Rivalry Between the Taliban and ISKP: The Collision of Terror

Introduction

On the surface, the ideological dichotomy is a crucial driver of the conflict between the two groups. Islamic State—Khorasan Province (ISKP) adheres to the Salafi-jihadist interpretation of Islam ¹ that is rigidly literal in their interpretation of the text, disregards the development of Islamic thought over centuries and is critical of followers of mainstream Sunni Islam, primarily Hanafis. It rose in opposition to Abu Hanifa’s more liberal ideological leaning catered to the non-Arab world. Salafis consider him as having compromised on the pure version of Islam and accuse his followers of following him instead of Allah.

Its proponents, like Sayyid Qutb, have justified violence against fellow Muslims based on bidah (innovation in Islamic practices or doctrinal heresy having no basis in fundamental practices of the community). Having excommunicated (takfir) the ‘unbelievers’ for being apostates, the Salafi-jihadists legitimise the use of violence against such people. Followers of Shia Islam and Sufism have consequently become targets of attack by terrorist groups such as the ISIS.

However, Hanafis (the Taliban) ² follow the teachings of Abu Hanifa and rely on the teachings from the daily life of Prophet Mohammed and their personal judgement while dealing with matters such as the treatment of non-Muslims and individual freedom. They are also against takfiri or the excommunication of fellow Muslims. With the most significant proportion of Muslims adhering to this doctrine, it also has a considerable following among the Taliban. However, it is necessary to point out that ethnic minorities like Hazaras came under indiscriminate attacks under Taliban 1.0.

Salafism initially took root in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989. During that era, Arab Salafists travelled to the country to join the Mujahidin struggle against the occupying forces. That set the stage for spreading Salafi doctrine and mushrooming of Salafi mosques, reportedly financed by the Arab nations. The Hanafi tradition is more intrinsic to Afghanistan’s society and traditions compared to the Salafist school of thought, with the majority of Muslims across the country and broader South Asia region as its adherents. The Hanafi-Deobandi ideology has shaped the belief systems and way of life of overwhelming members of the Muslim communities in these geographical areas. ³

The ideological dichotomy and the resultant clash between these schools of thought within the broader subcontinent also find their place in the mujahedeen insurgency against the Soviets during the 1980s. ⁴ The Salafi jihadists were convinced that the banner of jihad must be based on their ideological beliefs and that only its followers should have the authority to assume leadership positions. Additionally, the presence of non-Salafists in the jihad could be found only because it was deemed necessary (by Salafists), and they should have no leadership role to play.

Contentious issues like the Taliban parlaying with the West and seeking recognition as a legitimate stakeholder in the international system also intensified the insurgency against its rule. It has even appeared to be inclined towards introducing marginal reforms like the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the interim administration and has engaged ⁵ in several bilateral and multilateral negotiations led by Amir Khan Muttaqi, the acting foreign minister.

Such initiatives are attempts to convince the international community to resume full-diplomatic cooperation with Afghanistan and potentially release 9.5 billion dollars’ ⁶ worth of funds currently seized by the Biden administration.

On the other hand, ISKP, which seeks to establish a global Islamic caliphate, perceives the West as the enemy and considers the Westphalian state system as an ‘apostasy, required to be overthrown by its fighters’. ⁷ Such ambitions contradict the objectives of the Taliban leadership, which is fervently hoping to reap benefits procured from the global banking system, international trading and diplomatic engagement with previously adversarial powers such as India and the United States of America.

Worryingly, per the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to the United Nations’ 12th report, dated June 2021, ISKP might have set its sights on morphing into ISIS’s nucleus and using Afghanistan as a base of its global terrorist operations, with approval of leaders operating out of Syria. For example,

The ISIL core’s leadership in the Syrian Arab Republic views Afghan territory as a base for the spread of their influence to Central and South Asia as part of the realization of its ‘great caliphate’ project. This has been supported by an active social media presence with a post-United States withdrawal period in mind. ⁸

In the past, they have violently clashed in an attempt to capture and recapture territories, with ISKP often making a public spectacle of the killings of the Taliban militants. Last year, the Taliban made a symbolic show of force. They freed the former ISKP leader, Omar Khorasani (Mawlavi Ziya ul-Haq), from jail and executed him ⁹ after capturing Kabul. The tug of war for dominance between the two groups surged again as the American forces withdrew from Kabul airport, whose security the Taliban was supposed to guarantee.

On the other hand, since the fall of the Ghani government, China has tried to assume a more significant role in the Afghan quagmire, positioning itself as the new great power in regional geopolitics. Moreover, the threat posed by Uyghur jihadists has compelled Xi Jinping to use a carrot and stick policy with the Taliban regime. He presumably hopes that economic, humanitarian and infrastructural incentives (however minimal) and rhetoric will prove sufficient for the de facto leaders of Afghanistan to address China’s security concerns and hand over those fleeing persecution from the Xinjiang province or using the Afghan territory as a base to launch terrorist attacks.

Soon after the Taliban took control of Kabul in August 2021, the Chinese government announced $31 million in aid to the interim administration as a ‘necessary step’ and to ‘end anarchy’, ¹⁰ becoming one of the first to do so. The Chinese aid to the ‘graveyard of empires’ has also encompassed food aid—6,220 tonnes by April 2022, winter clothing and COVID-19 vaccines. ¹¹

For example, in July 2022, China delivered $37.4 million in aid to Afghanistan’s interim government, as part of its pledge in 2021, after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul. ¹² Furthermore, during the same month, it announced its intent to halt levying tariffs on 98% of goods it imports from Afghanistan to stabilise the plummeting economy. ¹³

Although the government has yet to comply with Chinese demands, its implicit realignment away from its jihadist brethren and towards the dragon has provided ISKP necessary ammunition to recruit disaffected terrorists into its ranks.

ISKP had followed a similar policy while swelling its ranks with the Pakistan branch of the Taliban, drawing its earliest leaders from this outfit. Pakistan, which shares a highly contentious Durand Line with Afghanistan, rightly fears the porous border could foment opportune conditions for an ideological spillover, further emboldening its domestic terrorists to destabilise the state through bottom-up guerrilla warfare. The federal government understandably fears renewed violence aided and abetted by militant terrorist groups within its territory, like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This dilemma has increased its reliance on the Haqqani Network, a predominant faction within the Afghan Taliban (AT), and nudged sporadic negotiations with the violent extremist group (TTP).

Nevertheless, the international community ought to be prudent in dealing with the shifting geopolitical sands in Afghanistan, understanding that any mishap would inevitably result in an irreversible multi-pronged socio-economic, humanitarian and security catastrophe. More worrisome is that a similar chain of events may already be underway.

The Intensifying Conflict Between the Afghan Taliban and ISIS

The Hamid Karzai International Airport blast, in August 2021, ¹⁴ by ISKP was another theatre of war on a relatively smaller scale. It intended to signal to the Taliban that disruption of its consolidation of power and threats to Afghan national security would continue for the foreseeable future. These challenges have emerged even though ISKP is numerically and militarily disadvantaged vis-à-vis the Taliban.

According to the statistics released by the US CENTCOM—United States Central Command—this terrorist outfit has approximately 2,000 fighters. ¹⁵ Moreover, having its primary financier, the parent organisation— ISIS—disintegrated into sleeper cells in Syria and Iraq, ISKP has adopted other approaches to confront the Taliban. Improvised explosive devices have come in handy, whose raw materials are not financially impossible to procure and can result in significant losses for the opposing party. The ISIS’s disruptive power can compel its adversarial group to overhaul its approach to tactical offensive operations, particularly as the on-ground situation remains fragile.

The ambitions—territorial and resource-based—and the ambition to establish an Islamic Emirate without the competing threat of the other can also unravel the remaining fragments of the Afghan state. Unless the Taliban leaders can reverse the course of the cash-strapped economy and eliminate security-based challenges posed by the ISIS affiliate, they would find that grievances and anger stemming from the bottom-up can potentially unravel their power grab in an unprecedented manner.

The ISKP’s appeal among the Salafi jihadists, more so in the urban areas, has proven resilient. Additionally, the group had maintained a degree of support by cleverly manipulating the social media forums and exploiting the grievances of disillusioned Afghans. ¹⁶ ISKP has weaponised these tactics to recruit additional fighters and hollowed the Taliban’s claims of having tight control over Afghanistan’s security.

Additionally, the Taliban has to contain the threat posed by Khalil Haqqani (Sirajuddin Haqqani’s uncle). He is reportedly colluding with ISKP through financial support. ¹⁷ It must be noted that the airport blast could not have occurred without his approval or knowledge. There is another link between the Haqqani Network and ISKP. Shahab al-Mujahir, the emir of ISKP, who previously served as a mid-level commander for the Haqqanis. ¹⁸

The interim government’s potential inability to govern and the competing ideologies and ambitions of the Taliban and ISKP could intensify conflict, ensuring Afghanistan’s transition to a failed state. Since the on-ground situation remains fluid, it becomes permissible to deduce that challenges generated by such fissures would also lead to increasing jihadist threats. They are natural by-products of disintegrating states and thrive on chaos and instability.

Challenges to the Taliban’s Leadership

Even though the Taliban has announced its interim government, uncertainty plagues the Afghans. The assurances of the Taliban have proved insufficient in assuaging the people about long-term stability and prosperity in the country. It would not be improbable to assume that ISKP (convinced that the Taliban are ‘filthy nationalists’ and ‘apostates’ for failing to adhere to its pan-Islamist ideology) would seek to delegitimise its rival. Moreover, it could undermine the Taliban’s ability to stabilise Afghanistan through frequent attacks. There exists an underlying possibility that ISKP could bide its time before delivering a catastrophic and unprecedented jolt. The most destructive attacks (even on a small scale) occur when the hostile actors least expect them, exposing their vulnerabilities.

While there have been several reports of ISKP fighters being detained and the Taliban fighters recovering arms and ammunition from raid sites, the new regime is finding it to be a mammoth task in converting its rural guerrilla fighters into a force meant for urban warfare. The insurgents-turned-state leaders have confronted instances of 518 casualties claimed by ISKP in 2021. ¹⁹

In one of its attacks at the Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan National Military Hospital in Kabul, an ISKP suicide bomber killed at least 19 individuals, including Maulvi Hamdullah alias Mokhlis (a senior Taliban commander). ²⁰

The Taliban has ferociously cracked down on Afghan Salafists in its escalating war against the ISIS. Unfortunately, this clampdown has coincided with the ongoing insurgency waged by the ISKP militants. In August 2022, Sheikh Rahimullah Haqqani, a prominent Taliban ideologue, was killed in a suicide attack by an ISKP terrorist, who hid the bomb inside a fake prosthetic leg. ²¹

Since the downfall of Kabul, the Taliban has stood accused of detaining, torturing and killing Salafists suspected of supporting the ISKP. For example, in September 2021, the Taliban allegedly abducted and killed Sheikh Abu Obaidullah Mutawakil, a senior Salafist cleric. Analysts like Abdul Sayed claim that these actions could result in a backlash and provide fodder for swelling the ISKP ranks. ²²

On the other hand, ISKP could create dissension within the Taliban’s ranks and enable the formation of similarly radicalised groups through propaganda. Moreover, if the Taliban proves incapable of governing and fulfilling the promises made in the initial days, ISKP could effectively claim that the Taliban has compromised on its jihadist principles due to its rapprochement with the West without acquiring any dividends in the process.

Disgruntlement had sown the seeds of ISKP’s formation six years ago. It could also use grievances to recruit the dissenting voices that traditionally abhorred the notion of negotiating with the Western powers and yet found themselves compelled to toe the party line. Moreover, the potential recruitment pool could continue to include defectors from the AT if it is seen as compromising on its jihadist values.

Both extremist Hanafis and Salafists, with puritanical views about Islam, believe in jihad, residing in an Islamic society, governing it per sharia, and their leaders display absolute control over the doctrinal ideology, ideological differences remain.

For example, the Salafist jihadists, like ISKP, are vehemently opposed to any innovation, are anti-nationalist and seek to establish a global Islamic caliphate governed by an extreme and literal interpretation of sharia. There is no room for accommodation for those digressing from their views, particularly Shia Muslims, who are considered heretics and can therefore be killed. On the other hand, the Taliban, who have an equally violent approach to jihad, have a more nationalistic vision of forming an Islamic Emirate confined to Afghanistan and do not consider Shias to be heretics, warranting their deaths. ²³

This is one of the key reasons Al-Qaeda, despite a Salafist approach, was close to the Taliban, because the former had a more pan-Islamist worldview. This also pitted the Al-Qaeda leaders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, against their affiliate in Iraq, which later emerged as ISIS, due to the latter’s involvement in sectarian killings.

Incidentally, ISKP rejects participation in the international system shaped by the Western powers and considers engagement with perceived ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’ as a violation of their faith. It has also denounced opium cultivation, a practice tacitly supported by Afghanistan’s interim government. ²⁴ In contrast, the current Taliban regime has frequently engaged in international outreach to gain legitimacy. On the other hand, while the former rejects international aid, the latter has welcomed any help from external actors. ²⁵

Naturally, these differences come into play if defectors believe that organisational leaders digress from the core ideological worldview. Non-adherence to their ideological goals is presumably seen as blasphemy and un-Islamic that no longer warrants the defectors’ loyalty to their initial group members.

The defection of the Taliban’s long-standing allies, the Uyghur militants, to ISKP does not bode well for Afghanistan’s current rulers. Since the 1990s, the Taliban and terrorists affiliated with the Uyghur terrorist group, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), had stood shoulder to shoulder, the latter having even celebrated the fall of Kabul in August 2021.

However, the Taliban’s declaration of disallowing any terrorist activities from its soil, silence on the alleged treatment of the Uyghur community in Xinjiang and China’s insistence on the deportation of all Uyghur terrorists from Afghanistan have reportedly caused fissures within the Taliban ranks ²⁶ who are sympathetic to the secession of the Xinjiang province and have stayed true to their fellow Hanafi jihadist brethren. ²⁷

The ETIM members have, for decades, carried out terrorist activities in mainland China. Additionally, the announcement by the ISIS on its Telegram channels, revealing the suicide bomber’s (responsible for the bomb attack at a Shia Hazara Mosque in Afghanistan’s Kunduz province in October 2021) ethnic affiliation as an Uyghur ²⁸ denotes that the Taliban’s influence over ideologically aligned groups is now seemingly disintegrating. Although ISKP is ideologically opposed to Hanafis, the Uyghurs presumably perceive such Salafi terrorist groups as significantly more reliable allies vis-à-vis the Taliban.

As reports of gross human rights violations continue to emerge from Afghanistan, including the arbitrary and extrajudicial killings of former Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), some analysts assume this strategy has backfired on the Taliban. Allegedly, ex-ANSF officials have joined hands with ISKP ²⁹ to strengthen their defence against the onslaught of regime-backed fighters. While the credibility of these reports is yet to be determined, this could open another front in the potential civil war.

The Civil War Forecast and Its Domino Effects

Advertising the ‘pure form of Islam’, ISKP could set up rival centres of power and sleeper cells to pressure the Taliban. The Taliban finds itself at a crossroads as it tries a balancing act between reforming its image from the destroyer of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001, summary executions, suppression of women’s rights and having offered haven to Al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and fulfilling the ideological objective of governing the Islamic Emirate based on sharia, free from the clutches of the ‘invaders’ or the ‘Western-backed cronies’, on the other hand.

Without reforming its approach, the Taliban risks being accountable for single-handedly plunging the country into chaos. However, that would mean it would also alienate the chunk of its supporters who made its insurgency against the Afghan state successful.

According to Barbara Keleman, the lead intelligence analyst for Asia at Dragonfly Security Intelligence, ‘ISIS-K has been previously successful in recruiting members disaffected with the Taliban as those who perceive the Taliban as too moderate…. With the Taliban now seemingly implementing some moderate reforms, there is a high possibility that IS-KP will try to capitalise.’ ³⁰

Dragonfly Security Intelligence is a private intelligence firm with offices in London, New York, Singapore and Washington, DC. Such an analysis is not unfounded. For example, one of the initial members of ISKP was a defector from the AT—Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim. ³¹ He had fought alongside the mujahidin and served in the first Taliban government.

Perpetual warfare would create a security vacuum, transcending all corners of the Afghan society, opening several gaps for more radical jihadist groups to exploit. This is one of the trajectories Afghanistan could take once international attention recedes. It followed a similar pattern post Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Afghans fear that casualties of ordinary civilians will mount as bloodshed between the Taliban and ISKP intensifies in the foreseeable future.

The increasing radicalisation could result in a spillover in Pakistan which over the years has faced internal revolts from groups such as TTP and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), both of whom seek to overthrow the ‘farce’ ISIS that Pakistan claims to be and establish a state governed by sharia. Recently, former Prime Minister Imran Khan found himself negotiating with TTP and TLP leaderships to procure a semblance of peace, primarily in the aftermath of the AT’s victory last year. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has followed suit, albeit partially, by negotiating with TTP.

For example, since 2007, subsequent Pakistani governments have faced a tide of violence from TTP, a group that at one point brought the state to its knees. ³² Then it attempted to overthrow the state establishment and remould it according to sharia and an extremist and distorted interpretation of Islam.

The deadly attack on an army school in Peshawar in December 2014 ³³ serves as a chilling, nonetheless necessary, reminder of one of the several attempts by the group to achieve its objectives. This event resulted in the death of over 140 individuals, primarily students. The relevance of ideological cohesion binding these groups together would become obsolete and fragmented should the AT turn its back on the TTP. After the fall of Kabul, TTP renewed its pledge of allegiance to the AT and lauded the latter’s victory over the international coalition led by the Americans.

Sirajuddin Haqqani has mediated dialogue between Pakistan and TTP. ³⁴ His involvement is a clear indication of the significance attached by the state to this process. The Pakistani establishment hopes sustainable peace would no longer be a pipe dream by relying on its most lethal and sophisticated non-state power broker (who also wields influence over the opposing side). Understandably, a state besieged by insurgency cannot overcome its economic crisis. For that, it requires a prolonged period of stability. Former and incumbent prime ministers undoubtedly stand shoulder to shoulder on this matter, regardless of their public disputes.

In a significant breakthrough and narrative change, TTP released a statement on 9 November 2021. ³⁵ Three crucial points had emerged amid this development: The ceasefire would last until 9 December 2021 (with the possibility of an extension with the mutual consent of the warring parties, but it failed to materialise, and the country erupted in violence again. The fighting continued until the AT initiated the negotiations again. In August 2022, TTP announced ³⁶ a three-month ceasefire unilaterally). The announcement acknowledged the contribution of the AT and, by that virtue, the Haqqani Network as a mediator between the TTP and the government.

Additionally, by negotiating the truce with TTP, the Pakistani state, Haqqanis and the AT possibly hoped to direct all of their attention and resources on eliminating the resistance movement led by Ahmad Massoud. The phrase ‘Enemy of thy enemy is my friend’ is applicable in this context. However, the Pakistani Supreme Court ³⁷ and opposition leaders remained vehemently critical of the former federal government’s decision to negotiate with terrorists. In addition, the Sindh Assembly passed a resolution condemning the peace talks. ³⁸

The Taliban and the Pakistani state understand the NRF as a potent threat to uninterrupted rule and influence in the region, respectively. Furthermore, Pakistan needs to preserve its economic engagement with China via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which has come under grave threat from TTP and Baloch suicide bombers. ³⁹ If the Chinese leaders consider pulling the investment and abandoning this project, Pakistan’s economic collapse would become inevitable. As confidence in the latter’s economic prospects continues to plummet, it cannot afford to lose out on the sole economic guarantor of its survival.

Nevertheless, the ceasefire fell apart a month later as TTP accused the government of violating ceasefire principles, and the former government responded with drone strikes a week later. The strikes marked the seventh anniversary of the army school massacre in December 2014. The previous government’s attempts to negotiate with the ‘good Taliban’ within TTP were bound to fall short of the government’s initial victory. However, whether the Sherif government will face similar results is yet to be seen.

It is crucial to emphasise that previous attempts by governments also collapsed in the face of overarching opposition from the terrorists and the latter’s refusal to accept anything short of a militant Islamist victory over the Pakistani state.

Furthermore, the spillover could also entail widening the recruitment pool as disgruntled TTP fighters who oppose the AT’s parlay with West end up joining ISKP. This would not be unprecedented since veteran leaders of ISKP, including Hafiz Saeed Khan (first emir of ISKP), traced their origin to TTP. ⁴⁰

Such events would not remain confined to the territorial boundaries of Pakistan, as its implications would also be felt in India with a significant shift in the former’s rhetoric and conduct of its foreign policy. A nuclear state kneeling before radicalised groups with an anti-India outlook could prove considerably more damaging to India’s national security interests, mainly regarding the uptick in militancy in Kashmir.

India, which already faces uncertainty regarding the long-term implications of the Taliban takeover, would also have to face a challenge in countering the ideological and physical manifestations of radicalisation and terrorism. This is regardless of India’s recent engagement with the Taliban and the upgradation of its diplomatic presence in Kabul, as the interim regime’s ability to rein in terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan remains in doubt. Al-Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul until his death by an American drone strike in July 2022 and the presence of Jaish-e-Mohammed training camps in the country support the claim.

Furthermore, countries bordering Afghanistan, like Iran, could set up or capitalise on existing proxy groups like Fatemiyoun Brigade to ward off threats from the turf war between the Taliban and ISKP. The Fatemiyoun Brigade comprises Afghan Shia refugees in Iran and the Shia Hazara minority, who comprise 9%–10% ⁴¹ of Afghanistan’s total populace. Its members are battle-hardened, having fought alongside President Bashar al-Assad’s forces in Syria. Their alleged association with Iran’s security establishment and grievances stemming from persecution by the Taliban 1.0 makes them an additional threat to the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. Other neighbouring countries could follow suit, resulting in a highly militarised region. Consequently, the Taliban would find itself amid a war on multiple fronts.

The Central Asian countries could face a potential spillover, as heightened tensions and in-fighting in Afghanistan carry the possibility of terrorist outfits, including the Islamic Jihad Union, ISKP and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, intensifying their efforts. The civil war between ISKP and the Taliban would give them a desirable guise to wage insurgencies against the Central Asian republics.

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan share over a 2,000-km porous border with Afghanistan, and ISKP has intensified its propaganda campaigns against the Central Asian leaders, hoping to radicalise their population and boost their numerical strength. Therefore, mobilising armed forces and outreach to the Taliban are now deemed defensive actions to ward off threats posed by radicalised elements.

On the other hand, the International Monetary Fund has denied ⁴² interim government access to lenders’ resources. The international community hopes to achieve democracy, the rule of law and equitable opportunities for Afghan females through its carrot and stick policy. It has made the release of funds conditional on the Taliban regime not reversing the gains made over 20 years since the US invasion in 2001.

However, the international community should be careful not to push the Taliban off the cliff’s edge. Coercive diplomacy through continued isolation of the new regime does not guarantee that desired objectives will be achieved. As aptly noted by Obaidullah Baheer, a lecturer at the American University in Afghanistan, incentives offered to the Taliban could become redundant, and it could choose the path of isolation as it did during the 1990s if the global community does not change its course. ⁴³

The Taliban leaders could adopt a more radicalised discourse in response to such a strategy, setting Afghanistan on a path of prolonged turmoil, as this would provide a conducive environment for like-minded radical groups to mushroom. Additionally, narcotics and human trafficking would surge as the economy continues to deteriorate.

This has become particularly significant because the country is caught in the cross hairs of a humanitarian catastrophe and requires urgent and uninterrupted access to finances to reverse the unfolding socio-economic crisis. Additionally, if the Taliban cannot wage successful counter-terrorism operations and maintain long-term security, there would be minimal potential, if at all, for foreign investors to hedge their bets on the development of Afghanistan.

These challenges set the stage for undermining Afghanistan’s transition to a well-functioning state and undermining the security of the broader Central and South Asian regions.