The Efficiency of Network Nodes: The Regulation of Airports

Abstract

This paper looks at the efficiency of airports and the ways in which the shifting regulatory structure of airports is gradually impacting on this efficiency. It considers the context in which airports, the nodes in the air transportation system, function in terms of both market and institutional forces, and argues that considerations of efficiency need to be viewed in a normative as well as a positive context. The role of institutions, embracing both private sector corporate entities and public government and governance are considered. What emerges is that there is no single model that demonstrably maximizes efficiency, at least not in the narrow economic sense, but rather that there are a number of experiments that are taking place within a variety of institutional contexts.

Keywords

airport regulation air transportation networks air transport nodes

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