Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Individual-based and group-based forms of relative deprivation (IRD and GRD, respectively) are linked with individual- and group-based responses to inequality, respectively. System justification theory, however, argues that we are motivated to believe that people’s outcomes are equitably determined. As such, endorsement of system-justifying beliefs should dampen people’s reactions to outcomes perceived to be unequal and ultimately undermine support for political mobilization. We examined these hypotheses in a national probability sample of New Zealanders (N = 6,886). As expected, IRD predicted individual-based responses to inequality (i.e., satisfaction with one’s standard of living and psychological distress) better than GRD. Conversely, GRD predicted group-based responses to inequality (i.e., perceived discrimination against one’s group and support for political mobilization) better than IRD. Each of these relationships was, however, notably weaker among participants who were high, relative to low, on system justification. These results demonstrate that system-justifying beliefs have a palliative effect on people’s experiences with inequality.

People often prefer inferior options in the present even when options in the future are more lucrative. Five studies investigated whether decision making could be improved by manipulating construal level and psychological distance. In Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, temporal discounting was reduced when future rewards (trips to Paris) were construed at a relatively concrete level, thus inducing a similar level of construal to present rewards. By contrast, Studies 3 and 4 reduced temporal discounting by making present financial rewards more psychologically distant via a social proximity manipulation, and thus linked to a similar high level of construal as future rewards. These results suggest that people prefer the more lucrative option when comparing two intertemporal choices that are construed on a similar level instead of on a different level. Thus, changes in construal level and mental representations can be used to promote more desirable choices in economic decision making.

Juvenile delinquency has long been associated with birth order in popular culture. While images of the middle child acting out for attention or the rebellious youngest child readily spring to mind, little research has attempted to explain why. Drawing from Adlerian birth order theory and Sulloway’s born-to-rebel hypothesis, I examine the relationship between birth order and a variety of delinquent outcomes during adolescence. Following some recent research on birth order and intelligence, I use new methods that allow for the examination of between-individual and within-family differences to better address the potential spurious relationship. My findings suggest that contrary to popular belief, the relationship between birth order and delinquency is spurious. Specifically, I find that birth order effects on delinquency are spurious and largely products of the analytic methods used in previous tests of the relationship. The implications of this finding are discussed.

Recent work demonstrated that whereas high-status and low-status group members seek to address cross-group commonalities during intergroup contact, members of low-status groups show a greater desire to discuss status differences between the groups. Drawing on social identity theory, the current research investigated the combined influence of status legitimacy and status stability on these contact preferences. In Study 1, perceived stability and perceived legitimacy were measured among members of a high-status ethnic group in Israel. In Study 2, group status, status stability, and status legitimacy were experimentally manipulated in a U.S. sample. Although they generally preferred to discuss commonalities over status differences, across studies high-status group members’ willingness to discuss status differences increased when they perceived the hierarchy as illegitimate but stable. By contrast, low-status group members were particularly inclined to address status differences and least interested in discussing commonalties, when the hierarchy was illegitimate and unstable.

The communication of group-based anger in intergroup conflict is often associated with destructive conflict behavior. However, we show that communicating group-based anger toward the out-group can evoke empathy and thus reduce intergroup conflict. This is because it stresses the value of maintaining a positive long-term intergroup relationship, thereby increasing understanding for the situation (in contrast to the communication of the closely related emotion of contempt). Three experiments demonstrate that the communication of group-based anger indeed reduces destructive conflict intentions compared with (a) a control condition (Experiments 1-2), (b) the communication of group-based contempt (Experiment 2), and (c) the communication of a combination of group-based anger and contempt (Experiments 2-3). Moreover, results from all three experiments reveal that empathy mediated the positive effect of communicating “pure” group-based anger. We discuss the implications of these findings for the theory and practice of communicating emotions in intergroup conflicts.

Moral courage is characterized as a bystander intervention against the norm violations of a perpetrator despite the potential for negative consequences for oneself. We tested a comprehensive set of potential personality determinants of moral courage derived from a model of helping. In Study 1, we used a vignette to assess the self-reported willingness to intervene against a theft. In Study 2, the theft was put into effect, and behavioral reactions were observed. The results of Study 1 showed that moral disengagement, self-efficacy, and social anxiety, which are traits that are known to predict helping, were also related to moral courage intentions. Differently, in Study 2, real moral courage was predicted only by beneficiary sensitivity, a disposition that captures perceptual readiness and affective reactivity to perceived injustice. Our results provide insights into the processes involved in moral courage in a realistic situation and stress the importance of behavioral observations.

The threat of terrorist attacks motivates emotional reactions that elicit functional behavioral responses to characteristics of a threatening group. We argue that the more the group is seen as unjust, the more anger arises, whereas the more it is seen as powerful, the more fear arises. In Experiment 1, British participants read about terrorist groups with varied levels of injustice and power. As expected, the manipulation of injustice increased anger, and power increased fear. Anger and fear predicted offensive and defensive reactions. Experiment 2 used a representative sample of U.S. residents and again found distinct effects of an injustice manipulation on anger, and a power manipulation on fear. Anger was a primary motivator of support for offensive and defensive measures in both experiments. Willingness to negotiate was reduced with more injustice and anger, but increased with more outgroup power and fear. These findings have implications on public reactions to terrorist organizations.

The present research examined when happy individuals’ processing of a counterattitudinal message is guided by mood-congruent expectancies versus hedonic considerations. Recipients in positive, neutral, or negative mood read a strong or weak counterattitudinal message which either contained a threat to attitudinal freedom or did not contain such a threat. As expected, a freedom-threatening counterattitudinal message was more mood threatening than a counterattitudinal message not threatening freedom. Furthermore, as predicted by the mood-congruent expectancies approach, people in positive mood processed a nonthreatening counterattitudinal message more thoroughly than people in negative mood. Message processing in neutral mood lay in between. In contrast, as predicted by the hedonic-contingency view, a threatening counterattitudinal message was processed less thoroughly in positive mood than in neutral mood. In negative mood, processing of a threatening counterattitudinal message was as low as in positive mood. These findings suggest that message processing is determined by mood congruency unless hedonic considerations override expectancy-based processing inclinations.

Reconciling competing viewpoints suggesting that power helps and hurts perspective-taking in close relationships, in two experiments and two daily experience studies we tested the hypothesis that power’s effect on perspective-taking depends on the extent to which people are relatively self-versus other-focused. In Study 1, recalling a time of high (vs. low) power over a romantic partner reduced inclinations to take the partner’s perspective for relatively self-focused but not other-focused individuals. Studies 2 and 3 replicated Study 1 using daily variations in power and perspective-taking. In Study 4, being the “in-charge” partner during a conflict conversation reduced empathic accuracy for more self-focused individuals. Self–other focus was assessed with measures of gratitude, relational self-construal, and social value orientation. The current findings provide evidence that, particularly for the more self-focused, relationship power influences people’s inclinations to take their romantic partner’s perspective in daily life as well as their empathic accuracy during conflict.

We proposed that (a) processing interest for affective over cognitive information is captured by meta-bases (i.e., the extent to which people subjectively perceive themselves to rely on affect or cognition in their attitudes) and (b) processing efficiency for affective over cognitive information is captured by structural bases (i.e., the extent to which attitudes are more evaluatively congruent with affect or cognition). Because processing speed can disentangle interest from efficiency by being manifest as longer or shorter reading times, we hypothesized and found that more affective meta-bases predicted longer affective than cognitive reading time when processing efficiency was held constant (Study 1). In contrast, more affective structural bases predicted shorter affective than cognitive reading time when participants were constrained in their ability to allocate resources deliberatively (Study 2). When deliberation was neither encouraged nor constrained, effects for meta-bases and structural bases emerged (Study 3). Implications for affective–cognitive processing and other attitudes-relevant constructs are discussed.