Abstract
Literature in Diplomatic Studies often reference a phenomenon where diplomats sent for too long to another country develop an affinity for their assigned country, sometimes to the detriment of their home country. This has profound implications when we examine diplomatic agents as personalities in their own right and their ability to perform as state agents. This article investigates the basis of such a claim by examining the Indian diplomatic corps as a case study to verify its validity and enlist the factors that influence this phenomenon. This article relies on interviews given by former diplomats of the Indian Foreign Service to highlight the structures that influence behaviour of diplomatic agents and the implications it may have on training for future diplomats and preparing them for the evolution of diplomacy in the technological age.
Introduction
In academic literature on the subject of diplomacy, we see recurring references to diplomats ‘going native’ in the countries that they are assigned to in the course of bilateral relations between states. While there has been no formal terminology assigned to this phenomenon, diplomats informally refer to it as ‘Localitis’, 1 where diplomats have immersed themselves locally to such an extent that they have lost their objectivity and neglected their primary role as a representative of their home country. Documentary evidence suggesting the prevalence of this phenomenon has not been well chronicled and often lacks any intersection with other disciplines like psychology.
Inferences to this phenomenon have often been made with connotations of disloyalty on the part of the diplomats, who have seemingly ‘traded’ their identity with their host state. Such emotive aspects of diplomacy evokes an interest in understanding the diplomat as an individual than a de-personalised instrument in the hands of the state to exercise diplomacy. Since diplomats of most countries hold significant autonomy in their functioning abroad, a diplomat’s personality is often conflated with the sending state’s personality, which makes it necessary for diplomatic studies to examine the diplomat as an individual with personalities that can be shaped, moulded and whose views can diverge from the state that they represent.
On their part, states do have legitimate concerns about the loyalty of their representatives abroad. The sending of a diplomat is an act of great trust and responsibility. The ability of states to exercise control extraterritorially is limited, which allows diplomats to exercise a lot more autonomy in their functions when posted abroad. In such circumstances, sending states cannot exercise control on what its agents are exposed to. While infrequent, diplomats have defected in the past, especially if they find themselves significantly at odds with the views of their home countries. Defecting diplomats can be characterised as one of the most humiliating experiences in state diplomacy, where trusted agents chosen for their unequivocal loyalty to the state not only stop being loyal but also possibly associate with an adversarial party to the detriment of the sending state. Diplomats may defect with or without the intent of personal profit or consideration.
At a time when the idea of diplomacy is evolving in the light of great technological advancements in communications along with the emergence of new diplomatic actors, states have revisited the way traditional diplomacy is conducted. Some of these questions include deliberations on whether the presence of diplomatic missions will have a future at all and whether viable models for its replacement exist.
This is an important debate when we consider the role of diplomacy in the future of diplomatic relations. Despite speculation about the end of traditional state diplomacy through diplomatic missions, it seems more likely that traditional state diplomacy will remain the primary mode of the practice of diplomacy between states for some time to come, supplemented with a range of new technologies to augment diplomatic capacity and act as ‘force multipliers’ (Hocking & Melissen, 2015). However, the changing role of the diplomat needs to be discussed as new technologies will only serve to enable diplomats in achieving scale in their objectives and cannot be expected to replace the diplomat completely. This is not to mention that technologies may be effective only to the extent that the diplomat exercises thorough judgement and innovation in deploying these tools.
Where the judgement of a diplomatic practitioner takes centre stage in the discussions about the future of diplomacy, aspects of diplomatic personality become an important area of focus. This article aims at addressing some such concerns in diplomatic literature, which are aimed at an intersection between personality and cultural immersion against the backdrop of states’ genuine concerns about the loyalty of its representatives.
The objective of this article is to examine the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) through the lens of its diplomats and examine the validity of the notion that lengthy periods of service create Localitis in diplomats, affecting their objectivity and which may have adverse effects on a state’s foreign policy. By examining Localitis through a state foreign-policy apparatus like the Foreign Service, this article aims to study the structural factors that create diplomats, the necessary conditions of socialisation, the relation between the sending state and its diplomats, the feedback loop that delineates the principal–agent relationship between the state and its diplomat and the human factors that influence the diplomatic agent’s behaviour.
Methodology
For the purposes of this study, retired diplomats of the IFS were interviewed about their personal experiences concerning the issue of Localitis during their years of service. The diplomats were interviewed with a standard questionnaire, which had a mixture of questions concerning their professional and personal lives, given that the subject matter is based on factors of socialisation. Former representatives of the IFS were contacted by email, and permission was sought for interviews. A combination of methods were used, including telephonic conversation, interpersonal interviews and filling out of questionnaires over the course of 2 months. The intersection of the diplomats’ personal lives is necessary as experiences and interactions with the local culture shape the world-view of the diplomat during their service abroad, which, in turn, would guide their professional conduct. This article is based on these interactions, which serve as primary data.
The decision to interview retired ambassadors was deliberate, given that each ambassador had at least 30 years of diplomatic experience with multiple postings to different parts of the world. This means that this data set accounts for several cycles of diplomatic postings and a diversified geographic spread, which enhances the generalisability of the findings in this article within the IFS apparatus. This serves as a better approach as opposed to interviewing currently serving officers because service rules may inhibit officers from divulging information, which could be pertinent to this study, which could yield inconclusive results.
This study also draws on the theoretical framework set out by Dr. Alisher Faizullaev, in his article about ‘Diplomacy and Self’(2006), where he writes:
However diplomats are not merely small cogs in a foreign policy machine. They possess emotions, temperament, character, dispositions, prejudices, and other attributes of a human being. In short, diplomats are not alien to human or existential experience and subjective perception of the world. The human and political sides of diplomacy form a single system and are interdependent parts of it.
Analysing the human factors involved in the practice of diplomacy allows us to see its influence on organisational cultures, which in this case is the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of India. This, in turn, allows us to examine the organisational factors that shape foreign policy decision-making when it relates to aspects of reportage, information-gathering and analysis.
We draw on the theoretical framework outlined by Faizullaev since it is one of the few studies that explicitly examines the relationship between a diplomat’s personality and its impact on the conduct of interstate diplomacy. The study of cultural immersion and its impacts on the diplomat fits into the scope of this theoretical framework.
The decision to analyse the IFS, in particular, without extending the scope to diplomats of other countries is also a deliberate choice to determine the systemic and organisational factors of the socialisation of a diplomat, which vary from country to country since the immersive experience of diplomacy is felt differently in different national cultures.
Most of the assertions in this article echo the views presented by the diplomats who were interviewed.
Limitations of the Study
Given that the study is about the lives of diplomats themselves, the use of interviews of former diplomats should account for subjective biases of the interviewees like recall bias and social desirability bias. It must also be mentioned that eight diplomats were interviewed in total, which is a rather limited sample size. Even when the diplomats interviewed had high variability in terms of service age, their year of entry into the service and the geographical spread of their service, a bigger sample size would have been more beneficial to the study.
The study may also observe some subjectivity in definitions, since the interviewees self-report based on their perceptions, feelings and lived experiences. This article serves to act as an oral history of diplomats in their years of service, from which lessons may be inferred and applied in diplomatic practice ahead.
Even with these limitations, it must be observed that several aspects of the narratives were remarkably consistent, which establish a level of generalisability of the findings, which will be discussed further.
This study also does not cover diplomatic actors who were involved with multilateral bodies and non-state actors like non-governmental organisations, since the nature of their work is differentiated from that of traditional diplomacy and requires a separate study how they perceive and experience Localitis as a phenomenon.
Significantly, this study does not delve into the reasons why some diplomats may not be inclined to immerse themselves in local culture, which requires larger studies and psychological insights.
Terminology
In its essence, this study aims at examining the socialisation process of the diplomats in the countries that they are assigned to. Harold Nicolson, in his article ‘Diplomacy Then and Now’ uses the term ‘going native’ (Nicolson, 1961, pp. 41–42), with the subtext that this situation applied to diplomats who had developed an affinity for the host country to the extent that it skewed their objective judgement and their duty to represent their home country’s interests. Localitis as a term is an informal characterisation of this process. The ‘–itis’ suffix has a connotation of this phenomenon being a ‘disease’ of sorts and in a sense represents a more negative view of this process of socialisation, which has been done in ‘excess’. While it is used in informal parlance by diplomats, there is little evidence that it is used on an official level.
Localitis does not have a precise definition because, in itself, Localitis is a highly subjective phenomenon. Even a negative emotional charge associated with the word is problematic because more often than not, Localitis is a matter of perspective. This article warns against any attempt to create neat compartmentalisations and definitions of Localitis and their types because they often exhibit significant overlap, and that making such assertions involve individual subjectivity to a large extent. Reinforcing a negative meaning of Localitis has implications on the underlying process of diplomatic socialisation. While this article repeatedly references Localitis as a term for the purposes of analysis, it does not endorse the negative connotations associated with the term.
The Making of an Indian Diplomat
Diplomats in the IFS are selected by a competitive examination by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), which also conducts examinations for several other executive services such as the Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service, Indian Revenue Service and several others through the same centralised process. Foreign Service candidates are picked from the top ranks of this examination process, which is regarded as a highly competitive process. Scholars also consider the competitive nature of their entry as one of the reasons why successful candidates are considered to be highly competent as professionals (Bajpai & Chong, 2019, p. 143).
It must also be noted that candidates who make it through the Foreign Service may also consist of individuals who did not choose the Foreign Service as their first choice and may have been aspiring to other services such as the Administrative or Police Services. The final allocation of services is done by the UPSC based on the candidate’s ranking in the exam, the number of vacancies available and the candidate’s own preferences. Of late, we see a trend where aspirants increasingly prefer to serve within India, which means that the number of people opting for the Foreign Service as their first preference has reduced (Sreenivasan, 2015). As a result, many newer recruits may opt to accept the service as it has been allotted to them and not necessarily because it was their conscious choice or preference to be in the diplomatic corps.
After they are selected, they undergo a training period that ranges between 2 years and 3 years, including the learning of a Compulsory Foreign Language (CFL). The first posting of a diplomat is usually to a country where the diplomat’s designated language is spoken as the first language, where the diplomat acquires linguistic and cultural proficiency.
The normal tenure of a diplomat of the IFS posted to any country ranges from 3 years to 4 years, barring exceptions. Some countries are categorized differently like hardship postings, which are designated as non-family stations for security reasons, where a diplomat might see shorter tenures and quicker rotations.
The IFS has been a relatively small corps with a strength of around 850 diplomats 2 representing India in all facets, including bilateral, multilateral and upper-management postings at home and spread over 190 missions across the world and in international organisations. This does not include second-tier officers of the MEA such as assistants, lower division clerks, section officers and other positions which constitute Group ‘B’ Personnel.
The IFS is spread thin in comparison to the diplomatic presence that it is expected to establish (Ramachandran, 2013), and this understaffing has an impact on a diplomat’s future posting. Despite several calls to massively expand the diplomatic corps to match the requirements of an emerging country like India, 3 the MEA has not been able to expand as quickly as it envisioned and has mostly kept the numerical status quo by hiring a slightly greater number of recruits than the number of retiring diplomats every year. This means that the overall number of postings itself is relatively fewer and is dependent on structural factors such as promotions, retirements and other restructuring to manage the spread of personnel across missions. Vacancies arise as and when either diplomats complete their terms or mostly when they retire/resign from service.
Differential terms of Indian diplomats serving around the world, the need for diplomats to periodically serve in the headquarters in New Delhi and promotion to newly created sections and desks of the MEA are all factors that determine the availability of postings for a diplomat. This is more to do with structural factors of the MEA, which has to manage a balancing act vis-à-vis postings which could be scarce and sometimes available only in regions far removed from a diplomat’s current posting. Postings are determined by a Foreign Service Board consisting of the senior leadership of the MEA along with selected officials from other Ministries such as the Ministry of Commerce. 4
As a result, postings of diplomats often seem random and defy any sense of continuity or regional logic. This would mean that diplomats could be posted to a country, which is starkly different from their previous posting in terms of region and culture. It is common for diplomats to not be posted in any one region twice. It is also possible that diplomats may never be posted to a country, which speaks the language he/she learnt as their CFL. While there are exceptions where some Indian diplomats have a semblance of continuity in terms of regions, most Indian diplomats experience an assortment of postings, which is often marked with wide regional discontinuities with each assignment. Regional discontinuity then leads to functional discontinuity since the nature of Indian foreign policy priorities differs depending on the host state, such as enhanced trade or defence relations.
As a result, acquiring either regional or functional specialisation becomes a challenging endeavour for the Indian diplomat who has to contend with constantly switching hats and modifying personalities to achieve their assigned objectives, which is continuously changing.
The Indian Diplomat on Foreign Soil
Duties of an Indian Diplomat
The core duty of the Indian diplomat is to act as an agent of the Government of India through the MEA and pursue activities that will further India’s national interests. In this regard, an Indian diplomat is expected to deepen ties between India and the host country in various spheres such as politics, economics, culture, defence and other areas of importance to Indian interests. For this purpose, a diplomat is expected to use persuasive tools at his/her disposal such as soft power, goodwill, negotiation and compromise to the extent that is allowed by their diplomatic principal. Another important duty is for the Indian diplomat to be an informational outpost in their host country, which can interpret events and access information that could be beneficial to India in their relations with the host country.
In this aspect, the diplomat is expected to interpret local events keeping cultural cues and attributes in mind, to provide contextually-appropriate advice to the MEA in New Delhi. To fulfil this role, diplomats are expected to cultivate large social networks with contacts across the spectrum, ranging from influential persons in positions of power to common people, to create connections in the host country and deepen ties with the host government.
These efforts in outreach also extend to India’s diasporic communities spread out around the world who are associated with the host state in different roles. Indian diplomats perform a variety of duties aimed at the welfare of the diaspora in line with India’s foreign policy vision. These duties could vary depending on the nature of the diaspora in the host country, especially with respect to their duration of stay and the status of citizenship in the host country.
The Diasporic Connection
The Indian diaspora is one of the largest in the world whose members are spread over 130 countries (Garha & Domingo, 2019, p. 9). As a diasporic community, Indians exhibit great diversity within themselves, with different points of origin from India, varying positions of citizenship in their host countries and different histories of migration (Hegde & Sahoo, 2018, p. 1). As a result, the relationship between the Indian government and the diaspora varies on a case-by-case basis. The needs of Non-Resident Indians in the Arabian Gulf are a lot different than the needs of Indian-Americans in the USA.
Services to the diaspora include consular services like providing travel documentation such as passports, Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) cards, registering births and deaths of Indian citizens, legal aid for Indian citizens imprisoned abroad and other measures for their welfare. Indian diplomats also have the responsibility to promote Indian culture by hosting cultural events to promote different facets of Indian culture through music, dance, films and cuisine. Catering to the Indian diaspora can also include the participation of Indian diplomats in the celebration of cultural ceremonies hosted by diaspora groups, some of which are tied to specific cultural markers such as religion, language or a combination of these.
At times, services for the diaspora can take on a political dimension as well, especially in countries where persons of Indian origin have higher participation in national politics (Sreenivasan, 2012). For instance, we have seen Indian diplomats play a mediatory role in places like Fiji where there have been disputes between Ethnic Indians and the Fijian government. Indian diplomats also help the diaspora by promoting their commercial interests by leveraging host country contacts as well as promoting investments back into India by highlighting attractive schemes and programmes by the Indian government.
In turn, the diaspora also serves critical functions for Indian diplomats. Influential members of the diaspora act as the gateway for establishing contacts and networks in the host country by way of introductions and referrals. They also guide the Indian diplomat through the local cultural norms and help them ease into it. Commercial enterprises of the diaspora may be leveraged to provide services that Indian missions require abroad, which could range from something as small as catering for embassy events to arranging for big-ticket items like chartered aircraft for evacuations or even acting as interlocutors in backchannel negotiations. 5
As a result, the role of the diaspora in an Indian diplomat’s life is significant and is characterised by a high frequency of interactions. The frequency of interactions also mean that both groups have overlapping social circles and activities, and more often than not, there is a symbiotic relationship between the two. This would mean that the Indian diplomat is firmly rooted with co-ethnics, which also influences their socialisation process. We see this influence where, on one hand, they can enable an easier transition into local culture, and, at the same time, could provide a more sheltered environment which could reduce the onus on the diplomat to make local contacts during their tenure in a particular country.
Tenure and Specialisation
Owing to the unique rotational structure of diplomatic postings, it is a challenging task for an Indian diplomat to acquire regional specialisation at par with the diplomatic corps of other countries. Regional specialisation, if any, is acquired inadvertently due to a diplomat’s own initiative and immersion. 6 A tenure of 3–4 years involves an initial familiarisation of the local culture, the leveraging of new-found knowledge and networks to enhance Indian interests and cater to the Indian community present there, and, finally, preparation to take up a new assignment as vacancies arise. In this process, incoming diplomats are ably assisted by lower-tier staff who have been in the same posting for a longer time and also the local staff whose services are contracted by the mission like translators.
The lack of regional continuity in a subsequent diplomatic posting creates a challenge in terms of transition from one culture to the other because of its glaringly vast differences, which need to be adapted to. Cultural shifts of such magnitudes require a lot more work towards acclimatisation. In a relatively short term of 3 years, readjusting to a completely new environment could take up more time for cultural immersion and also leave the diplomat prone to errors since the process of assimilation also requires significant unlearning of past habits and cultural mores.
While there have been times when officers would have their terms extended in countries which are considered relatively less prestigious, as a matter of policy, the MEA rotates diplomats regularly in most other countries, owing to administrative requirements. This is also done to ensure that those diplomats in prestigious postings do not overextend their terms and keep other diplomats from accessing these postings.
Indian diplomats generally favour the term of 3–4 years since they feel that it gives them adequate time to perform their duties after acclimatisation. 7 Diplomats generally did not prefer longer postings in any one country because they view longer postings as a gateway to a culture of complacency, which may hurt their professional trajectories and career development. While decisions on postings are finally made by the MEA, some diplomats who are keen on regional specialisation tend to prefer that their next bilateral posting would be a country within the same region. Preferences may also vary since there may also be postings in multilateral bodies with an issue-specific focus or, at New Delhi, through Ministerial and departmental liaisons within the Indian government.
While, on the one hand, it could be argued that this rotational policy has proved to be a hindrance in the way of Indian diplomats to acquire regional specialisation which is sorely needed (Sreenivasan, 2015), it could also be argued that it is these discontiguous postings that create the psychological barrier between the diplomats and conditions that may foster negative immersion, since every new posting requires experiencing larger culture shocks and overcoming larger learning curves on local culture.
This lack of regional continuity is not known to be a deliberate measure applied by the MEA to prevent Localitis since socialisation in any culture is imminent, and these subjectivities cannot be controlled. However, there is reason to believe that this rotational policy inadvertently creates longer assimilation times and steers the diplomats towards seeking familiarity in different cultural landscapes by looking inward.
The Personality of the Diplomat
Given that diplomacy is driven by individuals, the aspect of personality also determines the socialisation process. The IFS is far from a monolith, and it consists of individuals coming from different backgrounds. Indian diplomats represent a diverse group of individuals who come from an assortment of cultural backgrounds, live in diverse communities and family styles, practise different religious and cultural practices, and are generally attuned to syncretic and heterogeneous societies.
However, they are also subject to human biases, personal interests and differential rates of cultural assimilation. Given that the scheme of entry into the foreign services is not necessarily based on willingness to serve abroad, some diplomats may be a little more resistant to immersion of the local culture to the countries they are posted to. Affinity for certain cultures and willingness to immerse in them improve outcomes for the diplomat as they are able to navigate through cultural barriers and are better equipped to cultivate networks among locals by creating favourable perceptions of the diplomat as a representative of his/her home country. Actively resisting this process may have the opposite outcome for diplomats and their performance. This also means that pre-existing prejudices, racial biases, contemptuous behaviour may significantly inhibit a diplomat’s cultural immersion.
A diplomat’s political inclinations also impact the world view of the diplomat. Informally, several Indian diplomats serving during the Cold War years were known to harbour more pro-Soviet views, owing to the politics of its times, which was complemented by prevalent ideologies of anti-imperialism and the like. 8 This meant that some Indian diplomats aspired to be specialists in Russia, China and the communist bloc. On a related note, this also meant that some Indian diplomats did not favour Western postings like postings to Washington D.C. or London, owing to these countries being perceived as inimical to Indian interests. When we say ‘not favour’ Western postings, it does not mean that Indian diplomats rejected or refused such postings, but that Indian diplomats often kept a psychological distance against deep immersion and were more inclined to be more cautious and selective in their interactions with their hosts.
Examining ‘Localitis’ in the Indian Foreign Service
A History of Localitis
The incidence of Localitis, while not prevalent, was not entirely absent. There are accounts of India’s first-generation diplomats, who served just after independence, facing moments of questionable objectivity in their representation. One example is that of K. M. Panikkar who served as India’s first Ambassador to China. Panikkar was an academic with a great cultural affinity for China and could be considered a man who was truly immersed Chinese politics and culture. Reportedly, Panikkar would openly take the Chinese side even on matters where China posed a threat to India’s sovereignty. He earned the ire of his colleagues such as G. S. Bajpai (Arpi, 2018), who vehemently advocated against Panikkar’s very obvious China-tilt and his dangerous assessments that often advised the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s views on China.
Panikkar was not the only one who may have lost objectivity when dealing with a host country. Accounts of diplomats experiencing Localitis is also seen among officers who served in Soviet bloc countries towards the end of the Cold War, where Indian diplomats were not aligned with the view that the Soviet Union was inching towards collapse, which also reflected in their reportage to Delhi. 9 Panikkar’s affinity for the Chinese is seen as one of the worst cases of Localitis and is also considered one of the most damaging instances of Localitis in Indian Foreign Policy.
Accounts of diplomats having ‘suffered’ Localitis are not very common even when judged by their own colleagues. 10 Among diplomats, there is a wider margin of error when they make determinations of Localitis since erroneous characterisation of the degree of a colleague’s could land that colleague in trouble when it could very well be a misunderstanding or miscommunication.
Human Biases and Subjectivities
Subjectivities are an inevitability in a people-centric profession like diplomacy. While the diplomat frequently interacts with headquarters, diplomats are given a wider latitude to operate autonomously based on their best judgement of their circumstances and their perceptions. Much like diplomatic services around the world, the IFS operates on a decentralised basis where they receive broader principles and objectives from headquarters in Delhi, while details of its operationalisation is left to the diplomat on the ground. The job of any diplomat is to further and strengthen relations between the sending state and the host state and, to that end, must adopt a cordial and friendly approach to the furthest extent possible.
On the one hand, it is a difficult task to keep track of every development occurring in every diplomatic mission, much less in a service like the IFS, which operates over 190 missions around the world. The functional autonomy given to diplomats abroad is both a functional necessity and a reflection of the reality that headquarters does not have the capacity to influence all decisions and exercise micromanagement, which is neither possible nor effective.
On the other hand, decentralisation means that there is limited cross-referencing of a diplomat’s reportage and analysis of local events of importance to Indian interests. On their end, diplomats strive to ensure objectivity in their reportage, which is ultimately also influenced by their cultural immersion and the sources they are exposed to in the host country. Diplomats also have to deal with other problems in reportage, like complexity of events in host states, leading to higher prediction errors, ‘black swan’ events which are least predicted, a diplomat’s misreading of local nuance and culture, and other related problems. Accuracy errors in reportage could be misunderstood by headquarters as Localitis, especially if the reportage could be seen as favourable to the host country in general.
Perceptions at the level of headquarters also need to be understood in a similar vein. While diplomats on the ground make their analysis based on their host state as a unit of analysis, the MEA is more inclined to read the situation based on regional units of analysis, based on a mosaic of reportage from all their missions in the region. The MEA may not always be in a position to appraise every source that shapes the diplomat’s perceptions and, subsequently, their analysis.
On an analytical level, this becomes a question of intensive versus extensive sources, and a state versus regional level of analysis. Invariably, larger regional plays may affect individual countries in the process. For example, when India considers its relations in the Middle East and chooses to engage further with Saudi Arabia over Iran, it may undermine the work of the Indian mission in Tehran and, by extension, a diplomat’s progress with the Iranian government that would now contend with lesser access to power centres and lower social capital in the diplomatic community. It is also in the diplomat’s interest to elevate the prestige of their mission by increasing the host state’s importance to Indian foreign policy through intensified engagement (Faizullaev, 2006, p. 508). In such a scenario, a legitimate question would be whether any frustrations exhibited by the Indian mission in Tehran would constitute a demonstration of Localitis.
Adopting a favourable view of the host state is a natural mindset to adopt when the overarching mandate of a diplomat is to further ties between the two states, even during periods of hostility. The point of divergence then lies in the perception of what constitutes national interest. The diplomat may perceive furthering of national interests in the furthering of ties between the host country and India, while the MEA may see the furthering of national interests in furthering relations with one country at the cost of the said host country, creating a clash of values since both do not perceive analysis at the same levels.
At a time of great change with the coming in of the Internet and 24-h news cycles, the MEA, much like other diplomatic services, can get information on a real-time basis, even faster than their missions on the ground. 11 The traditional diplomatic services of reportage and analysis are being substituted by opinions of large media and research organisations that have the capacity to produce a much faster analysis which is qualitatively satisfactory. These sources of information may provide an alternative view to the MEA as opposed to relying solely on the mission’s reportage on the ground and in that sense provides alternative perspectives to the mission’s views. Such an avenue has provided an outlet for headquarters to cross-reference the views propounded by a diplomat serving in a mission.
It is at this juncture that questions may arise about the objectivity of the diplomat on the ground. Mutually, this is also the point where the diplomat on the ground feels that the MEA does not fully appreciate the facts and realities on the ground where they are stationed.
Determining Localitis
Whether a diplomat has ‘gone native’, is usually a determination made by the MEA in New Delhi. The most appropriate authority within the MEA is the joint secretary who oversees Indian missions in their designated regions. The joint secretary is also the direct supervisor of the heads of mission on the ground and remains the best arbiter to determine Localitis since they are the first point of contact with headquarters, and their interactions are frequent enough to make accurate assessments of ‘objectivity’. Joint Secretaries can compare the opinions of missions on the ground to identify differing viewpoints, deficiencies and inconsistencies. Joint Secretaries use this reportage in their discussions with political executives, other joint secretary colleagues and experts to give shape to the broad contours of Indian foreign policy, and to give direction for day-to-day diplomatic business through the Indian missions.
A joint secretary is usually an experienced Indian diplomat with experience of several years and fully understands the challenges associated with the job of an ambassador. The joint secretary therefore relies on their experience and instincts to see whether a diplomat remains objective and even-handed in their analysis.
The primary method by which Localitis can be determined is when Joint Secretaries review memos and diplomatic cables sent back to Delhi, which provide analysis of the situation on the ground and its implications for India. In this, the joint secretary tries to read the tonality of the document, the variation of their views from experts and also other diplomats in the region. The joint secretary also takes into account dissent expressed through the diplomat’s disagreements on foreign policy proposals, the nature of this disagreement and, wherever possible, the emotional charge associated with it.
The joint secretary also provides direction to the ambassador based on the ambassador’s own reportage and inputs from other states in the region, keeping in mind the larger geopolitical context and strategic goals. In fulfilling this role, the joint secretary is also expected to moderate the various positions and act as a bridge between all parties to operationalise the analysis from the ground into actionable tasks ahead and to frame priorities for foreign policy. 12 Joint Secretaries also act as a cushion between upper management and the diplomat on the ground, often putting local reportage of the diplomat into context for the Foreign Secretary and political executives.
Diplomats also rely on their peers within the service to hold each other accountable. While this is not a formal instrument to bring about accountability or control, it has persuasive value and acts as critical feedback. The compact size of the IFS cadre along with their highly restrictive mode of entry into the services means that the IFS is a more tight-knit community in comparison to bigger diplomatic corps of other states.
It must be noted that a ‘diagnosis’ of Localitis has a fairly high threshold of evaluation. Most diplomats acknowledge that allegations like these could be attributed to misreading or misunderstanding the facts on the ground. Diplomats have noted instances where some actions by diplomats on the ground have been misconstrued as diplomats having ‘gone native’, and such charges may have undesirable effects for a diplomat’s career in the Foreign Service. Some of these instances include delegations visiting from India, most of whom are not trained in diplomatic life and protocol, complaining to the MEA about diplomats ‘going native’. 13 Such instances demonstrate to us the dangers of misunderstandings when it comes to such assessments because such allegations border on accusations of disloyalty, with such narratives having the potential to harm diplomatic careers.
‘Remedying’ Localitis
Localitis As a Non-Issue
In the realm of Indian Foreign policy, it can be safely said that there is little fear of diplomats ‘going native’. For one, the advent of the communications revolution that has facilitated real-time two-way communication between the diplomatic mission and the home country has created a feedback loop, which allows the diplomat to access the views of the headquarters and vice versa. Globalisation has brought about a homogenisation of culture, which has led to aspects like Foreign Language Training to be less important than it once was, since English as a link language between diplomats has become prevalent. These have acted as moderating influences on a diplomat’s socialisation process.
Inadvertently, the MEA’s rotational policy creates a psychological barrier to immersion as diplomats tend to have postings that are culturally discontinguous and require a longer immersion period.
One of the most compelling pieces of evidence concerning Localitis as a non-issue is the fact that no diplomat acknowledges that they indulge in any form of self-censorship during their reportage and analysis to headquarters. This candour indicates that they are not scared of being perceived as sympathetic to local interests when necessary, and that they trust their superiors to not misinterpret their comments and reportage.
The discussion on Localitis as a non-issue serves a few purposes. For one, it demonstrates that fear of a diplomat ‘going native’ may be an outdated concept whose fears may be rooted in ethno-centricism and an irrational fear that exposure to foreign cultures may corrupt one’s own. When we see that expressions of Localitis is a matter of perspective, its treasonous undertones have very little evidentiary basis, and it could potentially be used as a weapon to malign well-intentioned diplomats reminiscent of the McCarthyism in the USA during the 1950s.
Second, Localitis as a non-issue also negates any argument against the prospect of regional specialisation, which might claim that staying in any one region may create conditions of Localitis. While this may be true for long terms. which may be in excess of 5 years, the same cannot be said about terms that last 3–4 years. It also discounts the fact that national cultures have their own distinctions despite their similarities with cultures of nearby states, which would require time for immersion. Staying within the region may give the diplomat a better edge in grasping the basics rather than completely starting from scratch in a state that looks completely different than the last posting. In the case of the IFS, the problem of discontiguous postings will continue till the size of the corps is not increased along with specialised positions in diplomatic missions. Having higher numbers of vacancies also allow for the flexibility of having diplomats serve longer in more isolated posts if they want to specialise.
Currently, Indian diplomats are expected to wear many hats, including political, commercial, cultural and administrative work, a lot of which requires specialist expertise developed in-house. The expansion of the diplomatic corps has been a long-standing recommendation by several scholars and policy experts. Indian diplomats currently are considered overworked and stretched thin, which invariably means that there are few postings to begin with and, therefore, even fewer positions to rotate out of, ensuring that the discontiguous postings will continue as a structural problem.
On this basis, it could be well argued that the sole raison d’être of maintaining a diplomatic mission abroad is for diplomats to have a more nuanced view, which accounts for local sensibilities. Objectivity then renders itself irrelevant since the analysis would have no value added and would be indistinguishable if it was written at headquarters without information from the ground. An alignment with an objective standard merely creates incentives for diplomats to self-censor, create prediction errors and reduce the morale of the diplomatic corps.
Immersion as a Function of Foreign Policy Decision-making
Given the polarity of circumstances, there will always be a conflict where, on one hand, the diplomat on the ground perceives and analyses the situation with a local lens, but does not always have the big picture laid out by the MEA, and, on the other hand, the Ministry, in its broader frame of mind, will miss out the subtleties involved in different cultures, leading it to make suboptimal choices on a bilateral level.
Ultimately, the diplomat’s assessment is the most authoritative source for the MEA to rely on while taking foreign policy positions. A diplomat’s assessment is called into question only when it is inaccurate, which may prompt questions of objectivity. The ability of a diplomat to provide accurate reportage and analysis is no longer as prized as it was in the yesteryears, owing to competing sources like international media and think tanks. This does not mean that the diplomat’s job has been rendered unimportant or that analysis by media and think tanks has replaced the analytical and reportage duties, especially since the diplomat is the best source to parse through the deluge of information, collate insights from insiders and report back directly on how events may influence Indian national interests and make suitable recommendations.
This aspect generates two important questions. For one, is it incumbent on a diplomat on the ground to be ‘objective’? Second, what is the standard of objectivity and how do we measure it?
On the examination of the question of whether it is incumbent on a diplomat on the ground to be ‘objective’, it could be argued that it is an unrealistic standard to attain, given that it varies in perspective depending on how one sees it, and given the number of actors involved in foreign policymaking, such a standard may straitjacket a state’s options. It is beneficial, then, for a diplomat to fully immerse in the local culture and go native to the extent that is possible, to see how their hosts think and perceive the world. While foreign policy decision-making cannot be dictated by the views of the diplomat on the ground alone, deprivation or dismissal of such a view on the basis of objectivity results in a valuable insight lost due to artificial concerns like adherence to the view from Delhi.
On the question of defining a standard for objectivity in the diplomatic realm, it could be described as the closest adherence to the foreign policy objectives and principles outlined and mandated by the MEA. Given its rather broad mandate and the subjective factors that shape it, an argument could be made that objectivity is what the diplomat makes of it. In this respect, anything a diplomat does to further relations between India and the host state, which they perceive to be favouring India in either the short term or the long term, could be considered fulfilling the mandate set out to them. The variance between the diplomat on the ground and the policymakers in Delhi is only a matter of differing spatial and temporal perspectives. Quantitative metrics to measure objectivity then becomes a fruitless endeavour.
Accuracy errors in prediction could also be attributed to an incomplete or inadequate process of socialisation. There is no reason to believe that ‘objective’ analysis, which conforms to views of headquarters, is more accurate. All assessments must comply with the same burden of proof. Diplomats advocating in favour of their host countries adds to the richness of the discourse within the Indian foreign policy-making apparatus. Consensus-building based on these diverse views and opinions can bring about a balanced foreign policy. India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and balance requires this kind of diversity in foreign policy discourse, especially by its practitioners. Where shifts in foreign policy may upset certain states, inability to decipher the emotive root of the problems will limit India’s ability to diagnose and find alternatives, for which cultural immersion can play a key role.
Ministerial Take
There is little evidence to suggest that Localitis is a widespread problem within the IFS as a corps. There is no training module for Indian diplomats that specifically addresses the problem of Localitis although trainees are advised against ‘undue influences’ from elements in the host country. This is mainly aimed towards specific host state-induced influences and concerns of espionage and does not necessarily emanate from fear of cultural assimilation as it were.
The informal peer review set-up of fellow diplomats and the supervision of the Joint Secretaries, who are more than familiar with the process, act as effective moderating influences. Mild influences of Localitis have been noticed, but even those who notice it do believe that, more often than not, it is merely a matter of perspective.
On the contrary, decision-makers in foreign policy are worried about the opposite problem, which is that diplomats hold back on their cultural immersion in the countries that they are posted to, resulting in unlived potential and the inability to access wider networks of contacts and influence. This problem was echoed by the Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs, which noted in its Seventeenth Report (2017) in its concerns about the linguistic skills of its diplomatic corps where it said:
There is considerable anecdotal evidence of Indian Ambassadors in Arabic-speaking countries being handicapped by their lack of knowledge of Arabic, and similar examples in a variety of countries, Indian diplomats being unable to appear on television discussions in the countries to which they are accredited because of a lack of fluency in the local language, and so on.
While on its part, the MEA has emphasised on further training, including refresher courses and mid-career training, a question does emerge as to whether the inception of the problem comes from a lack of general unwillingness to engage in foreign culture and whether this forms a trend of general apathy, which maybe a more complex problem to address. While there can be remediation for a lack of language skills, it could be a far more challenging problem for any diplomatic corps to address the lack of interest in engaging in a foreign culture on a large scale.
There are emerging concerns within the Indian diplomatic community that newer generations of diplomats are increasingly looking inward and are more resistant to engage in cultural immersion, which is also increasingly being linked to the ‘drop’ in quality of entrants into the IFS (Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs, 2017).
A Case for Localitis
If the fear of Localitis was about a diplomat going native and being overly enthusiastic about the host country rather than their own, a bigger fear is that of not engaging with the host country and its people. After all, the idea of representation and having a diplomatic mission is about outreach and generate goodwill through positive interactions. Diplomatic missions led by inward-looking diplomats is a negation of the very purpose of a diplomatic mission.
Diplomats who are not very enthusiastic in engaging with the local culture is not a phenomenon unique to the IFS as it is naturally faced by diplomatic corps of other countries as well (Malone, 2012, p. 227). First, the idea of learning the local language is no longer given as much priority as it once used to, given the growing prevalence of English as a global business language and as a bridge to various cultures (Munat, 2005). Second, diplomats posted to any country often have the choice of remaining within a tightly knit diplomatic circle, which includes diplomats from other countries and select local contacts mostly consisting of national elites. With such an alternative being available and also more appealing, diplomats may not find it worthwhile to expend more time in public outreach when a closed circle like this provides adequate information.
At a time when most Indian missions are stretched thin when it comes to manpower, diplomatic personnel have to prioritise making contacts among people who are most useful to Indian interests abroad, which invariably consist of members of the Indian diaspora and national elites consisting of politicians, business leaders and the like. Diplomats may consider that national elites are increasingly global citizens, and that the cultural gap between them has reduced, especially since many of them may already have substantial interests outside the country through education, business or other links. Cultural immersion is still important, perhaps even more so when outreach is targeted, as national elites cannot be divorced from their national culture, and influences like Westernisation and globalisation cannot be taken for granted.
Misreading cultural nuances can have disastrous consequences, and where making impressions is now concentrated only on a few, getting it wrong can have cascading effects without being able to balance it out among a larger audience. A diplomat’s inability or unwillingness to engage in local culture results in unrealised potential as it may play out in the diplomat’s analyses, which could be lacking in contextual depth. This results in analysis, which may be superficial or even worse, misleading. Unwillingness to immerse has the potential to create erroneous perceptions of the diplomat as being hostile to the host country, which is mostly not the case.
But a more likely consequence is that of indifference by the host state, which defeats one of the primary purposes of setting up a mission in the first place. Any notion of a diplomat being hostile or indifferent to the host state creates a self-fulfilling prophecy with a shrinking network of contacts, which leads to lesser importance, and it goes on. It could also be particularly damaging if such behaviour would be transposed as a community trait, furthering ugly stereotypes and xenophobia, which is a possibility since a diplomat is a representative of the nationals of the sending state and acts as a figurehead of the community. For an Indian diplomat, dispelling any notions of community inwardness becomes even more important, given the size of the diaspora and the kind of prejudices they face around the world, especially on questions of assimilation (Carsignol, 2014).
One of the biggest purposes of a diplomatic mission on the ground is to have access to large networks that can further the national interests of the sending state. Effective networks are characterised by its diversity, and it does not necessarily have to be elite-dominated. Less-immersive diplomats are doomed to have fewer sources, such as diplomats of other countries, small sections of local elites and direct governmental contacts. Diplomatic activity is likely to be limited to more formal aspects without significant room to expand the scope of relations through informal engagements. This can prove to be a setback, especially since the scope of diplomatic actors has widened to include a much larger range of non-state actors.
Where trade promotion is a fundamental purpose of setting up a diplomatic mission, larger local networks become even more important for the interests of the sending states. Smaller commercial enterprises often rely on their country’s diplomatic networks to further their business prospects since they may not have the necessary resources to invest in independent large-scale marketing and advertising. Smaller networks for a mission then lead to suboptimal performances in trade promotion. Such a problem is also applicable to specialised trade offices and not limited to embassies/High Commissions or consulates.
Diplomats who were interviewed for this article cited several instances where influence with local contacts and networks has even proved crucial for the protection of life and property of the Indian mission there. 14 For a country which is not financially as endowed as bigger countries like the USA, leveraging India’s soft power and its good offices becomes even more crucial for the work of its diplomatic missions.
Conclusion
This article set out to examine the question of Localitis and to determine whether concern about diplomats negatively ‘going native’ is a genuine problem. By examining the case of the IFS, it could be concluded that Localitis is neither a grave nor a widespread problem, and it may not merit a lot of attention in terms of ‘troubleshooting’. This does not mean that diplomats are immune to negative influences, which may affect their objectivity, as we have seen in the history of the IFS itself. However, determining the extent of ‘negative influences’ is a phenomenon shrouded in subjectivity and is subject to misinterpretation. Attaching punitive outcomes to such possibilities will only result in self-censorship during reportage, inhibition of open and free exchange of ideas in foreign policy discourse, undermining of autonomy in the exercise of diplomatic functions and will lead to suboptimal working conditions for a diplomat with long-term negative consequences for foreign policy and diplomacy.
The IFS structure provides for a continuous feedback mechanism through the diplomat’s peers and superiors, where long-term goals can be harmonised with local conditions and can provide a check on a diplomat’s conduct, and provides corrective measures in grave breaches of objectivity. With these informal systems in place, it is unlikely that Indian diplomats will have their objectivities compromised to an irredeemable degree. The prevalence of communication technologies, the growing spread of the Indian diaspora and Indian cultural influences are also factors that facilitate the grounding of an Indian diplomat.
On the contrary, the bigger concern at this point is the opposite problem, which is that diplomats do not engage sufficiently with the local culture, creating unlived diplomatic potential through undeveloped networks and limited local reach. In the long run, this contributes to inadequate representation that undermines the reasons for setting up a diplomatic outpost in the first place.
The coming in of new-age diplomacy has prompted concerns about whether the profession of a diplomat would be rendered obsolete with the coming in of new technologies in communication. However, on a closer examination of the progression of new-age diplomacy, we see that cultural immersion and adaptability are crucial even in the adoption of newer tools and methods of conducting relations (Hocking & Melissen, 2015). In that sense, technology cannot render the diplomat obsolete, as long as the diplomat retains his primary utility as an interpreter and bridge between cultures, where they are well equipped to understand the human dimension of such a practice and the subtleties that are associated with it.
Future Research Agenda on Diplomatic ‘Localitis’
The study on Localitis has created several research avenues on diplomatic psychology, especially on issues of cultural immersion. It also has a bearing on the study of organisational theory when it comes to diplomatic services and how certain systems through commission or omission bring about qualitative changes in the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy. An intersection between diplomacy and psychology would be of interest to scholars and practitioners.
Informally, there are concerns about newer generation diplomats not being as invested in the immersion process as compared to diplomats of previous generations. This is a claim that needs to be investigated and examined and whether or not there are interventions that can enhance the immersive experience of young diplomats as they start out into their diplomatic careers.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the participants of this study for their comprehensive views and comments that shaped this paper. I am also grateful to Anant Prabhat Jawla and Surajkumar Thube for their inputs.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Appendix
List of Interviewees
Mr Lalit Mansingh, Former Foreign Secretary 41 Years of Service (1963–2004) Countries Served: Switzerland, Afghanistan, Belgium, United Arab Emirates, the USA, Nigeria and the UK Mr K. P. Fabian, Ambassador 36 Years of Service (1964–2000) Countries Served: Madagascar, Austria, Iran, Sri Lanka, Canada, Finland, Qatar and Italy Mr Aftab Seth, Ambassador 35 Years of Service (1968–2003) Countries Served: Japan, Lebanon, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Pakistan, Greece, Vietnam and Japan Mr R. Viswanathan, Ambassador 35 Years of Service (1977–2012) Countries Served: Pakistan, Portugal, Mauritius, the USA, Libya, Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil Mr Yogendra Kumar, Ambassador 35 Years of Service (1977–2012) Countries Served: Russia, the UK, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Belgium, Tajikistan, Namibia and Philippines Ms Manju Seth, Ambassador 31 Years of Service (1983–2014) Countries Served: Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Thailand, France, Reunion Island, Madagascar and Comoros Mr Anil Trigunayat, Ambassador 35 Years of Service (1981–2016) Countries Served: Ivory Coast, Bangladesh, Mongolia, USA, Russia, Sweden, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan and Malta Mr Gurjit Singh, Ambassador 37 Years of Service (1980–2017) Countries Served: Japan, Sri Lanka, Italy, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Germany
