Perception

The recognition of faces has been the focus of an extensive body of research, whereas the preliminary and prerequisite task of detecting a face has received limited attention from psychologists. Four experiments are reported that address the question how we detect a face. Experiment 1 reveals that we use information from the scene to aid detection. In experiment 2 we investigated which features of a face speed the detection of faces. Experiment 3 revealed inversion effects and an interaction between the effects of blurring and reduction of contrast. In experiment 4 the sizes of effects of reversal of orientation, luminance, and hue were compared. Luminance was found to have the greatest effect on reaction time to detect faces. The results are interpreted as suggesting that face detection proceeds by a pre-attentive stage that identifies possible face regions, which is followed by a focused-attention stage that employs a deformable template. Comparisons are drawn with automatic face-detection systems.

We conducted four experiments to investigate the role of colour and luminance information in visual and audiovisual speech perception. In experiments la (stimuli presented in quiet conditions) and 1b (stimuli presented in auditory noise), face display types comprised naturalistic colour (NC), grey-scale (GS), and luminance inverted (LI) faces. In experiments 2a (quiet) and 2b (noise), face display types comprised NC, colour inverted (CI), LI, and colour and luminance inverted (CLI) faces. Six syllables and twenty-two words were used to produce auditory and visual speech stimuli. Auditory and visual signals were combined to produce congruent and incongruent audiovisual speech stimuli. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that perception of visual speech, and its influence on identifying the auditory components of congruent and incongruent audiovisual speech, was less for LI than for either NC or GS faces, which produced identical results. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that perception of visual speech, and influences on perception of incongruent auditory speech, was less for LI and CLI faces than for NC and CI faces (which produced identical patterns of performance). Our findings for NC and CI faces suggest that colour is not critical for perception of visual and audiovisual speech. The effect of luminance inversion on performance accuracy was relatively small (5%), which suggests that the luminance information preserved in LI faces is important for the processing of visual and audiovisual speech.

Display inversion severely impedes veridical perception of point-light biological motion (Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000 Perception & Psychophysics 62 889–899; Sumi, 1984 Perception 13 283–286). Here, by using a spontaneous-recognition paradigm, we ask whether prior information about display orientation improves biological motion perception. Participants were shown a set of 180° inverted point-light stimuli depicting a human walker and quadrupeds (dogs). In experiment 1, one group of observers was not aware of the orientation of stimuli, whereas the other group was told beforehand that stimuli will be presented upside down. In experiment 2, independent groups of participants informed about stimulus orientation saw the same set of stimuli, in each of which either a moving or a static background line was inserted. The findings indicate that information about display inversion is insufficient for reliable recognition of inverted point-light biological motion. Instead, prior information facilitates display recognition only when it is complemented by additional contextual elements. It appears that visual impressions from inverted point-light stimuli remain impenetrable with respect to one's knowledge about display orientation. The origins of orientation specificity in biological motion perception are discussed in relation to the recent neuroimaging data obtained with point-light stimuli and fragmented Mooney faces.

Observers typically detect changes to central objects more readily than changes to marginal objects, but they sometimes miss changes to central, attended objects as well. However, even if observers do not report such changes, they may be able to recognize the changed object. In three experiments we explored change detection and recognition memory for several types of changes to central objects in motion pictures. Observers who failed to detect a change still performed at above chance levels on a recognition task in almost all conditions. In addition, observers who detected the change were no more accurate in their recognition than those who did not detect the change. Despite large differences in the detectability of changes across conditions, those observers who missed the change did not vary in their ability to recognize the changing object.

In the line-motion illusion, a briefly flashed line appears to propagate from the locus of attention, despite being physically presented on the screen all at once. It has been proposed that the illusion reflects low-level visual information processing that occurs faster at the locus of attention (Hikosaka et al 1993 Vision Research 33 1219–1240; Perception 22 517–526). Such an explanation implicitly embeds the assumption that speeding or slowing of neural signals will map directly onto perceptual timing. This ‘online’ hypothesis presupposes that signals which arrive first are perceived first. However, other evidence suggests that events in a window of time after the disappearance of a visual stimulus can influence the brain's interpretation of that stimulus (Eagleman and Sejnowski 2000 Science 287 2036–2038; 289 1107a; 290 1051a; 2002 Trends in Neuroscience 25 293). If the online hypothesis were true, we should expect that events occurring after the flashing of the line would not change the illusion. Consistent with our hypothesis that awareness is an a posteriori reconstruction, we demonstrate that the perceived direction of illusory line-motion can be reversed by manipulating stimuli after the line has disappeared.

In the real-world, the retinal projection of an object changes as we move, or as a moving object passes in front of us. We have to recognise objects, despite such retinal-projection changes. Many studies have shown that the time required to identify objects after a change in the retinal projection is longer than when there is no retinal-projection change. This recognition cost is referred to as the view-dependent effect. Previous researchers have studied the view-dependent effect while disregarding the predictability of retinal-projection changes. Here, we demonstrate that there is no view-dependent effect when the predictability is introduced, in the case where participants track moving objects by head-turning or eye-movement in a virtual environment. Violation of the predictability, such as an unpredictable retinal-projection change or a movement of the first stimulus that was inconsistent with a subsequent retinal-projection change, caused a view-dependent effect. Moreover, we found that extraretinal information such as head-turning or eye-movement was unnecessary for view-independent recognition. These results indicate that humans can extrapolate to the tested view from the studied view in a view-independent way when retinal-projection change is predictable from the visual stimulus.

Most computational and neural-style models of contour completion (ie illusory and occluded contours) are based on interpolation: the filling in of an edge between two visible edges. The results of three experiments suggest an alternative conception, that units are formed as a result of extrapolation from visible edges. In three experiments, subjects reported illusory contours between standard illusory-contour inducing elements and forms that do not, by themselves, induce illusory contours. We suggest that these forms are not a special case of inducing elements but that they represent a different class—receiving elements. Receiving elements are forms that can receive an illusory contour but cannot generate one, and they can alter contour formation. In experiment 1, receiving elements increased the judged clarity of illusory contours. In experiment 2, illusory edges were seen to connect to corners, line ends, and even the edges of circles. Boundary formation in motion displays also appears to be based on extrapolation. In experiment 3, subjects reported that small moving dots altered the formation of spatiotemporally defined boundaries. Implications for higher-order operator and network models of boundary formation are discussed.

Some well-known geometrical illusions disappear when the eyes are fixating and saccades are suppressed for a period of time. This disappearance is not accompanied by fading due to stabilisation of the retinal image. Any saccade made on purpose restores the illusion immediately. The fixation time after which some illusions disappeared was measured for four illusions and four subjects each. Effects of practice have been observed after measurements were repeated on successive days. Present theories of vision cannot readily explain the effect.

Da Vinci stereopsis is defined as apparent depth seen in a monocular object laterally adjacent to a binocular surface in a position consistent with its occlusion by the other eye. It is widely regarded as a new form of quantitative stereopsis because the depth seen is quantitatively related to the lateral separation of the monocular element and the binocular surface (Nakayama and Shimojo 1990 Vision Research 30 1811–1825). This can be predicted on the basis that the more separated the monocular element is from the surface the greater its minimum depth behind the surface would have to be to account for its monocular occlusion. Supporting evidence, however, has used narrow bars as the monocular elements, raising the possibility that quantitative depth as a function of separation could be attributable to Panum's limiting case (double fusion) rather than to a new form of stereopsis. We compared the depth performance of monocular objects fusible with the edge of the surface in the contralateral eye (lines) and non-fusible objects (disks) and found that, although the fusible objects showed highly quantitative depth, the disks did not, appearing behind the surface to the same degree at all separations from it. These findings indicate that, although there is a crude sense of depth for discrete monocular objects placed in a valid position for uniocular occlusion, depth is not quantitative. They also indicate that Panum's limiting case is not, as has sometimes been claimed, itself a case of da Vinci stereopsis since fusibility is a critical factor for seeing quantitative depth in discrete monocular objects relative to a binocular surface.