Unified Korea’s policy under various scenarios of the US-Sino relationship

US-Sino cooperation (1-A)

US-Sino cooperation can take place when (1) China accommodates itself to the US-led order, or (2) when the US and China create a concert of power like the ‘concert of Europe’ in the 19th century. In the first case, China hopes to maintain stability in the region in order to breed an environment conducive to its economic development, thereby not challenging the US-led security and economic order. Though China will surpass the US in terms of GDP, in order to focus on resolving a multiplicity of domestic problems, such as inequality across regions and among classes, China would manage territorial disputes with regional states so as not to let them escalate into military confrontations between China and the US. In return, the US would avoid creating an image of China containment that would unnecessarily provoke China. It would make an effort to induce China to assimilate itself to democracy and free trade.

The second case of US-Sino cooperation would occur if the US and China were to maintain a concert of power between them, though China would not accede to the US-led order (White, 2013). Despite sporadic tensions between the two states, a great degree of their economic interdependence would lead them to form a strategic partnership. China harbors an intention of challenging the US-led regional order when the opportunity arises, but for the time being maintains a stance of ‘taoguang yanghui’ (韜光養晦 ‘biding one’s time while building up capability’). On the other hand, reflecting its assessment that the US cannot stop China’s economic development and military build-up, the US acknowledges China’s increased influence in the region.

US-Sino conflict (1-B)

US-Sino conflicts can emerge when (1) the US and China check against each other to increase their own influence at the expense of the other, or (2) they attempt to expand their spheres of influence to prepare for hegemonic competition in the long run. In the first case, though the US surpasses China in terms of overall military capabilities, China’s physical location in the region would help China to hold an advantage over the US in many parts of the region, especially in the continental area. As China increases its military expenditures, Western powers, including the US, will be forced to acknowledge China’s enhanced military capabilities. For fear of China’s military dominance over other continental states, the US will reinforce the military aspects of the US-led alliance network in the Asia-Pacific.

In the second case, the two states increase their military spending and reinforce their strategic preparedness against a hegemonic competition in the long run. On the one side, the US strengthens the US-led alliance network to prepare against uncertainties caused by China’s military rise. The US makes a forward deployment of its military assets to the territories of its traditional allies and friends. On the other side, China increasingly upgrades its strategic assets, such as nuclear aircraft carriers, deploying its strategic weapons to choke points across the region to implement its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. For example, China leases naval outposts in Cambodia, Myanmar and other littoral states around the Indo-Pacific for military purposes, so that it materializes its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.

However, it should be noted that though conflicts between the US and China become intensified in the above two cases, it is unlikely that they would engage in an offensive hegemonic war or a defensive preventive war. Because of a myriad of domestic problems, China will refrain from waging a full-blown war with the US. Also, the US would refrain from doing so, given the economic interdependence between the two states.

When the US and China cooperate (1-A)

Under the US-Sino cooperative situation, the US worries that a unified Korea, whose security threat is drastically reduced, would readjust its alliance with the US and reduce the size of the American forces stationed in Korea. Given that the North Korean threat would have disappeared, it is likely that anti-American or anti-alliance sentiments would surface as a result of poor alliance management in the process of Seoul and Washington adjusting the asymmetric nature of the alliance.

Also, the US worries that a unified Korea would tilt toward China, gradually distancing itself from the US. The Koreans have maintained diplomatic relations with the Chinese for thousands of years, while their experience of diplomatic relations with the US has lasted a relatively shorter period of time. Korea’s cultural similarities and historical ties with China could allow pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiments to emerge more strongly in the unified Korea. In order to overcome such concerns, the US would cooperate with the unified Korea to lessen the asymmetry, thus operating its alliance with the unified Korea in conformity with a changed security environment in Northeast Asia. The US will claim the justification of continuing the alliance as an insurance necessary to maintain a liberal regional order rather than balancing against China. Accordingly, the US will move proactively to re-establish its alliance relationship with the unified Korea, willingly adjusting the size of the US forces in Korea.

Nevertheless, China will raise a question with the US and the unified Korea as to why they maintain US troops on the Korean peninsula, despite the disappearance of the North Korean threat. If the US and the unified Korea expand the scope of the alliance regionally and globally, China will perceive it as a prelude toward China containment, therefore strongly opposing it. That being the case, China will ask the unified Korea to increase practical security cooperation with China, including conducting joint military exercises between the two states, with the intention of driving a wedge between the unified Korea and the US.

On the other hand, emphasizing that the South Korea-led unification signifies a success of democracy and the market economy, the US will attempt to spread global norms and values in the Asia-Pacific. Through such attempts, the US will push China to comply with these global norms and values.

In contrast, China worries that a unified Korea along with the US would attempt to spread democracy and human rights into China, which would destabilize domestic Chinese politics. In response, China will highlight Asian values and seek to enhance cultural interactions with the unified Korea with the hope of forming an anti-Japanese alignment.

When the US and China conflict (1-B)

The US will consolidate the US-led alliance network and, as a part of it, it will strengthen the alliance relationship with the unified Korea. Pushing for the forward deployment of US military assets on the Korean peninsula, the US will attempt to solidify the linkage between the US–Korea and the US–Japan alliances. Also, the US will seek to facilitate various forms of minilateral security cooperation, such as US–Korea–Japan, US–Korea–Australia, and US–Korea–Japan–Australia, to stand ready to counter threats coming from China. At the same time, in order to prevent a unified Korea from tilting toward China, the US would oppose the unified Korea enhancing security cooperation with China, especially at the level of conducting joint bilateral military exercises.

In response, in an effort to curb the strengthening of the US-led alliance network, China will criticize assigning the US–Korea alliance regional or global roles. Also, in order to block a security alignment among the US, Japan and the unified Korea, China will intentionally instigate confrontations with Japan over issues regarding imperial Japan’s past wrongdoings and induce a unified Korea to form an anti-Japanese coalition with China. To that purpose, China will pursue apparently Korea-friendly policies to capture the hearts of the Korean public.

When the US and China cooperate (1-A)

A unified Korea would come up with a rationale for maintaining the US–Korea alliance to assuage anti-alliance sentiments which would demand that the USFK (US Forces Korea) should be significantly reduced in a relatively benign security environment. Without a direct threat from North Korea, the alliance should shift its focus from threat to order. In this sense the unified Korea should identify the alliance as a tool to prepare against future uncertainties that would emerge in the region.

If the unified Korea–US alliance serves as ‘insurance’ against regional security uncertainties, its ‘instrumentalities’ should be readjusted accordingly. The ‘security–autonomy trade-off model’ would no longer be appropriate for explaining the alliance between the unified Korea and the US. ⁶ The Korean public would demand adjusting the asymmetric nature of the alliance. The US would cooperate to modify the asymmetry in order to operate the alliance in conformity with a changed security environment in Northeast Asia. Accordingly, adjusting the size of the USFK is inevitable. Under such circumstances, it would be unlikely that American troops would be stationed near the border with China, considering the unified Korea’s economic and security relations with China.

On the other hand, the unified Korea would facilitate regional institutional cooperation for peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Especially, it should facilitate such minilateralism as Korea–China–Japan, Korea–US–China and Korea–US–Japan. Before the unification, it has not been activated due to the passive attitude of China which should consider North Korean positions. However, after the unification, it would be facilitated, more so under the security environment of the US-Sino cooperation. If regional states foster cooperation and build trust through minilateralism, the minilateralism would act as a bridge between bilateralism and multilateralism. To accomplish this, the unified Korea should utilize international cooperative mechanisms that would be put in place in the process of unification and integration after unification. Those mechanisms include ones established (1) to dismantle and dispose of North Korean nuclear weapons in the process of unification, (2) to manage official development assistance and other financial investments to develop the North Korean region, and (3) to manage nuclear non-proliferation in Northeast Asia.

The unified Korea also would put in place institutional mechanisms at the governmental level to engage in large-scale multilateral economic cooperation. Multilateral cooperation projects would be possible in developing the North Korean region and Chinese northeastern provinces. Development of energy resources, including oil and gas in Siberia and the construction of railways, ports and oil pipelines to supply this energy to related Northeast Asian countries, would give birth to an institutional framework to attract the necessary international capital and technology.

On the other hand, considering that China is concerned that the unified Korea would challenge it with regard to Western values such as human rights, democracy and freedom, the unified Korea would not intervene in internal affairs of the neighboring countries and instead would maintain a balance in terms of ideology. Ultimately, the unified Korea would perform the role of constructive and rational mediator in the region between the US and China. It would maintain and develop close security relations with Washington while also increasing military cooperation with Beijing.

When the US and China conflict (1-B)

If US-Sino confrontation is intensified, a unified Korea would continue to maintain a solid alliance with the US, as the two allies share principles of free democracy and a market economy. Also, the US is not a direct party to territorial disputes in Northeast Asia. The unified Korea would not likely tilt toward China for security, given the geographic proximity, potential territorial disputes and different political systems between Korea and China. Moreover, if the unified Korea is tilted toward China for security, Japan would increase its security dependence on the US, and consequently an ‘adversarial balance of power’ between unified Korea–China–Russia and US–Japan would weaken the unified Korea’s position. ⁷

That being said, even though the unified Korea is placed in the US-led security network in Northeast Asia, it would attempt to execute ‘positional power’ as a bridge linking the US-led security network and a China-led security network. For example, since a unified Korea has engaged with China for thousands of years and shares some cultural attributes, it would play an ‘interpreter’ role in explaining China’s behaviors to the US.

US-Sino cooperation (2-A)

When the US is preponderant, US-Sino cooperation is likely when one of the following conditions is met. First, the US does not pursue either a containment policy or a preventive action against China. ⁸ Given the current military balance, the US will be unlikely to take military action against China but will aim to maintain, if not strengthen, its own military superiority. A preventive action is taken by a declining state which wants to forestall an unfavorable change in balance of power. However, this ‘now-better-than-later’ logic does not apply to the preponderant power which sees its main rival’s rise stalling. Even if the US leadership prefers more hawkish policies, it will have trouble justifying those policies and drawing support in a democratic society.

Second, China is satisfied with a US-led regional order, thus taking an appeasement stance toward the US. When China is weaker than the US, Beijing has little incentive to become aggressive toward Washington, because the former gives priority to economic development and social stability. If China is not assured of its superiority, Beijing is more likely to abide by Washington’s rules and norms, while increasing its influence and resources till it can afford to do otherwise. ⁹ As the CPC sees slower growth in the economy, it has more motivation to strengthen its economic ties with strong economies like the US, because its ruling legitimacy is mainly based on economic performance.

Third, the US and China expand and institutionalize their economic and cultural interdependence. At least since China’s reemergence in the late 1970s, the US and China have cooperated repeatedly and have strengthened mutual trust about future benefits resulting from deepened interdependence, both economic and diplomatic. Actually, both Washington and Beijing have participated in an increasing number of inter-governmental organizations since the late 20^th century.

The cooperation between the dominant power and its potential major competitor will consolidate a ‘uni-multipolar’ security order. ¹⁰ In this Asia-Pacific region, the US will act as a center, with major powers (China, Japan, Russia, India), middle powers (unified Korea, Australia, Indonesia), and others relating to it as moons to a planet. Probably the dominant and major powers will see less of a security dilemma than now, but other medium and minor powers will continue their strategic calculations, because US-Sino cooperation will make both less willing to maintain strong alliance commitments.

US-Sino conflict (2-B)

There exists a possibility that US-Sino relations will become conflictual rather than cooperative when any of the following conditions is met. First, the US can be dragged into a territorial conflict between its ally and China. If a territorial conflict between a US ally (e.g. Japan or the Philippines) and China occurs, then the US has no option but to side with its friend in order to maintain its influence and to show its commitment. This is why some scholars and policy makers have begun to warn about the Thucydides trap in US-Sino relations that led to World War I (Allison, 2015; Rosecrance & Miller, 2014).

Second, China’s nationalism can be more belligerent, pushing Beijing to take aggression toward others, including the US. If China’s authoritarian leadership fails to manage the domestic voice for more freedom and more transparency, it has strong incentives to rely on strong nationalism, which often leads to autonomous and non-cooperative policies toward others, especially rival states. Even when the communist leadership does not face a strong democratization movement, it still has another factor, ‘cartelized politics’, with which to contend. In such a situation political and economic elites may drive the country in a way that does not maximize national interests through inter-state negotiation but that strengthens their hold on power through intra-elite bargaining (Snyder, 1991).

Third, if Beijing sees its relative decline to be inevitable, it can attempt to take preventive measures to stop the unfavorable change in the balance of power in order to change the dragon’s future. ¹¹ When state leaders see their state facing significant losses, they tend to turn to riskier options, such as military measures. When China sees little hope regarding its growth and status, it may consider policy options that challenge the US-centered unipolar system that go so far as to risk initiating a conflict with the US.

A conflict between the US and China can be a major destabilizing factor in the American dominance system. While Washington will try to maintain its dominant status as a means of preventing any major powers’ balancing behaviors, Beijing will seek its own strategy to make military and economic coalitions with other regional players. Accordingly, other major and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific will see this uni-multipolar system as unstable and uncertain and be forced to choose one of a multiplicity of strategic options for security and wealth.

When the US and China cooperate (2-A)

There is little doubt that the US will seek close cooperation with a unified Korea on various issues, global as well as regional. The unified Korea, a symbol of industrialization, democratization, and unification, can be a good partner for the US in the spread of liberal democracy and market economy, as well as in the institutionalization of common security and economic cooperation. However, the US’s alliance commitment to Korea will be weaker than it had been before reunification. US-Sino cooperation and the absence of a North Korean threat will lead Washington to refrain from deepening Korea–US and Korea–US–Japan security cooperation; instead, it will work to create regional security institutions in order not to alienate and provoke China.

The unified Korea will also be a partner of China which seeks its own Asian regional order. Considering the unified Korea’s geographical and economic merits, China will seek to engage Seoul in its own plan to institutionalize Asian economic and security relations. China’s longtime rivalry with Japan (and Russia), moreover, will make it give significant weight to the greater Korea, even as it cooperates with the US. By strengthening historical and cultural ties with the unified Korea, China will make efforts to emphasize Asian identity and community, which are distinct from those of the West, especially when its process of democratic transition is likely to be slower than that desired by the US and other democracies. In particular, Seoul will be an important partner to Beijing, especially in its relations with Tokyo and Moscow.

When the US and China conflict (2-B)

The US will strengthen its bilateral and trilateral security relations—Korea–US and Korea–US–Japan—in order to check and control China. In doing so, Washington will make greater efforts to institutionalize and expand its security and economic network than if it cooperates well with Beijing. That is because the growing gap between the US and China under American dominance would enable the US to have some breathing space in dealing with China. But Washington will not cease in its efforts to engage China in the US-led international order. The US may see the unified Korea as a partner for binding China through interdependence and institutions rather than for containing China through military confrontation.

In conflict with the US, China will pursue efforts to make the unified Korea a security partner. After its buffer state, North Korea, disappears, Beijing will seek more cooperation from Seoul and create a regional coalition with (potential) partners like Moscow and Islamabad. However, China will be prudent not to provoke US military aggression but to continue its own economic growth. If its rising is slower than before, China will not aim to create a new Asia-Pacific order replacing the US liberal order, but will focus on its efforts to expand its sphere of influence to regional players, including the unified Korea.

When the US and China cooperate (2-A)

Not surprisingly, the post-unification Korea will strive for two objectives: a strong alliance with the US and a deep cooperation with China. Under American dominance, Seoul will be more active in promoting democracy and human rights, in consultation with the US, than if it faces a US-Sino relationship of ‘unequal G2,’ as discussed in the previous section. Also, it will improve its economic/cultural relations with China in a more symmetrical way. This two-track approach will aim to make a balanced way between the dominant power and the regional power and to reinforce the common ground shared by the two major players through trilateral meetings among Korea, the US and China.

For the above goals, a unified Korea will implement a middle power’s multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. Given that the cooperative US-Sino relation weakens the US’s alliance commitment to and China’s favorable attitude toward Korea, the greater Korea will develop its own strategy to secure its security and other interests through international institutions like MIKTA and five-party talks. In addition, the unified Korea will make greater efforts to improve its relations with Japan and Russia. In the absence of the North Korean conundrum as well as encouraged by US-Sino cooperation, the unified Korea can share more interests and concerns with the big regional players.

When the US and China conflict (2-B)

The unified Korea will focus on its traditional alliance with the US while continuing its strong economic ties with China. The conflictual relations between the US and China will increase regional instability, creating more incentive for Korea to seek security guarantees through the dominant interdependence with China, especially for developing the former North Korean area and strengthening economic and social stability in a newly unified Korea. The main goal of Seoul will be to prevent a serious security dilemma between Washington and Beijing in the wake of the disappearance of China’s buffer state, North Korea. For this, Seoul will not alienate China but will engage it with the US through increased diplomatic and economic exchanges among the three—Korea, China, and the US.

In addition, Seoul will make efforts to increase resources and its own influence through prioritizing internal social and economic stability. This does not mean the unified Korea will aim to be a regional hegemon, but it will hope to be a more influential player in promoting regional security and prosperity through internal as well as external balancing, employing both soft and hard power. If the unified Korea successfully achieves political unification and social integration, it will be likely to look for greater status and respect from neighbors, as reunified Germany did in the 1990s and 2000s, and will be unlikely to take an isolationist stance, as the US did after the Civil War.

US-Sino cooperation (3-A)

The composition of US-Sino cooperation needs to start from a basic premise that the US de facto recognizes a power shift to China at the regional level. The US loses its capability while still intending to maintain its influence in East Asia. If this is the case, East Asian countries, reckoning their ‘balance of interest’, ¹² are likely to bandwagon with a powerful China and to distance themselves from a US that has lost the capabilities to provide international public goods in the areas of East Asian maritime security, international monetary and trade regimes, etc.

Nevertheless, it should be indicated that East Asian countries would make this choice only in the case that China fulfills the role of a ‘responsible great power’. If China does not take those responsibilities, it is less likely that East Asian countries would willingly embrace a hegemonic China, even in the case of a weakened US. At the same time, US-Sino cooperation will be viable only if China does not attempt aggressively to expand its influence over its Asian neighbors. In other words, the cooperative readjustment of US-Sino relations under China’s domination may be translated into a de facto formation of a ‘New Type of Great Power Relations (xinxing daguo guanxi, 新型大国关系)’ existing only at the Asia-Pacific regional level. ¹³

Simultaneously, the assumed US-Sino cooperation does not necessarily mean a peaceful Asia. An Asian power vacuum caused by the forward-looking accommodative US policy toward China may bring about new dynamics of a multipolar system. First of all, the situation could frustrate Japan. Japan does have a couple of choices; one is to choose a ‘balance of interest’, the other is to leave the US–Japan alliance and to act as a regional ‘polar’ vis-à-vis China. It is doubtful that Japan is willing to acknowledge China as a regional hegemon. Another candidate is Russia, which is a great power in Eurasia. Faced with a greater China, Russia would become concerned about Chinese expansion into Central Asia and Chinese encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence. In these ways, among others, US-Sino cooperation could increase tensions between China and Russia, and China and Japan. It creates new dynamics in Asia and international politics as well.

US-Sino conflict (3-B)

US-Sino relations may result in conflict or confrontation, even though China’s dominance becomes clear. This can be instigated either by China or by the US. First, it can be assumed that China would attempt to challenge the international political and economic order beyond Asia. For instance, China may try to make the RMB a global key currency, challenging the US dollar. Also, China may expand its maritime power beyond the South China Sea to the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and then seek to wield its influence on the seas.

Historically, Chinese emperors pursued expansionist policies and tried to establish a Sinocentric world order when a powerful dynasty enjoys centralized and stabilized political power and a prosperous economy (Swaine and Tellis, 2000). If China’s national power becomes comparable with that of the US, and China consolidates its geopolitical superiority over the Asia-Pacific, it is more likely that China will wield whatever power it takes to secure its national interests. In fact, this has historically been the path taken by great powers. In speaking about the ‘Chinese Dream’ of ‘the great revival of the Chinese nation’, President Xi holds that China should/will pursue peaceful development that contributes to both China and other countries (习近平, 2014). Nevertheless, there is no convincing reason that China should be an exception.

The other scenario may unfold as the US refuses to acknowledge the changed situation and the condition of China’s dominance. The US does not accept breaking the status quo on security order in the Asia-Pacific in spite of its willingness but inability to protect its interests in the Asian sphere. The American response would devote its diplomatic efforts to maintaining a balance of power with China by cementing its ties with US allies. In particular, Japan, a reliable linchpin of the US ‘hub-and-spokes’ system, is unlikely to bandwagon with a greater China. Also, other Asian states, including Vietnam, Indonesia, and India, tend not to accept a China-centric order, and want to maintain the status quo as far as possible.

When the US and China cooperate (3-A)

In the midst of forming a new regional architecture led by China, the US makes strategic choices with a cooperative policy line with China for the purpose of maximization of national interests under the given condition. With the fixed US stance, substantial factors that are attributed to the US policy choice are strategic responses from major countries, including Japan, Russia, unified Korea, Australia, and India. Asia-Pacific countries, in the given condition, have at least a couple of strategic choices; the one places more emphasis on balancing, the other, more on bandwagoning. Therefore, US policy toward the unified Korea can be calculated relative to both of the different scenarios.

In the case in which major countries of the Asia-Pacific tend to balance more against a greater China, the US makes efforts to cement the ties of the US ‘hub-and-spokes’ in spite of its cooperative policy line with China. In so doing, the US tries to maximize its interests in the Asia-Pacific by maintaining a restraining influence upon China. Nevertheless, the US shifts many more costs and responsibilities onto the allies, mainly because of its own lack of capacity. By the same token, the US makes diplomatic efforts to strengthen the US–Korea alliance but tries to shift the costs onto the unified Korea.

In the second case, the Korean peninsula comes to lose its strategic importance for US policy toward the Asia-Pacific. Angry that Asia-Pacific countries are bandwagoning with China, the US goes back to the ‘Defensive Perimeter’ ¹⁴ strategy for its Western Pacific ‘Maginot Line’ that the US had implemented in 1949. It results in a significant withdrawal of the US’s commitment to the US–Korea alliance. If this is the case, the US is likely to give its priority to US-Sino cooperative relations rather than to the US–Korea alliance. Finally, a unified Korea comes to be a secondary concern in US policy toward the Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, the US does not discard the US–Korea alliance, insofar as the unified Korean government wants to keep the alliance.

China will take aggressive measures rather than defensive ones to eliminate potential risks that may potentially threaten its security in East Asia. In this regard, China reinforces its policy toward the unified Korea in order that the unified Korea goes along with Chinese efforts to build a new regional order. Since the unified Korea is a substantial middle power with an established advanced economy and a population of 80 million, as well as a major regional military power, willing cooperation from the unified Korea is necessary for China to build a new regional architecture in international finance, trade, and security. For these reasons, China expands its efforts to keep the unified Korea from seeking a balancing strategy against China.

When the US and China conflict (3-B)

The US will strive to check and balance a greater China in the case that it does not accept the Chinese attempts to break down the status quo and to set up a new regional architecture. It creates the assumed US-Sino conflict. On that occasion, the US is bidding to contain China by a coalition of allies, including the unified Korea, behind the American campaign. It brings about a wave of confrontations between China and the US in a wide range of issue areas, including security, international finance, and trade. It is likely to develop into a battle over the world order. In that case, US allies in the Asia-Pacific, including the unified Korea, would be forced to stand at the critical crossroad of the choice between China and the US.

Faced with the US response, China will devote all its efforts to counteract the US actions, luring the East Asian countries, including the unified Korea, to take China’s side. Especially, China is likely to make an attempt to use the Korean peninsula as a forward base to establish a countervailing partnership system against US containment. In that case, China places much more pressure on the unified Korea in order not only to reinforce a Sino-Korea partnership but also to weaken the US–Korea alliance. Furthermore, it would be icing on the cake for China’s regional strategy if China successfully makes US–Korea relations a peripheral alliance and wins the unified Korea to China’s side, and finally forms de facto a China–Korea alliance. If China accomplishes this, China would be able to give a decisive blow to the US ‘hub-and-spokes’ system. With strategic calculation, China aggressively puts political, diplomatic, and economic pressures on the Korean peninsula based upon China’s increased economic, and then political, leverage on Korea. Consequently, the unified Korea is placed in a tough situation in the midst of a US-Sino conflict. It shrinks Korea’s strategic space.

When the US and China cooperate (3-A)

If the US and China cooperate under China’s domination, it would imply that the Asia-Pacific regional order is reshaped by a greater China, while the US actions remain nothing but passive engagement. In that case, China tries to make the unified Korea a reliable partner as well as an order-taker in the course of building a new regional architecture led by China, while the US shifts costs of maintaining the status quo onto the regional countries, including the unified Korea, and simultaneously strives to secure its political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Nonetheless, it can be envisioned that the unified Korea may have breathing space in strategic terms between China and the US, though it is not a favorable strategic environment.

The unified Korea’s foreign policy depends mainly on China’s behaviors. If China acts as a ‘responsible great power’ providing a set of international public goods for the region, the unified Korea is willing to act as a reliable partner of China. This results in a weakening of the US–Korea alliance. However, it is required that a greater China commits itself to supporting and building a liberal order rather than a 21^st century hierarchical order. If this is not the case, the unified Korea runs up against a brick wall in its positioning between China and the US. The unified Korea then strives to secure its own autonomy from China, looking for an international coalition opposing the domineering China, in spite of it being so challenging.

When the US and China conflict (3-B)

When the US and China are in conflict, the unified Korea will face challenges of choice between China and the US, since both great powers will try to win it over. Reacting against the pressures, the unified Korea attempts to keep a balanced positioning of noninvolvement between the two. In security areas, the unified Korea tries to change the purpose of the US–Korea alliance to non-traditional security issues in a situation in which the North Korean threat does not exist any longer. Still, the unified Korea is likely to take international responsibilities in the issue areas of sustaining a liberal order, such as free trade, freedom of navigation, and human rights.

Especially, the unified Korea is likely to seriously consider declaring the neutrality of unified Korea in the case that the US-Sino conflict is exacerbated over the Korean peninsula. Neutrality implies that the unified Korea discards the US–Korea alliance. For that reason, it can be simultaneously interpreted as Korea’s strategic choice toward China. However, it should have a different strategic meaning from that interpretation, specifically in the case of a US-Sino conflict under China’s domination. The unified Korea will consider neutrality for the purpose of minimizing possible damage caused by the conflict between the great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. Thinking of side effects and feasibility, however, it should be used only as a last resort. In any case, the unified Korea will not be able to avoid a policy dilemma and political and economic disadvantages from the clash of Titans.