Abstract
The futility of defining planning suggests that there is no planning as a recognizable practice. Sociology of knowledge definitions imply three kinds of planning practices: (1) Generic “planning”—what people do when they are planning; (2) Knowledge-centered “something” (e.g., spatial) planning; and (3) Real planning practiced in specific contexts, from metro-regional planning for Jakarta to transportation planning for the Trans-Europe Network, and enacted in general contexts, for example, informal- or Southern planning. Planning theories are linked to different practices: generic “planning” theories and “something” (e.g., regional, community, environmental, or Southern) planning theories. Selected topics illustrate the “planning” theory discourse and spatial planning theories are briefly reviewed. Three generations of planning practice studies are reviewed: the first, a-theoretical; the second, the “practice movement,” who studied practice for their own theorizing; and the third, informed by practice theories. Five books about planning show how their planning theorist authors understand planning practice. While recognizing planning as diverse practices, they hardly apply “planning” theory to planning practices. “Planning” theories are divorced from enacted planning practices, “something” (e.g., spatial) planning theories include constructive adaptations of “planning” theories and paradigms, but knowledge about real planning practices is limited. Implications from these conclusions are drawn for planning theory, education, and practices.
Introduction: There is no planning, only planning practices 1
The question what is planning? has engaged planning theorists for decades. Today's most popular answer is Friedmann’s (1987: 38–44) definition of planning as the link between knowledge and action. Other answers range from planning as rational choice (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962), through planning as “the guidance of future action” (Forester, 1989: 3) to planning as a “language game” (Lord, 2014: 37–39).
The problem with all these definitions is not that they are not true; it is that they are too abstract for closure. We can see this by simply substituting another term for “planning”; for example, “Plumbing links knowledge with action” or “Politics as a language game.” Ultimately, it seems, planning defies categorical definition: Jean Hillier, a leading planning theorist, could only offer a variety of definitions with different “referents in specialist theories and approaches” (Hillier, 2010: 3–5). Perhaps Tim Chapin’s “Planning is a funny field…” (2015: 315) is as good an answer as we can get.
In this light, Vickers (1968) definition, “Planning is what planners do,” offers a promising direction: relating planning to practice, which in its simplest sense is what planning is, if it is “what planners do.” Theorists and planners recognize that planning is a practice (De Neufville, 1983; Sandoval, 2020: 129). 2 But there has been little concern with what this really means. Is planning a practice, and if so, what kind of practice is it? If planning is diverse practices, what does this imply? What kinds of practice are these? To answer these questions, I review definitions of practice.
Sociology of knowledge definitions of practice imply three kinds of planning practices: (1) Generic “planning”: what people do when they are planning; (2) (Something) planning: knowledge-centered planning practices, for example, spatial, environmental, or transportation planning 3 ; and (3) Real planning: specific planning practices in particular contexts, for example, community development planning for the Webster neighborhood, Oakland CA. USA, regional ecosystem planning for the Hardanger wild reindeer preserve, Norway, or transportation planning for the Shanghai municipality-metropolitan area. These are what (something) planners do in their daily work. Planning in more general contexts—kind, time and space, for example, colonial, informal, or Southern planning—can also be real planning practices. The conclusion, then, is that there is no planning as a recognizable practice, but planning is a multiscalar set of diverse practices.
Planning theories are linked to these planning practices. “Planning” theories are for and about “planning” 4 ; they are intrinsically abstract and general, divorced from any specific context. A review of “planning” theory details discourse on planning paradigms and the Public Interest as examples.
“Something” (urban, regional, strategic, or environmental) planning theories are engaged with these planning practices and their objects. A review of spatial planning theories illustrates (something) planning theories, and the relationship between these two levels of theorizing is explored. While generic “planning” theories have limited normative value, their contributions to knowledge-centered planning theories and practices are important, as planning paradigms and ideal models are translated into more concrete methods, norms, and applied planning concepts and movements.
Real-life planning practices and their contexts are the subjects of planning and planning-related research that engenders planning theories: empirical research for theories in “something” (e.g., regional, development, or Southern) planning, and practice studies contributing to normative and positive theories of “something” planning. Planning practice studies are reviewed to examine their link to real planning practices, “planning” theories, and practice theory in general. There are three generations: the forerunners of a third generation are detailed case studies informed by practice theories. More such studies are needed to understand real planning practices.
Finally, this paper examines planning theorists’ enacted concepts of planning: how does mainstream planning theory understand planning practice, and relate to planning practices? To show us how planning theorists talk about planning, five books about planning by planning theorists are reviewed. These planning theorists recognize planning as diverse practices. When explaining or teaching planning, these authors address recognized planning practices, but hardly apply “planning” theory to them.
This review reveals prevailing ideas about planning. Here, I present a new way to understand planning, planning theory, and practice based on sociology of knowledge definitions of practice. Planning is not a practice, but a set of diverse practices in a fractal multiscalar hierarchy linking different kinds of practices to different levels of planning theories.
This model of planning can solve some dilemmas in planning theory and practice. For planning theorists, the “fractal” model of planning can partly explain the “planning theory-practice gap.” “Planning” theory is abstract, general, for and about “planning”—the planning everyone can do, not for the planning practices we know. But “planning” theories shape planning when they are applied to particular planning practices. In spatial planning, for example, comprehensive planning is based on the rational planning paradigm, while communicative practice inspired collaborative planning. Understanding this relationship between planning theories and practices may help to close the gap.
For the academy, this model of planning solves a problem that besets many planning programs' curriculum design. Recognizing that your concentrations are the specialized practices that are planning can help to balance between their demands and your “generalist” core.
For planning practice, this model’s main implications concern planners' identity. “Planners” can be mobilizers, mediators, or entrepreneurs, and planners’ skills in these roles may help them to succeed. But first, planners are professionals: spatial, environmental, transportation, or community development planners contributing their knowledge and experience in the participative process of planning for collective action.
Practice, practices, and planning practices
Practice and practices
From its simple sense of what people do, the term “practice” has evolved into a complex concept with multiple meanings. Even the dictionary defines several kinds of practice linked to distinct levels of knowledge: “1. Simple senses (:)…doing something; 2…habitual…usual, customary or constant action… 3. ...doing something repeatedly or continuously…exercise in any art, handicraft etc. (to) gain proficiency…5. The…exercise of a profession or occupation” (OED, 1971: 2264).
In social anthropology, practice has acquired more nuanced meanings, detailing a group’s practices as enactment of its culture (Bourdieu, 1977) 5 . The sociology of knowledge, interested in practices as applications of knowledge, has also identified various forms of practice. One approach identifies two concepts of practice, one descriptive: practices as “the patterns and regularities…(that) people learn…are the best ways…toward the fulfillment of their purposes” (Turner, 2001: 130). The other is normative (Rouse, 2001: 183–189): “actors share a practice if their actions are answerable to norms of correct or incorrect practice” (189).
Schatzki (2001: 48–53) offers a tripartite division between practices as defined and organized nexuses of activity, for example, cooking practices or banking practices, and practices as specifications of what people do: a set of activities linked by common understandings and abilities. Finally, there is practice as “institution of meaning”(53), knowledge-centered practice: “socially recognized forms of activity, done on the basis of what members learn…capable of being done well or badly, correctly or incorrectly” and endowing their “membership with the power to perform” (Barnes, 2001: 19–20).
Science and Technology Studies (STS) 6 scholars study the role of knowledge-centered practice in the production of scientific knowledge and its application in the adoption and diffusion of technologies. 7 STS research extends the idea of socially produced knowledge to the co-production of knowledge, involving expert and non-expert domains of knowledge and knowledge-centered practices (Jasanoff, 2004). 8
Many STS researchers borrowed Bourdieu’s ethnographic approach from social anthropology to study knowledge-centered practices. Just as Bourdieu’s Berber tribes’ social practices enact their culture, each knowledge-centered practice enacts the particular culture of its knowledge domain. STS scholar Knorr-Cetina calls these “epistemic” cultures and practices. Here, practice means more than simple skill or routine task performance, but involves specialized knowledge and expertise (Knorr-Cetina, 2001: 175).
Epistemic practices operate in various fields, each with its distinct epistemic culture: “the uncodified strategies and policies of knowing (that) inform expert practice” (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 2). Knorr-Cetina investigates scientific disciplines, 9 but epistemic practices can also be found outside science in knowledge-centered fields that include other disciplines and professions. Knorr-Cetina illustrates this for the medical profession, where epistemic cultures and practices were radically transformed when the practice of medicine changed from “bedside sciences” (from the 18th through the 19th century) to clinical practices based on laboratory sciences into the 20th century (1999: 29–30, 246). Though never expressed like this, we can assume a similar transformation of epistemic culture and practices in planning, as planners' professional and knowledge bases changed from the “design professions” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to a social sciences–based rational paradigm in the mid-20th century (Hall, 2014).
Epistemic cultures and practices in knowledge-centered fields relate to their specific “epistemic objects.” Some practices’ epistemic objects are real and concrete, ranging from quite general to very particular, for example, the human body for medicine, to the human brain for neurosurgery or cells and their molecules for molecular biology. But most practices have epistemic objects that are made-up concepts. The epistemic object of economics is economies, astrophysics’ epistemic object is the extraterrestrial universe, while high energy physicists’ is subnuclear particles. While these may be clear and well-defined (especially to their practitioners), they are not real, but cognitive-cultural artifacts. 10 It follows that understanding a particular epistemic practice involves learning and defining its relevant “expert-object relationship” (Knorr-Cetina, 2001: 175–187).
Now we can reframe the original question: is planning a practice? to ask: if it is, is planning one of these practices? The answer must be no. But if there is no planning as a recognizable practice, there are several kinds of planning practices.
Planning practices
At the most general and abstract level, planning can be a practice in Schatzki’s (2001: 57–59) broad descriptive sense: planning is what planners do—just as cooking is a practice: a broadly specified set of activities, linked by common understandings and abilities, of what cooks do when they are cooking. It is also something people do all the time (Miller et al., 1960): “Planning (also called forethought) is … a fundamental property of intelligent behavior.” (Wikipedia, 2019).
Such generic planning is consistent with planning theorists’ definitions of planning, which are true for “planning” in every context and for any purpose. Applying practice theory to planning, we can recognize some kinds of planning as “planning” practices: planning that anyone can do, practices that fit Schatzki’s definition of practice, and planning theory definitions of planning at the same time.
For insurgent planning Huq (2020) does this, clearly distinguishing insurgent planning practices (IP), the focus of his research, from radical planning (RP) as related but different. While RP is for professional planners, IP is enacted directly by people—activists and communities, outside and in opposition to hegemonic state, market, and even civil society. Sometimes RP and IP—planning and “planning” practices—are intertwined, as when Vila Autodromo residents in Rio de Janeiro, working with radical planners in universities and NGOs, resisted eviction and presented their own counter-plan for the area (Ivester, 2017). Sometimes, IP is distinctly “planning,” not involving planning at all. Examples are African-American communities remaking their New Orleans neighborhoods (Irazábal and Neville, 2007), and activists reasserting Buryat indigenous identity through education and cultural activities (Sweet and Chakars, 2010).
Are such “planning” practices knowledge-centered epistemic practices? The conclusive answer is no. “Planning” cannot be an epistemic practice, because it is not related or limited to any identifiable epistemic object. 11
But planning exists as specific knowledge-centered practices. Commonsense recognizes them by their epistemic objects: spatial, regional, environmental, transportation, or social planning. These conventional qualifiers of the term “planning” can serve as a tentative list of knowledge-centered or epistemic planning practices. They include substantive fields, for example, spatial-territorial planning, transportation planning, environmental planning; planning domains, for example, State planning and metro-regional planning; and defined or prescribed forms of practice, for example, advocacy planning, strategic-, and e-planning.
How can we identify these knowledge-centered planning practices? Perhaps there is no need: any generalization in planning theory or research could be framed in contingent terms, that is, as applying to regional-, environmental-, or social planning. But more rigor might demand evidence that a “(something) planning” practice really exists and is not just some academics' aspiration or theoretical construct. Evidence can come from several sources: 1. Tools: the (something) planner’s distinctive contribution in the co-construction of knowledge for collective decision-making and action. 2. Epistemic object (for practices in substantive fields, for example, spatial planning, environmental-, transportation-, and community planning): the specific object of planning intervention related to the (something) planning practice. 3. Practice (for types or forms of planning practice, for example, advocacy planning, strategic planning, and e-planning
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): the distinctive elements characterizing the real-life practice of (something) planning. 4. Context: the typical arenas in which (something) planning is practiced and the institutional contexts of (something) planning, with special attention to (something) planners’ real-life workplaces. The institutionalization of (something) planning itself is sufficient (but not necessary) evidence in knowledge diffusion (e.g., journals), education (e.g., specialized programs), professionalization (e.g., professional associations), and practice (e.g., recruitment).
At a more concrete level, identifiable planning practices (per Schatzki’s definition) also exist: real planning practices that are definable, observable, and researchable. Partitioning the life-world of planning, we can think of a large (but finite) number of such practices in various planning contexts that differ in significant ways. Imagine a large three-dimensional matrix combining the dimensions of planning purpose/content (identified by sector) with planning scope/institutionalization (associated with level or domain), and including some differentiation between relevant socio-economic, political, and cultural traits, summarized for practical purposes by country.
Such a matrix yields planning practices that are readily recognizable as real-life situations. At the local level, they range from advocacy planning for a Colombian barrio, through community planning in a U.S. inner city, to municipal planning for an Asian metropolis like Bangkok or Shanghai.
At intermediate levels (metropolitan and regional) diverse planning practices can be distinguished in sectoral terms. Spatial-territorial or land-use planning appears in many regional polities, and various kinds of sectoral planning, infrastructure, energy, and environmental planning, are practiced in regional agencies. So we find structure planning for a U.K. planning region, metropolitan-regional planning for Abidjan, environmental planning in the Los Angeles Area Air Pollution Control Agency, and transportation planning for the Mexican Distrito Federál.
Other planning practices can be identified at the national, transnational (e.g., EU), and international (e.g., UN) levels. Most countries have national planning in some (sometimes all) of various sectors, from territorial-spatial planning through infrastructure to economic planning and industrial policy. At the supranational level, examples include Netherlands-Flemish transborder economic development planning, EU TEN transportation planning and project evaluation, and World Bank development planning (Alexander, 2005).
Real planning practices are also enacted in more general contexts—kind, time, and space, for example, colonial, informal, insurgent, or Southern planning, and studies of these could engender related theories—of colonial, informal, or Southern planning. Such real planning practices need not necessarily be generic, but since the absence of plausible epistemic objects makes this unlikely, insurgent or Southern planning as knowledge-centered practices will remain an aspiration. 13
Planning theory and practice 14
Planning practices and theories
If there is no planning, in the sense of a definable planning practice, there cannot be any planning theory. But we can identify different kinds of planning theories, link them to the diverse planning practices we have found, and explore how these relations could explain how planning theories and knowledge interact with planning practices.
First, there is the link between “levels” of planning theory and research, and the three types of planning practices: generic “planning” practice, knowledge-centered planning practices such as spatial, environmental, or e-planning, and diverse real-life planning practices. These include real planning enacted in specific contexts, from community planning in a Cali barrio to transportation planning of the European TEN, 15 and planning in more general contexts, for example, colonial, informal, or Southern planning. These can be grouped in a rough hierarchy.
“Planning” practice and “planning” theory
At the highest level of abstraction and generality, there is a “planning” practice that can be described and theorized. This is planning as “an organized nexus of activity” generating actions that intervene in the world (Schatzki, 2001: 46, 48). As planning theory is supposed to be a theory of practice (Harrison, 2014: 68), theories of “planning” practice will be at the same level of abstraction as the subject practice.
Decades ago, Andreas Faludi divided planning theory into “Theory of planning” and “Theory in planning.” The former “relates to the planner…organization of planning…and planning procedures”; the latter is substantive theory, “related to planners’ specific concern about their particular core subject, for example, land use planning” (1973, in Mukhopadhyay, 2015). Faludi’s “Theory of planning” is made up of generic “planning” theories that relate to “planning” practice. These “planning” theories are what planning academics, students, and practitioners understand as planning theory.
Like the generic planning practice to which they relate, such “planning” theories are necessarily general and abstract. And because their subject—generic “planning” practice—is defined as descriptive (“planning is what planners do”) they must be descriptive or explanatory too. So the normative value of “planning” theories is limited 16 : they cannot be very helpful in prescribing (something) planners’ roles, actions, or behavior in their real-life planning practices.
That is not to deny “planning” theories’ important contributions to planning practices; these take three forms. Their descriptive-explanatory side helps planners understand what they are doing, for example, the rational model describes planning as goals-oriented decision-making, while communicative practice presents planning as interactive communication—each with different implications (Alexander, 2000). Their normative aspects are translated into methods and new approaches, for example, the ideal rational model is the basis of systematic analysis and methods in spatial, environmental, and transportation planning, and communicative practice has inspired approaches and methods for enhancing public participation, empowering disadvantaged communities, and mediating environmental conflicts.
Finally, topics in “planning” theory are subjects for targeted development and concrete applications in recognized planning practices. Striking examples are in environmental planning, where social justice criteria identified discrimination in environmental impact analyses (institutionalizing environmental justice in the US), and in spatial planning where debate on the Public Interest generated modified evaluation methods and systematic ways to enhance public participation.
A comprehensive survey of generic “planning” theories is beyond the scope of this paper, but two typical themes can serve as an illustration. One prominent theme is planning paradigms; another is the Public Interest.
Planning paradigms
Rationality was the original planning paradigm: with sources in other disciplines, rationality was incorporated into planning theory in the mid-20th century (Alexander, 1992: 39–60). The “Rational planning model” was presented as a “choice theory of planning” (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962) and recognized as “the ruling” planning paradigm (Hemmens, 1980: 259).
Accumulating critiques (see Alexander 1984) produced an alternative paradigm: Communicative Practice—drawing on Habermasian communicative rationality (Forester, 1980)—in a process of paradigm change and synthesis (Galloway and Mahayni, 1977; Lim, 1986). Communicative Practice (Innes, 1995; Sager, 1994) was proclaimed the new ruling paradigm (Beauregard, 1996), followed with critiques (Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Hytonen, 2016) 17 and responses (Innes and Booher 2015; Sager, 2012).
Other would be planning paradigms including Deleuze and Guattarian “becoming” planning, as presented by Hillier (2005) and Purcell (2013) and Mouffe’s (2013) agonism, presented (Swyngedou, 2009), and debated between advocates (McClymont, 2011; Pløger, 2004) and critics (Bond and Fougere, 2018). 18 Hoch (2019) advocates pragmatism against the rational model and as a complement to Communicative Practice. 19
The Public Interest
What makes these generic “planning” theory? There are several answers. First, it is abstract, general, and universal. Next, it does not apply or limit itself to any specific context. Finally, it relates to planning as a general, intrinsic human activity that anyone can do—generic “planning” practice—without addressing any specific recognized planning practice. The planning paradigms discussed in planning theory, ideal rationality, communicative practice, and the latest post-structuralist proposals fit this description perfectly. So does the concept of a “Public Interest,” imported from political philosophy and now debated and applied in political science, public policy, and administration.
Knowledge-centered planning practices and theories
“Theory in planning” is planning theory “related to planners’…particular core subject,” that is, a specific knowledge-centered planning practice’s epistemic object. Accordingly, we can identify several sets of planning theories, each related to a recognized knowledge-centered planning practice: theories of spatial planning, of social planning, of regional-, transportation-, or community development planning. These (something) planning theories are procedural and substantive, and, since they relate to knowledge-centered practices that are defined as normative, 20 they include normative theories too.
Spatial planning theories
An exhaustive survey of planning theories for (something) planning practices, that is, knowledge-centered practices in specified fields, is impossible. It is hard to imagine such a review, considering their multiplicity, diversity, and indeterminacy. I have chosen spatial planning as an illustrative case for two reasons. One is that spatial planning is a recognized specialized planning practice; the other is that spatial planning is a field I know something about.
This review is not a systematic survey of spatial planning theory, but an interpretive summary. Weber and Crane, 2012a offer a review with a different—more inclusive—frame for spatial planning theory. Their anthology of theory and research for planning as a discipline with “overlapping orientations,” which include “the built and natural environment” and “implementation and practice,” focuses on the “field of spatial planning” (Weber and Crane, 2012b: 3–4). But its chapters include clearly generic “planning” theory, for example, Chs.8 (Marcuse, 2012) and 15 (Forester 2012), and related planning practices such as environmental planning (Schweitzer and Marr, 2012), community economic development (Chapple, 2012), and housing (Bates, 2012).
Three kinds of knowledge enable good practice: knowing what (theories and concepts), knowing how (crafts and skills), and knowing to what end, moral choices (Davoudi, 2015). “Knowing what” has two basic aspects: the material object of spatial planning and spatial planning processes (Needham, 2013). These dimensions combine as follows to frame the field of spatial planning theories. 1. (What?) The object of spatial planning is human activities in space and their environment; for practical purposes, the land-property market can serve as a surrogate.
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The land-property market, which needs spatial planning to work, can be the object of spatial planners’ practice (Alexander, 2014a) and a subject of empirical spatial planning theories. Other subjects are drawn from planning-related disciplines
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and fields that address specific aspects of social activities and human behavior, such as demography, housing, or transportation. 2. (Where?) The context for spatial planning is the social-institutional environment of spatial planners' practice. Spatial planning institutions, spanning the public, private, and “third” sectors alike in various combinations (Alexander, 2001), are most spatial planners’ workplaces. This suggests analysis of the relevant institutional environment and institutional design of spatial planning institutions and processes. Case studies and analyses by scholars and researchers in the institutionalist stream of planning theory (Alexander, 2018: 12–13; Verma, 2007) do this. 3. (How?) Spatial planning tools are the concepts, methods, and skills needed for effective practice. These are the expert spatial planner’s contribution to the social co-construction of knowledge involved in all planning. Spatial planning concepts and methodologies are a central theme of spatial planning theories, though many of them are transferred from related disciplines, for example, social and urban geography, urban economics, and sociology. For the prospective (student) and engaged spatial planning practitioner, these are summarized in canonical planning methods textbooks.
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Integrating concepts and models in spatial planning theory are perhaps the most important aspect of “How?” These take different forms: some are mainly procedural, others more substantive; many combine these with normative, to imply that this is what makes a good plan.
The first includes procedural models that are adaptations for spatial planning of generic “planning” paradigms and ideal models. These are important in showing how expositions of “planning” theories for spatial planning have shaped planning practice. Comprehensive planning (Hollander et al., 1988, 71–91; Herman et al., 2016; Kent, 1964) applying the rational planning model and communicative practice as collaborative planning in the institutional design of local planning and governance (Healey, 1997; Innes and Booher, 2010) illustrate this. Communicative practice prescribed as mediation in resolving environmental conflicts (Susskind and Crump, 2009) and the social transformation model of planning (Friedmann, 1987: 395–412) enacted as transactive planning with local communities (Friedmann, 1973a) are more examples. Other models include Mazza’s (2002, 2016) territorial planning combining technical and governance functions, and adaptive spatial planning in complexity (De Roo et al, 2016).
The second type includes influential substantive concepts reflecting normative elements of urban morphology, which have come and gone over time. A notable historical example is the grid (Mazza, 2016: 6–17); more recent are the neighborhood unit (Gillette, 1983; Mumford, 1954) and concentrated decentralization (Zonneveld, 1989). The last kind are movements in spatial planning, from the New Towns movement, which began in the 1930s but is still alive (Hall, 2014: 88–100), to the New Urbanism (Talen, 2005; McDonald et al., 2019: 13–27) today. 4. (Why?) This question takes various forms in different contexts. Higher levels of theorizing and inquiry ask: What is the purpose of spatial planning? At the concrete level of real planning practices, making plans and evaluating alternatives, we ask: What is this project for? Often the normative aspect of spatial planning theories is indirect, expressed in some of the other aspects reviewed above. This includes prescribed procedural models (from comprehensive planning to communicative practice) applied to spatial planning, and historical, current, and emerging
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spatial planning movements and models. The evaluation literature (e.g., Alexander, 2006; Hull et al., 2011; Voogd, 2001) asks: what makes a good plan or selects the project to be implemented. General “planning” ethics applied to spatial planning (e.g., Wachs, 1985; Howe, 1994) and professional planning ethics complete the range of normative spatial planning theories.
Real planning practices—research and theory
Planning theories cannot relate directly to enacted planning practices in real-life settings, because theories are generalized abstractions of reality. But real planning practices are the subjects of most planning research, which is the base for (something) planning theories: theories in (something) planning that relate to a substantive epistemic object. Planning-related empirical research is drawn from a wide range of fields, from neighborhood segregation in social geography, through housing markets in urban economics, to local government models in public administration.
We might expect prescriptive theories of planning to be informed by some knowledge of actual contexts and behavior in real planning practices. All along, planning scholars and educators have said that planning theory is for practice (De Neufville, 1983): obviously, systematic study and investigation of planning practices are needed (Dalton, 1989: 29; Watson, 2002b: 178).
Planning practice studies
The planning literature has frequent references to planning practice, many 25 (implicitly) in the sense of specialized knowledge-based practices (ICMA, 1979; Leish and Blakeley, 2017; Rysey and Franchini, 2015; Taylor and Williams, 1982). A few works address the practice of (generic) “planning” (Forester, 1993; Sandercock, 2003), but there has been little systematic discussion of what planning practice really means.
Different planning theories are linked to the various kinds of planning practices and interact with the study of real planning practices. Studies of planning practiced in general contexts can lay the foundations for related planning theories, such as theories of colonial, insurgent or Southern planning. Real planning enacted in particular contexts is the subject of planning practice studies. These appear in three generations. The first includes systematic practice studies and case studies of planner role models—Ed Bacon (Heller, 2013), Howard, Abercombie, and Cerda (Mazza, 2016: 105–131).
Dalton (1989) reviewed planning practice studies published from the 1960s through the 80s. These are based on surveys and case studies, from advocacy planning organizations to public participation efforts, 26 and their findings explain agency performance, reveal how organizations work, and offer successful planning exemplars. Recent practice studies in the same vein include a survey of consultants and cases of planner roles and planning processes (Loh, 2018: 26–27). With the notable exception of Schön’s (1983) Reflective Practitioner, these studies are essentially a-theoretical.
The second generation is the “practice movement” of the 1980–2000s, which viewed planning practice as “fundamentally political” (Watson, 2002b: 179), and practice studies as “value inquiry and value-critical argumentation” (Forester 1999: 175). Its members based their theoretical reflections on empirical observation: case studies, participant observation, and interviews. 27 But they were not really researching planning practices; they saw “planning” practice as a starting point for their own excursions in critical planning theory (Zimmerman 2017 in Othengrafen and Levin-Keitel, 2019: 112). Consequently, the movement divided into theoretical “camps” (Watson, 2002b: 180), some (e.g., Baum, 1983; Forester, 2012; Hoch, 1994; Throgmorton, 1996) identifying with Habermasian communicative rationality, while others (e.g., Flyvberg,1998; Fischler, 2000) were inspired by Foucault. These researchers, less informed by practice theory and research, did no detailed studies of (something) planners’ epistemic cultures or their enacted planning practices, and understood practice differently than we can today.
At the same time, another “practice movement” began, one that did refer to practice theories. STS scholars study knowledge-centered practices in science and technology. These epistemic practices operate in various fields, each with its distinct epistemic culture, including disciplines and professions outside science (Knorr-Cetina 1999, 2001). Thus, STS research, while mainly in the sciences, explores medicine and engineering too (Hackett et al., 2008; Jasanoff et al., 1995; Law and Mol, 2002), and its conceptual approach and methodological tools also fit planning.
A third generation of planning practice studies is emerging. Like STS, but in contrast to the “practice movement,” its work is informed by practice theories and applies advanced qualitative and quantitative methods. A forerunner is Rydin’s (2013) excellent use of ANT to frame her study of environmental planners’ epistemic culture in a case of regulating commercial development. Another is the recent DFG Project that studied planning practices in mid-sized German cities (Levin-Keitel et al., 2019; Othengrafen and Levin-Keitel, 2019). 28 What we can learn from such studies is quite different from what the “practice movement” tells us, and more research like this is needed for relevant (something) planning theories.
“Planning” theory and planning practices
How does mainstream “planning” theory understand planning practice and relate to planning practices? In particular, what kinds of planning practices—generic “planning,” recognized knowledge-centered (something) planning or some other kinds of planning practices—are planning theorists thinking of. To answer these questions, we need sources that show us how planning theorists talk about planning practice.
The best source in the planning literature are books by planning theorists that clearly announce that this is what they are doing, with titles implying that their subject is generic “planning.” Two books do this: Introduction to Planning Practice (Allmendinger et al., 2000) and Planning Practice: Critical Perspectives from the UK (Ferm and Tomaney, 2018). 29 These books tell us how planning theorists describe planning practice to a “lay” audience, and how planning educators prescribe good practice to their students.
Allmendinger, Prior, and Raemakers' opening: “This book is an introduction to the practice of town planning” (2000: ix) confirms common understanding (here the editors') of planning with a qualifier, when talking about actual planning practice. These books’ titles Introduction to Planning Practice and Planning Practice reflect equally common usage: generic “Planning” as a metonym for a particular knowledge-centered planning practice, here, spatial-territorial planning. 30
The books’ contents also reflect their editors’ understanding of “Planning” as a set of diverse practices. Many chapters refer to subfields or particular issue-areas in spatial-territorial planning, for example, “Development Plans…," “Urban Renewal and Grants,” “Ethics and Town Planning,” “Neighborhood Planning,” and “Urban Regeneration.” Some chapters link spatial-territorial and environmental planning: “Conserv(ing) the Natural Heritage,” “Planning for Minerals, Waste and Contaminated Land,” and “Sustainable Development.” Others address topics in economic development: “Retail Development,” “Tourism and Local Economic Development” and "…Development Value Capture.” Finally, some chapters’ topics might be specialized knowledge-centered planning practices themselves: Housing, Transportation Planning/Public Transportation, Infrastructure, and Urban Design.
These chapters make up most of these books’ texts. We might expect the remaining chapters to talk about the generic “planning” of the title, but they do not. Introduction’s Ch.1 “What Is Planning and What do Planners Do?” confirms the book’s overall perspective on planning practice, explicitly identifying its subject with spatial-territorial planning (Hague, 2000: 1–3). The only other general topics are “Public Participation…," and “Planning for Diversity and Social Change.” Little in these books, except the word “Planning” in their titles, can be read as applying to generic “planning.” They are about what Introduction says in its Preface: “the practice of town planning”—a knowledge-centered planning practice as enacted in the UK.
The books’ structures and contents also tell us something about the relationship between planning theories and planning practices. Only four of their 34 chapters engage the kinds of “planning” theories reviewed above: “Planning for Diversity and Social Change,” “Sustainable Development,” and two chapters on public participation. Issues discussed in postmodern planning theory—for example, critique or advocacy of planning paradigms—are hardly mentioned. The absence of “planning” theories is striking. 31
Other books by planning theorists might also be useful. Books addressed to practitioners might not have direct answers, but may tell us in what kind of practices their intended readers are engaged. Hoch’s (2019) Pragmatic Spatial Planning: Practical Theory for Professionals, and Haughton and White’s (2019) Why Plan? Theory for Practitioners are such books. There are also books about planning that might reveal their authors’ ideas on planning practices, even when “practice” is not in their titles. These include The Purpose of Planning (Rydin, 2011) and Making Better Places (Healey, 2010). 32
Who are the professionals Hoch is addressing in his Pragmatic Spatial Planning and the planning practitioners reading Haughton and White’s Theory, and what kinds of planning practices do they enact? From its title, we would think Hoch’s book’s readers are professional spatial planners, but we would be wrong. Pragmatic Spatial Planning is mostly about generic, not spatial planning. Though Hoch questions Friedmann’s generic definition of planning (p.65), his intended readers are not professional spatial planners (who are addressed in occasional asides) but “planners,” following his explicit opening principle: “First…everyone plans” (p.3).
By contrast, we can deduce that Haughton and White’s intended audience are professional planners, from the authors' explicit approach and their book’s main contents. Planning theories are explained as ways of improving practitioners' understanding of their world, through 25 key concepts central to professional practice. These range from participation, through resilience and governmentality to ecosystems and sustainability. Here, Theory is not “planning” theory, because these concepts relate the theories to real practices and contexts.
The Purpose of Planning (Rydin, 2011) is less useful to us. Rydin is not talking about planning practice, nor is she addressing practitioners. Consequently, it is difficult to deduce what kind of practice she might be thinking of, or who she refers to as “planners.” Rydin writes, “My aim …was to provide an accessible introduction to the (UK) planning system…emphasis(ing) questions and issues that make people interested in planning.” (p.v). This implies a general readership—people interested in or engaged with planning, rather than planning students or practitioners—as Rydin’s intended audience.
But there are some clues to suggest what kind of planning practices she envisages. One is the planning process her book, “a primer on the democratic planning process.” (Mattiuzzi, 2012: 163) describes. Mediated through state institutions, its “starting point” is “spatial planning” for physical infrastructure that involves “collaborative governance” combining citizen groups and business representatives engaged in planning and development (pp.163–164). Here, we can deduce a “spatial planning” process of co-production of knowledge for action, integrating the contributions of professional spatial planners with other engaged “planners”: citizen activists, business representatives, and stakeholders. Another clue is Rydin’s references to “the (UK) planning system,” essentially engaged in spatial planning and largely staffed by spatial planners.
Healey’s “Planning Project” is clearly a particular knowledge-centered planning practice, as presented in her Preface: “This ‘planning’ (is) sometimes qualified with the terms ‘city’, ‘urban and regional’ or ‘spatial'…" (Healey, 2010: ix). Chapters covering “three broad areas of practice” (p. x) are the core of her book: “Shaping (and) Managing Neighborhood Change,” "Transforming Places through Major Projects,” and “Producing Place-Development Strategies.” Chapter 8 “Doing Planning Work,” work that “those trained as planning-oriented experts” (p.210) do, focuses “in particular (on) the contribution of planning expertise.” (p.xiii).
For one of our most prominent and respected planning theorists, Healey’s relation of “planning” theories to the “Planning Project” is revealing: “(in) social sciences and…philosophy…(there are) alternative perspectives and 'theories' (with) a rich tradition of such theory within the planning field …. In this book …such theory lies in the background…of the text.” (2010: xiii).
What answers does this review give to our questions? How do these planning theorists—academic educators—understand planning practice? How do they relate “planning” theories to different kinds of planning practices? From five of the six books, we can deduce quite clear answers. Pragmatic Spatial Planning answers our questions too, but Hoch’s answers are opposite to the others'. 33
The nine other planning theorists’ books are unambiguous in their presentation of planning: the planning practices they describe, prescribe, or teach are knowledge-centered planning practices, not generic “planning.” Often they identify a specific planning practice, spatial planning, as their subject, as Allmendinger does in Introduction, 34 Hague does in “What is planning.,” Rydin does for the planning process, and Healey does for her “Planning Project.” Each book offers its conceptual scheme to frame its exposition of theory. The edited textbooks are organized by planning practices or subfields; the others use key concepts, issues, and broad areas of practice. None applies any “planning” theories, as Healey admits.
This seems to reflect mainstream planning theorists’ understanding prevailing today: awareness—explicit or implicit—of planning as diverse practices. “Planning” theorists themselves concerned with participative “planning” practice, they identify and address recognized planning practices (usually spatial planning) when describing, explaining, or teaching planning.
Discussion
Summary and findings
There is no planning as a recognizable practice, but planning exists as a diverse set of practices. Sociology of knowledge definitions imply three kinds of planning practices: (1) Generic “planning”—what people do when they are planning; (2) Knowledge-centered “something” (e.g., spatial) planning; and (3) Real planning: “Something” planning practiced in particular contexts, from advocacy planning for a Colombian barrio to transportation planning for the EU, and planning enacted in general contexts, for example, informal, insurgent, and Southern planning.
Planning theories are linked to these practices: generic “planning” theories and “something” (e.g., regional, environmental, or Southern) planning theories. “Planning” theories are abstract and contextless; “something” planning theories engage with their epistemic practices and objects; for example, spatial planning theories focus on spatial planning practice and its object: human activities in space and their environment. Research on real planning practices engenders theory, for example, practice studies, and the “practice movement” that viewed planning practice as “fundamentally political.”
Planning theorists recognize planning as diverse practices, but hardly apply “planning” theory to planning practices. “Planning” theories are divorced from enacted planning practices, accounting for the “planning theory-practice gap.” “Something” planning theories include constructive adaptations of “planning” theories and paradigms, for example, in spatial planning: comprehensive planning based on the rational model, and collaborative planning incorporating communicative practice. But knowledge about real planning practices is limited: there are few detailed studies of epistemic planning practices and cultures.
Objections, responses and qualifications
These conclusions are not necessarily true; they are contested and need qualification. Colleagues objected that the idea of diverse planning practices undermines the united planning discipline and represents a retreat to modernism (Van Assche et al., 2017). This mistakenly assumes that unity and diversity are mutually exclusive, but they are complementary: for example when—from a flower to an ecosystem—diverse parts make an integrated whole.
Their accusation of modernism misreads practice theory on which my proposal is based. In a correct reading, modern planners were expert professionals in practices applying scientific knowledge and research. Postmodern planning theorists condemned these practices and the rational paradigm that shaped them, rightly provoked by bad consequences of modern planning. These critiques also drew on new thinking that questioned the objectivity of scientific knowledge, suggesting that knowledge is a social construct (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Now planning practice was no longer “scientific” and planners were not experts. Rather, planning as linking knowledge to action is a communicative process with planners in different roles interacting with the other engaged actors, all contributing in their own ways in the social construction of knowledge.
Practice theory evolved when sociologists and anthropologists were curious about how the social construction of knowledge really happens. Researchers found various practices that produce our recognized fields of knowledge and adopted technologies. While first focused on scientific knowledge—previously thought objective—these were more general; knowledge-centered practices of communities engaged in a collective undertaking or with a common interest: scientific research, technology development and application, and professional practice in fields from medicine and education to public planning and policy. In these communities, scientists and professionals interact with the other participants in a cooperative process researchers called the co-production of knowledge. Deconstructing the postmodern generalization of social production of knowledge, co-production of knowledge is a post-postmodern concept. 35 In co-production of knowledge, the interactions between experts (scientists, professionals, and technicians), contributing knowledge in their specialized domains, and other actors with their knowledge contributions are detailed, in an integrative process producing socially valid knowledge for action. 36 Today’s planners, then, are not modern technocrats, but post-postmodern professionals in knowledge-centered practices (Alexander, 2017).
Another colleague remarked that planners can engage in several practices, as shown by debaters' personal experiences. 37 This critic misunderstood the meaning of practice, confusing practice with role. A knowledge-centered practice implies a community of practitioners sharing their knowledge base, norms, understandings, and experience. That does not restrict planners to one practice; someone with wider horizons can engage in related practices, learn, and practice in different fields over the course of a career, or even adopt another practice as a passing role. 38
After these critiques, my propositions still need qualification. Though they look categorical, these conclusions are only a hypothesis that needs substantiation (Popper, 1959). 39 The epistemological argument for this model of planning is strong, based on good (if anecdotal) evidence of common usage. Also, while systematic research is lacking, a recent study is suggestive. A survey of recruitment ads for Canadian municipal planners (Guyadeen and Honsta, 2021) found desired knowledge areas to include official plan and zoning bylaw amendments, subdivision and site planning and processing plan applications, and recommendations and advice on land use, development control, and planning studies among assigned tasks. These demands clearly identify municipal planning with a recognized knowledge-centered practice: spatial, urban or city, and regional planning.
This “fractal” model of planning could be a useful analytical construct for further research. But the recognized (something) planning practices identified here are tentative and provisional, and empirical support for their real existence is weak. Can we say whether it is spatial-, transportation-, or environmental planners who engage in common knowledge-based practices, in communities sharing norms, experience, and understandings that make up their epistemic cultures, or perhaps it is urban, regional, and e-planning that are epistemic planning practices. How can we be sure that these kinds of planning practices exist at all—though if they do not, what else can planning practice be?
Implications
For planning theory
Today, “Planning Theory (is) positioned between day-to-day practice…and higher levels of theory,” with planning defined as linking knowledge to action. “Real practice needs theory that can inform action; higher levels of theory can contribute concepts and analytical categories to practitioners’ understanding” (Chettiparamb 2019: 441). This position suggests a body of Planning Theory made up of several kinds of planning theories. Redefining planning as proposed gives a multiscalar answer to the question of how to relate theory to practice: making different levels of planning theories for different kinds of planning practices.
“Planning” theories are the “higher levels of theory,” designed for generic “planning” practice—the planning that anyone can do, that links knowledge to action. Though abstract, general, and divorced from a specific context, some have enriched planning thought with important models and concepts. At a lower level, “something” planning theories are engaged with recognized knowledge-centered planning practices, for example, spatial planning. Spatial planning theories include theories of spatial planning, often expositions of “planning” theories for spatial planning. More than “planning” theories, however, these can have normative content with useful practical application.
The “planning theory-practice gap” identified above raises Moroni’s (2010: 138) question: “which theory for what kind of practice?” Awareness of the differences between “planning” and planning theories and practices might engender better planning theories in several ways. One way is sensitivity to the limitations of abstract “planning” theories divorced from any context and without a definable epistemic object. 40 Better focused and less abstract derivations from general “planning” theories and paradigms can be more useful. 41
Another way is to avoid generalizations (frequent in “planning” theories) in favor of contingent expressions: “When…then…." This is useful for adapting “planning” theories and paradigms to specific planning practices. Finally, planning theorists can direct their attention to real planning practices; that is how more “third generation” practice studies with detailed research into epistemic planning practices and cultures may improve planning theory.
For planning education
Planning educators have always been committed to educating students for practice. As planning education grew in the mid-20th century and produced new planning programs, leaders tried to define the planning practices they were thinking of for their curriculum design. Perloff designed his pilot program in the University of Chicago for the practicing planner as a “generalist with a specialty” (Perloff 1957: 35). Later, John Friedmann envisaged a generalist planner whose “substantive…domain of competence… is the urban habitat” (1996: 95,98). 42 What this means is unclear, when he concedes: “there is (no) single practice of planning” (1996: 92). In their dialogue here, Donald Schön (quoted in note 3, 1996: 103) takes this concession to its logical conclusion: “The… practices we serve – environmental regulators…developers…urban designers…data analysts, community developers, advocates…call for different cores.” Friedmann rejected Schön’s argument, proposing seven courses as a “core of planning expertise” for “planners…defin(ing) themselves as urban professionals” (1996: 90).
For nearly a century, knowledge-centered planning practices have been identified in planning education under various terms: concentrations (1973 AIP recognition standards in Dalton, 2001: 428),"areas of specialized knowledge” (PAB, 1989), and specializations (Friedmann 1996: 98). Since the 1950s, these have included spatial-territorial planning, 43 housing, social-, community/economic development-, environmental-, and transportation planning, development planning for LDCs, and urban design (Brinkley and Hoch, 2021). “Planning is what it does” (p.88), and planning educators should recognize that these are the planning practice for which they are educating their students. Designing planning programs will be easier with a simple goal for core curricula: to give students the essential competences for “planning” practice. Operationally, this means courses in the common understandings and performative skills everyone engaged in planning needs, 44 if they want to be effective.
For planning practices
Recognizing that there is no “planning” but there are diverse planning practices has no implications for planners’ behavior or actions: that is what planners (spatial, transportation, or environmental) are and what they do. But these conclusions may be consciousness-raising.
Practicing planners' frustration at the contrast between their aspirations and their practices is well known. This can be avoided if planning is more pragmatic. Rather than being “planners,” mobilizers, mediators or entrepreneurs to transform society, planners can content themselves with more mundane—but challenging—roles: urban-, environmental-, community-, transportation-, or e-planners contributing their knowledge, understanding, and experience in the collective co-construction of knowledge for action that is planning.
Conclusions
Theorists and planners recognize that planning is a practice, though efforts at defining planning have failed. If there is no planning as a recognizable practice, planning exists as a set of diverse practices.
Following definitions of practice in the sociology of knowledge, there are three kinds of planning practice: (1) Generic “planning”: what people do when they are planning; (2) (Something) planning: knowledge-centered planning practices, for example, spatial, regional, environmental, community, or transportation planning, each with its epistemic object; and (3) Real-life planning: planning practices in specific contexts, for example, metropolitan-regional planning for Auckland, New Zealand; environmental planning for the Fraser River Basin management area, Alberta, Canada; transportation planning for the Stadsprovinsie Amsterdam, The Netherlands; and planning enacted in general contexts, for example, colonial, informal, insurgent, and Southern planning.
Planning theories are linked to these planning practices. Generic “planning” theories are for and about “planning,” abstract and general, they are divorced from any specific context. “Something” (spatial, regional, environmental, or Southern) planning theories are engaged with their epistemic practices and objects. Real-life planning practices and their contexts are the subjects of planning and planning-related research that engenders planning theories: empirical research for theories in (something) planning and practice studies contributing to normative and positive theories of planning.
This model offers a new way to understand planning and the relationship between planning theory and practice. There is no “planning”; rather, planning is a set of diverse practices in a multiscalar hierarchy linking different kinds of practices to different levels of planning theories. Like fractals, where an equation in climate science describes a snowflake and hydrologists use fractals to predict waves, in planning, “planning” theories are the counterparts of fractal mathematics, practice-linked theories for spatial or environmental planning parallel climate science and hydrology, and enacted planning practices and their specific contexts are concrete realities: planning for Colombo as a snowflake, or regulating UK power plant location and emissions like the waves.
A “fractal” image of planning can explain a few problems, offer some insights, and resolve dilemmas that have bedeviled planning theory and practice. For planning theory, the distinction between generic “planning” practice and theories and epistemic planning practices with their (something) planning theories can resolve some longstanding issues and problems.
Acknowledging this distinction releases “planning theorists who are trapped between two opposing forces:...the draw of planning as an idea (vs) the…pull of (planning) practice.” (Beauregard, 2020: 107). Deconstructing planning practice separates these to identify “planning as an idea” with “planning” and generic “planning” practice, and “planning practice” with recognized knowledge-centered planning practices and the many diverse real planning practices that are “what planners do."
Now, we planning theorists can recognize Planning Theory, which for some of us is our main concern, as the generic “planning” theory it is abstract, general, for and about “planning” practice—the planning everyone can do. Planning paradigms, models, and discourse on normative issues from the public interest to the just city that are the stuff of “planning” theory have been essential in shaping planning thought—here planning as a discipline—and will surely make valuable contributions into the future. 45
But “planning” theory’s contributions should not blind us to its shortcomings: abstraction and decontextuation limit its normative value for real planning practices. “Planning” theories are for a generic “planning” practice that has no epistemic object, not for the knowledge-centered normative practices society recognizes as planning. This is why “planning” theories' prescribed roles—planners should be social change agents, good storytellers, or public resource managers—are problematic.
Understanding the relationship between “planning” theory and planning theories for (something) planning practices can make planning scholarship better and enhance our contribution to planning practices. “Planning” theories shape planning practices when they are transcribed into the body of planning theories through exposition for particular (something) planning practices. Spatial planning offers some cases: comprehensive planning based on the rational planning model and communicative practice applied as collaborative planning in the institutional design of local planning and governance. Other examples are mediation in resolving environmental conflicts as communicative practice, and the social transformation model of planning enacted as transactive planning with local communities. 46
This “fractal” model of planning also (partly) explains the “planning theory-practice gap”: “planning” theory is for “planning,” not for the (something) planning practices we know or the real planning practices that are what planners do. Realizing this and understanding the relationship between planning theories and practices may help to close the gap.
For the planning academy, recognizing planning in its diverse practices resolves a dilemma that has preoccupied educators for decades: the conflicting demands of the planner as a generalist versus educating planners as specialized professionals. This resolution has practical implications for planning programs’ self-identification and curriculum design. 47
There are fewer insights for planning practice: this is what planning practices are, and this is what planners do. But there may be some consciousness-raising implications for planners' self-image and aspirations. To succeed, “planners” may be mobilizers, mediators, entrepreneurs, analysts, or politicians, depending on the circumstances. Planners are professionals, experts in their practices, combining their knowledge, understanding, and experience with others' in the collective co-construction of knowledge for action that is planning.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
Author biography
Ernest R. Alexander