Conflict Management and Peace Science

Peace scientists such as Kenneth Boulding, Ted Gurr, Thomas Schelling, and Charles Tilly were fastidious in their use of abstract concepts free of the political baggage that politicians, policymakers, and pundits necessarily foist upon the terms in the rough and tumble world of politics. Too much contemporary peace science fails to follow their lead. This essay describes this problem and proposes a useful heuristic to help us improve.

Researchers generally examine how variables directly affect events in war. Some variables, however, may not simply increase or decrease conflict events but may instead displace them. In wartime, this dynamic may result from the conditional decision-making made by militaries constrained, at least partially, by time. When there is a necessary regularity to military operations, decision-making may be complicated by factors such as inclement weather, and this regularized pressure to act may produce a hydraulic relationship between inclement weather and events. In this dynamic, today’s inclement weather, such as rain, may displace today’s events. Conversely, yesterday’s rain may increase today’s, with planned events postponed. Similarly, tomorrow’s rain may also increase today’s events, with planned activities moved forward. We test this hydraulic argument with geo-referenced data from the recent Ugandan civil war and find significant evidence that conflict events are fluid in time. Inclement weather constrains and also displaces events.

Concerns about international terrorism make the stability of failing states central to Western foreign aid policies. This paper explores how donors reduce the volatility of aid to avoid political destabilization of recipient countries. Using a formal model, we show that stability-oriented donors control the risk of conflict, but they never fully eliminate it. Recipient governments can exploit donor preferences for stability through increased rent extraction. As a result, stability-oriented aid reduces the risk of political destabilization only under narrow circumstances. If these conditions are not met, stability aid makes conflict more likely. We present evidence for key predictions of our model.

This paper brings together studies of civil war consequences and literature on military spending, introducing a novel mechanism for how civil wars adversely affect neighbors—through neighbors’ increased military spending. Military expenditures are important because they often inhibit development. Civil wars affect proximate states’ defense spending because the potential spillover threatens neighbors. Tests on developing countries from 1950 to 2006 suggest that bordering civil wars are associated with military spending levels, independently of arms races or civil war interventions. Analyses use measures of neighboring civil war that take into consideration whether or not the civil war zone reaches the shared border.

The capacity to build nuclear weapons—known as “nuclear latency”—is widely believed to be important in world politics. Yet scholarly research on this topic remains limited. This paper introduces a new dataset on nuclear latency from 1939 to 2012. It discusses coding procedures, describes global trends, and compares the dataset with earlier efforts to measure nuclear latency. We show that nuclear latency is far more common than nuclear proliferation: 31 countries developed the capacity to build nuclear bombs from 1939 to 2012, and only 10 of those states went on to acquire atomic arsenals. This paper provides one empirical application of the dataset, showing how the study of nuclear latency can contribute to our understanding of international conflict. We provide preliminary evidence that nuclear latency reduces the likelihood of being targeted in militarized disputes. Having the capacity to build nuclear weapons, therefore, may provide deterrence benefits that we usually associate with possessing a nuclear arsenal.