The Effects of Centralized Government Authority on Black and Latino Political Empowerment

Abstract

Studies on centralization and its effect on political empowerment among racial minorities suggest that decentralized arrangements are optimal for increasing empowerment. However, this article argues that the “decentralization-as-optimal” perspective ignores the complicated history that racial minorities have had with government. To assess the effects of centralized government on political empowerment among racial minorities, this article examines how state takeovers of local school districts have affected black and Latino descriptive representation on local school boards. Using an original dataset of state takeovers of local school districts from 1989 to 2013, as well as case study analysis of Newark, New Jersey, this article shows that centralization affects communities differently according to the level of political empowerment they have at the time of centralization.

Keywords

centralization state takeovers race ethnicity political empowerment

How is black and Latino representation affected by state takeovers of local government? This question is part of a larger discussion in American politics concerning decentralized and centralized government authority. In the U.S. federal system, centralization and decentralization can take different forms. However, government centralization has generally meant the concentration of governance authority at the municipal, state, or national level (Meier 2013).

The scholarship on government centralization and decentralization has generally argued in favor of decentralized arrangements as a way to enhance democratic participation (Dye 1990; Rivlin 1992). Scholars have also focused on how political participation and empowerment among racial minorities increase as a result of decentralized arrangements and are harmed by centralization (Chambers 2006; Fung 2004).

Yet the focus on decentralization for the purposes of increasing political empowerment among racial minorities presents a puzzle. At times, the state has prevented racial minorities from achieving political power; and at other times, it has helped in the process of political empowerment. Scholars have shown how federal and state disenfranchisement laws and mortgage and housing policies, among other things, contributed to the political and economic marginalization of racialized communities (Pinderhughes 1987; Reed 1999). However, research also shows that racial minorities have relied on centralized authority to protect and advance racial equality and disrupt the policies and practices of local government officials who have intentionally and unintentionally prevented racial minorities from achieving political power (Greenstone and Peterson 1973). As Dawson (2001, 26) points out, African Americans have generally supported a strong centralized state because of the “federal government’s relative support in protecting black claims for property rights and human rights against public and private expropriators in the states and local communities.”

Although scholars have dedicated attention to understanding the role of government intervention in addressing barriers to political participation among historically marginalized populations, the scholarship has focused on federal intervention in states and localities. We know less about how state-level intervention at the local level affects racialized communities.

Historically, on issues of race, states and localities have unified in their opposition to federal intervention (Lowndes 2008). However, by the 1970s, the increasing presence of state governments in local affairs began to change the relationship between states and localities. Support from federal grants in the 1960s increased the capacity of state governments, which allowed state governments to expand their governmental authority (Hanson 1998; Manna 2006). In addition, under Presidents Nixon and Reagan, the era of “New Federalism” shifted significant governance authority from the federal to state governments (Reagan 1972). As state governments became stronger, they expanded their role in local affairs and by the 1980s, began to centralize authority over several policy areas, particularly public education (McDermott 2011).

As states increase their presence in local affairs, what are the political implications for communities of color? Because racial minorities have had a complex history in the struggle between local autonomy and centralized authority, when does state centralization lead to increased political empowerment for racial minorities? Conversely, when does centralized authority negatively affect political empowerment among racial minorities? To answer these questions, this article will focus on state takeovers of local school districts as a form of centralization.

In the United States, local governments have traditionally had the responsibility of governing the local public schools (Tyack 1974). However, by the 1970s, state governments became increasingly involved in the local public schools and by the 1980s, governors and state legislatures began to use state takeovers as a policy option to address concerns with local school districts (Burns 2003; Wong and Shen 2003). Although scholars have examined how state takeovers of local school districts affect educational outcomes (Wong and Shen 2003), we know little about the political implications of state takeovers, particularly, how state takeovers affect political empowerment among black and Latino communities; the communities mostly affected by state takeovers of local school districts.

To examine the effects of centralization on political empowerment, I focus on one particular aspect of political empowerment: descriptive representation. Descriptive representation has been one of the key factors that researchers have used to assess a community’s level of political empowerment. Although descriptive representation is not the sole factor in helping formulate political empowerment, scholars have pointed to “its symbolic or material importance as a necessary condition or positive factor towards group empowerment” (Hardy-Fanta, Sierra, Lien, and Pinderhughes 2005, 2). Scholars have used racial and ethnic representation in the mayor’s office and in city councils as a measure of political empowerment (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Kaufmann 2004; Owens and Brown 2013). Scholars have also demonstrated how descriptive representation can encourage political participation among racialized communities at the municipal (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Marschall and Ruhil 2007), state (Pantoja and Segura 2003), and congressional (Tate 2003) levels. In addition, scholars have shown that increases in descriptive representation can lead to positive policy outcomes for communities of color (Karnig and Welch 1980; Saltzstein 1989).

At the local level, the public schools have played an important role in the process of political empowerment, particularly for communities of color. Several works have shown how the schools and school boards are essential components in the schema of community political empowerment by providing a public sphere for citizen engagement (Fung 2004; Chambers 2006) and serving as a the platform from which to launch battles against systemic discrimination (Katznelson and Weir 1985). Scholars have also found that increases in black and Latino descriptive representation on school boards are associated with improved student performance (Meier and England 1984; Meier and O’Toole 2006) and increases in black and Latino parental and community engagement (Fraga, Meier, and England 1986; Marschall 2005).

Finally, descriptive representation on school boards has implications for political empowerment beyond the schools. Local school boards have also been the entry point for black and Latino political office holders. The rise of black and Latino politicians in many cities begins at the school board level. Henig, Hula, Orr, and Pedescleaux (1999, 34) show that blacks held seats on local school boards in major cities before gaining seats on the city council and electing the city’s first black mayor. Hardy-Fanta, Sierra, Lien, and Pinderhughes (2005) also show that Latinos serve on school boards at higher rates than any other political office. Therefore, the literature on political empowerment, particularly among racialized communities, suggests that the conceptualization of community political empowerment should take into account the role of the public schools and descriptive representation on the school board.

Since 1988, there have been more than 100 state takeovers of local school districts in the United States. Although takeovers are executed differently across states, a takeover results in the shift of governance authority from local actors to state authorities (Zeibarth 2002). In addition to centralizing governance authority of the school district, state takeovers of school districts disproportionately affect black and Latino communities. Nearly 85 percent of takeovers occur in districts where blacks and Latinos make up the majority of the student population. In several cities across the United States, citizens have protested the takeovers, claiming that the takeovers disempower their communities. Community members in Compton, California, where the state had taken over the school district in 1993, considered the state oversight a form of “slavery” (Reid 2001). The 1997 state takeover of the Baltimore school district had a similar reaction from community leaders. In a letter to the Baltimore Sun (1997), community leaders in Baltimore stated,

We will not accept Baltimore becoming a colony of the state, with its citizens having no say in the education of their children. African Americans, in particular, have fought a long, hard battle for equality. Over the years, too many paid the ultimate price for community empowerment.¹

The Compton and Baltimore examples show that beyond academic concerns, state takeovers of school districts also elicit concerns about a community’s political empowerment and loss of local autonomy. In most cases, takeovers result in the abolishment of the locally elected school board.² Some scholars have argued that takeovers violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965, by replacing elected school boards with state-appointed school boards (Green and Carl 2000). Researchers have also argued that a loss of decision-making authority for school boards has a negative effect on participation (Wirt and Kirst 1997). In some instances, the elected boards remain in place but are stripped of decision-making authority, which has led to community concerns over decision-making power. In Oakland, for example, although the school board was not removed after the takeover in 1991, board members and community organizations felt disempowered after the takeover (Ansell, Reckhow, and Kelly 2009).

In short, existing evidence suggests that state takeovers have a negative effect on racialized communities. However, the argument that black and Latino political empowerment is negatively affected by takeovers is reliant on the assumption that blacks and Latinos have political power where the takeovers have occurred; which may not be the case even in districts where blacks and Latinos constitute a significant portion of the population. Historically, population growth has not always been a sufficient factor for black and Latino political empowerment (Morone 1990; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2013). Race and ethnicity have figured prominently in the struggle for local political power in urban politics (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Dahl 1961; Pinderhughes 1987). Moreover, local regimes adopt practices aimed at deliberately preventing marginalized communities from gaining power (Trounstine 2006). The relationship between black and Latino communities and the local power structure is, therefore, complex, and a more complete analysis of the effects of centralization on racialized communities requires (1) a historical frame that reveals where a community is along the continuum of political power at the time of centralization and (2) a recognition that centralization may affect groups differently within the same locality.³

Although contemporary studies of centralization and its effect on political empowerment suggest that decentralized arrangements are optimal for increasing empowerment, I maintain that the “decentralization-as-optimal” argument ignores the complicated history that racial minorities have had with government. Instead, I argue that the extent to which centralization is harmful or helpful is a function of how politically empowered a community is at the time of centralization. As there has been little work done on the political effects of state takeover of local school districts and the literature on centralization and decentralization does not provide a framework for predicting the effects of state takeovers on communities of color, this study will employ a mixed-methods approach. The mixed-methods approach provides the opportunity to explore the complex dynamics of centralization through a case study analysis. The case study will help inform potential causal mechanisms that help formulate hypotheses that will be tested using an original dataset of the universe of state takeovers between 1989 and 2013.

The mixed-methods analysis will begin with a case study of Newark, New Jersey.⁴ The Newark Public Schools were taken over by the state of New Jersey in 1995. In terms of size and racial and ethnic demographics of the school district, Newark is similar to the majority of the other school districts that have experienced state takeovers.⁵ Like most cities that have had their school districts taken over by the state, Newark’s locally elected school board was abolished and a new board was appointed by state officials. In addition, the Newark case is instructive because the city faced the threat of a state takeover at two distinct periods for the city’s African American and Latino communities. The initial takeover of the Newark schools was proposed in the l960s when the black and Latino communities lacked political power in the city. In the 1990s, the state threatened the city with a takeover of its schools and eventually took over the school district in 1995. In this second period, African Americans had gained significant political power in Newark but the Latino community still had low levels of political empowerment. Therefore, the study of Newark allows us to assess how communities perceive and respond to the prospects of centralized authority at a time when they have little political power and when they have gained significant political power.

Case Study: Newark, New Jersey

Newark, the largest city in New Jersey, has a population of 277,140.⁶ African Americans represent 52 percent and Latinos represent 34 percent of the population, respectively. Latinos have represented between 25 to 30 percent of Newark’s population for the past thirty years. Blacks have made up the majority of the population in Newark since the 1960s. Fueled by a migration from the South in the 1940s and 1950s, Newark’s black population increased from 45,760 in 1940 to 207,458 in 1970 (Mumford 2007). The increase in the black population coincided with a rapid decrease in the city’s white population. Whites comprised 89 percent of the Newark’s population in 1940 and only 45 percent by 1970 (Mumford 2007).

The path to black political office-holding in Newark began with the local school board. Newark’s first black political officeholder was an appointed school board member in 1944 (Rich 1996). By the mid-1960s, African Americans constituted the majority of the population. However, as of 1965, the city had only one African American elected official, and whites, whose percentage of Newark’s population had decreased by nearly 50 percent between 1940 and 1970, remained in political control.

In their efforts to gain political empowerment, blacks focused their attention on the local school board. Although blacks and Latinos had come to represent roughly 60 percent of Newark’s population by the mid to late 1960s, they represented 60 percent of the Newark student population as early as 1961 (Lilley et al. 1968). By the late 1960s, blacks and Latinos represented 74 percent of the students in the Newark public schools (Rich 1996). Yet, representation on the school board did not reflect the community’s racial and ethnic makeup. At the beginning of 1967, there was only one African American and no Latinos on the school board.

In the summer of 1967, racial tensions escalated in Newark when a school board seat became vacant and the city’s black community expected Mayor Addonizio to appoint an African American to fill the vacancy. The black community, led by the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), had pushed Addonizio to appoint Wilbur Parker, an African American and the city’s budget director to fill the vacancy (Rich 1996). However, Addonizio appointed James Callaghan, a white Newark councilman to fill the position (Tuttle 2009). Following the news of Callaghan’s appointment, Fred Means, the president of the Negro Educators of Newark, said, “The Negro community is in turmoil over this injustice. If immediate steps are not taken, Newark might become another Watts” (Lilley et al. 1968). One month later, at Callaghan’s nomination hearing, one speaker “predicted that ‘blood would run through the streets of Newark,’ if Callaghan was named to the post at tonight’s meeting” (Mumford 2007).

The Board of Education decided not to confirm Callaghan’s nomination and the decision prevented further escalation. However, roughly two weeks later, the community’s frustration with their persistent subordinate status did lead to unrest in Newark. In July of 1967, the city of Newark erupted in one of the deadliest urban uprisings in the history of the United States.

In the wake of the 1967 unrest, the governor of New Jersey commissioned a report on “Civil Disorder” in the state. The report attributed the controversial Callaghan nomination as one of the factors that “helped set the stage for the July riot” (Lilley et al. 1968, 15). In addition to referencing lack of representation on the school board as a key factor, the report also cited the “state of educational crisis” in the Newark public schools. The report cited high dropout rates, dilapidated buildings, and shortage of teaching personnel as factors contributing to the education “crisis” in Newark, particularly among the city’s black and Latino students.

To address the lack of black representation on the school board, the Commission recommended that the state take over the Newark schools. In their view, the state takeover would have provided the opportunity to restructure school governance to provide blacks greater opportunities to influence school policy. Their plan called for “subdistricts” that would be “governed by boards of education, whose members must reside in the subdistrict” (Lilley et al. 1968, 171). In other words, state officials were prepared to use their centralized authority in an attempt to give blacks control of their local schools.

The black community, which did not have citywide political power, viewed the potential takeover positively. Several leaders, including Kenneth Gibson, who would become the city’s first black mayor in 1970, supported the plan (Rich 1996). Latinos, mostly of Puerto Rican descent, were not vocal about the proposed takeover. However, the lack of Latino representation and political power in Newark led Puerto Rican leaders to join African Americans to form the Black and Puerto Rican Convention in 1969, which mobilized to help Kenneth Gibson become the city’s first black mayor (Woodward 1999). As blacks and Latinos did not control the Newark schools, the state takeover would not have been detrimental to their communities.⁷ In contrast, white politicians, who still had political control of the city, opposed the takeover. Anthony Imperiale, head of the North Ward Citizens Committee, a vigilante group formed during the 1967 rebellion, who would also get elected to the Newark city council in 1969, called the state takeover plan a “governor’s dictatorship” (Rich 1996).

In short, support or opposition to the proposed takeover in 1968 was based on questions of political power. The white-dominated power structure viewed the takeover as a threat and a violation of their democratic rights. However, blacks, who lacked local political power, considered the potential state takeover as an opportunity to increase their political empowerment. Latinos did not oppose the takeover plan and coalesced with African Americans in an effort to increase their political empowerment. Despite the absence of black and Latino opposition to the takeover, the state of New Jersey did not take over the Newark public schools in 1968.

In 1995, the state did take over the Newark schools, and African Americans felt differently about the takeover. By then, the black community had political power. The city had a black mayor and majorities on the city council and school board. As a result of the takeover, the locally elected school board was abolished and replaced with an advisory board. In an effort to avoid being perceived as “colonizers,” which in their view would undermine their claims of legitimacy, the Commissioner of Education Leo Klagholz sought to assemble a school advisory board that was “representative of the grassroots community” (Larini 1995; Larini, Reilly, and Peterson 1995). After reviewing hundreds of applications, the commissioner decided on a board that descriptively represented the city: 53 percent African American, 27 percent Latino, 20 percent white (Walker 1995).

The abolishment of the elected board had differing effects on the African American and Latino communities. In 1995, before the takeover, five blacks served on the nine-member elected school board; representing 56 percent of the board. When the elected body was replaced with an appointed board, black representation decreased slightly from 56 to 53 percent. For blacks, however, who controlled the majority of the school board before the takeover, the switch from an elected to appointed board signified a decrease in symbolic (minimal, as the 3 percent decrease was) and substantive power. The notion of an “advisory board” had a negative effect on African Americans because prior to the takeover, they controlled the school board and had significant influence on issues related to district governance, budget, and personnel.

Latinos, in contrast, had very little power on the school board prior to the takeover. From 1988 to 1995, there was only one Latina represented on the school board, although Latinos represented around 28 percent of the Newark city and student population during this period. Furthermore, in the years leading up to the takeover, there was an increasing frustration among Latinos, that they were not part of the decision-makers in the schools. At an August 1991 school board meeting, during the public comments portion, a Latino community member stated that the “Hispanic community is displeased with the Board” and indicated “that changes must be made to include Hispanic leadership.”⁸ At another meeting, a Latina stated “that Hispanics are not getting their fair share” when referring to the absence of Latino leadership in Newark.⁹

Therefore, the abolishment of the locally elected school board following the 1995 state takeover of the Newark schools did not represent a loss of empowerment for Latinos. In fact, Latino representation on the board increased after the takeover. Before the takeover, there was only one Latina on the nine-member elected board. After the takeover, there were four Latinos on the fifteen-member appointed board. The increase in Latino members raised their representation from 11 percent to 27 percent, closely resembling their overall share of the city’s population.

Although the newly appointed board was only to serve in an “advisory” capacity, the Latino members of the advisory board brought forth issues of importance to the Latino community that were not raised at the board meetings prior to the takeover. An analysis of the board meeting minutes following the takeover reveals that Latino board members raised issues specifically concerning the Latino community, including concerns with bilingual education, construction bids for Latino businesses, and contracts for Latino vendors in the school district.¹⁰ The concerns brought forth by the appointed Latino members of the school board also shows that board members viewed the school district not only as an educational institution, but as a vehicle to expand economic opportunity to the city’s Latino community as well.

In addition to increasing Latino representation on the board, the takeover seemed to spur greater interest in school-level politics among Latinos in Newark. In 2000, the school board switched from an appointed board to an elected board, and Latinos participated at higher rates than in the period before the takeover.¹¹ By 2003, Latinos had five representatives on the nine-member school board (see Figure 1). This marked the first time that the board, advisory or not, had a Latino majority. Just eight years earlier, members of Newark’s Latino community had raised concerns about their lack of representation in leadership positions within the school board. Furthermore, in 2004, six Latinos ran for a position on the advisory board. It was the highest number of Latino candidates in the history of Newark’s advisory/school board elections.¹² Interestingly, despite the significant gains in school board representation, the Latino population in Newark had only increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 29 percent by 2000.

Figure 1.

Newark school board descriptive representation 1990–2006 (state takeover 1995).

The findings from the Newark case study show that time and place on the spectrum of political empowerment were important factors in understanding how communities perceived and were affected by centralized government arrangements. In 1968, the city’s black community welcomed the proposed takeover of the schools because they viewed the state’s involvement as an opportunity to break through the barriers to political empowerment imposed by the white-dominated power structure at the time. However, by 1995, when the state did take over the Newark schools, blacks were in control of the city and school politics and viewed the state role as an intrusion.

Indeed, the black community was negatively affected by the takeover. In terms of descriptive representation, black representation on the school board decreased after the takeover. In addition, the local black leadership was no longer able to influence school policy and play a role in school-based employment decisions to the extent that they were able to do prior to the takeover. On the other hand, the Newark case study also suggests that the state takeover was not detrimental to Latino political empowerment in Newark. As a result of the takeover, Latino representation on the school board increased. In addition, the increase in representation seemed to have a positive effect on Latino interest to participate in school politics in the years following the takeover. This finding suggests that symbolic representation that resulted from the state takeover may have led to increased levels of participation among Latinos.

The Newark case study helps demonstrate that centralization can affect communities differently. To further develop the theory and formulate and test hypotheses on how centralization affects black and Latino political empowerment, I will now turn to a quantitative analysis relying on an original dataset of the universe of state takeovers of local school districts between 1989 and 2013. The first state takeover of a local school district occurred in 1989 when the state of New Jersey took over the Jersey City Public Schools. Since then, there have been roughly 100 takeovers of school districts in the United States.

When states take over local school districts, state authorities keep the elected school board, appoint a new school board, or abolish the school board entirely. Following the takeover of the Newark schools in 1995, the state abolished the elected school board and appointed a new board. In nearly 60 percent of all state takeovers of local school districts, state authorities abolish the locally elected school board (see Table 1). The school board is replaced by an appointed board in 41 percent of cases. In 17 percent of cases, the school board is not replaced at all.

Table 1.

School Board Type after State Takeover of Local School District.

	%
Elected	42
Appointed	41
No board	17

The literature on elected versus appointed boards and their effect on descriptive representation is scant. Moreover, the existing research has focused on mayoral and superintendent appointments on the school board, not state-appointed boards. When a state takes over a local district, abolishes the existing school board, and replaces it with an appointed board, those appointments are typically made by the state’s governor and/or the commissioner of education.

As most research on appointed boards has focused on mayoral appointments, researchers have argued that the need to maintain or create successful coalitions, particularly in urban environments, has led to the “overrepresentation” of blacks and Latinos on appointed school boards. As a result, the research shows that appointed systems tend to lead to increases in black and Latino representation on school boards (Meier and England 1984; Welch and Karnig 1978). However, the research on appointed boards is not conclusive. In a study of school boards across the United States, Stewart, England, and Meier (1989) found that blacks were actually underrepresented in appointed systems.

Although the literature on appointed boards is inconclusive, and the literature on state-appointed school boards is exiguous, the Newark case is helpful in formulating hypotheses on state-appointed boards. As most state takeover laws are passed under Republican gubernatorial administrations, and Democrats have a strong presence in most urban localities, the argument that appointed boards result in more racially equitable representation because of a need to maintain electoral coalitions may not apply.¹³ However, the state is interested in being perceived as a legitimate authority. At the time of the Newark takeover, state officials were concerned with being perceived as “colonizers,” and the commissioner of education stated that he wanted to appoint a board that was representative of the community. By providing an opportunity for multiple groups, particularly marginalized groups, to be included in the governing board, states can purchase legitimacy, even if the representation is symbolic.

In cases where the elected board remains in place after a takeover, I do not expect a significant change in the descriptive representation of the school board. However, in cases where the takeover results in an appointed board and then transitions to an elected board, the Newark case suggests that we might expect different outcomes. In Newark, the Latino community had low levels of representation when the school board was an elected board in the years before the takeover. However, following the takeover, the state-appointed board increased Latino representation on the board. Furthermore, when the board transitioned to an elected board, the number of Latinos running for school board positions and the number of Latinos getting elected to the school board were the highest in the history of the city.

The possibility that symbolic representation may increase Latino participation is supported by the literature on descriptive representation. Scholars have shown that symbolic representation has positive psychological effects on marginalized groups, which can have a positive effect on political efficacy (Shah 2009; Tate 2001). Thus, whereas symbolic representation may not have had a positive effect on the previously empowered group (blacks), symbolic representation seems to have had a positive effect on the politically weaker group (Latinos).

So how do state takeovers of local school districts affect black and Latino descriptive representation? Figure 2 provides a diagram of the different types of school boards that are instituted by state governments following a state takeover of a local school district, and how we can expect communities to be affected by each type of school board.

Figure 2.

Conceptual model of effects of takeover on school board representation.

Based on the existing literature and the Newark case study, I propose the following hypotheses:

Baseline Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: State takeovers will have a negative effect on black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board in localities where their respective racial/ethnic group is politically empowered.

Hypothesis 2: State takeovers will have a positive effect on black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board in localities where their respective racial/ethnic group is not politically empowered.

Appointed Boards

Although the literature on appointed school boards is inconclusive, I argue that concerns with the perception of legitimacy will lead state governments to attempt to create descriptively inclusive school boards, which will result in more equitable representation for disempowered or marginalized groups. Therefore, I hypothesize as follows:

Hypothesis 3: State-appointed boards after a takeover will have a negative effect on black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board in localities where their respective racial/ethnic group is politically empowered.

Hypothesis 4: State-appointed boards after a takeover will have a positive effect on black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board in localities where their respective racial/ethnic group is not politically empowered.

Elected Boards

Hypothesis 5: School boards that remain elected after a takeover will have no significant effect on black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board.

Hypothesis 6: School boards that are initially appointed by state officials after a takeover and then transition to an elected board will have a positive effect on black and Latino descriptive representation when their respective racial/ethnic group has been positively affected by state-appointed boards.

Data and Measures

To test the proposed hypotheses, I rely on an original dataset of state takeovers from 1989 to 2013.¹⁴ I employ eight models using panel data regression with fixed effects. The panel data regression is useful for observing school districts over time. The first two models in the analysis are the baseline models. The first model uses the percentage of black school board members as the dependent variable, and the second model uses the percentage of Latino school board members as the dependent variable. I collected racial/ethnic descriptive representation data for the school board in each district that was taken over by the state dating back to 1989. For African American representation, I relied on the National Roster of Black Elected Officials by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. For Latino representation, I relied on the Directory of Latino Elected Officials provided by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). For descriptive representation data not accessible through the National Roster of Black Elected Officials or NALEO, I used a combination of strategies, including online and newspaper sources, as well as acquiring data directly from a particular city or school district. I relied on state and county Boards of Elections for election data.

The primary explanatory variable is “takeover,” coded “0” for the period before the takeover and “1” for the period after the takeover. For data on school districts that have been taken over, including the time period of a takeover, I rely primarily on the Education Commission of the States (2004), which has a database of state takeovers between 1989 and 2004. For state takeovers after 2004, I searched for takeovers in each state that currently has a law that allows for state takeovers. As districts transition from nontakeover to takeover, I expect black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board to be affected differently according to levels of political empowerment their respective groups have at the time of the takeover.

To examine levels of black and Latino political empowerment, I include “Black Mayor” and “Latino Mayor” (0 = no/1 = yes) and “Black City Council” and “Latino City Council” (percentage of black and Latino city council members) (see Table 2 for summary statistics). As levels of black and Latino political empowerment increase, as measured by mayoral and city council descriptive representation, I expect black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board to increase as well. Finally, I include a number of control variables in the models. The models include the political variable, “Republican Governor,” to control for the party of the governor in office at the time of the takeover.¹⁵ I also use the 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Census to control for population size and percentage of black and Latino population.

Table 2.

Summary Statistics.

Variables	M	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent variables
Black school board representation	0.357	0.359	0	1
Latino school board representation	0.082	0.185	0	1
Independent variables
Black mayor	0.297	0.457	0	1
Black city council	0.320	0.329	0	1
Latino mayor	0.052	0.223	0	1
Latino city council	0.070	0.164	0	1
Population	234,377	880,506	60	8,180,000
Black % of population	0.363	0.301	0	0.981
Latino % of population	0.161	0.218	0	0.974

In the third and fourth models, I use the same dependent variables, Black Representation (Model 3) and Latino Representation (Model 4), and the same independent variables used in the baseline models. However, in Models 3 and 4, I include several variables to test the empowerment hypotheses. I constructed interaction terms using “Takeover” and “Black Mayor,” “Black City Council,” “Latino Mayor,” and “Latino City Council.” As black and Latino representation at the mayoral and city council level increase, I expect the interaction with a state takeover to be negatively associated with black and Latino school board representation.

In Models 5 and 6, I test the appointed board hypotheses. The models include the following variables: “appointed” and “no board.” I expect state-appointed boards to have a negative effect on black and Latino descriptive representation on the school board in localities where their respective racial/ethnic group is politically empowered. Finally, in Models 7 and 8, I test the elected boards hypotheses. The models include “elected,” “elected after takeover” (school boards that remain elected following a state takeover), and “elected after appointed” (school boards that were initially an appointed board following a takeover and then transitioned to an elected board). The expectation is that black and Latino descriptive representation is not significantly affected by state takeovers when the locally elected board remains elected following a takeover. However, I hypothesize that black and Latino descriptive representation is positively affected when their respective group was positively affected by a state-appointed board and then the appointed board transitioned to an elected board.

An analysis of the descriptive statistics shows that African Americans represented at least 50 percent of city council membership in 34 percent of pre-takeover observations (see Table 3). In comparison, Latino membership on city councils surpassed 50 percent in only 4 percent of pre-takeover observations. Additional analyses show that African Americans held the mayoralty in 28 percent of observations during the pre-takeover period. Latinos, however, held the mayoralty in 3 percent of observations. The results of the descriptive statistics analysis show that Latinos had low levels of political empowerment, as measured by membership on the city council and holding the mayoral seat, in the localities where takeovers occurred. In contrast, African Americans held significantly more political power in the localities where takeovers occurred. Therefore, the results of the descriptive analysis would suggest that black representation on the school board would be more negatively affected than Latino representation on the school board, if the proposed hypotheses are confirmed.

Table 3.

Pre-Takeover City Council and Mayoral Representation.

	At least 50% of city council representation (%)	Mayoral representation (%)
Black	34	28
Latino	4	3

An analysis of the descriptive statistics also shows that the type of school board that states put in place following a takeover varies significantly by race and ethnicity. In 46 percent of all cases where a majority-Latino student district has been taken over, the school board remains elected, compared with only 24 percent in majority-black districts (see Table 4). In takeover districts where white students represent the majority of the student population, the board remains elected in 70 percent of cases. Furthermore, in 33 percent of cases where a majority-black school district has been taken over, the school board is abolished and not replaced at all, compared with 4 percent for majority-white districts and 0 percent of majority-Latino districts, respectively. The practice of abolishing school boards following a takeover, thus, is disproportionately affecting black communities.

Table 4.

School Board Type after State Takeover of Local School District.

	Majority black district	Majority Latino district	Majority white district
Elected (%)	24	46	70
Appointed (%)	43	54	26
No board (%)	33	0	4
Total (%)	100	100	100

Results

The results from the first baseline model (Black Representation) show, as expected, that increases in levels of black political empowerment are associated with increases in black representation on the school board (Black Mayor: b = .062; SE = .022; p = .01 and Black City Council: b = .110; SE = .053; p = .05) (see Table 5). However, as districts transition from nontakeover to takeover, black descriptive representation on the school board decreases by 4 percent (b = –.043; SE = .015; p = .01). In contrast to the black representation model, the results from the Latino representation model suggest that state takeovers of local school districts have a positive effect on Latino descriptive representation. As districts transition from nontakeover to takeover, Latino descriptive representation on the school board increases (b = .017; SE = .008; p = .05). Similar to the black representation model, increases in Latino political empowerment (Latino Mayor: b = .053; SE = .023; p = .05 and Latino City Council: b = .421; SE = .043; p = .001) are associated with increases in Latino representation on the school board.

Table 5.

Effects of State Takeovers on Black and Latino School Board Descriptive Representation.

	Black representation baseline Model 1	Latino representation baseline Model 2	Black representation Model 3	Latino representation Model 4	Black representation appointed Model 5	Latino representation appointed Model 6	Black representation elected Model 7	Latino representation elected Model 8
Takeover	−0.042*** (0.014)	0.017** (0.008)	−0.003 (0.020)	0.007 (0.008)	—	—	—	—
Black mayor	0.061*** (0.022)	−0.002 (0.012)	0.070** (0.030)	−0.002 (0.011)	0.063*** (0.021)	−0.002 (0.012)	0.064*** (0.022)	−0.003 (0.012)
Black city council seats	0.110** (0.052)	−0.010 (0.028)	0.174*** (0.063)	−0.003 (0.028)	0.137*** (0.051)	−0.001 (0.028)	0.059 (0.052)	−0.009 (0.028)
Latino mayor	0.034 (0.042)	0.052** (0.023)	0.031 (0.042)	0.011 (0.037)	0.030 (0.041)	0.052** (0.022)	0.030 (0.042)	0.048** (0.022)
Latino city council seats	0.018 (0.078)	0.420*** (0.042)	0.014 (0.078)	0.344*** (0.059)	−0.001 (0.077)	0.427*** (0.042)	−0.030 (0.079)	0.413*** (0.042)
Republican governor	0.001 (0.012)	0.005 (0.006)	5.61 (0.012)	0.005 (0.006)	0.001 (0.011)	0.002 (0.006)	0.007 (0.012)	0.003 (0.006)
Population	−9.85 (1.58)	−3.40 (8.61)	−1.52 (1.59)	−4.47 (8.55)	−5.00 (1.56)	−2.97 (8.65)	−1.01 (1.59)	−1.54 (8.63)
Black % of population	0.610*** (0.158)	0.042 (0.085)	0.584*** (0.157)	0.040 (0.085)	0.644*** (0.155)	0.047 (0.083)	0.590*** (0.158)	0.061 (0.085)
Latino % of population	0.275** (0.131)	0.328*** (0.071)	0.243* (0.131)	0.309*** (0.070)	0.211* (0.126)	0.364*** (0.039)	0.193 (0.129)	0.350*** (0.070)
Black Mayor × Takeover	—	—	−0.026 (0.037)	—	—	—	—
Black City Council Seats × Takeover	—	—	−0.0.93* (0.054)	—	—	—	—
Latino Mayor × Takeover	—	—	—	0.063 (0.044)	—	—	—
Latino City Council Seats × Takeover	—	—	—	0.118** (0.059)	—	—	—
Appointment	—	—	—	—	−0.050** (0.020)	0.008 (0.011)	—
No school board	—	—	—	—	−0.231*** (0.036)	−0.004 (0.020)	—
Elected	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.053*** (0.016)	0.011 (0.008)
Elected after takeover					—	—	0.007 (0.019)	0.015 (0.010)
Elected after initially appointed	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.057 (0.036)	0.035* (0.019)
Constant	0.075 (0.071)	−0.018 (0.038)	0.080 (0.071)	−0.009 (0.038)	0.049 (0.070)	−0.023 (0.039)	0.045 (0.072)	−0.038 (0.039)
R ²	.499	.660	.421	.621	.574	.668	.482	.684
Observations	844	844	844	844	844	844	844	844
Number of groups	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94

Panel data regression model with fixed effects.

p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

In the third and fourth models, I include interaction terms to test the empowerment hypotheses. The results from the third model (Black Representation) show that when “Black Mayor” and “Black City Council Seats” are interacted with “Takeover,” increases in black political empowerment are negatively associated with black representation on the school board following a takeover. Although both interaction terms suggest a negative association, only the Black City Council interaction reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (b = –.093; SE =.055).

Unlike the Black Representation model, the interaction terms in the Latino Representation model (fourth model) “Latino Mayor × Takeover” and “Latino City Council Seats × Takeover” are positively associated with Latino school board representation following a takeover. Although both interaction terms are positively associated with Latino school board representation, only the “Latino City Council Seats × Takeover” reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (b = .120; SE =.060; p = .05). The results of the empowerment hypotheses models suggest that increases in black political empowerment are negatively associated with black school board representation following a takeover but increases in Latino political empowerment are positively associated with Latino school board representation following a takeover. However, the lack of variation as a result of the very low levels of Latino representation in city councils and low numbers of Latino mayors in the observed districts in the pre-takeover period should be taken into account when interpreting these results.

In Models 5 and 6, I test the appointed boards hypotheses and include “Appointment” and “No School Board” as independent variables in the models. The results show that state-appointed school boards following a state takeover are negatively associated with black school board representation. In districts where a takeover results in an appointed school board, black representation decreases by 5 percent following a takeover (b = –.050; SE = .020; p = .05). The results also show that when school boards are abolished and not replaced at all, black representation is significantly negatively affected (b = –.231; SE = .032; p = .001). These findings suggest that when states take over a local school district and replace the school board with an appointed board or abolish it altogether, black representation on the school board is negatively affected.

In Model 6, the Latino Representation model, the appointment variable, unlike the Black Representation model, is positively associated with Latino representation, although the effect does not obtain conventional levels of statistical significance. Similarly, the “no school board” variable is not statistically significant, although the variable is negatively associated with Latino descriptive representation on the school board.

Finally, in Models 7 and 8, I test the elected board hypotheses. The findings show that elected boards, during the pre- and post-takeover periods, are positively associated with black school board representation. The findings suggest that when school boards remain elected following a takeover, black school board representation is not negatively affected by a state takeover. Interestingly, in the Latino Representation model, the only statistically significant variable is the elected after appointed variable. That is, following a takeover, boards that were initially appointed and then transitioned to elected are positively associated with Latino school board representation (b = .035; SE = .019). Similar to the findings in the Newark case study, Latino representation on the school board seems to be positively affected when the school board transitions from an appointed board to an elected board following a takeover.

Conclusion

In the 1970s, states became increasingly involved in local affairs, particularly in the area of public education. One consequence of the centralization of state authority has been the emergence of state takeovers of local school districts. By the 1980s, several states began to take over local school districts, and by 2010, thirty-one states had passed laws that allowed state authorities to take over local school districts.

The research has had little to say about the political implications of state centralization and state takeovers, particularly on communities of color. Furthermore, to the extent that the existing research is informative, the research suggests that a state takeover is unequivocally disempowering to local communities. In this study, I propose a framework that suggests that communities are affected differently by centralized authority, depending on the level of political empowerment their community has at the time of centralization.

This paper examined the effects of centralization on racialized communities by exploring how state takeovers of local school districts affect black and Latino descriptive representation on local school boards. Relying on a case study of Newark, New Jersey, and analysis of the universe of state takeovers between 1989 and 2013, I find support for the argument that the effects of takeovers are influenced by the level of political empowerment a particular community has at the time of the takeover. The findings show that state intervention has the capacity to address political marginalization at the local level by creating opportunities for previously excluded groups to participate in governance decisions.

In 1968, the black and Latino communities in Newark, who were politically marginalized, did not oppose a state plan to take over the school district because they viewed the proposed intervention as a potential path to political empowerment. However, in 1995, when the state took over the Newark schools, blacks had political power, and viewed the takeover as a threat to their political empowerment. Latinos, in contrast, who had low levels of political empowerment at the time of the takeover, did not view the takeover as a threat, and in fact, gained greater representation on the school board as a result of the takeover. Moreover, the findings from this study suggest that the symbolic representation of previously marginalized groups can lead to greater efficacy and political participation on the part of that group. Therefore, state governments can assume a role, which has been traditionally relegated to the federal government, of addressing racial inequities at the local level.

However, despite the potential to address political marginalization at the local level, the results of this study also show that state takeovers can have a detrimental effect on local communities. The results of the analysis show that blacks, the group with the highest levels of political empowerment in communities that experienced state takeovers, were most negatively affected by takeovers. The abolishment of locally elected school boards following a takeover disproportionately affected black communities. The practice of abolishing a locally elected school board and not replacing the board at all has primarily affected black communities. By comparison, although white communities are less likely to experience a state takeover of their local school districts, in cases where majority-white school districts were taken over, the state takeover of their local school districts did not result in the abolishment of the locally elected school boards. In sum, black communities are more likely than white communities to experience the political disruption that is caused by the abolishment of locally elected school boards following a takeover.

Since the research has shown that school boards are an important part of the local political ecosystem, understanding how state takeovers of local school districts may affect political empowerment beyond school-level politics warrants further examination. Furthermore, the fact that black communities have been disproportionately negatively affected by state takeovers of local school districts suggests that in addition to examining the effects of state interventions, the logic, justification, and intentions of state centralization should be explored as well.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

References

Ansell

Chris

Reckhow

Sarah

Kelly

Andrew

. 2009. “How to Reform a Reform Coalition: Outreach, Agenda Expansion, and Brokerage in Urban School Reform”. The Policy Studies Journal 37:717–43.

Bobo

Lawrence

Gilliam

Franklin

. 1990. “Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment”. American Political Science Review 84:377–93.

Browning

Rufus

Marshall

Dale

Tabb

David

. 1984. Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Burns

Peter

. 2003. “Regime Theory, State Government, and a Takeover of Urban Education”. Journal of Urban Affairs 25:285–303.

Chambers

Stefanie

. 2006. Mayors and Schools: Minority Voices and Democratic Tensions in Urban Education. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dahl

Robert

. 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dawson

Michael

. 2001. Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Dye

Thomas

. 1990. American Federalism: Competition among Governments. Lexington: Lexington Books.

Education Commission of the States. 2004. Takeovers: State Takeovers and Reconstitutions. Denver: Education Commission of the States.

10.

Fraga

Luis

Meier

Kenneth

England

Robert

. 1986. “Hispanic Americans and Educational Policy: Limits to Equal Access”. The Journal of Politics 48:850–76.

11.

Fung

Archon

. 2004. Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

12.

Green

Robert

Carl

Bradley

. 2000. “A Reform for Troubled Times: Takeovers of Urban Schools”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 569:56–70.

13.

Greenstone

David

Peterson

Paul

. 1973. Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty. New York: Russell Sage.

14.

Hanson

Russell

. 1998. “The Interaction of State and Local Government”. In Governing Partners: State-Local Relations in the United States, edited by Hanson

Russell L.

1-15. Boulder: Westview Press.

15.

Hardy-Fanta

Carol

Sierra

Christine

Lien

Pei-te

Pinderhughes

Dianne

Davis

Wartyna

. 2005. “Race, Gender, and Descriptive Representation: An Exploratory View of Multicultural Elected Leadership in the United States”. Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4, Washington, DC.

16.

Henig

Jeffrey

Hula

Richard

Orr

Marion

Pedescleaux

Desiree

. 1999. The Color of School Reform: Race, Politics, and the Challenge of Urban Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

17.

Karnig

Albert

Welch

Susan

. 1980. Black Representation and Urban Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

18.

Katznelson

Ira

Weir

Margaret

. 1985. Schooling for All: Class, Race, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal. New York: Basic Books.

19.

Kaufmann

Karen

. 2004. The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

20.

Larini

Rudy

Reilly

Matthew

Peterson

Lisa

. 1995. “State Takes Control of Newark Schools”. Star-Ledger, July 13. NewsBank.http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/1224CEDC8897BCD0?p=AWNB(accessed on February 2, 2015)

21.

Larini

Rudy

. 1995. “‘No-Nonsense’ Boss Named for District”. Star-Ledger, July 6. Newsbank. http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/1224CE4CBB333278?p=AWNB (accessed on March 7, 2016).

22.

Lilley

Robert

Brown

Raymond

Dougherty

John

Driscoll

Alfred

Gibbons

John

Leuchter

Ben

Lofton

Oliver

Meyner

Robert

Taylor

Prince

Wachenfeld

William

. 1968. Governor’s Select Commission on Civil Disorder. Report for Action. New York: Lemma Publishing Corporation.

23.

Lowndes

Joseph

. 2008. From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

24.

Manna

Paul

. 2006. School’s in: Federalism and National Education Agenda. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

25.

Marschall

Melissa

. 2005. “Minority Incorporation and Local School Boards”. In Besieged: School Boards and the Future of Education Politics, edited by Howell

173–98. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

26.

Marschall

Melissa

Ruhil

Anirudh

. 2007. “Substantive Symbols: The Attitudinal Dimension of Black Political Incorporation”. American Journal of Political Science 51:17–33.

27.

McDermott

Kathryn

. 2011. High-Stakes Reform: The Politics of Educational Accountability. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

28.

Meier

Kenneth

. 2013. “From Theory to Results in Governance Reform”. In Education Governance for the Twenty-First Century: Overcoming the Structural Barriers to School Reform, edited by Manna

McGuinn

353-374. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

29.

Meier

Kenneth

England

Robert

. 1984. “Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?” American Political Science Review 78:392–403.

30.

Meier

Kenneth

O’Toole

Laurence

. 2006. Bureaucracy in a Democratic State: A Governance Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.

31.

Morone

James

. 1990. The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government. New Haven: Yale University Press.

32.

Mumford

Kevin

. 2007. Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in America. New York: New York University Press.

33.

Orr

Marion

. 1999. Black Social Capital: The Politics of School Reform in Baltimore, 1986–1998. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

34.

Owens

Michael

Brown

Jacob

. 2013. “Weakening Strong Black Political Empowerment: Implications from Atlanta’s 2009 Mayoral Election”. Journal of Urban Affairs 36:663–81.

35.

Pantoja

Adrian

Segura

Gary

. 2003. “Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation among Latinos”. Social Science Quarterly 84:441–59.

36.

Pierson

Paul

. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

37.

Pinderhughes

Dianne

. 1987. Race and Ethnicity in Chicago Politics. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

38.

Reagan

Michael

. 1972. The New Federalism. New York: Oxford University Press.

39.

Reed

Adolph

. 1999. Stirrings in the Jug: Black Politics in the Post-segregation Era. Minneapolis: Minnesota Press.

40.

Reid

Karla

. 2001. “‘Comeback’ from State Control Means Solvency for Compton”. Education Week 20 (20): 1.

41.

Rich

Wilbur

. 1996. Black Mayors and School Politics: The Failure of Reform in Detroit, Gary, and Newark. New York: Garland.

42.

Rivlin

Alice

. 1992. Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, the States, and the Federal Government. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

43.

Rocha

Rene

Matsubayashi

Tetsuya

. 2013. “Latino Representation and Immigration in Local Politics”. Urban Affairs Review 49:353–80.

44.

Saltzstein

Grace

. 1989. “Black Mayors and Police Policies”. The Journal of Politics 51:525–44.

45.

Shah

Paru

. 2009. “Motivating Participation: The Symbolic Effects of Latino Representation on Parent School Involvement”. Social Science Quarterly 90:212–30.

46.

Stewart

Joseph

England

Robert

Meier

Kenneth

. 1989. “Black Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to Office to Classroom”. Western Political Quarterly 42:287–305.

47.

Tate

Katherine

. 2001. “The Political Representation of Blacks in Congress: Does Race Matter?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26:623–38.

48.

Tate

Katherine

. 2003. Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

49.

Trounstine

Jessica

. 2006. “Dominant Regimes and the Demise of Urban Democracy”. The Journal of Politics 68:879–93.

50.

Tuttle

Brad

. 2009. How Newark Became Newark: The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of an American City. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

51.

Tyack

David

. 1974. The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

52.

Walker

Steven

. 1995. “15 Newarkers Named to Panel Advising State’s School Administrators”. Star-Ledger, 9 September. Final, News (web accessed Newsbank on April 7, 2014).

53.

Welch

Susan

Karnig

Albert

. 1978. “Representation of Blacks on Big City School Boards”. Social Science Quarterly 59:162–72.

54.

Wirt

Frederick

Kirst

Michael

. 1997. The Political Dynamics of American Education. Berkeley: McCutchan.

55.

Wong

Kenneth

Shen

Francis

. 2003. “Measuring the Effectiveness of City and State Takeover as a School Reform Strategy”. Peabody Journal of Education 78:89–119.

56.

Woodward

Komozi

. 1999. A Nation within A Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and Black Power Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

57.

Zeibarth

Todd

. 2002. “Takeovers: State Takeovers and Reconstitutions”. Policy Brief. Education Commission of the States, Denver.