Journal of Accounting,Auditing & Finance

Cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology are disruptive innovations at the vanguard of a new wave of the digital revolution. The far-reaching appeal, global reach, unprecedented mobility of capital, and multitude of trading venues have created a marketplace like no other. The economic fundamentals underlying this market are yet to be fully comprehended, as evidenced by the often-contradicting guidelines recommended by accounting firms, government agencies, and standard setters. Many of the definitions and models used for classical markets cannot be applied directly to cryptocurrency. Basic concepts must be reinterpreted, and models must be modified to fit the mechanics of these markets. In this article, we focus on one such concept: that of fair value. We argue that in light of the fragmentation of cryptocurrency markets and the global dispersion of trading venues, a principal market may be difficult to identify. The primary objective of this article is to present a methodology to dynamically designate principal markets and derive fair value prices for financial reporting using this designation.

We provide evidence that the profitability of corporate insiders’ trading decreases in the degree of asymmetric timely loss recognition (TLR) of their firms’ financial reporting. Consistent with TLR reducing insiders’ information advantage over outside shareholders regarding future negative news about the firm, we find that reduced insider trading profitability is mainly driven by (a) stock sales, as opposed to purchases; (b) the price change component of trading, as opposed to its volume; and (c) insiders’ nonroutine trades, as opposed to less information driven routine trades. Although CEOs/CFOs are more likely to influence TLR, the effect is more pronounced for non-CEO and non-CFO insiders, inconsistent with reverse causality. Overall, our findings suggest that TLR reduces managers’ ability to extract rents from investors via insider trading.

This article investigates the link between board members’ past professional experiences and the terms and conditions of the debt contracts of their current firms. In particular, we examine whether directors’ past bankruptcy experience affects the pricing and nonpricing terms of public debt contracts. Using a sample of 8,142 bond issues in the United States in the period 1995 to 2015, we document higher credit spreads and smaller bond sizes for firms with such directors, suggesting that bondholders are concerned about past bankruptcy experience. Our results remain robust to different model specifications. This effect is moderated for bankruptcies that are likely driven by macroeconomic shocks such as the dotcom bubble and the global financial crisis. We also show that our findings are not explained by bond issuers with an elevated risk of default and seem instead to be driven by directors serving on key monitoring committees, indicating that prior bankruptcy experience raises concerns about the company’s corporate governance. Finally, mediation analysis offers some evidence of a limited negative indirect effect of prior bankruptcy experience on the terms of debt contracts through the firm’s financial and investment policies. Overall, our findings suggest that lenders incorporate information about past professional experiences of directors into public debt contracting.

We investigate whether board-interlocked firms via an audit committee (AC) board member exhibit correlated non-audit service (NAS) purchases, and whether financial reporting quality and future firm performance vary with the amount of correlated NAS purchases from the AC interlock. We find that AC interlocked firms have positively correlated total NAS and three NAS subtypes—Tax, Assurance, and Other—in the overall sample period from 2000 to 2016, and in each of the subperiods pre- and post-SOX (Sarbanes–Oxley Act). Firms with a larger NAS component that is explained by the AC interlock tend to exhibit lower financial reporting quality. We also find evidence that firms with higher AC interlocked NAS purchases are associated with lower future performance, although this association exists only in the pre-SOX period. Overall, the evidence suggests that greater NAS purchases among AC interlocked firms can have a detrimental effect on financial reporting quality and auditor independence. While these detrimental effects are concentrated in the pre-SOX period when there were less restrictions on NAS purchases, we find some evidence that the association with lower financial reporting quality persists in the post-SOX period.

This study examines the economic implications of fair value liability gains and losses arising from the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (hereafter, FAS 159). We find a positive correspondence between a firm’s FAS 159 fair value liability gains and losses and current period stock returns, consistent with the notion that these gains and losses are priced by equity investors. However, further analysis indicates that fair value gains and losses from liabilities have a statistically significant negative association with future returns, suggesting that investors misprice this earnings component and subsequently correct the mispricing. We also find that the negative association for fair value gains is stronger for firms with lower levels of institutional ownership.

We examine the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the global economic crisis of 2008 on revenue generation patterns of public accounting and law firms. Using a sample of firm-year observations from both industries, we show that since the enactment of SOX, public accounting firms have significantly increased leveraging of partner time and decreased charge-out rates to boost their revenue per partner. While law firms also exhibit an increase in revenue per partner in the post-SOX era, their increase is rooted in higher average charge-out rates and lower leveraging. During the crisis, the public accounting industry was insulated by the relatively inelastic nature of its services. By contrast, law firms suffered a decline in demand for their services, which reduced their revenue generation by reducing their charge-out rates. We also consider cross-sectional variations within each industry and find significant differences across firms in the impact of SOX and the economic crisis. Notably, large firms in both industries were more significantly impacted by SOX and the Big 4 accounting firms were adversely impacted during the crisis. Our study sheds light on the revenue generation and human resource consequences of two significant macroeconomic events for two professional service industries that serve as watchdogs in our capital markets.

This study evaluates the effect of returnee directors on corporate tax avoidance by using data on publicly listed Chinese companies from 2000 to 2012. Returnee directors grow up in China and then study or work abroad before returning home to be listed firms’ board directors. We use the introduction of provincial policies toward attracting skilled individuals with foreign experience as an instrumental variable for Returnee directors, which is the fraction of returnee directors divided by the total number of directors within a firm. Using quantile regression, we find a positive relation between Returnee directors and corporate tax avoidance for low levels of tax avoidance but a negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance. The result is robust to a battery of tests. The relation between returnee directors and tax avoidance is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than non-SOEs and stronger for returnees who hold MBA degrees, possess a background in accounting or auditing, or are independent directors than other returnees.

This article examines equity market perceptions of fair value reporting for tangible assets. We identify six events—four designated as increasing, two as decreasing—affecting the likelihood of U.S. adoption of fair value reporting for investment property (i.e., real estate) assets, one of the largest asset classes in the world. Fair value adoption in the United States would facilitate convergence of one of the widest remaining disparities between U.S. reporting and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): accounting for tangible investment property assets, where the United States (IFRS) requires depreciated historical cost (recognized or disclosed fair values). Using a sample of U.S. investment property firms, we document an average positive market reaction for movement toward fair value reporting. We further find predictable cross-sectional variation, with the market reaction increasing for firms with greater commitment to high-quality reporting, greater investor demand for fair values, higher financial risk, and staler asset values. Overall, the results are consistent with U.S. equity markets perceiving net benefits to movement toward a fair value reporting approach for this asset class.

Management incentives for engaging and excelling in corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance is an important theme as business sustainability gains momentum. We examine the role of tournament incentives, which are created by competition among non-CEO (chief executive officer) senior executives (vice presidents [VPs]) for promotion to the CEO position, in firms’ CSR performance. Using a sample of U.S. Standard & Poor (S&P) 1500 firms from 1993 to 2014, we find that tournament incentives proxied by pay gaps between CEOs and VPs are negatively associated with CSR performance, suggesting that competition for promotion could be detrimental for CSR performance. We further show that such association is more pronounced when the perceived probability of promotion increases prior to CEO turnover. This article provides policy, practical, and education implications and contribute to the literature on the integration of CSR into the business culture and strategic management processes.

This study examines whether individual auditors with experience as independent directors provide better audit performance than those without independent directorship experience. Using the Chinese setting where audit partners’ names are publicly disclosed, we find that audit partners with independent director experience provide higher audit quality for clients that operate in the same industries as the companies where they concurrently hold or have previously held directorships. However, directorship experience at companies in different industries has an insignificant effect on audit quality. These findings suggest that independent director service enables audit partners to gain industry-specific knowledge. This leads to knowledge spillovers on the audits of clients in the same industries. This study contributes to the literature by identifying an alternative channel through which auditors gain industry-specific knowledge which enhances their performance.

Theoretical propositions suggest that mandatory and voluntary disclosures are related. Empirical studies focusing on this relationship provide mixed evidence as they found that mandatory and voluntary disclosures are either complements or substitutes. Relying on a proprietary, hand-collected database about the risk disclosure of oil companies, we find that voluntary risk disclosure increases with the level of mandatory risk disclosure up to a threshold above which companies reduce their voluntary disclosures. We also find that this relationship depends on the firm-level uncertainty, and it is sharpened in the presence of high exposure to liquidity risk. Overall, our results contribute to the debate on whether and on which level disclosure should be regulated.

JEL Classification: M41, G14