Towards a theory of illiberal dualisation? Conceptualising new employment and social policy divisions in Poland and the United Kingdom

Introduction

Liberalism in Europe is under stress. In recent years, as a result of economic and freedom of movement crises, support has been growing for parties that reject European integration. Although some left-wing populists who criticise EU neoliberalism are part of this trend, many of the most considerable gains have been made by right-wingers (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Such movements are not only opposed to immigration and the EU, but also advocate economic policies that are more statist in orientation. Right-wing populists have made substantial gains in the political opposition in western European countries and dominate government in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, such as Hungary and Poland. The UK Brexit vote was also widely interpreted as a victory for right-wing populism (Ford and Goodwin, 2017).

Right-wing populists have revived certain ideas about employment and social policy. Although such movements espouse eclectic socio-economic policies, there is a tendency to reject neoliberalism and advocate measures that redistribute resources. The employment and social policies promoted by right-wing populists are nonetheless based on illiberal criteria. Because such movements hold ‘others’, such as immigrants, the unemployed and Roma, culpable for socio-economic iniquities, such groups are often excluded from the remit of redistributive policies. Such developments raise questions about prevailing approaches to employment and social policy. The marginalisation of certain groups is not new in kind, but its intensity appears to be increasing (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Literature on welfare chauvinism and dualisation provide clues about how such an endeavour might be pursued; the former examines resentment of welfare provision to certain groups (Van der Waal et al., 2013), while the latter posits that labour markets have a tendency to become divided between insiders and outsiders (Emmenegger et al., 2012).

In this article, we theorise recent developments with reference to such literatures and argue that there is a need for scholars of industrial relations to pay greater attention to illiberal criteria. Because right-wing populist ideas are increasingly finding expression in policy-making, there is an emerging trend for divisions based on welfare chauvinism to take root in employment and social policy systems. ‘Others’ such as the unemployed, immigrants and former Communists are stigmatised by right-wing populist discourse and, consequently, marginalised. In a parallel process, resources tend to be redirected to those demographics for whom right-wing populists purport to stand up, including pensioners, the employed and members of ethnic majorities, who tend to be defined against the ‘others’ of right-wing populist discourse. Literature on welfare chauvinism acknowledges these attitudes, but existing accounts tend not to recognise enhanced influence on policy-makers (Van der Waal et al., 2010). The relationship of trade unions to these processes is ambiguous. Though unions unequivocally oppose certain policies, other measures attract little opposition or are even supported; we contend that the attitude of individual unions is path-dependent.

Our argument is based on two countries, Poland and the United Kingdom. In the Polish case, we examine developments following the election of the right-populist Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, ‘Law and Justice’) government in October 2015 (Ost, 2016). PiS have attempted to reverse the neoliberal policies adopted during the Polish transformation; since 2015 a wide-ranging employment and social policy programme has improved conditions in the country. Though these measures have tended not to be based on welfare chauvinism, the existence of an aggressive discourse towards minorities means that certain indirect links exist and there is the potential for development in this direction; Poland therefore represents an interesting nascent case. The trade union relationship to these processes has been ambiguous; although the Solidarność union generally supports PiS, the post-communist Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (OPZZ, All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions) union has often opposed the government.

In the United Kingdom, we examine the record of Conservative governments from 2010. Though the Conservative Party is not generally a right-wing populist party, in the period under investigation right-wing populist ideas exerted a strong influence on its programme; there was, accordingly, a tendency for employment and social policy divisions to emerge that were based on criteria such as immigration and employment status (Grimshaw, 2015). Unions paid less attention to the redistributive measures introduced by the government, but unambiguously opposed measures that targeted minorities. In conclusion, we theorise the manner in which such divisions emerge. Specifically, we contend that the crystallisation of such partitions involves two processes: (i) the existence of a pejorative discourse towards ‘others’ and (ii) the transfer of resources from these ‘others’ to certain majority groups. Implications for unions and ideas for future research are also discussed.

Prevailing theories of welfare chauvinism and dualisation: time for an analysis of illiberal dualisation?

Welfare chauvinism has long been recognised by scholars (Andersen, 1992). This phenomenon, which involves citizens resenting the provision of welfare to certain groups, has been associated with racial differences; the trend has therefore been prevalent in the United States. As a result of recent immigration, welfare chauvinism has increasingly occurred in Europe and a literature has begun to develop that grapples with the issue. Some have spoken of a ‘progressive dilemma’ (Pearce, 2004). Such authorities contend that the European welfare state developed in conditions of ethnic homogeneity and, given the propensity for distrust among different ethnicities, is unlikely to endure in more diverse societies (Goodhart, 2004). The case of the United States, which is characterised by a diverse society and a residual welfare state, is highlighted.

Empirical support for this hypothesis is nonetheless mixed; although certain studies confirm such an effect (Alesina et al., 2001), other investigations into the American and European contexts have found no such link (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004). A series of studies have investigated wider issues associated with welfare chauvinism. The capacity of mainstream parties to adopt the chauvinistic positions characteristic of populists has been confirmed (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016), while research into welfare chauvinism across regimes reveals that the phenomenon is more prevalent in liberal and conservative systems (Van der Waal et al., 2013). Others have found that the incidence of welfare chauvinism among the least educated is associated with more limited cultural capital (Van der Waal et al., 2010).

A developed literature has therefore investigated the prevalence of welfare chauvinism. However, this scholarship has tended not to consider related trends in labour markets. Research on dualisation provides clues about how such an endeavour might be undertaken. Although this agenda does not address chauvinism, its conceptualisation of divisions between insiders and outsiders in labour markets is highly pertinent. Such partitions have long inspired academic interest. From the 1970s, following an economic crisis that saw the return of mass unemployment to Europe, mainstream economists considered divisions between the employed and unemployed to result from the substantial employment rights still afforded to European workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 1987).

In later decades, attention turned to disparate levels of employment protection. As a consequence of elevated unemployment rates and the growing perception that labour markets in Europe were ‘overregulated’, from the 1980s the peripheries of European labour markets began to be liberalised (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000). Such divisions inspired a literature on dualisation; this agenda was led by political scientists and concentrated on factors related to actors and policy processes. In a study of the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, Rueda (2007) proposed that such partitions were sustained by social democratic parties acting in the interests of insiders. Theoretical (Emmenegger, 2009) and empirical (Amable, 2014) critiques of this thesis were carried out, but later accounts extended the argument to encompass trade unions; because unions disproportionately represent permanent workers, they were regarded as more willing to consent to the deregulation of temporary employee protection (Palier and Thelen, 2010).

Well-developed literatures therefore chronicle welfare chauvinism and dualisation (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Van der Waal et al., 2010). Despite this scholarship, there has been little attempt to synthesise these concerns and scant attention has been paid to trade union attitudes to welfare chauvinism. Recent developments in European politics, in which welfare chauvinism has increasingly inspired policy, suggest the necessity of such an endeavour. As a result of economic and freedom of movement crises, there has been a rise in support for right-wing populist parties (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Though the employment and social policies advocated by right-populists often reject neoliberalism and attempt to redistribute resources, they are also associated with illiberal criteria. Because right-wing populists blame socio-economic injustices on ‘others’ – such as immigrants, the unemployed and Roma – there is a tendency to exclude the latter groups from the remit of redistributive policies. The relationship of trade unions with these processes is also worthy of investigation.

In this article, we move towards a conceptualisation of such partitions. Based on analysis of developments in two countries – Poland and the United Kingdom – we suggest that scholars might begin to consider employment and social policy divisions using new categories. In both countries, governments adopted employment and social policies based on illiberal criteria. A set of ‘others’, which included immigrants, the unemployed and former Communist functionaries, were sometimes penalised during this time. By contrast, certain citizens were rewarded; these groups were often defined in contrast to ‘others’ and included pensioners, the employed and members of ethnic majorities. The relationship of trade unions to these changes was ambiguous. Some measures were unequivocally opposed, but others attracted little opposition; we contend that trade union attitudes were path-dependent. Although our aims are broad, our goal is to call attention to an emergent trend that also has key implications for unions. Our ideas may then inspire future studies that examine narrower hypotheses; in a concluding section, we reflect on potentially suitable research questions.

In the first of our countries, Poland, the right-populist PiS party has been in power since the autumn of 2015. In contrast to certain other right-wing populists, PiS explicitly oppose neoliberalism. Since assuming power, PiS have therefore implemented a series of measures aimed at reversing the neoliberal orientation of post-communist Polish economic policy. Certain of these policies, the most high-profile of which is the 500+ family policy which provides significant levels of child benefit, have involved considerable redistribution of resources. Although these measures are not based on welfare chauvinism, the wider programme of PiS has involved discourse and policies that stigmatise ‘others’. Not only have PiS adopted negative stances towards groups such as refugees, but policies have aimed to disenfranchise communist-era security personnel; the Polish case, which remains at an early stage, therefore allows for an assessment of nascent processes of welfare chauvinism. The aggressive discourse of PiS towards minorities makes the case particularly interesting. The relationship of unions with these processes has been ambiguous. Although the Solidarność union has supported PiS, the post-communist OPZZ union has often opposed it. The Polish case is particularly representative of other Central and Eastern European (CEE) contexts. Though developments are partly specific to Poland, not least in the manner in which PiS have adopted redistributive policies, right-wing populism is also well-entrenched in countries such as Hungary and Slovakia.

In the second of our countries, the United Kingdom, the centre-right Conservative Party has been in power since 2010; the party has been in coalitions yet has always been the dominant partner. The Conservative Party is not considered a populist party, but right-wing populism has exercised a key influence over its recent programmes. A series of groups, including the unemployed and immigrants, have been stigmatised by Conservative discourse and policy (Grimshaw, 2015). Given the depth of this process, the case of the United Kingdom is particularly interesting; right-wing populist parties are stronger in other western European countries, but in a few contexts their ideas have influenced UK policy. Although measures that attack ‘others’ have been driven by neoliberal rationales, in certain spheres the motivation of the Conservatives has been more redistributive. Policies such as the pensions ‘triple-lock’ and the raising of the minimum wage, which were implemented to aid favoured groups who were defined in opposition to penalised ‘others’, led to a certain redistribution of resources. Though unions paid limited attention to these redistributive measures, they unambiguously opposed measures which target minorities. The case of the United Kingdom is representative of other western European countries. Although there are key differences between the United Kingdom and Continental countries, not least in terms of social and employment policy regimes, the use of right-wing populist policies by mainstream parties is an increasing trend in western Europe. This reflects the fact that, although right-wing populists have tended not to enter governments in the region, their ability to influence policy agendas is considerable.

Poland: towards an illiberal employment and social policy regime?

The post-communist Polish economy has been run on predominantly neoliberal lines, notwithstanding the separate approaches of different governments and the tendency for certain groups to be compensated (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). The PiS government elected in October 2015 was the first party seriously to challenge this consensus. PiS had been in office before, but its lack of a majority in 2005–2007 meant that its capacity to implement its programme was constrained (Dudek, 2013). A major goal of the PiS government that assumed power in 2015 was the amelioration of socio-economic conditions. Unlike certain other right-wing populists, PiS had strong links with trade unions and Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński explicitly denounced neoliberalism. One of the main grounds on which PiS had criticised the preceding Platforma Obywatelska (PO, Civic Platform) – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL, Polish People’s Party) government was its tolerance of inequalities between different social groups and regions.

After entering office, the PiS government implemented a programme that attempted to improve socio-economic conditions. The centrepiece of this agenda was the so-called 500+ policy. This measure, which was first conceived in 2014, involved a payment of 500 zł (around €120) for each child from the second child onwards; no income-related conditions were attached to this benefit. Families with low incomes were also eligible for the benefit for first children, if their monthly income did not exceed 800 zł (or 1200 zł in the case of families caring for a disabled child). The introduction of 500+ was controversial. Critics argued that it was fiscally irresponsible and would lead to a decline in labour market participation by women.

However, the reform appears to have led to a substantial diminution in poverty. According to the research of Ryszard Szarfenberg of the Polish committee of the European Anti-Poverty Network (Szarfenberg, 2016), the measure has reduced extreme child poverty by 94 per cent and relative child poverty by 64 per cent. There have been allegations that certain elements of 500+ are discriminatory (Rzeczpospolita, 2017); an indirect tendency for large Catholic families to benefit from the reform cannot be denied; but the policy itself does not discriminate on the basis of marital status.

Other measures introduced by PiS also ameliorated working and living conditions. Following a 2012 decision to raise the retirement age to 67, PiS presidential candidate Andrzej Duda promised a reversal of this measure during the 2015 presidential election campaign. After Duda’s victory, the retirement ages of 60 for women and 65 for men were reinstated. Although this reform was also criticised on fiscal grounds, it proved to be popular with citizens; according to the polling company CBOS, 84 per cent of those surveyed declared support for the measure (CBOS, 2016). PiS reforms of the labour market have also met with popular support. Besides relaunching tripartism, the minimum wage has been raised substantially.

The government’s programme has generally been supported by the Solidarność trade union confederation. Solidarność and PiS are allies and a key motivation for Solidarność was to move beyond the neoliberal approach adopted by the previous government. Solidarność has not supported all actions of the PiS government; there was disagreement on issues such as Sunday trading. But policies that tend to ameliorate socio-economic conditions have been supported. The Catholic-nationalist character of Solidarność also meant that the union tended to approve of broader elements of the PiS agenda. The position of the post-communist OPZZ union confederation differed. Due to its distinct political profile, OPZZ has opposed the government in many areas. Certain measures which improved living and working conditions were nonetheless supported, although OPZZ was prepared to emphasise the shortcomings of the policies.

The achievements of PiS in the spheres of employment and social policy are undeniably impressive. Although legitimate concerns have been raised concerning the sustainability of certain measures, PiS’s programme represents one of the most notable efforts to ameliorate inequalities implemented in Europe; reforms have also tended not to formally exclude minorities.

Whatever the vigour of its efforts in this sphere, however, the PiS government has otherwise been distinguished by its disregard for liberal-democratic norms (Ost, 2016). Aside from attacks on the independence of the courts and media, the new government has become associated with chauvinism towards minorities. This tendency has been particularly apparent in the attitude of PiS towards refugees. The party has expressed opposition to EU plans to relocate Middle-Eastern refugees to Poland; the comments of Jarosław Kaczyński, in which he claimed that refugees might bring rare diseases, became particularly notorious. PiS has also been distinguished by its Islamophobia. Hostility to Islam, related to opposition to the resettlement of refugees, has increased in Poland in recent years and has been encouraged by sections of the press sympathetic to PiS.

Such phenomena cannot be entirely separated from those employment and social policy reforms. Although these measures were not inherently discriminatory, the literature on welfare chauvinism indicates the importance of understanding the relationship between redistribution and broader attitudes (Van der Waal et al., 2010). In the Polish case, arguments about the redistribution of resources were linked to a wider suspicion of internal and external ‘others’. When PiS addressed the issue of inequality in Poland, it was therefore common for such problems to be associated with ‘treacherous elites’. There was a particular focus on alleged connivance between Communist apparatchiks and transformation elites; socio-economic injustices were associated with a supposed układ (pact) between these groups (Davies, 2016). Such worries were complemented by fears of the disenfranchisement of ethnic Poles by external foes; potential enemies included the EU, Germany and Middle Eastern refugees. Redistribution of resources within Poland was therefore associated, in the minds of PiS and their supporters, with confrontation of such forces. Having identified a series of groups who wished to subjugate Poles, PiS presented themselves as the only party prepared to defend the socio-economic interests of natives.

Aside from the indirect relationship between such discourse and measures introduced by the government, reform of the pensions of former employees of the communist-era security services directly targeted those ‘others’ that were the subject of PiS discourse. The issue of the pensions of these functionaries had long been controversial; it was indeed addressed by legislation in 2009, but on assuming office PiS returned to the issue. Advocates of the measures underlined the high pensions enjoyed by some; 32 recipients were reported to receive monthly payments of over 12,000 zł (around €2900). Parliament therefore passed legislation in December 2016 to reduce the retirement benefits of functionaries linked with communist-era security services; the policy introduced a maximum quota, based on average entitlements. The language used to justify these measures appealed to concepts of social justice; it was asserted that the transgressions committed during the communist era justified such reductions. A 2017 measure, which increased availability of benefits for victims of the Communist regime (Tygodnik Solidarność, 2017), was also inspired by such rationales.

The UK: a simple neoliberal roll-back of the state?

In contrast to the case of Poland, the orientation of recent UK Conservative governments has been predominantly neoliberal. This not only reflects the ideological sympathies of the Conservative Party, but is also a result of mainstream economic perceptions of the United Kingdom’s challenging fiscal position; public debt grew exponentially following the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis. After the conclusion of a coalition agreement between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in 2010, the coalition government introduced significant cuts to the welfare state and further deregulated the labour market. Literature has chronicled the nature of these reforms in some detail (Grimshaw, 2015; Taylor-Gooby, 2016). In the public sector, substantial cuts were made in health, education and local government; in addition to spending cuts in such sectors, measures were also introduced to restructure the sectors along more ‘marketised’ lines. There were also significant welfare changes; for example, there were cuts or freezes in the value of most benefits, reductions in the scope of entitlements, delays in payments for job-seekers and the introduction of a maximum welfare cap (Grimshaw, 2015). The labour market has also been reformed. Not only have additional obstacles been established for taking industrial action, but procedures for collective redundancies have been deregulated and workers seeking access to employment tribunals must now pay a fee.

Rather than merely implementing an agenda aimed at reforming the welfare state and the labour market, UK Conservative governments have also been remarkable for the extent to which they have tried to rebrand the very concept of the welfare state; the purpose of this scheme has been not only to justify the changes made but, in a further step, to explain away the transfer of resources to certain ‘deserving’ groups. The Conservative austerity drive has appealed to self-sufficiency, fiscal prudence and frugality in an effort to garner public support for reducing or even withdrawing some welfare services for the ‘undeserving’ poor (MacLeavy, 2011). The government has portrayed welfare benefit recipients and their alleged ‘passive culture of receiving’ as a constraint on the nation’s ‘entrepreneurial spirit’. The coalition government used the ideology of ‘hard working families’ as a means of inspiring a desire in ordinary people to live a worthwhile life. This is why Conservative governments have sought to marginalise weak social groups, presenting them as unproductive parts of society and blaming them for social problems, including poor education and housing and health-care crises (Fuchs, 2016). According to the government, groups such as benefit claimants represent an obstacle to those wishing to live a ‘decent’ life. Conservative governments have long been supported by an ideologically aligned press; the right-populist orientation of newspapers such as The Sun and The Daily Mail has become notorious.

Immigrants have been specifically targeted by Conservative governments. In the course of implementing austerity measures since 2010, the rights and protections enjoyed by immigrants have been subjected to major scrutiny. Government policy has served to further encourage ‘welfare chauvinism’ within British society, fuelled by fear of competition for jobs, education and housing. In these circumstances, Conservative government policy-making has instrumentalised such attitudes. Specifically, the coalition government pledged to reduce immigration ‘from the hundreds [of thousands] to the tens of thousands’ in 2010 and sought to renegotiate the terms of UK membership of the EU in 2016 to restrict the welfare entitlements for EU nationals working in the UK (Taylor-Gooby, 2016). This discourse went hand in hand with a number of attacks on welfare entitlements; the welfare of immigrants was restricted, for example, with regard to levels of access to social housing, access to health-care services for temporary immigrants and new requirements for landlords to check tenants’ legal migration status.

In contrast to Poland, trade unions in the United Kingdom have adopted a more adversarial attitude to government policy. Via lobbying of public authorities and protests, the unions have contested measures that reduce employment and social protection and/or target certain minorities. Unions in the United Kingdom are allied with the opposition Labour Party and have long opposed the Conservative Party, but trade union objections to measures that stigmatise minorities also reflect their political liberalism. The UK union movement is distinguished by social and cultural liberalism and has therefore long opposed the victimisation of minority groups.

Although the extent to which recent Conservative governments have reduced welfare entitlements and reformed the labour market along neoliberal lines is well attested in the literature, a phenomenon that has been less remarked upon is the tendency of these governments to use employment and social policy to redistribute resources to certain groups of citizens. In recent years, there has been a fairly significant transfer of resources to certain groups. Such groups are not necessarily more affluent, as indicated by studies demonstrating that income inequality has fallen somewhat of late (Office for National Statistics, 2017), but rather citizens favoured by Conservative Party discourse. The reforms, for example, improved conditions for low-paid workers. Not only was the threshold at which the lower-paid start paying income tax raised, but the minimum wage received a substantial boost: since 2016 workers aged over 25 have enjoyed an hourly rate of over £7. The emphasis on ‘making work pay’ is part and parcel of the discourse on the unemployed, which we discussed above. The government therefore adopted what might be considered a natural corollary of attacks on the unemployed, namely improving conditions for those engaged in work. This rationale was made explicit and featured heavily in relevant speeches and publications.

Pensioners were another group that have benefited from Conservative reforms. The pensions ‘triple-lock’, which guarantees an annual increase of the state pension by whichever is the higher out of inflation, average earnings or 2.5 per cent underpins a steady rise in transfers to pensioners. The privileged status of pensioners is partly related to political realities – such citizens are a crucial part of the Conservative Party’s electoral base and are also very likely to vote – but also reflects the logic of Conservative discourse. Pensioners are perceived to have made adequate contributions to the welfare state and to have worked hard over their lifetimes; they are therefore considered to ‘deserve’ their payments in a way in which the unemployed and immigrants do not. This rationale has been made explicit by the government and its supporters in the press. Wider society also seems to be sympathetic to such arguments; one instructive social media meme proclaimed that the ‘state pension is not a benefit’. A number of other factors have also inspired support for decent state pensions. Not only are current pensioners overwhelmingly white and British, but the fact that most people have pensioners in their family means that sympathy is more natural.

Trade unions have tended not to dwell on redistributive reforms introduced by Conservative governments, notwithstanding efforts to ensure that reforms such as the triple-lock remained in place. This is related to the trade unions’ tendency to focus on issues which they seek to contest, but also reflects the tactical imperative of maintaining opposition to Conservative governments.

Conceptualising illiberal forms of dualisation

The cases of Poland and the United Kingdom are admittedly different, but in both countries the development of employment and social policy divisions based on illiberal criteria has been discernible. Rather than being based on the economic divides typically identified by dualisation theorists, divisions associated with illiberal characteristics have tended to emerge. The crystallisation of such partitions is related to two processes: (i) the existence of a pejorative discourse towards ‘others’ and (ii) the transfer of resources from these ‘others’ to certain majority groups. Derogatory portrayals of ‘others’ have been apparent in both Poland and the United Kingdom. In Poland, the PiS government has consistently maligned groups such as refugees and former members of the security services; such vilification has been performed through both official and unofficial channels and has led to marked increases in popular hostility. A parallel process has occurred in the United Kingdom. In this context, Conservative governments have denigrated groups such as immigrants and the unemployed, with the collusion of a press that is sympathetic to the government; as in Poland, levels of popular antipathy towards such ‘others’ have correspondingly burgeoned. A classic explanation for this phenomenon might include the need to conceal wider inequalities; the argument is commonly made that the scapegoating of minorities deflects attention from systemic injustices in capitalist societies (Reed Jr., 2013). Although this explanation is relevant to both our countries – but particularly the United Kingdom, in which economic policy is very much neoliberal in character – this discourse can also be argued to have fulfilled the function of justifying transfers of resources away from stigmatised groups. Because of the vilification of demographic groups such as immigrants and the unemployed, there has been a tendency for measures that disenfranchise these groups to be greeted with sympathy.

This first process is therefore related to a second phenomenon: the transfer of resources from ‘others’ to certain majority groups. There have been more limited signs of this process in Poland; most reforms undertaken by PiS are not based on welfare chauvinism, although former security service staff were disenfranchised while significant transfers were made to other sections of the population; given PiS discourse, nascent trends may deepen in coming years. In the United Kingdom, in which the process has been more pronounced, resources have been directed away from immigrants and the unemployed, while the position of groups such as pensioners have improved. The means by which such processes are brought about are, admittedly, complex. Although in both countries there have been attacks on the position of ‘others’, the resources taken from the latter have usually not been allocated directly to majority groups. Negative discourse about ‘others’ in the countries studied here has justified the transfer of resources to certain majorities in a more indirect fashion. In both countries, redistributive social policy measures have therefore been accompanied by a discourse arguing that such groups ‘deserve’ such transfers. In these cases, it has also been implicit that certain ‘others’ were undeserving.

The means by which resources have been transferred to certain majority groups has also been complex. Although in some cases such processes have been direct – UK governments have explicitly sought to reward those in work – in other cases resources have been transferred more covertly. For example, the tendency for UK pension reforms to advantage white British citizens and for the Polish 500+ reform to benefit large Catholic families should not escape our attention; although such outcomes were not explicit goals of these reforms, the consequences are consistent with the discourses and support bases of the parties in question.

We consider such developments to be illustrative of a phenomenon we term ‘illiberal dualisation’. Although there has always been a tendency for certain groups to do better than others in social and employment policy regimes (Emmenegger et al., 2012) – often in a manner that reflects ethno-national divisions – the unusual extent to which this characterises certain contemporary systems means that this appellation is particularly pertinent; welfare chauvinism appears to be influencing policy to an advancing degree. This is consistent with wider politico-economic trends. As numerous authorities have noted, we live in an age in which political and economic liberalism is under sustained attack (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Much impetus comes from the populist-right; such movements emphasise ethno-national identities, while simultaneously demanding more interventionist economic policies.

A further issue concerns the role of unions in these processes. The consistent opposition that UK unions have mounted to measures targeting minorities is rooted in their political profile; not only are UK unions politically liberal, but they have historically opposed the Conservative Party. Given similar conditions in other western European countries, it may be expected that unions there will behave in a like manner. The situation is more complex in Poland. The attitude of OPZZ to the PiS government, which it has opposed, has been complicated by the redistributive nature of many of the measures introduced by PiS. In the case of Solidarność, the Catholic-nationalist profile of the union means that it is a natural partner for PiS; the union has not concurred with every decision made by the government, but it has failed to oppose its more illiberal impulses. We therefore conclude that the disposition of unions towards illiberal forms of dualisation is likely to be heavily path-dependent. Though the liberal profile of certain unions will mean that they are likely consistently to oppose measures that target minorities, separate backgrounds of other unions imply that they will adopt attitudes of their own. The propensity of illiberal forms of dualisation to transfer resources to certain groups of workers – which is more pronounced in certain contexts – means that there is much to tempt certain unions.

As we have emphasised, this article represents only an initial attempt to draw the existence of such regimes to more general attention. The focus of this article is broad and specific policy processes have not been examined in great detail; given these restrictions, it is inevitable that there are empirical gaps in our argument. We therefore conclude by calling for further research on trends that we have highlighted. Developments in other countries might be examined, but a more pressing concern will be to establish causal links more robustly. Future studies might achieve this by identifying specific forms of illiberal dualisation, closely examining the role of unions or conducting more in-depth analyses of policy processes.