According to economists, solving environmental problems is simple. Politicians should simply impose a uniform tax on harmful emissions. However, the actual design of such green taxation shows that politicians do not follow their advice. CO2 taxation in OECD, for example, is highly differentiated and greatly favours industry. In fact, CO2 tax rates for industry are, on average, six times lower than those for households. We argue that the reason for this tax differentiation is that industry, in contrast to households, has a strong capability to lobby. Therefore, green taxation is effectively blocked and the desired environmental results are not being achieved. Why then is green taxation persistently applied in relation to industry? We argue that strong fiscal incentives drive this policy choice at the expense of environmental concerns because this allows environmental bureaucracies to maximize budgets.
BaumolW.J. and OatesW.E. (1988), The Theory of Environmental Policy, 2. ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.
2.
BramhallD.F. and MillsEdwin S. (1966) “A Note on the Asymmetry between Fees and Payments”, Water Resources Res., 2(3), pp. 6] 5–16.
3.
ClasenGesa (1998). A Framework for Innovation: Corporate Responses to Applied Energy/CO2 Taxes in Denmark, Masters Thesis.
4.
CoaseRonald H. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, pp. 1–44.
5.
CropperM.L. and OatesW.E. (1992), ‘Environmental Economics: A Survey’, Journal of Economic Literature, XXX, pp. 675–740.
6.
DalesJohn H. (1968), Pollution, property, and prices. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1968.
7.
Daugbjerg and Svendsen, (2001), Green Taxation in Question. London, Macmillan.
8.
Dutch Ministry of Finance (1998). Taxation in the Netherlands, The Hague: Ministry of Finance, 1998.
9.
European Environmental Agency (1996), Environmental Tares, implementation and Environmental Effectiveness, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996.
GoulderL.H. (1995), ‘Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend': A Readers Guide’, International Tax and Public Finance, 2, pp.157–183.
12.
HanleyN.HallettS. and MoffattI. (1990), “Research policy and review 33. Why is more notice not taken of economists' prescriptions for the control of pollution?”, Environment and Planning A, 22, pp. 1421–39.
13.
HoweC.W. (1994), ‘Taxes Versus Tradable Discharge Permits: A Review in the Light of the U.S. and European Experience’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 4, pp. 151–69.
14.
KamienMorton I.SchwartzNancy L. and DolbearF.T. (1966), “Asymmetry between Bribes and Charges”, Water Resources Res., 2(1), pp. 147–57.
15.
LeeDwight R. and MisiolekWalter S. (1986), “Substituting Pollution Taxation for General Taxation: Some Implications for Efficiency in Pollution Taxation”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 13(4), pp. 338–47.
16.
MontgomeryDavidW. (1972), “Markets in Licenses and efficient Pollution Control Programs”, Journal of Economic Theory, 5(3), pp. 395–418.
17.
MuellerD.C. (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18.
Naturvårdsverket (1997). Miljöskatter i Sverige: Ekonomiska styrmedel i miljöpolitiken. Stockholm: Naturvårdsverket Förlag, 1997.
19.
OatesW.E. (1995), ‘Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment and Improve the Tax System at the Same Time?’, Southern Economic Journal, 4, s. 91S–22.
OlsonM. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22.
ParryI.W.H. (1995), ‘Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, S-64–S-77.
23.
PigouA. (1920), The Economics of Welfare. London: MacMillan, 1920.
24.
StavinsR.N. and WhiteheadB.W. (1992), ‘Pollution Charges for Environmental Protection: A Policy Link Between Energy and Environment’, Annual Reviews (Energy and Environment), 17, pp. 187–210.
25.
SvendsenG.T. (1998): Public Choice and Environmental Regulation: Tradable Permit Systems in United States and CO2 Taxation in Europe. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
26.
SvendsenG.T.DaugbjergC.HjoellundL. and PedersenA.B. (2000): ‘Consumers, Industrialists and the Political Economy of Green Taxation: CO2 taxation in OECD.’Energy Policy.
27.
TerklaDavid (1984), “The Efficiency Value of Effluent Tax Revenues”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 11(2), pp. 107–23.
