Hwang’s Philosophy for Developing an Indigenous Cultural Psychology

Abstract

Kwang-Kuo Hwang provides numerous recommendations for how to develop an indigenous cultural psychology. These recommendations may be understood to suggest proceeding according to three stages: (1) beginning with philosophical reflection on the meaning of modernization and exploring the topics of reality and structure (where such reflections ground one’s subsequent development of meta-models concerning self and social interaction), (2) adopting such meta-models as a hermeneutic for interpreting texts associated with one’s cultural tradition, and (3) conducting experimental studies on the basis of hypotheses derived from such cultural interpretations. Hwang’s philosophy is valuable in that it exemplifies a postmodern approach to cultural psychology that integrates traditional pre-modern forms of wisdom with modern methods of scientific investigation.

Keywords

Indigenous psychology cultural psychology philosophical psychology confucian philosophy methodology in psychology

For over thirty years, Chinese psychologist Kwang-Kuo Hwang has published research describing the development of indigenous psychology (Evenden & Sandstrom, 2011). For Hwang (2019a), indigenous psychology is a form of cultural psychology (p. 57). Hwang (1998) frequently quotes the phrase of Shweder who refers to cultural psychology’s recognition of “one mind, many mentalities” (p. 235; cf. 2000, p. 176, citing Shweder et al., 1998; Hwang, 2013b, p. 115). It is one thing to study the human mind from a global perspective and another to study the human mind as a mentality developed within a particular cultural context: “A mentality is owned or exercised by some group of particular individuals, so it can be a subject for research in cultural psychology” (Hwang, 2006a, p. 75, emphasis original).

In contrast with the study of a cultural mentality, Hwang (2005b) believes it is impossible to obtain a psychology of the global human mind by adopting only an inductive experimental approach:

This universal mind cannot become the subject of research in cultural psychology. If indigenous psychologists want to achieve the goal of universalization with the inductive approach, they would have to carry out a very large-scale research program by traveling around the globe to investigate all indigenous psychologies. (p. 8)

Citing Popper (1963), Hwang (2005b) proposes that a cultural psychologist first adopt a post-positivist perspective that develops indigenous theories “on the basis of previous findings… and then use these theories to analyze the particular mentality of a people in an indigenous culture” (p. 9; cf. Hwang, 2003b, p. 288, citing Popper, 1934/1959). When this analysis is conducted by a researcher who shares in the same cultural mentality, the resulting psychology may be understood to emerge by means of the “indigenization” of scientific research procedures “from within” the culture that is also under study (Hwang, 2019a, p. 10, quoting Kim & Berry, 1993, p. 22).

In contrast with the post-positivism that Hwang (2019c) advocates, he describes positivism as a “radical empiricism” that involves a kind of sensualism, a modern viewpoint that maintains that “the only reality is [comprised of] the facts experienced by sensory organs” (p. 127; cf. 2019b, p. 21). Hwang (2020b) maintains that his mentor Yang aimed to develop an indigenous cultural psychology in this way on the basis of inductive positivism (p. 61). Chang (2003) similarly contrasts Yang’s “positivistic empiricism” with Hwang’s “postmodernist spirit” (p. 239). Despite his reference to Popper, however, Hwang (2013a) states that he does not strictly subscribe to Popper’s program of scientific falsificationism; rather, Hwang is a pluralist in the philosophy of science (pp. 52–53). Hwang (2005a) refers to his outlook as a “multiparadigm approach” that draws on both indigenous resources and Western academic works (p. 234). Such an approach may require “an adjustment of the Chinese cultural system to accommodate some crucial components of Western culture” (Hwang, 2021b, p. 123).

Regarding the nature of a cultural mentality, Hwang (1998) explains that, “People around the world may develop particulars of sustainable mentality or ways of life in their own cultural communities from the potentialities of a universal mind. Therefore, there may be multiple, diverse psychologies rather than a single psychology” (p. 235). Hwang (2019d) interprets contemporary positive psychology (understood as ultimately originating from Aristotle’s ethics) as exemplifying one kind of cultural psychology (pp. 285–286, citing Waterman, 2008). With respect to the cultural mentality that is his own focus, Hwang (2017a) states that his work has aimed at “establishing a tradition of autonomous social science in Confucian culture” (p. 1).

Hwang’s approach to developing an indigenous cultural psychology involves three stages that may have some relation to the three-level interpretation approach of Taylor (which in turn is indebted to the “ontological hermeneutic” of Gadamer): “in consideration of Taylor’s (1989) philosophy, I do believe that his three levels of interpretation are… appropriate for indigenous psychologists” (Hwang, 2019b, p. 69; cf. p. 68 citing Taylor, 1973; Gadamer, 1960). For Hwang (2004), the first stage of research when developing an indigenous cultural psychology involves philosophical reflection and exploration of the Western philosophy of science (Hwang, 2004, p. 172; 2010, p. 100). One is then prepared to proceed with the task of theoretical development. With respect to Taylor’s hermeneutics, this task concerns “the interpretation… made by [a] social scientist from a particular perspective of social science” (Hwang, 2019b, p. 68, citing Taylor, 1973). The first stage of Hwang’s theoretical cultural psychology concerns his formulation of two meta-models—his Face and Favor meta-model (hereafter “miàn zi meta-model”) that describes social interaction (Hwang, 1987) and his mandala model of self (hereafter “mandala meta-model”) (Hwang, 2011a). I explain below why I refer to these theories as ‘meta-models’.

The second stage of Hwang’s approach to developing an indigenous cultural psychology occurs at “the cultural system level” (Hwang, 2015a, p. 18). At this stage, Hwang offers a “reinterpretation” of important texts in the Chinese cultural tradition in light of one or both of his meta-models (Hwang, 2013a, pp. 54–55). This reinterpretation enables the formulation of derivative culture-inclusive theories that might illuminate psychosocial processes exhibited in Chinese contexts (Hwang, 2019c). With respect to Taylor’s hermeneutics, this second level of research involves exploring the “meanings” of “vocabulary [that] can be understood only in the linguistic system of a particular culture” (Hwang, 2019b, p. 68, citing Taylor, 1973).

The last stage of developing an indigenous cultural psychology involves experimental research that occurs at “the social-cultural level” (Hwang, 2015a, p. 18). At this stage, Hwang reinterprets existing studies of experimental research (Hwang, 1998). He also conducts new research experiments in light of his culture-inclusive theories (Hsu & Hwang, 2016; Shiah & Hwang, 2019). With respect to Taylor’s hermeneutics, this third level of research involves persons using “vocabulary of meanings to experience… situations in daily life” (Hwang, 2019b, p. 68, citing Taylor, 1973). In what follows, I provide an overview of each of these three stages of Hwang’s research philosophy. For reasons that will become clear in the discussion, I refer to these stages as (1) integrative meta-theory, (2) cultural interpretation, and (3) experimental research.

Stage one: Part one—preliminary philosophical reflections

The meaning of modernization

Hwang (2004) maintains that the first stage of research when developing an indigenous cultural psychology is to engage in philosophical reflection (p. 172). Elsewhere, he writes: “the crucial factor for promoting the indigenization of psychology lies in philosophy, not psychology itself” (Hwang, 2019a, p. 19). The first philosophical question a researcher might ask concerns what meaning modernization has in non-Western cultures (Hwang, 2009b, p. 119; cf. 2009a, p. 931). Hwang (2003a) describes modern culture as involving a Western “method of rational thinking” that emerged during the European Renaissance in the 1300s that can be associated with the development of scientific methods (p. 242; cf. Hwang, 2004, p. 173; 2006a, p. 84). Hwang (1999) notes that in East Asia a kind of modern culture is communicated along with the spread of capitalist economies, where “increasing numbers of people have given up their traditional ways of life and adopted modern ones” (p. 178). This kind of cultural colonization of non-Western peoples is further facilitated by global mass media communications (Hwang, 2003a, p. 247, citing Habermas, 1978). While in “Western countries” Hwang perceives this kind of “rationalization” to have modified “every aspect of the cultural tradition,” in Asia there may still be found “the coexistence of modernity and traditionalism,” where two forms of knowledge are “mixed” and persons might “switch cognitive frames” depending on their context (Hwang, 2003a, p. 245, citing Kitayama & Markus, 1999). This kind of coexistence is possible in some Asian societies because the “main task” of universities in certain contexts “is to train technicians… rather than to promote the rationalization of their cultural systems” (Hwang, 2006a, p. 89). The coexistence of two cultural mentalities in this regard can result in a kind of psychosocial compartmentalization on the part of such persons (p. 245, citing Yang, 1988). Such a psychosocial compartmentalization may be accentuated if a person experiences “cognitive conflict across different domains of life” (Hwang, 2003a, p. 246). Hwang (2004) suggests that these two cognitive modes of thinking (i.e. frames) may also be correlated with Heidegger’s distinction between technical and non-technical thinking (p. 175, citing Heidegger, 1966). If modernity brings with it technological advances, Hwang (2003a) is also aware that it can facilitate a “degeneration” of reason into a mode of “instrumental rationality” (p. 254, citing Husserl, 1936/1970). The scientific theories that instrumental reason develops cannot answer fundamental perennial questions of human existence concerning the ultimate meaning of self, suffering, and salvation (Hwang, 2004, p. 176). Through the indigenization of the modernization process, modernization does not need to be identified with Westernization or the loss of Eastern cultural traditions (Hwang, 1995a, p. 12). Another way to understand indigenization might be to refer to it as a self-appropriation of the modernization process such that it does not proceed as a kind of assimilation but rather as a “pragmatic acculturation” that integrates non-indigenous cultural elements judged to be useful and compatible (cf. Hwang, 1995a, p. 4, citing Quah, 1995, p. 288).

Hwang (2004) maintains that it is therefore the purpose of indigenous cultural psychology to seek to integrate scientific knowledge into a cultural heritage resulting in a “combination of types of knowledge” (p. 179, citing Hong et al., 2000). Hwang (2021b) indicates that such a combination serves “an urgent need” in contemporary education for preserving pre-modern forms of wisdom within modernized scientific cultures:

Confucian scholars of any generation must be able to elaborate and transform [Confucian ethics and morality] from the first-order implicit wisdom into the second-order explicit knowledge for educating the current young generation on the basis of their academic horizons…. It remains an urgent need for Chinese scholars to figure out a modern epistemological strategy to successfully undertake a creative transformation of Confucianism for the present day. (p. 144)

Hwang’s research approach may thus be interpreted not only to focus on the topic of modernization in contemporary Chinese culture, but also to model a particular approach to that process in terms of his dialectical engagement with both Eastern wisdom and Western philosophy of science (Hwang, 1988; cf. 1999, pp. 178–181; Yang, 1988).

Modernization was the topic of Hwang’s early research with Yang (Hwang & Yang, 1972) before Hwang worked on his PhD at the University of Hawaii (1972–1976) (Hwang, 2017b, p. 562). Hwang’s philosophy works toward overcoming (or at least regulating) bicultural compartmentalization through his creative integration of sources and critical reflection on the presuppositions of modern Western philosophy and science (Hwang, 2001b). Hwang’s work thus explicitly models the value of “comprehensive integration” in learning (Hwang, 2001a, p. 194, citing Confucius, The Analects, Book II, Ch. 15, where Confucius refers to the value of both learning from others and thinking about what one has learned—see Confucius, 1979). In a recent essay, he writes: “we are facing a new situation of the world that cannot be understood though the simple distinction between traditional and modern culture. The uni-dimensional perspective of human development towards modernization is out-of-date” (Hwang, 2022).

Structural realism

A second philosophical reflection Hwang (2009b) proposes for cultural psychologists is to consider the goals of their inquiry and to clarify their understanding of structure in relation to the reality of psychosocial activity (p. 122). Hwang refers to his theoretical work as occurring within the context of philosophical realism (Hwang, 1998, p. 235). He elaborates in later studies that the kind of realism involved is aligned with Bhaskar’s critical realism (Hwang, 2015a, pp. 16–17, citing Bhaskar, 1975 & 1978). According to this viewpoint, “The objects of scientific research are neither the phenomena (empiricism) nor the constructs imposed on the phenomena (idealism), but the real structures that exist and operate independently from our knowledge…. nature is not a product manufactured by human beings” (Hwang, 2016a, p. 101). Hwang also brings this realist viewpoint into connection with the “evolutionary epistemology” of Popper (1963) who similarly “assumes that there exists an ontological reality beyond our sensory experience,” an “objective world” or “noumenon” described by theory, which for Bhaskar (1975) is approached indirectly on the basis of an “inference from an observed phenomenon to a lasting structure” or to an underlying “fundamental mechanism that makes the event possible” (Hwang, 2016a, pp. 102–103). On the basis of this realist philosophy of science, Hwang (2020b) indicates that an indigenous cultural psychology might aim “to explain the reality behind the observed phenomena” (p. 64).

Hwang (2016a) elaborates how cultural psychology might investigate real psychosocial structures in this regard:

All subjects, material or social, have certain structures and powers. In the field of social science, structures are defined as sets of internally related objects or practices that can be used to refer to large social institutions, as well as to small structures at the interpersonal level. Those universal mechanisms deal with something real in our lifeworlds; such philosophical advocacy is called ontological realism. (p. 104)

With respect to social structures as distinct from material structures, Hwang (2015b) maintains that both of his meta-models exemplify what Vygotsky referred to as a psychology of intentionality as distinct from a causal psychology (p. 41 and p. 49, citing Vygotsky, 1927/1997). Hwang (2015a) also correlates this distinction with Vygotsky’s distinction between a human psychology and an animal psychology, as well as with Wundt’s distinction between a folk psychology (social structures) and a physiological psychology (material structures)—which correlates with Dilthey’s distinction between the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) and the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) (p. 3; cf. 2016a, p. 99, citing Wundt, 1873; cf. Dilthey, 2002).

Aiming to describe real psychosocial structures at the level of human science, Hwang (2015a) maintains that both of his meta-models represent “universal mechanisms… which might be manifested or cognitively activated in any given event of self-reflection or social interaction” (p. 16). Hwang suggests that the miàn zi meta-model may even “reflect the deep structure of universal human mind” (Hwang, 2009b, p. 112). Hwang encountered the phrase “deep structure of culture” in an address by Greenfield in 1999 (Hwang, 2009b, p. 118, citing Greenfield, 2000, p. 229). In his writings, he frequently utilizes this phrase to denote both the global structure of the human mind as well as the contextual structure of cultural mentalities. Greenfield’s phrase encourages Hwang’s interest in using a “method of structuralism” to develop a psychosocial interpretation of the Chinese cultural tradition (Hwang, 1995b; 1995c, p. 16; Hwang, 2003a, p. 249, notes a similar structuralist approach in Li, 1992). Regarding “structuralism,” Hwang (2000) explains that,

people are able to find the deep structure underlying a family of language games played in daily life. In the long history of a given culture, people may develop surface structures of myths, proverbs, mores, and customs from the deep structures of their cultural traditions by metaphoric or metanymic rules. (p. 175, citing Lévi-Strauss, 1973 and 1978)

Such a deep cultural structure, Hwang (2006a) states, is largely unconscious: “People are unaware of it directly in their daily lives, but researchers may reveal the deep structure using the methods of structuralism” (p. 91).

There is also a global structure of the human mind, Hwang (2015a) indicates, that is partially influenced by human biology: Any indigenous theory

must represent not only the universal mind of human beings determined by biological factors, but also mentalities of people shaped in a particular culture. Therefore, the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is destined to integrate the philosophy of natural and social sciences which had been addressed by the philosophy of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975; 1978). (pp. 16–17)

Since Hwang (2005b) believes it is impossible to obtain a global psychology of the human mind by employing an inductive experimental approach (p. 8), he might be understood in this remark to propose approaching the globality of the human mind in terms of a “contextualized universalism”: for example, Hwang (2020a) writes: “For Confucians, universalism and particularism are not concepts of binary opposition; they should be viewed as two aspects of a totality, which can be termed contextualized universalism” (p. 874, citing Lin, 2002). In this way, according to Hwang (2017b), his meta-models “can be used to analyze other cultural system[s]” (p. 561, emphasis added).

Stage one: Integrative meta-theory

A meta-model of social interaction

After adopting certain perspectives in philosophical reflection, Hwang (2020b) indicates that one might then develop “universal models… on the ground of Western philosophy of science” (p. 65). Hwang’s meta-models enable “the vast stock of knowledge on Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism [to be] transformed into [the] modern language of psychology” (Hwang, 2020b, p. 65). Hwang’s first major model is his Face and Favor theory (or miàn zi meta-model) of social interaction (Hwang, 1987). In the original article, he refers to four “indigenous concepts” associated with the Chinese language that previous social science researchers observed were important for understanding interpersonal relationships in Chinese culture: face (miàn zi), favor (rén qíng), relationship (guān xì), and repayment or reciprocity (bào ēn) (Hwang, 1987, p. 945, noting that he employs the pinyin transliteration system for Mandarin Chinese). Hwang (1987) states that these four indigenous topics have been studied individually by previous researchers (pp. 944–945, citing King & Myers, 1977; King, 1980; Chiao, 1982; Wen, 1982). Hwang (1987) also references the work of previous social psychologists who in developing social exchange theory pointed to equity, equality, and need as global norms or rules of justice (p. 945, citing Deutsch, 1975).

When developing his miàn zi meta-model, Hwang (1987) worked to “integrate” the four indigenous Chinese topics listed just above in light of social exchange theory in order to develop “a conceptual framework” that “depicts not only a prototype of social behavior in Chinese society,” but also provides “a general model for illustrating the process of social interactions in most cultures” (p. 945; cf. Hwang, 1999, p. 163). On the basis of this remark, I refer to this stage of Hwang’s research philosophy as developing an integrative theory. If this task requires “creative imagination” (Hwang, 2013a, p. 54), it is not an effort of pure invention, but rather one focused on pre-existing cultural topics and partial social science theories.

Hwang’s miàn zi meta-model specifically aims to illustrate “the psychological processes” of a “resource allocator” who cognitively references the indigenous topics listed above as well as rules of justice when making decisions in response to petitioners (Hwang, 1987, p. 947 and p. 949). With respect to such psychological processes, Hwang (1987) diagrams the resource allocator as proceeding through specific stages of reflection (p. 948; 1995c, p. 22). First, the allocator must first judge the nature of the relationship (guān xì): Does the relationship involve an expressive bond or tie involving affection and warmth such as relationships among family members or close friendships (Hwang, 1987, p. 949)? If so, the relationship is an end in itself (Hwang, 1987, p. 950). If this is the kind of relationship at hand (an “expressive tie”), the allocator may reference a need rule in order to evaluate the distribution of a requested resource and also seek to avoid the dilemma of becoming entangled in intra-family conflicts (Hwang, 1987, pp. 949–50). Alternatively, does the guān xì involve an instrumental tie where the relationship serves as a means for some other end—for example, a relationship that provides a professional service (Hwang, 1987, p. 950)? If this is the kind of relationship at hand (an “instrumental tie”), the allocator might reference an equity rule (Hwang, 1987, p. 951). Lastly, does the guān xì involve a “mixed tie” involving some degree of affection where a concern may also be elicited with one’s face or reputation (miàn zi) and favor (rén qíng)—for example, relationships involving extended family members, neighbors, or colleagues (Hwang, 1987, p. 952; cf. Hwang & Han, 2010, p. 481)? While the phrase miàn zi might denote one’s reputation, rén qíng can denote receiving a gift from a donor as well as reciprocation (including the distribution of a good return to cooperators in a common work)—or rén qíng can denote the performance of some social behavior that maintains a relationship in good standing (Hwang, 1987, pp. 954–55). To owe rén qíng to another is to be in another’s debt; some persons may wish to evade such a relational entanglement by having recourse to “cultural devices”—for example, discerning ways to leave a particular network of relationships (Hwang, 1987, pp. 963–67).

Hwang (1997–1998) later clarifies that his miàn zi meta-model aims to depict social interaction “on the basis of symbolic interactionism and social exchange theory” (p. 17). As an example of what Hwang means by “a symbolic approach for cultural psychology,” he refers to Kitayama (2002) who describes culture as both internal (psychological) and external as expressed in behaviors and in enduring public artifacts (Hwang, 2003b, p. 290). Hwang also agrees with Berry who quotes Geertz’s proposal that culture involves the transmission of a “pattern of meaning” in history by means of exterior symbols (Hwang, 2013a, pp. 55–56, quoting Berry, 2000, p. 199, who in turn quotes Geertz, 1973, p. 89).

A meta-model of self

After the miàn zi meta-model, Hwang’s next major theory is his mandala model of self (Hwang, 2011b; Shiah & Hwang, 2019). Hwang (2019c) states that the general background of this theory concerns “one’s intentional searching for self-nature (zì xíng)” in association with religious practice in Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism (p. 128). Regarding this meta-model, Hwang (2011a) states:

The so-called “self” in this model refers to an individual who has been socialized with the ability of reflexivity, whose life world can be represented by a structural model, with a circle inside a square [i.e. a mandala]…. Mandala can be viewed as a symbol for the prototype, or the deep structure of the Self. (p. 329)

Hwang (2019d) states that use of the mandala structure to represent the self was inspired by his visit to the Buddhist Borobudur Temple in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in 2010, a building that also has a mandala-like architectural design (p. 286). The mandala (a circle within a square) might be understood as depicting a human being striving for wholeness (the circle) within embodied existence (the square) (Hwang, 2019d, p. 288).

Drawing on Harris (1989), Hwang employs anthropological distinctions that consider a human being as a biological individual, a psychological self, and a social person (Hwang, 1999, p. 164). With respect to the mandala structure, the social person appears at the top of the circle, the psychological self in the middle, and the biological individual at the bottom (Hwang, 2019d, p. 289). Hwang (2019d) suggests that this vertical structure is “isomorphic” vis-à-vis Freud’s theory that the human psyche is comprised of three domains, a superego (informing the social person), an ego (psychological self), and id (biological individual) (pp. 288–289, citing Freud, 1899). It is thus understandable that Hwang would continue to explore the connection between his meta-model and post-Freudian psychodynamic thought: for example, Hwang (2011a) connects his mandala meta-model to the work of Jaffe (1964) and Jung (1964) and latter describes it as “psychodynamic” (Hwang, 2019d).

As a second dimension of the mandala structure, a human being might draw on wisdom and knowledge (the left side of the circle) and applies these resources in praxis (the right side of the circle) (Hwang, 2019b, p. 72). Hwang (2011a) explains this distinction further as follows:

Reflexivity means that the self is able to monitor his or her own actions, and is able to give reasons for its actions. Knowledgeability means that the self is able to memorize, store, and organize various forms of knowledge, and make them a well-integrated system of knowledge. (p. 330, citing Giddens, 1984)

Hwang (2011a) recognizes that a human being might not reflect on each and every action that is performed, but rather may act on the basis of a habitus or a “kind of embodied and structuralized behavioral tendency” (p. 330, citing Bourdieu, 1990). When self-reflection is employed, this practice enables one “to integrate his own behaviors” and develop a “self-identity” as well as to reflect on one’s relationships with groups and develop a “social identity” (Hwang, 2011a, p. 330). The former (self-identity) might be associated with the development of a “specific sense of conscience” (Hwang, 2011a, p. 333).

Stage two: Cultural interpretation

Cultural systems

The next tier of Hwang’s research program is what he calls “the cultural system level” (Hwang, 2015a, p. 18). Referring to his miàn zi meta-model, Hwang (1998) maintains that this model can be used “as a conceptual instrument to study the symbolic and behavioral inheritance of a given culture” (p. 235). Drawing on the realist social theory of Archer (1995), Hwang (2015a) employs Archer’s principle of analytic dualism to differentiate a given cultural system from observable social interactions (p. 19; cf. Archer, 1995, pp. 165–194; Hwang, 2015a, citing Archer, 2005). Hwang (2021b) describes Archer’s principle as informing his “epistemological strategy of cultural hermeneutics” exemplified by his analysis of the Confucian “cultural heritage” in light of his miàn zi meta-model (p. 136). Archer’s principle enables one to make a mental distinction between a culture and contemporary people who may participate in that culture to different degrees (Hwang, 2019b, p. 73). Hwang (2021b) indicates that Archer’s principle supports a “hermeneutics for morphostasis” (p. 137) where one attempts to discern the enduring “morphostasis” or structure of a cultural system as well as the “morphogenesis” or development of that structure over time (Hwang, 2013a, p. 55).

The analysis of a cultural morphostasis may be understood to involve a synchronic analysis whereas the analysis of cultural morphogenesis involves a diachronic analysis (Hwang, 2015a, p. 19; cf. 2019b, p. 42, citing Archer & Elder-Vass, 2012). For Hwang (2015a), the synchronic consideration has a certain priority vis-à-vis the question of a culture’s historical development (p. 21). Hwang (2011c) agrees that this focus results in a certain “reification” of a cultural system but he argues that this reification is necessary in order to formulate a cultural theory (pp. 129–130). Further, Hwang (2004) indicates that the models he develops at the cultural system level are not models of psychology that necessarily describe existing psychosocial processes—that kind of exploration will occur later at stage three of his approach (pp. 180–181). As such, Hwang (2005a) states that a researcher at the stage of cultural system theory development is not first and foremost concerned with the immediate indigenous compatibility of the theory being developed (in terms of its description of the de facto psychosocial processes found in an existing population)—although this consideration arises later (pp. 235–236).

Interpretation of cultural sources

The Chinese cultural tradition is complex and involves Confucianism, legalism, a Martial School (Hwang, 1997–1998, p. 17), as well as Daoism and Buddhism (Hwang, 2020b, p. 65). Hwang (2012) describes these traditions as forms of wisdom that are different from Western philosophy and the philosophy of science (pp. 34–35, citing Jullien, 1998; cf. Hwang, 2009b, p. 122; 2019b, p. 39). However, there can be interpretive models of such forms of wisdom (Hwang, 2019a, p. 39). The primary wisdom tradition with which Hwang is concerned is Confucianism (Hwang, 2001a; 2006a; 2016b) which he affirms to be a religion (Hwang, 2014, p. 61). Hwang (2015b) indicates that his approach might be replicated in other indigenous contexts such as in the religious cultures of Islam, Hinduism, Christianity (p. 51), or Buddhism (2017b, p. 558). Such religions may be understood as “cultural groups” that impart ways of life as “cultural traditions” (each involving “a fixed pattern”) that present possible “targets of research for indigenous psychologists” (Hwang, 2011a, p. 333, citing Shils, 1981). Hwang (2011a) also observes that “even the community of ‘indigenous psychology’ itself is a kind of ‘cultural group’ emerging from the rapid cultural exchanges of the contemporary world” (p. 333).

With respect to the Confucian cultural group, Hwang focuses in a special way on ethical teachings (Hwang, 1997–1998, p. 18). Hwang (1998) observes that the past Republic of China President Yuan Shih-kai (1912–1916) ordered “Confucian classics” to be studied and “tried to establish Confucianism as the national religion,” but his political initiative encountered resistance from the New Culture Movement that promoted modernization, especially the elimination of hierarchical subordination (pp. 223–224; cf. Hwang, 2012, p. 170). Hwang (1998) maintains that the New Culture Movement “soon evolved” into “totalistic anti-traditionalism,” ultimately leading to the Communist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) under Mao (p. 224; cf. 2015a, p. 21, citing Lin, 1979).

Hwang refers to his study of traditional Confucian writings as having recourse to a hermeneutic approach that facilitates “reinterpreting texts” (Hwang, 2013a, pp. 54–55). Elsewhere, he clarifies that using a “method of hermeneutics,” he focused on the Confucian ‘Four Books’ (Sì shū), specific “pre-Qin” dynasty era texts—The Analects (Lún yŭ), Mencius (Mèng zì), The Great Learning (Dà xué), and The Golden Mean (Zhōng yōng)—texts that enabled him to discern “the deep structure of pre-Qin Confucianism,” a worldview that involves belief in (a) a metaphysical heaven (tiān) (Hwang, 2014, p. 56), (b) destiny (mìng yùn), (c) a specific ethics with an associated program of self-cultivation (Hwang, 2001a, p. 200; cf. 2017a, p. 1; Hwang & Chang, 2009), as well as (d) a sense of shame (chì) when one departs from that ethics (Hwang, 2001a, p. 195; cf. Bedford & Hwang, 2003). Hwang (1998) alludes to his ‘method of hermeneutics’ when he states that “the Confucian ethics for ordinary people can be mapped into my theoretical Face and Favor Model” (p. 217). More specifically, Hwang describes the miàn zi meta-model as providing a “preunderstanding” that he brings to the process of cultural interpretation (Hwang, 2013a, p. 55). One can thus see how Hwang’s miàn zi theory is functioning as a meta-model that is referenced to help a researcher discern “the deeper structure” of a “cultural tradition” that is communicated, for example, by means of the external signs contained in a sacred text (jīng) (Hwang, 2004, p. 180).

Such a reinterpretation of classic Chinese works might be needed on one hand because the texts are being brought into the academic field of psychology (and explored through the lens of Hwang’s meta-model): “Reinterpreting Confucianism from the perspective of social psychology may enable psychologists to construct a series of theoretical models to describe various aspects of Chinese social behavior, and to conduct empirical research in Confucian societies” (p. 163). Hwang (2015b), however, hints at a further rationale for such a reinterpretation: he states that he agrees with the modern viewpoint of Tu (1998, p. 130) that Confucianism today should be emphasized as a path of “self-cultivation” and not abused as when the relationship structure of “the three bonds” (sāngāng) (namely, the bonds between sovereign and subordinate, father and son, husband and wife) were transformed into a “politicized Confucian ideology of control” (“the traditional belief in [the] three bonds has been destroyed under the impact of Western modern culture”—Hwang, 2015b, p. 56). In this sense, an indigenous cultural psychology can promote emancipation from past distortions of a cultural tradition (Hwang, 2010, p. 99).

Confucian religious culture

In contrast with Chinese legalism which “stressed laws, strategies, and power,” Hwang (2012) focuses on the Confucian virtues of benevolence, righteousness, and propriety (rén, yì, and lì) (p. 36). Hwang (2001a) describes his rén-yì-lì cultural system theory as a “Confucian model of mind” within which he integrates insights from Confucius (d. 479 B.C.), Mencius (d. 289 B.C.), and Xunzi (d. c. 238 B.C.) (p. 184). Hwang (2001a) describes the relationship between the miàn zi meta-model and “the Confucian model of Mind” as involving an “isomorphism” (p. 199). This cultural model depicts “an archetype of Chinese social action” (Hwang, 1997–1998, p. 17, citing Hwang, 1995b). Hwang (1999) refers to social action according to Confucian ethics as following “the Way of Humanity” (rén dào) which Hwang further subdivides into an ethics for ordinary people and an ethics for scholars (the latter includes and expands the former) (pp. 165–166). Hwang (2001a) refers to rén dào as “revealed” by Confucian sages as a path of living that corresponds to tiān dào, “the way of heaven” (p. 184; cf. 1995c, p. 23).

Hwang’s rén-yì-lì model illustrates how these three Confucian virtues correspond to the three stages of the resource allocator’s decision-making processes as described above in the miàn zi meta-model: (a) the allocator’s evaluation of the kind of relationship at hand (guān xì) involves the exercise of rén, (b) the allocator’s reference of a rule to evaluate the distribution of a resource involves the exercise of yì, and (c) the allocator’s discernment of conflicts involves the exercise of lì (Hwang, 1997–1998, p. 17 and p. 20). According to Hwang (2001a), lì was at first an exterior cultural code of rites that Confucius appropriated and “transformed” into “a cultural psychological structure” through his ethical teachings (p. 193).

With respect to ‘the Confucian five virtues’ (wŭ cháng), in addition to rén-yì-lì, there is also the virtue of wisdom (zhì) (Hwang, 2001a, p. 193, citing Confucius, The Analects, Book XIV, Ch. 28; cf. Hwang, 2020a, p. 872, citing Zhōng yōng, Ch. 20). The fifth virtue is fidelity (xìn) (Hwang, 2019b, p. 78; 2020a, p. 873, citing Confucius, The Analects, Book IV, Ch. 15). To observe the five virtues is to practice rén dào as a method of “self-cultivation” whereby one becomes a “gentleman” (jūn zì)—a refined or cultured person in the Confucian sense (Hwang, 1999, p. 171; 2001a, p. 193). One who lacks such cultivation and refinement (in comparison with a jūn zì) lacks development in rén and is thus a kind of scoundrel (xiăo rén), a man of vice (Hwang, 2001a, p. 196). Sage King Shun might be understood to serve as a model jūn zì, as well as a model sage (shèng rén) (Hwang, 2001a, p. 194, citing Mencius, Book III, Part 1, Ch. 1). Certain “methods of self-cultivation,” Hwang (2001a) writes, “constitute the essential process for achieving” virtues such as the five virtues noted above and also the virtue of courage (yòng qì) (p. 193, citing Confucius, The Analects, Book XIV, Ch. 28; cf. Hwang, 2020a, p. 872, citing Zhōng yōng, Ch. 20). Confucians “emphasized the importance of cultivating oneself by turning inward and examining oneself in every occasion” (Hwang, 2014, p. 57). Hwang (2018) also describes Daoist self-cultivation. Self-cultivation in this tradition can involve the practice of specific exercises such as the practice of qì gōng (physical movements involving muscle and breath control), tài jí quán (shadow boxing), and meditation (Hwang, 2018, p. 302). In either religion, Hwang (1999) points to the value of indigenous knowledge; only the one who practices a teaching really understands it (p. 171).

Of the Confucian virtues, rén “is the most highly valued virtue” and “the perfect virtue” (Hwang, 2001a, p. 188 and p. 200). The ‘Confucian model of mind’ is foremost a ‘mind of rén’ (a “mind of benevolence”) which Hwang (2001a) states can function in a manner akin to personal conscience (liáng xīn) (p. 186; cf. p. 191 citing Mencius, Book IV, Part 1, Ch. 10; Hwang, 2014, p. 57). To cultivate virtue (dé) in oneself is in a sense to follow the way of virtue or the way of morality (dào dé) (Hwang, 2020a, p. 872, p. 872)—for Confucians, this is foremost a way of benevolence (rén dào). The practice of rén involves the observance of mercy requiring self-reflection and empathy (shù), leading one to respect ‘the silver rule’—that is, not to impose on another what one does not desire to be imposed on oneself (Hwang, 2020a, p. 873, citing Confucius, The Analects, Book XV, Ch. 24). Hwang (2014) states that the rén-yì-lì ethics comes forth from rén dào (which corresponds with tiān dào) and so Confucian ethics might be understood to cultivate a particular kind of moral conscience in human beings: “So long as one is willing to reflect with sincerity, he certainly will be aware of the way of Benevolence that is supposed to correspond to the way of Heaven. Hence, I deliberately call the Confucian conscience Tienliang [literally, conscience in unity with Heaven]” (p. 57, citing Mencius, Book VII).

Hwang (1999) states that Confucian ethics also proposes an “ideal arrangement of interpersonal relationships” (p. 163) where such arrangement prescribes a general “formal structure” that first and foremost involves respect for superiors and favor for intimates (p. 167).

With regard to this relationship arrangement, Hwang (2001a) notes that in the Confucian cultural system there are “five cardinal relationships (wŭ lún)” involving specific dispositions as described in the teaching of Mencius (who claims to recount a teaching that originated with either Sage King Shun or Yao): affection between father and son, righteousness between sovereign and subordinate, attentiveness between husband and wife, order between an older and younger brother, and friendship between friends (p. 188, citing Mencius, Book III, Part 1, Ch. 4; cf. Legge, 1895, pp. 251–252). The first three of these relationships comes to be described as “the Three Bonds (sāngāng)” mentioned earlier (Hwang, 2015b, p. 56). The Book of Rites (Lì jì), one of the five Confucian classics (jīng shū), further develops the Confucian teaching on relationships by also associating a specific disposition with each relationship role (note also that a relationship involving differing ages replaces the reference of Mencius to friendship): kindness for fathers and filial duty (xiào) for sons, benevolence for rulers and loyalty for ministers, righteousness for husbands and passivity for wives, gentleness for older brothers and obedience for younger brothers, kindness for elders and deference for juniors—altogether ten forms of yì (Hwang, 1998, p. 218, citing Lì jì, Chapter 9). The observance of filial duty on the part of a son is “a mandatory natural law of ethics” (Hwang, 1998, p. 222). All relational interaction is based on rén—but the yì of each role varies according to its purpose (Hwang, 2001a, p. 189). Meanwhile, the Confucian ethics for scholars observes the same rén-yì-lì model yet according to “higher moral standards”: persons who are designated “to occupy a higher position in government” might study further in order to practice rén dào in this higher mode and thus achieve a distinct kind of self-cultivation (Hwang, 1999, p. 175).

Cultural models: Microworlds distinct from lifeworlds

Hwang (2009b) states that he developed “a series of mini-theories” on the basis of his study of Confucian cultural sources (p. 112). Such mini-theories are “culture-inclusive theories” that “illuminate the morphostasis of [a] cultural tradition” (Hwang, 2022). In addition to the rén-yì-li model described above, Hwang (1997–1998) also provides a conflict resolution model that integrates “the research traditions of realism, structuralism, and pragmatism” (p. 34) which he states builds upon and modifies the pre-existing model of Hall (1969) (p. 24; cf. Hwang, 2000, p. 172). He also developed a model of psychosocial adaptation responses informed by belief in serendipity in relationships (yuán fèn) (Hsu & Hwang, 2016). Regarding the development of these mini-theories, Hwang (2004) writes:

I emphasize that theoretical models about the deep structure of Confucianism are just microworlds constructed by a social scientist. They are cultural structures, but not psychological structures…. In people’s actual lives, it is very hard to find any person who has the exact mentality as described by the deep structure of a culture…. People in contemporary East Asian societies may or may not use these cultural theories in their lifeworlds. (pp. 180–181)

In this discussion, Hwang is using a ‘lifeworld-scientific microworld’ distinction that is found in the constructive realism of Wallner (Hwang, 2004). Regarding the development of a microworld (or a scientific theory), Hwang (2000) describes himself as having “dialectically” developed a “series” of theories (collectively called “Chinese relationalism”) that are all scientific “microworlds” derived from his interpretive study of the Chinese cultural tradition (p. 155, citing Wallner, 1994).

Hwang (2013a) notes the correlation of his use of the word ‘microworld’ with the philosophy of Husserl (p. 52, citing Husserl 1936/1970). Hwang (2000) explains that, “A microworld is a systematized construction of reality. Every scientific theory can be viewed as a microworld” (p. 162). A microworld imparts “its own specific culture” with respect to how it affects the scientists and persons who engage it (Hwang, 2013a, p. 50). In contrast, “One’s lifeworld is [a] pre-logic, pre-technological, and pre-instrumental state of existence…. the contents of peoples’ lifeworlds in different cultures or generations may vary. War, economic depression, or political struggle can cause discrepancy among lifeworlds” (Hwang, 2000, pp. 162–63). The process of modernization has also affected and changed East Asian lifeworlds (Hwang, 2006a, p. 100).

Stage three: Experimental research

Transition to a contemporary lifeworld

The culture-inclusive theories that Hwang develops at the second stage of his approach are next employed to evaluate data gathered by way of experimental research: “These microworlds can then be used as a framework for studying Chinese social behavior in the lifeworld at a psychologistic level” (Hwang, 2000, p. 155). Referring to the rén-yì-lì model, Hwang (1997–1998) indicates that such a framework provides a hermeneutic or “a formal structure that can be used to interpret social interaction” (p. 27). Elsewhere, Hwang (2003a) refers to such a formal structure as a “cultural heritage” (p. 243). In “real life” social interaction may involve relationship patterns that arise not on the basis of such a heritage but “in a completely different way”—for example, interaction may proceed not according to the prescriptions of ancient wisdom texts, but rather on the basis of intersubjective agreement (Hwang, 1997–1998, p. 27). Hwang (2011c) similarly writes, “I certainly understand that nobody in his/her lifeworld will behave exactly in the Confucian way even though Confucian sayings are frequently cited by Chinese people in their daily life,” yet even so, a researcher’s reference of such a hermeneutic is a valid way “to interpret social psychological phenomena in Confucian societies” (p. 130).

Use & reinterpretation of existing experimental research studies

Hwang (1997–1998) notes that he draws on existing qualitative research studies to support his development of a conflict resolution model (p. 34). However, regarding his use of Western experimental research, Hwang is concerned with how such studies presuppose Western philosophical anthropology in the formulation of hypotheses and in the interpretation of data. He refers, for example, to problematic philosophical presuppositions such as individualism and an associated overemphasis on instrumental relationships (Hwang, 2015b, p. 60), rationalism (Hwang, 2016a, p. 107), imported neoliberalism (Hwang, 2020b, pp. 48–49), and scientism “which might be the cultural foundation of self-colonization” (Hwang, 2019a, p. 4). Hwang (2020a) further describes the “Chinese cultural heritage” (once “transformed into objective knowledge” by a person who learns it) as able to act “in competition with thoughts of utilitarianism and hedonism in the moral space of multiculturalism” (p. 875; cf. 2021a, p. 616). Elsewhere, he repeats that his program of “integrating Western and Eastern philosophies may open a new field of psychology for self-cultivation to compete with… the values of hedonism, individualism, and utilitarianism” (Hwang et al., 2017, p. 2, emphasis added).

If Kant is a Western modern philosopher who exemplifies rationalism (Hwang, 2020a, pp. 864–865), Descartes exemplifies individualism: Referring to Descartes who “assumes an attitude of dualism to calculate and to measure objects in… nature,” Hwang (2019b) writes that “the individualist orientation” found in contemporary American psychology

is grounded on [the] philosopher Descartes’ assertion that what is most fundamental to the self is the “I,” the cogito or thinking subject. The Cartesian “I” emphasizes the rational, conscious, and deliberative mind, which stands alone against society that surrounds it. (p. 69, citing Christopher et al., 2014)

When a microworld is developed that presupposes Cartesian dualism, there is a risk that the lifeworld upon which it is imposed may subsequently become subjected to a “dominative construction” (Hwang, 2003a, p. 244, quoting Shen, 1994). Without critically evaluating such philosophical presuppositions, indigenous psychologists may experience “the destruction of their [own] cultural subjectivities” when conducting and interpreting research (Hwang, 2016a, p. 108). Such a non-critical approach to the philosophical elements blended with Western scientific psychology risks a kind of cultural “self-colonization” on the part of the researcher (Hwang, 2019a, p. 1).

Hwang, 2013b therefore maintains that when reviewing previous experimental research studies, an indigenous psychologist may need to reinterpret the data under consideration (p. 110). For example, Hwang (1998) suggests that previous experimental research conducted in Taiwan on “Chinese moral development” should be reinterpreted in light of alternative theories such as his rén-yì-lì model because the studies were too focused on the Western moral theory of Kohlberg (p. 211, citing Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). Hwang is critical of Kohlberg’s claim that Kohlberg’s theory exhibits genuine “cross-cultural universality” (p. 213) and he agrees with the critique of Simpson (1974) that Kohlberg “blurred the distinction between normative philosophy and empirical psychology” (p. 214). In this way, adopting Confucian philosophical presuppositions in contrast with Kohlberg’s philosophical presuppositions, Hwang (1998) seeks to reinterpret experimental data gathered by Cheng (p. 231, citing Cheng, 1991).

Conducting new experimental research

Hwang, 2013b states that cultural system theories can yield “a series of hypotheses to be tested by either qualitative or quantitative methods of research” (p. 116). Regarding such hypotheses, Hwang (2015b) writes, “In the case that some empirical research hypotheses are derived from them [viz. “culture-inclusive theories” or mini-theories], further analyses should be made at the socio-cultural interaction (SC) level” (p. 56; cf. p. 59). This derivation of hypotheses from “culture-inclusive theories” functions akin to what Hempel (1966) described as formulating general laws to be subjected to experimental testing (Hwang, 2022). Hwang (2016a) believes that both qualitative and quantitative experimental approaches can be employed and that they are “complementary to each other” (p. 107). He specifically refers to “hermeneutic phenomenology” as a kind of qualitative research approach (Hwang, 2022). In experimental research, a scientist may discern whether a “formal structure” (such as the rén-yì-lì model) is “manifested” in real “interpersonal relationships” found in the lifeworld (Hwang, 2019b, p. 75). This approach to developing an indigenous cultural psychology might thus be referred to as a “structural hermeneutics” (regarding this phrase, see Alexander & Smith, 2001). I do not believe the manner in which Hwang employs Archer’s principle of analytic dualism—when developing interpretive models that represent de iure cultural structures in precision from experimental investigation of de facto psychosocial processes—is liable to the criticism that cultural structures for Archer reduce to logical relations between propositions (cf. Rambo & Chan, 1990, p. 645). Cultural structures rather, at least for Hwang (2016a), arguably pertain to interrelated human practices that are also interpersonal (p. 104, as quoted above).

In addition to his interpretive models focused on the Confucian religious culture, Hwang also indicates that his two meta-models can have direct bearing upon experimental research design. For example, Hwang (2006b) describes his co-facilitation of two experimental studies that focused on the indigenous concept of face (miàn zi) (Su & Hwang, 2003; Wei & Hwang, 1998). Hwang also participated in experimental studies considering miàn zi at the national level (Chen & Hwang, 2016). Likewise, Hwang (2019d) states that his mandala meta-model “can be verified or falsified by scientific methods of empirical research” (p. 303). This remark might be taken to mean that in experimental research one might seek to verify whether a meta-model is present or absent in data derived from the lifeworld under consideration, not that one would verify a model’s validity as a cultural structure in and of itself.

Review

In the discussion above, I explored the philosophical recommendations of Kwang-Kuo Hwang for the development of an indigenous cultural psychology. These recommendations may be understood to suggest proceeding according to three stages: (1) beginning with philosophical reflection on the meaning of modernization and exploring the topics of reality and structure (where such reflections might ground one’s subsequent development of meta-models concerning self and social interaction), (2) adopting such meta-models as a hermeneutic for interpreting texts associated with one’s cultural tradition, and (3) conducting experimental studies on the basis of hypotheses derived from such cultural interpretations. Hwang’s work is noteworthy in terms of his epistemological observation that unexamined philosophical presuppositions can influence the formulation of scientific hypotheses as well as the interpretation of research data. By making a distinction between (a) normative philosophical presuppositions (involving de iure cultural assumptions based on received texts and traditions) and (b) descriptive experimental studies (involving inductions based on de facto contemporary processes), Hwang’s philosophy indicates how psychosocial research might be contextualized within a hermeneutic mode of reflection where traditional pre-modern forms of wisdom continue to inform modern methods of scientific investigation.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Matthew R McWhorter

Author Biography

Matthew R McWhorter is an assistant professor who teaches philosophy in the clinical mental health counseling program at Divine Mercy University in Sterling, Virginia, USA. His current research interests include philosophical psychology, cognitive psychology, cultural psychology, and moral psychology. He has published previous research on hermeneutics and psychotherapy that appeared in the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.

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