Commercial Exploitation of Outer Space: Navigating the Role of International Space Law in Regulating Space Activities

INTRODUCTION

Outer space has undergone a fundamental change, moving from state-controlled military operations and scientific research during the Cold War era to a new era in which commercial entities lead the way. Major space-faring nations continue to invest in advanced technologies, while emerging countries rapidly adopt space capabilities on an unprecedented scale. ¹ The commercialization of space technology advances because of four main factors, which include smaller technology sizes, reduced launch expenses, lower system prices, and digital technology implementation in space-based systems.

The SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket achieved a historic milestone when it launched NASA astronauts to the International Space Station on May 30, 2020, during the first private company-operated crewed orbital mission. ² Private companies now operate extensive satellite constellations (SpaceX operates Starlink) while performing suborbital space tourism flights (Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic), and they are working to extract lunar resources through commercial agreements (Intuitive Machines and ispace). ³ The accomplishments represent more than engineering achievements because they signify an essential transition in human space exploration, which moved away from superpower competition toward commercial space exploration. ⁴ The transition has created conditions for an “in-space” and “for-space” economic sector, including orbital tourism, space-based settlement opportunities, and services that operate from space (see Fig. 1 ). The sector is now one of the fastest-growing industries globally.

The international framework of space law, which emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, focuses on states as its main entities and requires them to take responsibility. States must authorize all national space activities under the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and its associated agreements. At the same time, they must continuously monitor these activities and remain responsible for any international damage that occurs. ⁵ The current framework, which focuses on states, creates significant problems during the commercial era because private entities lead technological progress and business expansion. Still, the existing legal system does not have specific rules that match their business size, operational methods, and exposure to danger.

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Fig. 1.

Evolution of Outer Space Activities: From State-Centric Exploration to Commercial Exploitation. Evolution of Outer Space Activities—From state-centric Cold War exploration to commercial exploitation dominated by private actors in satellite services, tourism, and resource activities. Sources: NASA historical archives, SpaceX reports, AEI analysis.

The article provides a thorough evaluation of commercial space activities, examining the current international legal system to assess its operational success. The study reveals essential regulatory deficiencies stemming from insufficient definitions of space resource ownership after extraction, the need to determine responsibility for mega-constellation debris, and the need to apply national licensing to private operations spanning multiple countries. The research establishes that states need to define their international space law duties by making their responsibilities for private space activities more specific and robust, particularly with respect to authorization, supervision, and liability management. The international community requires the establishment of a new multilateral framework to regulate commercial space activities, grounded in the principle of the province of all mankind, to achieve sustainable access to space resources for all.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE LAW

International space law governs human activities in outer space, including exploration, use of celestial bodies, and satellite operations. The exploration of outer space emerged in the mid-20^th century, when V-2 rockets (Vengeance Weapon Two) designed by the Nazi scientists were deployed to bombard Western Europe. ⁶ It was the first artificial object to travel into space by crossing the Kármán line (edge of space) with the vertical launch of MW 18014 on 20 June 1944. ⁷ The Cold War space race between the United States and the Soviet Union provided the primary impetus for rapid legal development. Driven by ideological competition, fears of nuclear weaponization in orbit, and the need to prevent military escalation in a new domain, both superpowers recognized the urgency of international rules to ensure peaceful uses and avoid territorial claims. This geopolitical context accelerated the creation of binding treaties under United Nations auspices, balancing competition with cooperation. The Cold War era spurred space exploration and the space race between the U.S. and the former USSR, aimed at establishing dominance in outer space. The USSR launched Sputnik-1, the first artificial Earth satellite, on October 4, 1957; as a result, the USA successfully landed Apollo 11 on the Moon. ⁸ As a result of instantaneous growth of space exploration, the United Nations (UN), by its resolution 2222(XXI) adopted OST (OST 1967, which is well known as the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies…it was primarily based on the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles… The OST, ratified amid heightened Cold War tensions, established enduring principles such as peaceful purposes, benefit for all humanity, non-appropriation of celestial bodies, and state responsibility for all national activities in space (whether governmental or nongovernmental), ⁹ it was opened for signature by the former USSR, the United Kingdom and the USA in January 1967. Finally, it entered into force in October 1967. This Treaty remains a bulwark and is considered the constitution of outer space. It established most acceptable principles of outer space that remain valuable in the peaceful regulation of outer space, such as the use of space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity, and that celestial bodies cannot be appropriated by national sovereignty. States bear international responsibility for all their national activities in space, whether governmental or private. ¹⁰ Besides this, from 1969 to 1979, the international community also negotiated four most significant treaties under the leadership of the United Nations, the 1968 Rescue Agreement (obliging states to assist and return astronauts and space objects), the 1972 Liability Convention (establishing absolute liability for damage caused on Earth by space objects), the 1975 Registration Convention (requiring launch states to register objects with the UN), and the 1979 Moon Agreement. The 1979 Moon Agreement established the Moon, together with its resources, as property belonging to all people of Earth and created new regulations governing how those resources could be used. However, it has been ratified by only 18 states (none of the major space-faring nations such as the United States, Russia, China, or India). It is widely regarded as a diplomatic failure. The major powers considered the resource-sharing system to be premature and overly limiting because they believed it would block their commercial and national exploration activities. ¹¹ The 1980s marked the beginning of a long period when international efforts to create new binding multilateral treaties came to a standstill because of the Cold War’s conclusion, new global priorities, and the increasing number of space-faring nations, including China and India. Consensus in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) became more difficult. The international community implemented new requirements through non-binding soft law instruments, which they combined with national/domestic legislation and plurilateral initiatives. Moreover, from the 1980s to the 2000s, progress in the development and codification of space remained stagnant until the adoption of soft law instruments and national legislation. The COPUOS adopted principles on direct broadcasting satellites (1982), remote sensing (1986), nuclear power sources (1992), and, most importantly, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (2007) and the 21 Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (2019). Moreover, at the domestic level, commercial exploration of outer space led the space-faring nations to adopt domestic laws in the governance of activities in outer space; for instance, the U.S. adopted the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, the U.S. Space Act of 2015, which is designed to facilitate the growth of the commercial space industry. ¹² As a result, …NASA initiated the Artemis Accords in 2020, a set of non-binding principles now signed by 61 nations (as of January 2026, with Oman as the latest), aimed at ensuring exploration and resource extraction align with the OST. ¹³ Similar to Artemis, China and Russia announced in March 2021 that they would be collaborating on an ambitious project named the International Lunar Research Station, which would establish a facility close to the Moon’s south pole. ¹⁴ Other states, including Luxembourg (2017), the United Arab Emirates (2019), and Japan (2020), enacted domestic laws to attract private investment in space resources, reflecting a pragmatic response to the absence of updated multilateral rules.

COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE

At the preliminary level, it is most essential to understand the intrinsic meaning of outer space and its commercialization. Indeed, the precise altitude of outer space is not defined by the OST nor by the Chicago Convention of 1944. But there is consensus among UN agencies that outer space lies 100 km above Earth’s surface and that this notional boundary is known as the Kamran Line. ¹⁵ The commercialization of outer space signifies a paradigm shift in space activities from exclusively government-funded and government-operated to phenomena in which major stakeholders are vibrant, profit-oriented industries led by major private companies. For a long time, outer space has been an exclusive domain of space-faring nations and their agencies, including NASA, Roscosmos, ESA, and ISRO. Nowadays, however, private companies design, construct, launch, and operate satellites, spacecraft, and human spaceflight missions, often at a fraction of the cost governments used to pay. This sudden shift has dramatically altered the entire governance framework for activities in outer space. However, this transformation was not driven solely by private innovation. Governments played a pivotal role through substantial funding, contracts, regulatory support, and public-private partnerships, enabling companies to scale rapidly while maintaining state oversight in line with international law. It might be a result of lowering the space launch costs. For instance, NASA’s “space shuttle had a cost of about $1.5 billion to launch 27,500 kg to Low Earth Orbit (LEO), $54,500/kg. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 now advertises a cost of $62 million to launch 22,800 kg to LEO, $2,720/kg. Commercial launch has reduced the cost to LEO by a factor of 20.” ¹⁶ For example, SpaceX received billions in NASA contracts for cargo and crew missions, which provided critical early revenue and technical validation (see Fig. 2 ). Similar partnerships exist globally, such as ESA collaborations with European firms and China’s state-guided private sector, illustrating that commercialization builds on government-enabled infrastructure and risk-sharing. Within a short span, SpaceX deployed thousands of Starlink satellites, with over 9,600 active in orbit as of early 2026, providing global broadband. Private lunar landers from companies like Intuitive Machines (U.S.) and ispace (Japan) support government missions, while firms in Europe and emerging markets contribute to Earth observation and smallsat services. The 2020 Indian reforms enabled rapid market entry through IN-SPACe, which allowed private businesses to expand their operations rapidly (Agnikul Cosmos developed 3D-printed rocket engines, and Skyroot conducted its spacecraft launch). Multiple countries exhibit identical patterns because their private funding exceeds $100 million, supporting the development of small launch vehicles, satellite constellations, and space-based manufacturing operations.

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Fig. 2.

Decline in Space Launch Costs and the Rise of Commercial Space Actors. Significant decline in space launch costs over time, driven by reusable technology and private providers, enabling large-scale deployment of constellations and accelerating commercialization.

In the new space economy, satellite services are now the most significant source of income. Businesses like Planet Labs, Maxar, and India’s Pixxel provide daily high-resolution imaging of the entire planet to clients in agriculture, urban planning, insurance, and defense. Private landers manufactured by Intuitive Machines, Astrobotic, and Firefly Aerospace are crucial to the NASA Artemis mission. ¹⁷ Businesses are already entering into contracts to harvest water ice that can be used as rocket propellant and to deliver payloads to the lunar surface. The Artemis Accords, which India joined in 2023, and the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act specifically allow private companies to own and market commodities they extract in space, laying the legal groundwork for a completely new off-planet mining sector. The 2020 space sector reforms and the establishment of IN-SPACe as an independent promoter and regulator marked the arrival of the commercialization wave in India. India now has over 200 start-ups and businesses, up from less than five private space companies in 2019. In 2022, Agnikul Cosmos successfully tested the world’s first single-piece 3D-printed rocket engine, and Skyroot Aerospace became the first private Indian company to launch a rocket. ¹⁸ With hundreds of millions of dollars in private funding, Indian companies are developing small-launch vehicles, satellite constellations, lunar rovers, and in-space manufacturing platforms. By 2035, the global space economy, estimated at $600 billion in 2025, is expected to surpass $1 trillion, with the commercial sector expanding faster than the governmental sector for the first time in recorded history. ¹⁹ By 2035, the global space economy, valued at approximately $613 billion in 2024–2025, is projected to reach $1 trillion as early as 2032, or up to $1.8 trillion, with the commercial sector expanding faster than government activities for the first time.

LEGAL CHALLENGES IN THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE

The drastic shift in the paradigm of outer space from state-centric to private entities also has a far-reaching impact on the rift between Cold War-era laws and the current reality. The process of commercialization has revealed multiple legal problems arising from the OST 1967 and its associated agreements, as states created these documents. The list includes resource ownership and state responsibility for private actions, space debris management, orbital resource distribution, and the potential for military use. The most contentious challenges in the space law regime are ownership and exploitation of space resources. Article II of the OST strictly prohibits “by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”. ²⁰ However, the Treaty remains silent on the role of private entities in relation to the extraction of these precious resources. Indeed, some space-faring nations, such as the U.S., Luxembourg, the UAE, and Japan, as well as several other countries, have passed national laws that explicitly allow their citizens and companies to own resources they can extract without claiming territorial sovereignty. ²¹ Although it’s also argued that such a kind of extraction by the private entities violates the fundamental spirit of Article II and the principle of the “province of mankind”. ²² To bridge these ambiguities, soft law instruments have emerged as practical interim solutions. Notably, the Hague Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities (adopted in 2019 by The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group) provide non-binding guidelines. Key principles include adaptive governance, international cooperation, benefit-sharing (monetary and non-monetary), priority rights for operators, safety zones around extraction sites, environmental protection, and promotion of participation by all countries. These Building Blocks aim to foster legal certainty and predictability for commercial activities while respecting OST principles, though their voluntary nature limits binding enforcement. While national laws offer investment incentives, critics argue they risk undermining the “province of all mankind” principle without multilateral consensus. Suppose there is a lack on the part of the company. It directly compelled the state to provide substantial insurance coverage and created uncertainty about who would pay in the event of mega-constellation collisions or debris-related damage.

The second major obstacle arises because different levels of liability protection exist for private commercial activities. The 1972 Liability Convention establishes that launching states must bear absolute responsibility for damage that occurs on Earth or to aircraft. Still, they will face fault-based liability for damage in space. States thus remain internationally responsible and liable for damages caused by private entities under their jurisdiction (per Article VI of the OST), even without direct involvement. The absence of specific rules regarding space debris collisions creates uncertainty for prominent satellite constellations, which might lead governments to adopt strict insurance rules that would prevent new investments until states develop effective systems to share liability between themselves and satellite operators.

The growing number of commercial operations has created a significant sustainability risk by producing more space debris. The space surveillance networks operating in early 2026 monitor 40,000 objects exceeding 10 cm in size, while experts predict more than 1.2 million objects exceeding 1 cm, and numerous dangerous small fragments exist. State missions throughout history have generated most of the space debris, but mega-constellation operations now pose a greater risk of satellite collisions and fragmentation. ²³ The UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (2007) and Long-term Sustainability Guidelines (2019) offer vital non-enforceable direction through their suggested methods for passivation and de-orbiting operations. ²⁴ Soft law serves as an optimal solution because it adapts to rapid technological change while enabling parties to reach agreements through alternative means when conventional treaty negotiations stall. The program faces enforcement challenges because it operates voluntarily, enabling organizations to avoid compliance and preventing them from completing required remediation work. Moreover, the rise of massive commercial constellations has also facilitated disputes over slots and spectrum, as well as increased satellite interference. ²⁵ With the commercialization of space, it also increases the risk of militarization due to the dual-use of satellite performance and its increasing use in conflict zones. ²⁶ It is also debated whether a private company can be held liable as a lawful combatant under international humanitarian law. Thus, the absence of clear and coherent rules for planetary protection and environmental impact assessment has threatened the long-term sustainability of outer space.

The growing number of prominent satellite constellations has created conflicts over methods for obtaining space-based positions and radio frequency assignments. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) operates a resource management system that allows new users to access these restricted resources through an application-submission ordering system. Still, the expansion of satellite deployment creates coordination problems that lead to delayed submissions and a higher risk of signal interference. The ITU rules aim to prevent harmful interference, but their current system faces two significant problems that require new enforcement mechanisms to achieve fair and enduring satellite network access. The deployment of dual-use commercial satellites, which perform Earth observation and communication tasks, creates military risks because they could become targets for international humanitarian law during conflicts. The legal status of private space operators remains unclear because experts cannot agree on their combatant status or their duty to engage in military operations. The combination of these obstacles endangers the future sustainability, equal access, and peaceful exploration of outer space. Soft law provides flexible responses to international problems, although its limited legal framework requires international organizations to modify their multilateral systems.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW IN GOVERNING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

The international space law regime derives its authority from the 1967 OST and the four related UN treaties, which establish the main legal framework for all space activities, including commercial operations. The instruments created for state-to-state relations during the Cold War period still operate under the core doctrine of state responsibility for controlling private entities. Under Article VI of the OST, states bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, whether carried out by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities (including private companies). This means states must authorize and continuously supervise commercial space activities and remain liable for any damage caused, as set out in the 1972 Liability Convention. These obligations form the backbone of the current governance of private space companies. It fundamentally relies on “the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including Moon and Celestial Bodies” (OST), 1967 and four other international treaty instruments, “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1968”, “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972,” “Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1976” and “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1984.” All of these latter agreements expand upon obligations specified in the OST, which has 117 ratifications and 22 signatories, including major space-faring nations. ²⁷ This Treaty contains essential rules and principles for space operations, such as Article II’s non-appropriation principle, which is widely regarded as representative of customary international law. The regime continues to function because it provides various long-term advantages that it sustains. The non-appropriation principle (Article II) has successfully prevented sovereignty claims over celestial bodies. The requirement for state supervision has enabled nations to create their own domestic licensing frameworks that regulate private operators. The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines function as soft law instruments that create adaptable rules that most countries choose to follow. The framework presents specific boundaries that restrict its application during the commercial period because it fails to establish rules for private businesses, relies on state goodwill for enforcement, and requires different countries to apply its provisions. Enforcement remains a major weakness. Compliance depends largely on voluntary state action, and there is no centralized international oversight body with binding powers. The growing number of unilateral domestic laws (e.g., in the United States, Luxembourg, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates) creates the risk of regulatory fragmentation, potentially leading to a “race to the bottom” or conflicts between national approaches and the OST’s common heritage principles. The OST was negotiated and came into force during the Cold War between the former USSR and the USA, particularly in the context of the threat of the use and placement of nuclear weapons in outer space. The OST begins with an explanation of its emphasis on guaranteeing openness, collaboration, and equitable access to space. Although this Treaty’s tenets provide a solid basis for space resource operations, it lacks clear regulations governing the specifics of those operations. Article I of the OST allowed the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. It involves direct resource utilization and other space resource activities. Although this clearly involves “use” in the context of resources like fuel, oxygen, or water, it probably involves resource extraction for use on Earth. Article I also states that “such exploration and use shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.” ²⁰ Although there are some examples of activities that could be seen as bringing these ideas into reality, such as the sharing of samples returned from the Moon, it remains unclear how these principles might be realized and could potentially cause conflict. Article II of the OST strictly prohibits “by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” It clearly imposes restrictions applicable to both commercial and governmental space resource operations. It is also reiterated in Article 11 (2) of the Moon Agreement, 1979. Perhaps it would be feasible to distinguish between the appropriation of a celestial body in its entirety and the appropriation of resources that have been derived from it. ²⁸ The principle of non-appropriation prohibits only the appropriation of a celestial body in its whole if such a distinction could be made, which is by no means established by law. This interpretation of the non-appropriation principle would significantly impact the commercial feasibility of space resource activities. Indeed, some space-faring nations, such as the U.S., Luxembourg, the UAE, and Japan, as well as several other countries, have passed national laws that explicitly allow their citizens and companies to own resources they can extract without claiming territorial sovereignty. Although it’s also argued that such a kind of extraction by the private entities violates the fundamental spirit of Article II and the principle of “province of mankind”. Article III of the OST requires state parties to “carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law.” Hence, it imposes a positive restriction on the state to consider international law when extracting resources (see Fig. 3 for an illustration of this regulatory framework). Undoubtedly, nations (as well as their corresponding civic and commercial entities) must operate in accordance with the wording and spirit of the OST while engaging in such operations. Moreover, the two most important principles related to resource extraction activities are authorization and continuous supervision. Article VI of the OST stated that states parties bear international responsibility for all national activities in outer space, whether conducted by governments or non-governmental entities, in accordance with the Treaty. Therefore, to ensure that non-governmental organizations in space comply with the OST, nations must formally authorize or approve their operations and periodically monitor them. ²⁹ Furthermore, the liability and issuance for commercial activities also pose another challenge, as the Liability Convention 1972 has established a threshold of absolute liability only to the launching state, and the state remains responsible internationally, not the private players. ³⁰ Furthermore, the liability and issuance for commercial activities also pose another challenge, as the Liability Convention 1972 has established a threshold of absolute liability only to the launching state, and the state remains responsible internationally, not the private players. If there is a lack on the part of the company. It directly compelled the state to provide substantial insurance coverage and created uncertainty about who would pay in the event of mega-constellation collisions or debris-related damage. Furthermore, the space environment is another concern, as a surge in space debris poses a serious threat. More than “128 million pieces of debris smaller than 1 cm (0.4 in), about 900,000 pieces of debris 1–10 cm, and around 34,000 pieces larger than 10 cm (3.9 in) were estimated to be in orbit around the Earth.” Although state missions largely contribute to it, commercialization may increase the risk of debris in outer space. However, the “UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” exist, but they are only a non-binding soft law. Moreover, the rise of large commercial constellations has also led to disputes over slot and spectrum allocation, as well as increased satellite interference. With the commercialization of space, the risk of militarization also increases due to the dual-use nature of satellite performance. Its increasing use in conflict zones has raised questions about whether a private company could be held liable as a lawful combatant under international humanitarian law. Furthermore, this soft-law evolution demonstrates that the 1967 legal framework can be extended to accommodate the commercialization of outer space beyond the treaty drafters’ intentions and imagination. Nonetheless, these advantages are becoming eclipsed by substantial disadvantages that jeopardize long-term sustainability and equity. The most fundamental drawback is the absence of direct private regulation entities. International space law primarily concerns states and relies on domestic implementation, which varies enormously in quality and rigor. The operational framework of international coordination serves as the primary mechanism for managing orbital slots and radio frequency distribution. The ITU operates a first-come, first-served filing system to manage its limited available resources. The ITU faces challenges because commercial satellite constellations are now deployed at such high speeds, overburdening their operational systems, creating problems with satellite interference and fair access to space resources, and leaving insufficient procedures for managing large numbers of satellites. Overall, while the existing international space law provides essential foundational principles, its state-centric design, limited enforcement tools, and reliance on soft law and national regulation leave significant gaps in addressing the scale, speed, and diversity of today’s commercial space activities. Most fundamentally, OST, 1967 prohibits national appropriation but does not far and wide clearly address commercial ownership of extracted resources, open the door for state to pass unilateral domestic laws that might be having some confrontation with the existing principles of outer space, such as the doctrine of the “common heritage of mankind.” it also meticulously lacking a robust enforcement mechanism and its compliance is generally based on voluntary state cooperation.

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Fig. 3.

Interaction Between International Space Law, National Regulation, and Commercial Space Activities. This figure illustrates the regulatory framework governing commercial space activities, highlighting the interplay between international space treaties, domestic space legislation, and private commercial operators, while identifying existing legal gaps in areas such as resource ownership, liability, and environmental sustainability. Sources: https://www.aei.org/articles/moores-law-meet-musks-law-the-underappreciated-story-of-spacex-and-the-stunning-decline-in-launch-costs/.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Outer space has evolved into a worldwide billion-dollar industry driven by rapid commercial growth, encompassing satellite broadband services, Earth observation systems, space tourism, lunar exploration, and resource mining. The transition to commercial space operations reduced costs while introducing new technological advancements. Yet it revealed critical weaknesses in the current international space law framework, which relies on the 1967 OST and its accompanying agreements. The regime retains valuable strengths: the non-appropriation principle (Article II) continues to prevent sovereignty claims over celestial bodies, and soft law instruments such as the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Long-term Sustainability Guidelines, and the Hague Building Blocks for space resource activities offer flexible, consensus-based tools that adapt to technological change without requiring complete treaty renegotiation. However, significant weaknesses persist: the absence of direct regulation of private entities, reliance on voluntary compliance, varying national implementation, and a lack of robust enforcement mechanisms undermine long-term sustainability and equitable access. Unilateral domestic laws (e.g., in the United States, Luxembourg, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates) risk regulatory fragmentation and potential conflicts with the OST’s “province of all mankind” principle. Thus, while the existing legal framework has laid essential foundations, it requires significant modernization to ensure that the commercialization of outer space remains equitable, sustainable, and consistent with the interests of all humanity. The creation of a comprehensive international legal framework that specifically addresses the rights and obligations of private actors is necessary to strengthen the regulatory environment for commercial space activities. A new treaty or protocol should explicitly regulate activities such as resource extraction, space mining, satellite mega-constellations, space tourism, and in-orbit manufacturing, as the current treaties were designed for a state-centric space environment. Such a document must establish universal operating regulations that apply to all states and private organizations, define liability standards for commercial accidents, and clarify ownership rights over extracted resources. This will foster a stable and predictable business climate, helping eliminate the legal ambiguity currently surrounding commercial exploitation.

States need to establish clear responsibilities under the OST because major space-faring nations, including the United States, China, Russia, India, and European partners, need to define their duties. The system needs enhanced authorization procedures and continuous tracking of individual activities, and it must establish clear rules for commercial space incident response regarding mega-constellation debris and create robust domestic systems to manage risks effectively while addressing technological limitations.

A contemporary multilateral system is a fundamental requirement that will achieve three essential goals: create uniformity, prevent conflict, and maintain a fair distribution of benefits. The process must follow these basic steps to continue progressing. The organization should create a new treaty or protocol, which UNCOPUOS would oversee, to establish specific regulations for space activities, including resource extraction, mega-constellation operations, space tourism, and in-orbit manufacturing. The treaty should develop clear rules on resource ownership, liability frameworks, and procedures for environmental impact evaluation. The proposal outlines an improved international monitoring system that UNCOPUOS would operate to monitor compliance, verify registration information, assess sustainability practices, and address disputes.

The Hague Building Blocks (2019) serve as a foundation for developing new binding norms that build on their existing soft law achievements in responsible resource management.

The company should implement worldwide safety standards for passengers, require all operators to obtain insurance coverage, protect the planet, and practice ethical business practices when entering new markets. The Artemis Accords, which now have 61 member states since early 2026, show how willing states can establish new norms, but the process requires more participants to prevent international separation.

Last but not least, the rapid development of new commercial industries, such as space tourism, lunar missions, and in-orbit manufacturing, necessitates specific laws tailored to cutting-edge technologies. To ensure the orderly development of these industries, global standards for passenger safety, insurance requirements, environmental protection, and ethical conduct must be established and consistently enforced. These steps can guide the commercialization of space in a manner consistent with global peace, sustainability, and the benefit of humanity as a whole when combined with increased international cooperation, technology sharing, and joint missions. However, it remains silent on the role of private entities in relation to the extraction of precious resources. Indeed, some space-faring nations, such as the U.S., Luxembourg, the UAE, and Japan, as well as several other countries, have passed national laws that explicitly allow their citizens and companies to own resources they can extract without claiming territorial sovereignty. Although it’s also argued that such a kind of extraction by the private entities violates the fundamental spirit of Article II and the principle of “province of mankind”. ³¹

The legal framework governing these activities remains based on the structure of treaties established during the Cold War era, when the Rivalry between the former USSR and the U.S. dominated space exploration. The most fundamental Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty on “Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (OST), 1967, is clearly embodies that no national appropriation of it by way of claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means is to take place. Therefore, a wide rift has developed between what technology can do today and what laws and regulations control it, and this is the core paradox of the commercial space era. National legislators have addressed this paradox in very different ways. In the USA, the 2015 Act on Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness gives minimal property rights to extracted resources. ³² Luxembourg offers similar legal guarantees through the 2017 Space Resources Law, and the UAE has a state-owned sovereign fund to invest in off-world mining. Furthermore, in this regard, international forums by and large remain in a sedentary mode, such as the “UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)”, which has remained silent and has not developed any binding instrument to regulate resource utilization for over four decades. The situation remains the same, with the principal institutions governing these matters being the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) and other organizations, such as the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), as well as specialized United Nations agencies. International law applies to regions that are now open to human exploration but located outside Earth. Moreover, within a short span of time, SpaceX had deployed over 6,000 Starlink internet satellites into Earth orbit. Private companies, such as Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic, are launching routine suborbital tourist flights, and lunar landers from ispace and Intuitive Machines are poised to prospect for water ice under commercial contracts. These milestones are not separate engineering accomplishments; they are also signs of a structural change in humanity’s engagement with outer space, shifting from a superpower pursuit to market-based exploitation. Furthermore, the legal framework governing these activities remains based on the structure of treaties established when the superpowers primarily dominated space exploration. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST), states that outer space is the “province of all mankind” and that no national appropriation of it by way of claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means is to take place. This gap between what technologies can do today and what laws and regulations control is the core paradox of the commercial space era. National legislators have addressed this paradox in very different ways. In the USA, the 2015 Act on Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness grants minimal property rights to extracted resources; Luxembourg provides similar legal guarantees in the 2017 Space Resources Law; and the UAE has a state-owned sovereign fund to invest in off-world mining. Further, International forums by and large remain in a sedentary mode, such as the UN COPUOS, which has still not developed any binding instrument to regulate resource utilization for over four decades. International law applies to regions that are now open to human exploration but located outside Earth. ³³ Despite this, the entire cosmos is located in outer space. Airspace and space features overlap, making it challenging to define them under international law. By clarifying state responsibilities and advancing multilateral cooperation, the international community can guide the commercialization of outer space toward a future that is safe, sustainable, peaceful, and beneficial for all humanity. Failure to act risks unchecked fragmentation, environmental degradation, and inequitable access outcomes incompatible with the foundational principles of international space law.

Authors’ Contributions

T.Q. conceived the overall idea and structure of the article, led the legal analysis of international space treaties (particularly the OST and related agreements), conducted the primary research on commercialization challenges and gaps, and drafted significant portions of the introduction, legal challenges, and conclusion sections. S.A.S. contributed equally to the conceptual framework, co-developed the critical examination of resource exploitation and state responsibility, and co-authored sections on historical development and the role of international space law. A.A.S. contributed equally to the research on national laws, the Artemis Accords, and emerging commercial practices and co-wrote sections on commercialization trends and legal deficiencies. M.S. provided overall supervision, coordinated the collaboration, contributed to the policy suggestions and future framework proposals in the conclusion, and led the final review, editing, and integration of all sections. All authors reviewed and approved the final version of the article.