-how-india-reached-out-to-the-afghan-mujahideen/20160914.htm, accessed January 2, 2019.

Bird

Tim

Marshall

Alex

. 2012. Afghanistan: How West Lost Its Way , 142. New Delhi: Orient Black Swan.

Chaudhuri

Rudra

. 2014. “A Taliban Message to India,” The Sunday Guardian . Available at http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/a-taliban-message-to-india, accessed February 12, 2019.

Chaudhury

Roy

. 2018. “Seasoned Diplomats Raghavan and Sinha Represent India at Moscow Format on Afghanistan,” The Economic Times , November 9, Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/seasoned-diplomats-raghavan-sinha-represent-india-at-moscow-format-on-afghanistan/articleshow/66551801.cms, accessed February 21, 2019.

Cherian

John

. 2000. “Failure of Diplomacy,” Frontline , vol. 17, no. 1, January 8–21. Available at https://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1701/17010200.htm, accessed February 12, 2019.

10.

Cherniav

S. Anatoly

. 2000. My Six Years with Gorbachev , 77. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.

11.

D’souza

M. Shanthie

. 2007, September. “India’s Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects,” Strategic Analysis , vol. 31, no. 5, p. 834.

12.

Dixit

J. N.

1995. Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance , 503. New Delhi: Konark Publishers

13.

Dixit

J. N.

1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary , 113. New Delhi: UBS Publishers.

14.

Dixit

J. N.

2000. An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah to Taliban , 21. New Delhi: Konark Publishers.

15.

Frontline. 2014. Interview with John Cherian, Bureau Chief, Frontline , New Delhi, 10 October.

16.

Ghosh

Ahmed Huma

. 2006, March. “Voices of Afghan Women,” International Feminist Journal of Politics , vol. 8, no. 1, p. 115.

17.

Gujral

I. K.

2011. Matters of Discretion: An Autobiography , 171. New Delhi: Hay House Publishers.

18.

Gul

Imtiaz

. 2010. “London Conference and Pakistan,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung India , March 3. Available at https://in.boell.org/2010/03/03/london-conference-and-pakistan, accessed February 21, 2019.

19.

Gupta

Shisir

. 2010. “India Shifts Afghan Policy, Ready to Talk to Taliban,” Indian Express , New Delhi, 29 March, p. 9.

20.

Herold

Marc W.

2004. “Urban Dimensions of the Punishment of Afghanistan by US Bombs,” in Graham

Marvin

, eds, Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics , 316. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

21.

Hindustan Times. 2018. Interview with Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times , New Delhi, 21 August.

22.

Horn

Robert C.

1983, March. “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship,” Asian Survey , vol. 23, no. 3, p. 246.

23.

Hussain

W. Sayed

Ullah

Asmat

Bashir

Khilji A.

. 2014. “The Causes of Transit Related Pak-Afghan Cross Border Smuggling,” Quturba University Dialogue, Peshawar, March. Available at http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/9_1/Dialogue_January_March2014_39–66.pdf, accessed January 3, 2019.

24.

Indiatimes . 2018. “Jalaluddin Haqqani, The Man Who Attacked Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 is Dead,” Indiatimes , September 4. Available at https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/jalaluddin-haqqani-the-man-who-attacked-indian-embassy-in-kabul-in-2008-is-dead-352412.html, accessed February 20, 2019.

25.

Lakshman

Kanchan

. 2008. “The Cat’s Paw in Nimroz,” Outlook , April 16. Available at https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-cats-paw-in-nimroz/237228, accessed February 15, 2019.

26.

Lok Sabha Debates. 1955. Eleventh Session 1955 . New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat.

27.

Musharraf

Pervez

. 2006. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir , 211. London: Pocket Books.

28.

National Archives . 1996. Islamabad to Washington [CONFIDENTIAL], National Archives , November 26. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/19.pdf

29.

National Security Archives . 1997. Islamabad to Washington [CONFIDENTIAL], National Security Archives , March 10. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/21.pdf

30.

‘Pact with Russia on Afghanistan’ April 22–28, 1996., Asian Recorder , vol. XXXII, no. 2, p. 25574.

31.

Paliwal

Avinash

. 2017. My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan From the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal , 98. Noida: Harper Collins Publishers.

32.

Prakash

Nanda

. 1997. “India Seeks to Open Channel with Taliban,” Times of India , 28 May, p. 8.

33.

Rashid

Ahmed

. 2001. Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords , 26. London: Pan Books.

34.

Rashid

Ahmed

. 2012. Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West , 50. London: Allen Lane.

35.

Rediff News . 2010. “London Conference on Afghanistan: Implications for India,” February 8. Available at https://www.rediff.com/news/column/afghan-conference-implications-for-india/20100208.htm, accessed February 20, 2019.

36.

Roggio

Bill

. 2010. “The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders,” Long War Journal February 23. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php (accessed 13 February 2019).

37.

Schmemann

Serge

. 1982. “Mrs. Gandhi, on Soviet Visit, Affirms Indian Nonalignment,” The New York Times , September 23,. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/23/world/mrs-gandhi-on-soviet-visit-affirms-indian-nonalignment.html, accessed January 2, 2019.

38.

Schmidle

Nicholas

. 2007. “The Middleman,” ICWA Letters Washington, October. Available at http://www.icwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/NES-20.pdf, accessed January 3, 2019.

39.

Sharma

Pranay

. 2005. “Dead Driver’s Boss on Security Recce: Border Roads Chief Set for Afghanistan,” The Telegraph , November 25, p. 10.

40.

Sreedhar

2003. “India’s Afghan Policy,” The Hindu , March 7. Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/14368/Indias+Afghan+policy, accessed January 4, 2019.

41.

Sreenivasan

P. K.

Shukla

Saurabh

. 2005. “Taliban Militants Kill Indian Workers in Afghanistan, Concern Rises Over Safety of Others,” India Today , December 5. Available at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/20051205-taliban-militants-kill-indian-worker-in-afghanistan-concern-rises-over-safety-of-others-786609-2005-12-05, accessed February 20, 2019.

42.

Takkar

Khan Mashal

. 2016. “Pakistan: Taliban Are Our Boys,” The Voice Times , July 13. Available at http://www.thevoicetimes.com/pakistan-taliban-boys-2/, accessed January 3, 2019.

43.

Tharoor

Shashi

. 2012. Pax-Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century , 96. New Delhi: Allen Lane.

44.

The Express Tribune . 2017. “RAW Supports Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Acknowledges Indian Analyst in Top Daily,” The Express Tribune , September 24. Available at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515080/raw-supports-tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-acknowledges-indian-analyst-top-daily/, accessed February 15, 2019.

45.

The New York Times . 1996. “Guerrillas Take Afghan Capital as Troops Flee,” The New York Times , September 28. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/28/world/guerrillas-take-afghan-capital-as-troops-flee.html, accessed January 3, 2019.

46.

Tocqueville

de Alexis

. 2010. Democracy in America, Vol. II. East Rutherford, NJ: Penguin USA.

47.

“Treaty of Friendship Between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan,” January 4, 1950. Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6584/Treaty+of+Friendship. Accessed February 15, 2019

48.

Yousufzai

Rahimullah

. 1995. “Taliban Head Says Rabbani Sabotaging UN Peace Efforts,” The News , February 2, p. 8.

49.

Yusufzai

Rahimullah

. 1997. “India Must Not Treat the Taliban as Enemy,” Outlook , June 11. Available at https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-must-not-treat-the-taliban-as-enemy/203662, accessed January 5, 2019.

50.

Yusufzai

Rahimullah

. 2010. “The Taliban and India Can Be Reconciled,” Outlook , April 5. Available at https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-taliban-and-india-can-be-reconciled/264839, accessed February 21, 2019.